

W. Faithorne Sculp:



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TWO

CHOICE and USEFUL

TREATISES:

THE ONE

LUX ORIENTALIS;

OR

An Enquiry into the Opinion of the

EASTERN SAGES

Concerning the

PRÆEXISTENCE of SOULS.

Being a Key to unlock the Grand Mysteries of PROVIDENCE.

In Relation to Mans Sin and Misery.

THE OTHER, A

DISCOURSE of TRUTH,

By the late Reverend Dr. *RUST* Lord Bishop of *Dromore* in *Ireland*.

WITH

ANNOTATIONS on them both.

Πᾶσα ἰδέα ἐξ ἀνάγκης πρόσεισι τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸ σώματος; Plato.

LONDON,

Printed for *James Collins*, and *Sam. Lowndes* over against *Exeter* Exchange in the *Strand*, 1682.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

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TO THE
HONOURABLE
Sir JOHN FINCH.

SIR,

YOU may well be ſurpri-
zed at this unexpected
Dedication from one that
may ſeem an utter Stranger to
your Perſon; but the fame of
your ſingular knowledge in the
choiceſt parts of Philoſophy, and all
other worthy accompliſhments, will
make this preſumption of me, the
Publiſher of theſe two Treatiſes,
as pardonable by your ſelf, ſo, I
hope, juſtifiable to all the World.
Not to ſay that it is a peice of in-
diſ-

dispensable justice that one of them be Dedicated to you; the Author thereof being that Excellent Person the Reverend Dr. Rust, *late Bishop of* Dromore *in* Ireland, *once fellow of* Christs *Colledge in* Cambridge, *to which you lately have been so Noble a Benefactor. Wherefore in hopes that you will be pleased to take the Dedication of this whole Book, the two* Treatises, *and the* Annotations *thereon in good part, craving pardon for this boldness I humbly take leave, and am,*

Honoured Sir,

Your most obedient and humble Servant.

JAMES COLLINS.

The Publisher to the Reader.

These two Choice and Useful *Treatises* I present thee with, the name of the Author of the latter of them is set down in the Title Page, the Reverend Dr. *Rust* late Lord Bishop of *Dromore* in the Kingdom of *Ireland*; whose Vertues Parts and Abilities are copiously set out in a Letter of Mr. *Jos. Glanvill* prefixt to the *Discourse* it self. And if thou hast the curiosity to know who is the Author of the former Treatise *LUX ORIENTALIS* (who then thought fit to conceal his name as himself takes notice in his Epistle Dedicatory) I can assure thee, that it is the said Mr. *Jos. Glanvill*, a person reputed one of the most ingenious and florid Writers of his Age. But for my own part I must ingenuously confess, that I am no competent Judge, and consequently can be no fit *Encomiast* of the Abilities or Performances of Either. Only this I know, that both these *Treatises* have sold very well, and that there is none to be got of the *Discourse of Truth*; though it is not many years since it was Printed. And for *LUX ORIENTALIS*, which was Printed about twenty years ago, when the Book grew scarce, it was so much valued by the more eager and curious searchers into the profoundest points of Philosophy, that there was given for it by some, four or five times the price for which it was at first Sold.

The considerations whereof coming into my mind, I thought I should both gratifie the learned World and benefit my self, if I reprinted these *two Treatises* together. Which I do the more willingly, be-

because the former Editions were too too false and corrupt, especially of *LUX ORIENTALIS*. Which faults of the Press, or MSS. are carefully corrected in this.

And besides that this Edition is more correct than the former, there are also *Annotations* added to each *Treatise* by one not unexercized in these kind of Speculations. And in the *Annotations* upon the *Discourse of Truth*, there is inserted a *DIGRESSION* that contains a brief Answer to Mr. *Baxters Placid Collation with the learned Dr.* Henry More.

And because men usually have a fondness even for the smaller Toyes or Trifles of well esteemed Writers after their decease, I have prefixed a *Latin Dedication* of *LUX ORIENTALIS* (which I opportunely had by me) before the Epistle Dedicatory: Which *Latin Dedication* the Author sent so prefixed, in a Copy to the Party it is made, and I have Printed it in the same order it was there found, that it may be one Monument amongst many other of the Authors *Wit* and *Ingenuity*. I have also, that nothing may be wanting to thy Content, got a friend to devise an *Hieroglyphical Frontispice*, intended more especially for *LUX ORIENTALIS*. But I do not profess my self able to unriddle the meaning thereof. The best Interpreter will be the Book it self. To the reading whereof I leave thee and rest

Your humble Servant

JAMES COLLINS.

LUX ORIENTALIS,

OR

An Enquiry into the Opinion of the

Eastern Sages

Concerning the

PRÆEXISTENCE

OF

SOULS.

Being a Key to unlock the Grand Mysteries of

PROVIDENCE,

In relation to mans Sin and Misery.

Cardanus. *Quid jucundius quàm scire quid simus, quid fuerimus, quid erimus, atque cum his etiam Divina illa atque suprema post obitum mundique Vicissitudines?*

London, Printed for *J. Collins*, and *S. Lowndes* over against *Exeter Exchange* in the *Strand*, 1682.

LUX ORIENTALIS,

OR

An Enquiry into the Opinion of the

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PRAEXISTENCE

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In relation to mans Life and Misery.

London, Printed for J. Collins, and S. Lownds, over against Lloyd's Coffee-house in the Strand, 1684.

Doctiſſimo viro Domino Doctori

HENRICO MORO

Maximo Purioris Philoſophiæ

Magiſtro & Sapientiæ

ORIENTALIS RESTAURATORI

In exiguum Summi

Affectûs Teſtimonium

ET

Æternæ Obſervantiæ Pignus

a ſuis Flammis mutuatam hanc

Orientis Scintillam

D. D. D.

Humillimus Virtutum ejus

Et candoris non minùs

Quam Doctrinæ Cultor;

Qui ei exoptat Lucem Sempiternam, & petit ut

candidè accipiat

LUCEM ORIENTALEM.

TO THE

Much Honoured and Ingenious

FRANCIS WILLOUGHBY

ESQUIRE.

SIR,

'TIS likely you will no leſs wonder at this unexpected ſally of my pen; than at my having prefixt your name to a ſmall Triſle, that owns no Author. Of the former, you will receive an account in the Preface. *And the latter, if the conſiderations following are not of weight, to attone for; I know you have goodneſs enough to pardon, what I have not reaſon ſufficient to excuſe, or vindicate. Well meaning intentions are* Apology *enough, where candour, and ingenuity are the Judges. I was not induced then to this Addreſs, be-*

because, I thought, I could oblige you; Worth describes it self in the fairest Character. But reflecting upon that delight and satisfaction, that I have received in discoursing with you on such matters; and knowing that your Noble Genius is gratified by such kind of speculations; I thought, I could not make more suitable payment for my content, or better acknowledge the favour I receive in your acquaintance, then by presenting you a Discourse about Præexistence; *and giving you a peculiar interest in* it, *as you have in its* Author. *Not that I would suggest, that you are a favourer of any strange opinions, or hold any thing in this particular, or any other, that is fit to be discountenanc'd. But I know you love to be dealing in high and generous* Theories, *even where your self are a dissenter, Nor is it the least evidence of the greatness and Heroick Nobleness of your Spirit; that amidst the flowing aboundance*

dance of the World's Blessings, with which you are encircled, you can yet Dedicate your self to your beloved Contemplations, *and look upon the Furniture and accomplishments of the mind, as better riches, than the largest doals of fortune, and the Wealth and Revenues of an ample inheritance. And methinks, while most others at the best, do but* use *the* Donatives *of* Providence, *you* enjoy *them. And, by a Nobler kind of* Chymistry, *extract from them a pleasure, that is not to be met with in all the trivial sports of* empty Gallantry. *To be reveiwing the Recesses of Nature, and the Beauteous inside of the Universe, is a more* Manly, *yea* Angelick *felicity, than the highest* gratifications *of the* senses; *an happiness, that is common to the Youthful* Epicure, *with his Hounds and Horses; yea, your ends are more* August *and generous, then to terminate in the private pleasure you take, even in those*

Philoso-

Philoſophical Reſearches; *For you are Meditating a more general good in thoſe careful and profound inquiries you are making into* Animals, *and other concerning affairs of nature, which I hope, one day the World will be advantag'd by. But I muſt not ingage in an* Encomium, *in which I cannot be* juſt, *but I muſt be troubleſome. For your modeſty is no more able to bear it, then my Pen can reach. Wherefore I ſhall diſmiſs your eyes from this tireſome Attendance; and only beg, that you would aſſure your ſelf that no Man is more your Servant, then*

The Authour of

Lux Orientalis.

THE PREFACE.

IT is none of the leaſt commendable indulgences of our Church, that ſhe allows us a latitude of judging in points of *Speculation*; and ties not up mens Conſciences to an implicite aſſenting to opinions, not *neceſſary* or *Fundamental*; which favourable and kind *permiſſion*, is queſtionleſs a great obligation upon the ingenuous, ſubmiſſively to receive and obſerve her pious appointments for *peace* and *order*. Nor is there leſs *Reaſon* in this *parental indulgence*, than there is of Chriſtian *charity* and *prudence*; ſince to tie all others up to our opinions, and to impoſe difficult and diſputable matters under the Notion of *Confeſſions* of *Faith*, and *fundamentals* of *Religion*, is a moſt unchriſtian piece of

Tyranny, the foundation of *perſecution*, and very root of *Antichriſtianiſme*. So that I have often wondred, that thoſe that heretofore would have forced all men to a compliance with their darling *notions*, and would have made a prey of them, that could not bow down before the *Idol* of their new-framed *Orthodoxy*; ſhould yet have the face to object *perſecution* and unchriſtian *Tyranny* to our Church Appointments; when themſelves lie under a deep and Crimſon guilt of thoſe very ſame miſcarriages, which they endeavour to affix upon thoſe more innocent *Conſtitutions*. For is it not a far more blameable and obnoxious impoſition to frame *Syſtems* of diſputable *Opinions*, and to require their admittance into our *Creeds*, in the place of the moſt *ſacred*, *neceſſary*, and *fundamental* verities; Than it is to appoint ſome harmleſs orders of *circumſtance* and *ceremony*,

ceremony, which in themſelves are *indifferent* and *innocent*? And let any equal Man be Judge, which is the greater *ſuperſtition*, either to *Idolize* and place *Religion* in things of *diſpute* and meer *opinions*; or conſcientiouſly to obſerve the *Sanctions* of that *Authority* we are bound to obey. But how all thoſe ill applyed reproaches of the *Church* of *England*, recoyl upon thoſe that diſcharge them, I have fully proved in a Diſcourſe on this Subject, which in its due time may ſee the *Light*. But for the preſent I go on with what I was about; Therefore I ſay, 'tis a moſt commendable excellency in our *Eccleſiaſtical Conſtitutions*; which with all due regard ought to be acknowledged; That they lay ſtreſs on few matters of *opinion*, but ſuch as are of important concernment, or very *meridian* truths. Which I mention not to this purpoſe, as if

men might therefore indulge themſelves in what conceits and dangerous opinions ſoever their phancies might give birth to, (This were an unpardonable abuſe of that noble and ingenuous Liberty that is afforded us;) But that they might ſee the beauty of thoſe well temper'd Conſtitutions; and that the mouth of obloquy might be ſtopped that ſlanders our Church, as if it yielded no ſcope at all for *free inquiry*; when I dare ſay there is not a Church in Chriſtendome, that in this regard is leſs taxable.

As for the opinion of *Præexiſtence*, the ſubject of the following Papers, it was never determined againſt by ours, nor any other Church, that *I* know of; And therefore *I* conceive is left as a matter of *School Speculation*, which without danger may be *problematically* argued on either hand. And I have ſo

great

great confidence in all true Sons of our common Mother, to think, that they will not fix any harſh and ſevere cenſures, upon the innocent *Speculations* of thoſe, though poſſibly they may be Errours, who own the *Authority*, *Articles*, *Canons*, and *Conſtitutions* of that Church which they are ſo deſervedly zealous for.

Therefore let me here premoniſh once for all, that I intend no Innovation in Religion, or diſturbance of our eſtabliſhed and received *Doctrines*, by any thing I have undertaken in this little *Treatiſe*; But only an innocent repreſentation of an Antient and Probable opinion, which I conceive, may contribute ſomewhat towards the clearing and vindicating the *Divine Attributes*, and ſo repreſenting the ever bleſſed *Deity*, as a more fit object of *Love* and *Adoration*, than the *Opinions* of the *World* make him. And what ever

may be thought of the thing it ſelf, or the manage of this affair, I'm ſure the end and deſign is concerning and important, and deſerves at leaſt a favourable conſtruction of the undertaking. For there is nothing more for the intereſt of *Religion*, than that God be repreſented to his Creatures as amiable and lovely, which cannot be better done, than by clearing up his Providences and dealings with the Sons of men, and diſcovering them to be full of Equity, Sweetneſs and Benignity; ſo that though I ſhould be miſtaken in the opinion which *I* endeavour to recommend, yet *I* expect the candour of the ingenuous, being betray'd into an errour, if it be one, by ſo pardonable an occaſion.

If it be excepted againſt this undertaking, that the Doctrine of *Preexiſtence* hath in a late Diſcourſe been purpoſely handled; beſides

what the learned Dr. *More* hath written of it; and therefore that this labour may ſeem a ſuperfluous, unneceſſary Repetition: *I* anſwer, that that very Treatiſe, *viz.* the Account of *Origen*, made ſome ſuch thing as this expedient. For though the proof and management of this affair be there unexceptionable, as far as the Author is by his deſign ingaged; yet, he being confined to the reaſons of *Origen*, and to the anſwering ſuch objections, as the *Fathers* urged againſt him; hath not ſo fully ſtated and cleared the buſineſs, but that there was room for after-undertakers. And 'tis a great diſintereſt to ſo ſtrange and unuſual a Doctrine as this, to be but partially handled: ſince ſo long, it will not be underſtood, and conſequently be but expoſed to contempt and ignominy. Nor can we hope that the world will be ſo favourable to a *Para-*

dox, or take ſo much pains for the underſtanding of that which they think a *groſs abſurdity*, as to collect thoſe Principles that are ſcatter'd up and down the writings of that great and excellent Reſtorer of the *Platonick Cabbala*, and accommodate them to the intereſt of this opinion. So that *I* thought that till the *Reaſons*, *Anſwers*, *Principles*, and *particular State* of the *Hypotheſis* were brought all together, to talk of *Præexiſtence* in Earneſt were but to make a mans ſelf ridiculous, and the Doctrine, the common *Ludibrium* of fools and ignorants.

And yet *I* muſt confeſs my ſelf to be ſo much a contemner of the half-witted cenſurers of things they know not, that this Reaſon alone could not have moved my pen the breadth of a letter; But ſome ingenious friends of mine, who were willing to do their Maker right, in a due ap-

apprehenſion of his Attributes and Providences, having read the *Letter of Reſolution*, and thence being induced to think favourably of *Præexiſtence*, were yet not fully ſatisfied in the proof, nor able to give ſtop to thoſe *objections*, which their imperfect knowledge of the *Hypotheſis* occaſioned; wherefore they deſired me to draw up a more full and particular Account of that Doctrine, which they had now a kindneſs for, and which wanted nothing more to recommend it to them, but a clear and full repreſentation. For their ſatisfaction then, *I* drew up the following Diſcourſe, intending at firſt, that it ſhould go no further than their hands, whoſe intereſt in mine affections had commanded it; but they being more than *I* could well pleaſure with written Copies, and perceiving others of my acquaintance alſo, to whom

I owe regard and ſervice, to be in the like condition with theſe; *I* was induced to let this *Little Triſle* tread a more *publick Stage*; and to ſpeak my mind to them from the *Preſs*.

If further reaſon be expected for mine undertaking a buſineſs in which others have been ingaged, *I* would deſire them to conſider what an infinite of Books are written upon almoſt all ſubjects can be named. And *I* am confident, if they turn o're *Libraries*, they'l find no *theam*, that is of any conſideration, leſs traced than this is. So that no body hath reaſon to call it a *Crambe*, who conſiders, that there are multitudes, even of Scholars that have never ſeen or heard of any thing of this nature; And there is not, that *I* know of, any one Book extant in any language beſides this, that purpoſely, ſolely, and fully treats of *Præexiſtence*. Wherefore who ever condemns

demns this as a ſuperfluous ingagement, if he will be juſt, muſt paſs the ſame cenſure upon well nigh every Diſcourſe the Preſs is deliver'd of; for hee'l meet with few written on leſs handled ſubjects. I might urge alſo if there were need on't, that various repreſentations of the ſame thing, fit the variety of phancies and guſts of peruſers; and that may have force and prevalence to perſwade in one, which ſignifies nothing in another. But 'tis enough; he that will judge me on this account, muſt paſs the ſame Award on every Sermon he hears, and every *Book* he looks on; And ſuch a cenſure will do me as little hurt, as him good, that paſſeth it.

Beſides this exception, 'tis not unlikely that ſome may object, that I uſe *Arguments* that have already been pleaded in behalf of this opinion; which rightly underſtood,

is no matter of disrepute; since every one else doth it that deals in a Subject formerly written of. And I would have him that commenceth such a charge against me, to consult divers Authours who have handled the same subject; and if he find not the same Arguments and Reasons infinitely repeated every where, let him call me *plagiary*, and spare not. 'Tis true therefore I have not baulk't the reasons of *Origen*, Dr. *More*, or the Authour of the *Letter of Resolution*, because they had been used already; but freely own the assistance of those worthy Authours; however I think I have so managed, fortified, and secured them against exceptions, especially the most considerable, that *I* may reasonably expect a pardon, yea and an interest in them also. For 'tis the backing of an argument that gives it force and efficacy; which *I* have done to the most

moſt weighty of them, at my proper coſt and charges. Nor ſhould I have been faithful to my cauſe, had *I* omitted any thing that *I* thought confirm'd it, upon any pretence whatever; ſince poſſibly this diſcourſe may fall into the hands of ſome, who never met with thoſe other Authors. And my deſign being a full proof, defence, and explication of *Præexiſtence*, it had been an unpardonable defect to have pretermitted thoſe weighty reaſons by which its learned aſſertors have inforced it.

If any yet ſhould criminate me (as *I* know ſome did the *account of Origen*,) for uſing many of the ſame *words*, and ſome of the ſame *phraſes* and *expreſſions*, that thoſe others, who have writ about thoſe matters, have made uſe of; *I* am not very careful to anſwer them in this matter; and *I* doubt this engagement

againſt

againſt thoſe little ſcruples, will but ſeem importune to the judicious. For no body blames the frequent uſage of words of Art; or thoſe which the firſt *Maſters* or *Reſtorers* of any Doctrine have been wont to expreſs their notions by; ſince that ſuch words and expreſſions are beſt underſtood, as have by cuſtome, or the Authority of ſome great Authors, been appropriated to ſuch Doctrines, as they have imployed them in the ſervice of. And ſhould every man that writes on any ſubject, be obliged to invent a-new, all the terms he hath need of, and induſtriouſly to ſhun thoſe *proper expreſſive words* and *phraſes* that are fitted to his hands, and the buſineſs he is about; all things will be fill'd with *impertinency*, *darkneſs* and *confuſion*.

It muſt be acknowledged then, that moſt of the peculiar *words* and *phraſes* that either I, or any body

else

elſe that will ſpeak properly and intelligibly in this matter, make uſe of, are borrowed from the judicious and elegent contriver of them, the profound Reſtorer and Refiner of almoſt-extinct *Platoniſm*: Whoſe invention hath been ſo happy in this kind, that it hath ſerved up thoſe notions in the moſt *appoſite, ſignificant, comprehenſive* and *expreſſive* words that could well be thought of. Wherefore 'twere an humourſome piece of folly for any man that deals in theſe matters, induſtriouſly to avoid ſuch *termes* and *expreſſions* as are ſo adapted and fitted to this purpoſe, and ſo well known among thoſe that are acquainted with this way of *Learning*; when without vanity he could not think to be better furniſh't from his own phancy.

If in the following papers I have uſed any *expreſſions* of others, which theſe

theſe conſiderations will not warrant; I muſt beg pardon for my *memory*, which doth not uſe to be ſo ſerviceable. And where I writ this Diſcourſe, I had not one of my books within my reach, that treated of *this*, or *indeed any other Subject*. Nor am I at leaſure now, to examine them and *this*, to ſee whether I can find any ſuch *coincidences*; which a mans phancy dealing frequently in ſuch matters, might inſenſibly occaſion. If any there be, let thoſe that find them out, pardon them, as the ſlips of a too *officious imagination*; or however elſe they treat them, they ſhall not much diſpleaſe the Author.

And now that this Diſcourſe may paſs with leſs controul among thoſe that ſhall light on it, I find my ſelf ingag'd to ſpeak a little to a double ſort of Readers, who are like to be offended at my deſign, and averſe

to

to the *Doctrine* aſſerted in theſe *Papers.* And (1) ſome will boggle at *Præexiſtence*, and be afraid to entertain it, upon an apprehenſion that the Admiſſion of this opinion will diſorder and change the Frame of *Orthodox* Divinity; which, were there cauſe for ſuch a jealouſie, were but a commendable caution; but there's hope this may prove but a panick fear, or ſuch a needleſs terrour as ſurpriſeth Children in the dark, when they take their beſt friends for ſome *Bug-Beat* that would carry them away, or hurt them. For 'tis but ſuppoſing (as I have ſomewhere intimated in the diſcourſe it ſelf) that God created all ſouls together as he did the Angels; That ſome of them ſinned and fell with the other *Apoſtate Spirits*; and for their diſobedience were thruſt into a ſtate of ſilence and inſenſibility; That the *Divine goodneſs* ſo provided for

them, that they ſhould act a part again in *terreſtrial Bodies*, when they ſhould fitly be prepared for them; And that *Adam* was ſet up as our great *Protoplaſt* and *Repreſentative*, who, had he continued in *Innocence* and *Integrity*, we had then been ſharers in that happineſs which he at firſt was inſtated in; but by his unhappy defection and diſobedience we loſt it; and became thus miſerable in our *New life* in theſe earthly bodies. I ſay the Doctrine of *Præexiſtence* thus ſtated, is, in nothing that I know of, an enemy to *common Theology*: all things hence proceeding as in our ordinary Syſtems; with this only difference, that this *Hypotheſis* clears the *divine* Attributes from any ſhadow of harſhneſs, or breach of equity, ſince it ſuppoſeth us to have ſinned and deſerved all the miſery we ſuffer in this condition before we came hither: whereas

whereas the other which teacheth, that we became both guilty and miſerable by the ſingle and ſole offence of *Adam*, whenas we were not then in being, or as to our ſouls, as much as *potentially* in our great *Progenitour*; bears ſomewhat hardly upon the repute of the *Divine perfections*. So that if the wary Reader be afraid to venture upon the *Hypotheſis*, that I have drawn up at the end, (which, I confeſs, I would not give him the leaſt incouragement to meddle with) yet without danger he may admit of *Præexiſtence* as accommodated to the *Orthodox* Doctrine.

Nor ſhould I indeed have medled with the other *ſcheme*, which is built upon the *Principles* of meer *Reaſon* and *Philoſophy*; but that thoſe friends who drew the reſt of the Diſcourſe from me, ingag'd me to give them an Account of the *Philoſophical Hypotheſis*. In which, I know, I have

not in every particular, followed the mind of the Masters of the *Origenian Cabbala*; but kept my self to the conduct of those *Principles*, that I judged most rational; though indeed the things wherein I differ, are very few and inconsiderable. However for that reason I thought fit to intitle no body to the *Hypothesis* that I have made a draught of, lest I should have affix't on any one, what he would not have owned. But for the main, those that understand it, know the Fountain; and for others, 'tis no great matter if they be ignorant.

Now if any one judge me to be a Proselyte to those *opinions*, because I call them not all to nought, or damn not those, that have a favour for them; I know not how to avoid the doom of their severe displeasure; having said as much in the place where I treat of those matters, to purge my self of such a suspicion, as I thought neces-

sary

fary to clear me, in the opinion of any competently ingenuous. As for others, let me ſay what I can, I ſhall be what their wiſdoms think fit to call me; And let that be what it will, I am very well content to bear it. I'le only add, to take off the ground of this uncharitable jealouſie, that among the favourers of *Præexiſtence*, I know none that are adherers to thoſe *opinions*; and therefore for me to have declaim'd againſt any, on this account, had been a piece of *Knight-Errantry*; And thoſe *Dons* that do ſo make *Gyants* of the *Wind-mills* of their own *Imaginations*.

But, (2) There are another ſort of Readers that I have a word to ſay to, who contemn and laugh at every thing that their narrow noddles comprehend not. This, I confeſs, is a good *eaſie* way of *confutation*, and if we may take every fool's ſmile for a

Demonſtration, *Præexiſtence* will be routed. But the beſt on't is, to call things by their right names, this is but a vulgar childiſh humour ariſing from nothing but a fond doating on the opinions we were firſt inſtructed in. For having made thoſe the ſtandard of truth and ſolidity, theſe prepoſſeſt diſcerners preſently conclude every thing that is a ſtranger to their ears and underſtandings, and of another ſtamp from their *Education-receptions*, falſe and ridiculous; juſt like the common people, who judging all cuſtoms and faſhions by their own, account thoſe of other Nations abſurd and barbarous. 'Tis well for thoſe ſmiling *Confuters*, that they were not *bred* in *Mahumetiſm*, for then without doubt they would have made ſport of *Chriſtianity*. But ſince they are ſo diſpoſed, let them laugh at the opinion I have undertaken for, till they underſtand

ſtand it; I know who in the judgment of wiſe men will prove *Ridiculous.* It was from this very *principle* that the moſt conſiderable truths, that ever the world was acquainted with, were to the *Jews*, a *ſtumbling block*, and to the *Greeks*, *fooliſhneſs*; and 'twas ſuch a *ſpirit* as reigns in theſe Children of *ſelf-confidence*, that call'd S. *Paul* a *babbler.* And methinks till theſe narrow-ſcull'd people could boaſt themſelves *infallible*, and all their opinions, an *unerring Canon*, common modeſty and civility ſhould teach them better manners, than at firſt daſh to judge that a ridiculous abſurdity, which the greateſt and wiſeſt Sages, that inlightned the antient World, accounted ſo ſound and probable a *Concluſion.* Eſpecially it being a matter not determin'd againſt, but rather countenanc't in *Scripture*, as will appear hereafter. But *Opinionative Ignorance* is very *weak*

and immoral. And till those slight and Vulgar discerners have learn't that first principle of true *wisdom, To judge nothing till they throughly understand it, and have weighed it in the Ballance of impartial Reason*; 'tis to no purpose to spend ones breath upon them.

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LUX ORIENTALIS.

CHAP. I.

The opinions proposed concerning the original of Souls.

IT hath always been found a matter of discouraging difficulty, among those that have busied themselves in such *Inquiries*, To determine the *Soul's original*. Insomuch that after all the contests and disputes that have been about it, many of the wisest Inquisitors have concluded it *undeterminable:* or, if they have sate down in either of the two opinions, *viz.* of it's *immediate Creation*, or *Traduction* (which of later ages have been the only competitors); they have been driven to it, rather from the absurdities of the *opposite opinion*, which they have left; than drawn by any rational *alliciency* in that which they have taken to. And indeed, if we do but impartially consider the grand inconveni-

ences which each party urgeth againſt the others Concluſion, it would even tempt one to think, that both are right in their *oppoſition*, and neither in their *aſſertion*. And ſince each ſide ſo ſtrongly oppugns the other and ſo weakly defends it ſelf, 'tis a ſhrewd ſuſpicion that they are both miſtaken. Wherefore if there be a *third* that can lay any probable claim to the truth, it deſerves to be heard to plead its cauſe; and, if it be not chargeable with the contradictions or abſurdities either of the one or other, to be admitted.

Now though theſe later ages have concluded the matter to lie between *immediate Creation*, and *ſeminal Tradution*; yet I find that the more *antient* times have pitcht upon *Præexiſtence*, as more likely than either; For the *Platoniſts*, *Pythagoreans*, the *Chaldæan* wiſe men, the Jewiſh *Rabbins*, and ſome of the moſt learned and antient Fathers were of this opinion. Wherefore I think we owe ſo much at leaſt to the *Memory* of thoſe grave *Sages*, as to examine this *Doctrine* of theirs, and if neither of the later *Hypotheſes* can eaſe our anxious minds, or free themſelves from abſurdities; and this Grey *Dogma* fairly clear all doubts, and be obnoxious to no ſuch contradictions; I ſee no reaſon but we may give it a favourable admittance, till ſomething elſe appear

more

more concinnous and rational. Therefore let us take some account of what the two first *opinions* alledge one against another, and how they are proved by their promoters and defendants. Now if they be found unable to withstand the shock of one anothers opposition; we may reasonably cast our eyes upon the third, to see what force it brings to vouch its interest, and how it will behave it self in the encounter.

Chap. II.

Daily creation *of* Souls *is inconsistent* with the Divine Attributes.

THe first of these *opinions* that offers it self to Tryal is, *that God daily creates humane souls, which immediately are united unto the bodies that Generation hath prepared for them.* Of this side are our later *Divines*, and the generality of the *Schoolmen*. But not to be born down by *Authorities*, Let us consider what reason stands against it. Therefore,

(1) If our Souls came immediately out of the hands of God when we came first into these bodies, Whence then are those enormously brutish inclinations, that strong natural proclivity to vice and impiety, that are extant in the children of men? All the works

of God bear his image, and are perfect in their kind. Purity is his nature, and what comes from him, proportionably to its capacity partakes of his perfections. Every thing in the *natural world* bears the ſuperſcription of his *wiſdom* and *goodneſs*; and the ſame fountain cannot ſend forth *ſweet* waters and *bitter*. Therefore 'tis a part of our allegiance to our Maker to believe, * that he made us *pure* and *innocent*, and if we were but juſt then framed by him when we were united with theſe *terreſtrial bodies*, whence ſhould we contract ſuch degenerate propenſions? Some tell us, that this impurity was immediately derived from the *bodies* we are united to; But, how is it poſſible, that purely *paſſive inſenſible* Matter ſhould transfuſe *habits* or *inclinations* into a Nature that is quite of another Make and Quality? How can ſuch a cauſe produce an effect ſo diſproportionate? * Matter can do nothing but by motion, and what relation hath *that* to a moral contagion? How can a *Body* that is neither capable of *ſenſe* nor *ſin*, infect a *ſoul*, as ſoon as 'tis united to it, with ſuch vitious debauched diſpoſitions?

But others think to evade by ſaying, That we have not theſe *depravities* in our natures, but contract them by *Cuſtome*, *education*, and evil *uſages*. How then comes it about, that thoſe that have had the ſame care and induſtry uſed upon them,

them, and have been nurtured under the ſame diſcipline and ſevere overſight, do ſo vaſtly and even to wonder differ in their *inclinations*? * How is it that thoſe that are under continual temptations to *vice*, are yet kept within the bounds of *vertue*, and ſobriety? And yet that others, that have ſtrong motives and allurements to the contrary, ſhould violently break out into all kinds of extravagance and impiety? Sure, there is ſomewhat more in the matter than thoſe general cauſes, which may be common to both; and which many times have quite contrary effects.

(2.) This *Hypotheſis*, that *God continually Creates humane ſouls in theſe bodies*, conſiſts not with the honour of the Divine Attributes. For,

(1.) How ſtands it with the *goodneſs* and *benignity* of that *God*, who is *Love*, to put pure and immaculate *ſpirits*, who were capable of living to him and with him, into ſuch *bodies* as will preſently defile them, deface his *image*, pervert all their *powers* and *faculties*, incline them to hate what he moſt loves, and love what his Soul hateth; and that, without any knowledge or concurrence of theirs, will quite marre them as ſoon as he hath made them, and of dear *Children*, render them *rebels* or *enemies*, and in a moment from being like *Angels* trans-

form them into the perfect resemblance of the first *Apostates*, *Devils*?

Is this an effect of those tender mercies that are over all his works? And

(2.) Hath that *Wisdom* that hath made all things to operate according to their natures, and provided them with whatever is necessary to that end, made myriads of noble *Spirits* capable of as noble operations, and presently plunged them into such a condition wherein they cannot act at all according to their first and proper *dispositions*, but shall be necessitated to the quite contrary; and have other noxious and depraved inclinations *fatally* imposed upon their pure natures? Doth that wisdom, that hath made all things in *number*, *weight*, and *measure*, and disposed them in such exact *harmony* and *proportions* use to act so *ineptly*? And that in the best and noblest pieces of his Creation? Doth it use to make and presently destroy? To frame one thing and give it such or such a nature, and then undo what he had done, and make it another? And if there be no such irregular methods used in the framing of *inferiour Creatures*, what reason have we to suspect that the *Divine Wisdom* did so vary from its self in its *noblest compositures*?

And (3.) Is it not a great affront to the *Divine Justice*, to suppose, as we are commonly taught, that assoon as we are *born*, yea,

and

and in the *Womb*, we are obnoxious to *eternal wrath* and torments, if our *Souls* are then *immediately created* out of *nothing*? For, To be *juſt* is to give every one his *due*; and how can *endleſs* unſupportable *puniſhments* be due to *innocent Spirits*, who but the *laſt moment* came *righteous*, *pure*, and *immaculate* out of their Creators hands; and have not *done* or *thought* any thing ſince, contrary to his *will* or *Laws*, nor were in any the leaſt capacity of *ſinning*?

I, but the firſt of our order, our *General head* and Repreſentative, ſinned, and we in him; thus we contract guilt as ſoon as we have a Being, and are lyable to the puniſhment of his diſobedience. This is thought to ſolve all, and to clear *God* from any ſhadow of *unrighteouſneſs*. But whatever truth there is in the thing it ſelf, I think it cannot ſtand upon the *Hypotheſis* of the *Souls immediate Creation*, nor yet juſtifie God in his proceedings. For, (1.) If I was then newly *Created* when firſt in this *body*; what was *Adam* to me, who ſinned above 5000 *years* before I came out of *nothing*? If he repreſented me, it muſt be as I was in his *Loins*, that is, in him as an *effect* in a *cauſe*. But ſo I was not, according to this Doctrine; for my ſoul owns no *Father* but *God*, its *immediate* progenitour. And what am I concern'd then in his ſins, which had never my

will or conſent, more than in the ſins of *Mahomet*, or *Julius Cæſar*? Nay, than in the ſins of *Beelzebub* or *Lucifer*? And for my body, 'tis moſt likely, that never an *Atom* of *his*, ever came at me; or, if any did, he was no cauſe on't. Beſides, *that* of it ſelf is neither capable of *ſenſe*, *ſin*, *guilt*, nor *puniſhment*: or, (2.) Admitting that we become thus *obnoxious* aſſoon as in the *body*, upon the account of his *default*, How doth it comport with the divine *Juſtice*, in one moment to make ſuch excellent Creatures, and in the next to render them ſo *miſerable*, by thruſting them into a condition, ſo *fatally obnoxious*; eſpecially ſince they were capable of living and acting in *bodies* more perfect, and more accommodate to their new *undefiled natures*? Certainly, could they have been put to their choice whether they would have come into *being* upon ſuch termes, they would rather have been *nothing* for ever. And *God* doth not uſe to make his Creatures ſo, as that, without their own *fault*, they ſhall have cauſe to unwiſh themſelves.

Hitherto in this ſecond *general Argument* I have dealt againſt thoſe that believe and aſſert the *original depravity* of our *natures*: which thoſe that deny, may think themſelves not pinch't by or concern'd in; Since they think they do no ſuch diſhonour to the *divine Attributes*, while they aſſert, that we were not made

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in ſo deplorable and depraved a condition, but have ſo made our ſelves by our *voluntary aberrations.* But neither is this a fit *Plaiſter* for the *ſore*, ſuppoſing our *ſouls* to be *immediately created* and ſo ſent into theſe *bodies.* For ſtill it ſeems to be a diminutive and diſparaging apprehenſion of the *infinite and immenſe Goodneſs* of God, that he ſhould detrude ſuch excellent creatures as our *ſouls* into a ſtate *ſo* hazardous, * wherein he ſeeth it to be ten thouſand to one, but that they will corrupt and defile themſelves, and ſo make themſelves miſerable here, and to *eternity* hereafter. And certainly, be we as *indifferent* naturally to *good* and *evil* as can be ſuppoſed; yet great are the diſadvantages to *virtue* that all men unavoidably meet with, in this ſtate of *imperfection.*

For conſidering, that our *infant* and *growing* age is an age of *ſenſe*, in which our *appetites*, and *paſſions* are very *ſtrong*, and our *reaſons weak*, and ſcarce any thing but a *chain* of *imaginations*, 'tis I ſay great odds, but that we ſhould be carried to inordinacy, and exceed the bounds the divine laws have ſet us. So that our *lower powers* of *ſenſe* and *paſſions* uſing to have the *head*, will grow ſtrong and impetuous, and thus 'tis an hundred to one but we ſhall be rooted in *vice*, before we come to the *maturity* of our *reaſons*, or are capable of the *exerciſe* of *virtue.* And woful experience teach-

teacheth us, that moſt men run ſo far before they conſider whither they are a-going, that the care and diligence of all their lives after, will ſcarce reclaim them. Beſides, the far greateſt part of the world are led into *wickedneſs* and all kinds of *debauchery*, by corrupt and vitious *education*. And 'tis not difficult to obſerve what an *enormous* ſtrength, bad *education* hath to deprave and pervert well *diſpos'd inclinations*. Which things conſider'd, this way alſo methinks reflects a Diſparagement on the *Divine Attributes*: Since by creating ſouls daily and putting them into ſuch *bodies*, and ſuch parts of the world as his *infinite Wiſdom* ſees will *debauch* them, and pervert them from the ways of *righteouſneſs* and *happineſs*, into thoſe of *vice* and *miſery*; he deals with them leſs mercifully than a *parent* among us would with his *Off-ſpring*. And to ſuppoſe *God* to have leſs goodneſs than his degenerate *creatures*, is to have very *narrow* apprehenſions of his *perfections*, and to rob him of the honour due to his *Attributes*.

(3) It hath been urged with good *probability* by great and wiſe *Sages*, that 'tis an *unbecoming apprehenſion* of the *Majeſty* on high, * to ſuppoſe him aſſiſtant to unlawful and unclean *coitions*, by creating a *ſoul* to animate the impure *fœtus*. And to think, It is in the power of *brutiſh* luſt to determine *Omnipotence* to create a *Soul*, whenſoever a couple

couple of *unclean Adulterers* ſhall think fit to join in their *beſtial pleaſures*; is methinks to have a very mean apprehenſion of the *divine Majeſty* and *Purity*. This is to make him the worſt of *Servants* by ſuppoſing him to *ſerve* his creature's vices, to wait upon the vileſt actions, and to engage the ſame infinite Power that made the world for the perfecting what was begun by *diſſolute Wantons*. This Argument was uſed of old by pious and learned *Origen*, and hath been imployed in the ſame ſervice ſince, by his *modern* defendents. But I foreſee an *evaſion* or two, that poſſibly with ſome may ſtand for an *anſwer*, the removal of which will clear the buſineſs.

It may be pretended that God's attending to *create* ſouls for the ſupply of ſuch *generations*, is but an act of his *juſtice*, for the *detection*, and conſequently *puniſhment*, of ſuch lawleſs offenders; which therefore will be no more matter of diſparagement than the waiting of an *Officer* of *juſtice* to diſcover and apprehend a *Maleſactour*.

But this Subterfuge cannot elude the force of the *Argument*, for it hath no place at all in moſt Adulteries; yea great *injuſtice* and *injury* is done many times by ſuch *illegitimate* births; the Child of a Stranger being by this means admitted

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to carry away the *inheritance* from the *lawful* off-ſpring. Beſides, *God* uſeth not ordinarily to put forth his *Almighty power* to diſcover *ſecret* miſcarriages, except ſometimes for very remarkable and momentous ends, but leaves *hidden iniquities* to be the objects of his own *caſtigations*. And if *diſcovery* of the fault be the main end of ſuch *creations*, * methinks that might be done at a cheaper rate, that ſhould not have brought ſo much inconvenience with it, or have expoſed his own *innocent* and *harmleſs* off-ſpring to undeſerv'd *Reproach* and *Infamy*.

But further it may be ſuggeſted, that it is no more *indecent* for God to *create ſouls* to furniſh thoſe *unlawful Generations*, than it is that a man ſhould be nouriſht by meat that he hath unlawfully come by, or that the *Cattle* which he hath ſtoln ſhould ingender with his own. But the difference of theſe inſtances from the caſe in hand is eaſily diſcernable; in that the *nouriſhment* and *productions* ſpoken of, proceed in a ſet orderly way of *natural cauſes*, which work *fatally* and *neceſſarily* without reſpect to *moral circumſtances*; and there is no reaſon, it ſhould be in the power of a ſinful creature to engage his *Maker* to pervert or ſtop the courſe of nature, when he pleaſeth. But in the caſe of creating ſouls, God is ſuppoſed to act by *explicite* and *immediate Will*, the ſuſpending of which,

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in ſuch a caſe as this, is far different in point of credit and *decorum*, from his altering the ſetled *Laws* he hath ſet in the Creation, and turning the world upſide down.

I might further add (4*ly*), That * it ſeems very *incongruous* and *unhandſome* to ſuppoſe, that God ſhould create two *ſouls* for the ſupply of one *monſtrous body*. And of ſuch *prodigious productions* there is mention in *Hiſtory*. That's a remarkable inſtance in *Sennertus*, of a *Monſter* born at *Emmaus* with two *hearts*, and two *heads*; the diverſity of whoſe *appetites*, *perceptions*, and *affections*, teſtified that it had two ſouls within that *bi-partite habitation*. Now, to conceive the moſt *wiſe Maker* and *Contriver* of all things, immediately to create two *ſouls*, for a *ſingle* body, rather than ſuffer that *ſuper-plus* of *matter* which conſtitutes the *monſtrous excreſcence* to prove *effœte & inanimate*, is methinks a *derogatory apprehenſion* of his *wiſdom*, and ſuppoſeth him to act more *ineptly* in the great and *immediate* inſtances of his power, than in the ordinary courſe of nature about leſs noble and accurate *productions*. Or, if it be pretended, that *Souls* were ſent into them while the *bodies* were yet *diſtinct*, but that afterwards they grew into one: This, I ſay, will not heal the breach that this *Hypotheſis* makes upon the *divine Wiſdom*; it tacitely reflecting a ſhameful overſight upon *Omni-*

ſcience,

science, that he should not be aware of the future *coalescence* of these bodies into one, when he made souls for them; or at least, 'tis to suppose him, *knowingly* to act *ineptly*. Besides, that the *rational soul* is not *created* till the body, as to the main strokes of it at least, is framed, is the general opinion of the Asserters of daily *creation*; So that then there is no room for this *evasion*.

And now one would think that an *opinion* so very *obnoxious*, and so lyable to such grand *inconveniences*, should not be admitted but upon most pressing *reasons* and *ineludible demonstrations*. And yet there is not an *argument* that I ever heard of from reason to inforce it, but only such as are brought from the impossibility of the way of *Traduction*; which indeed is chargeable with as great *absurdities*, as that we have been discoursing of. 'Tis true, several *Scriptures* are *prest* for the service of the cause; but I doubt much against their *intent* and *inclination*. *General testimonies* there are to prove that God is the *Father* and *Creator* of *Souls*, which is equally true, whether we suppose it made just as it is *united* to these *bodies*, or did *præexist*, and was before them; But that it is just then *created* out of nothing when first it comes into these *earthly bodies*, I know not a word in the *inspired Writings* that speaks it. For that saying of our *Saviour*, *My Father worketh hitherto, and*

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I work, is by the moſt *judicious* underſtood of the *works* of *preſervation* and *providence*: Thoſe of *creation* being concluded within the firſt *Hebdomade*, accordingly as is expreſt in the *Hiſtory*, * that God on the *ſeventh day* reſted from all his works. Nor can there an inſtance be given of any thing *created* ſince, or is there any pretended, but that which hath been the ſubject of our *inquiry*; which is no inconſiderable *preſumption*, that that was not ſo neither; ſince the divine way of *working* is not *parti-colour* or *humourſome*, but *uniform* and *conſonant* to the laws of exacteſt *wiſdom*. So that for us to ſuppoſe that God, after the compleating of his *Creation*, and the laws given to all things for their *action*, and *continuance*, to be every moment working in a quite other way in one *inſtance* of beings, than he doth in all beſides; is methinks a ſomewhat odd *apprehenſion*, eſpecially when no *Reaſon* urgeth to it, and Scripture is *ſilent*. For ſuch places as this [*the God of the Spirits of all fleſh, the Father of Spirits. The ſpirit returns to God that gave it. The ſouls which I have made. We are his off-ſpring. Who formeth the ſpirit of man within him*, and the like] ſignifie no more, but that our *ſouls* have a nearer relation to *God* than our *bodies*, as being his *immediate* workmanſhip, made without any *creature*-interpoſal, and more eſpecially regarded by him. But to in-

infer hence, that they were then produced when theſe bodies were *generated*, is *illogical* and *inconſequent*. So that all that theſe Scriptures will ſerve for, is only to diſprove the Doctrine of *Traduction*, but makes not a tittle for the ordinary *Hypotheſis of Daily Creation againſt Præexiſtence*.

CHAP. III.

(2) Traduction *of* ſouls *is impoſſible, the reaſons for it weak and frivolous, the propoſal of* Præexiſtence.

THus then we have examin'd the firſt way of ſtating the *Soul's original*, that of *continual Creation*; and finding no ſure *reſting* place for our *inquiry* here, we remove to the ſecond,

The way of *Traduction* or *ſeminal Propagation*. And the adherers to this *Hypotheſis* are of two ſorts, *viz.* either ſuch as make the Soul to be nothing but a *purer* ſort of *matter*, or of thoſe that confeſs it wholly *ſpiritual* and *immaterial*. I'le diſpatch the former, briefly ſtrike at the root

root of their misconceit of the *Souls production*, and shew it cannot be *matter*, be it as *pure* as can be conceived.

Therefore (1) If the *soul* be *matter*, then whatever *perceptions* or *apprehensions* it hath, or is capable of, they were let in at the *senses*. And thus the great Patron of the *Hypothesis* states it, in his *Leviathan*, and other writings. But now clear, it is that our Souls have some *conceptions*, which they never received from *external sense*: For there are some *congenite implicit Principles* in us, without which there could be no *sensation*. * since the *images* of objects are very *small* and *inconsiderable* in our *brains*, comparatively to the vastness of the things which they *represent*, and very unlike them in *multitudes* of other *circumstances*; so that 'twere impossible we should have the *sensible representation* of any thing, * were it not that our *souls* use a kind of *Geometry*, or *mathematick* Inference in judging of external objects by those little hints it finds in *material impressions*. Which *Art* and the *principles* thereof were never received from *sense*, but are presupposed to all *sensible perceptions*. * And, were the *soul* quite void of all such *implicit notions*, it would remain as *senseless* as a stone for ever.

Besides, we find our minds fraught with principles *logical*, *moral*, *metaphysical*, which

could never owe their original to *ſenſe* otherwiſe, than as it gives us occaſions of uſing them. * For *ſenſe* teacheth no *general propoſitions*, but only affords *ſingulars* for *Induction*; which being an *Inference*, muſt proceed from an higher *principle* that owns no ſuch dependence on the *ſenſes*, as being found in the mind, and not deriv'd from any thing without. Alſo we find in our ſelves *mathematical notions*, and build *certain demonſtrations* on them, which abſtract from *ſenſe* and *matter*. And therefore never had them from any *material* power, * but from ſomething more ſublime and excellent. But this Argument is of too large a conſideration to be treated of here, and therefore I content my ſelf with thoſe brief Touches, and paſs on.

(2) If the *ſoul* be *matter*, 'tis impoſſible it ſhould have the *ſenſe* of any thing: for either the whole *image* of the *object* muſt be received in one point of this *ſenſitive matter*; a thing abſurd at firſt view, that ſuch variety of diſtinct and orderly *repreſentations* ſhould be made at once upon a *ſingle atom*; or the *whole image* is impreſt upon every *point*, and then there would be as many *objects* as there are *points* in this *matter*; and ſo every thing would be infinitely *multiplied* in our *deliſive ſenſes*. Or finally, every part of the *ſoul* muſt receive a proportionable part

of

of the *image*; and then, how could those parts communicate their *perceptions* to each other, and what should *perceive* the *whole*? This Argument is excellently managed by the great Dr. *H. More*, in whose writings this fond *Hypotheſis* is fully *triumpht* over, and *defeated*. Since therefore the very loweſt degree of *perception*, *ſingle* and *ſimple ſenſe*, is incompatible to meer *body* or *matter*; we may ſafely conclude, that the higher and nobler operations of *imagining*, *remembring*, *reaſoning*, and *willing* muſt have a cauſe and ſource that is not *Corporeal*. Thus therefore thoſe that build the ſouls traduction upon this ground of its being only *body* and *modified matter*, are diſappoimted in the *foundation* of their *concluſion*.

But (2) Another ſort of aſſertors of *traduction* teach the *Soul* to be *ſpiritual* and *incorporeal*, and affirm that by a vertue deriv'd from the firſt *benediction*, it can propagate its like; one *ſoul* emitting another as the body doth the matter of *Generation*. The manner of which *ſpiritual production* uſeth to be illuſtrated by one Candle's lighting another; and a mans begetting a thought in anothers mind, without diminiſhing of his own. This is the moſt favourable repreſentation of this opinion, that I can think on. And yet, if we nearly conſider it, it will appear moſt *abſurd* and *unphiloſophical*. For if one *ſoul* produce another,

ther, 'tis either out of *nothing* or ſomething *præexiſtent*. If the former, 'tis an *abſolute creation*, which all *philoſophy* concludes impoſſible for a *Creature*. And if it be pretended that the Parent doth it not by his proper *natural* virtue, but by a ſtrength imparted by God in the firſt *bleſſing*, *Increaſe and multiply*, ſo that God is the prime *agent*, he only the *inſtrument*: I rejoin, that then either God hath thereby obliged himſelf to put forth a new and extraordinary *power* in every ſuch occaſion, diſtinct from his *influence* in the ordinary courſe of *nature*: Or elſe (2) he only concurrs by his *providence*, as he doth to our other natural actions, we having this Ability beſtowed upon our very natures. He that aſſerts the firſt, runs upon all the rocks that he would avoid in the former *Hypotheſis* of *continual Creation*, and God will be made the cauſe of the *ſin*, and *miſery* of his ſpotleſs and blameleſs Creatures; which *abſurdities* he cannot ſhun by ſaying, that God, by interpoſing in ſuch *productions*, doth but follow the *rules* of acting, which he firſt made while man was innocent. For certainly, infinite *goodneſs* would never have tyed up it ſelf to ſuch *Laws* of *working*, as he foreſaw would preſently bring unavoidable *inconvenience*, *miſery*, and *ruine* upon the beſt part of his *workmanſhip*. And for the ſecond way, it ſuppoſeth God to have no more to do in this

action

action than in our *eating* and *drinking*. Conſequently, here is a *creation* purely *natural*. And methinks, if we have ſo vaſt a *power* to bring the *ends* of *contradictories* together, *ſomething* out of *nothing*, (which ſome deny to *Omnipotence* it ſelf) 'tis much we cannot *conſerve* in being our *Creature* ſo *produced*, nor our own intimate *ſelves*, ſince *conſervation* is not more than *Creation*. And 'tis much, that in other things we ſhould give ſuch few *ſpecimens* of ſo vaſt an *ability*; or, have a *power* ſo *divine* and *excellent*, and no faculty to diſcern it by.

Again, (2) if the *Soul* be *immediately* produced out of *nothing*, be the agent who it will, *God* or the *Parent*, it will be *pure* and *ſinleſs*. For, ſuppoſing our *parents* to be our *Creators*; they make us but as *natural* agents, * and ſo can only tranſmit their *natural* qualities, but not their *moral pravities*. Wherefore there can no better account be given from this way how the Soul is ſo debauched and infected aſſoon as it comes into the body, than in the former, and therefore it fails in the main end it is deſigned for.

Thus we ſee then that the *traduction* of the Soul, ſuppoſing it to be *produced* out of *nothing*, cannot be defended.

Nor doth the ſecond general way yield any more relief to this *Hypotheſis*. For if it be made of any thing *præexiſtent*, it is either

of *matter* or *ſpirit*. The former we have undermined and overthrown already, in what was ſaid againſt thoſe, that hold it to be *body*. And if it be made out of any *Spiritual* ſubſtance, it muſt be the *ſoul* of the *parent*, (except we will revive the old *enthuſiaſtick* conceit of its *being* a *particle* of the *divine eſſence*) which ſuppoſition is * againſt the nature of an *immaterial* being, a chief property of which, is to be *indiſcerpible*. Nor do the *ſimilitudes* I mentioned in the propoſal of the *Hypotheſis*, at all fit the buſineſs; for one *candle* lights another, * by *ſeparable emiſſions* that paſs from the *flame* of that which is kindled, to the *wick* of the other. And *flame* is a body whoſe *parts* are in continual *flux*, as a *river*. But the ſubſtance of the *ſoul* is *ſtable*, *permanent*, and *indiviſible*, which quite makes it another caſe. And for a mans informing anothers mind with a thought which he had not conceived, it is not a *production* of any *ſubſtance*, but only an occaſioning him to exert an *operation* of his *mind* which he did not before. And therefore makes nothing to the *illuſtrating*, how a *Soul* can produce a *Soul*, a ſubſtance *diſtinct* and without it ſelf: Thus we ſee how deſperate the caſe of the *ſouls original* is in the *Hypotheſis* of *Traduction* alſo. But yet to let it have fair play, we'l give it leave to plead it's cauſe; and briefly preſent

ſent what is moſt material in its behalf.

There are but two reaſons that I can think of, worth the naming: (1) *A man* begets *a man*, and *a man* he is not without a *Soul*, therefore 'tis pretended that the *ſoul* is *begotten*. But this argument is eaſily detected of palpable *ſophiſtry*, and is as if one ſhould argue, a man is *mortal*, therefore his *Soul* is *mortal*; or is *fat* and *luſty*, therefore his *Soul* is ſo. The abſurdity of which kinds of *reaſoning* lyes in drawing that into a *ſtrict* and *rigorous affirmation*, which is only meant according to *vulgar* ſpeech, and is true only in ſome remarkable *reſpect* or *circumſtance*. Thus we ſay, A *man* begets a *man* becauſe he doth the *viſible* and only *ſenſible* part of him; The vulgar, to whom common ſpeech is accommodate, not taking ſo much notice of what is paſt the ken of their *ſenſes*. And therefore *Body* in ordinary ſpeaking is oft put for *Perſon*, as here *man* for the *body*. Sometimes the *nobleſt part* is uſed for the *whole*, as when 'tis ſaid 70 Souls went down with *Jacob* into *Egypt*; therefore ſuch arguments as the *aſſerters* of *traduction* make uſe of, which are drawn from vulgar *ſchemes* of *ſpeech*, argue nothing but the deſperateneſs of the *cauſe*, that needs ſuch pitiful *ſophiſtries* to recommend it. Such are theſe *proofs* which yet are ſome of the beſt I meet with, *The ſeed of the Woman ſhall break the Ser-*

pents head; *Sixty six souls descended out of* Jacobs *loins*; Adam *begat a son in his own likeness*, and such like. According to this rate of arguing the *scripture* may be made speak any thing that our humoursome phancies please to dictate. And thus to *rack* the *sacred* writings, to force them whether they will or no to bring *evidence* to our *opinions*, is an affront to their *Authority*, that's next to the *denying* on't. I might add (2) that *begetting* also hath a *latitude*, and in common speech signifies not a *strict* and *philosophical production*; So that a man begets a man, though he only generates the *body*, into which fitly *prepared* descends a *soul*. And he that doth that upon which another thing necessarily follows, is said to be the cause of both.

(2) The *adherents* to *traduction* use to urge, that, except the *whole man*, *soul* and *body*, be *propagated*, there is no account can be given of our *original defilement*. And *scripture* gives evident *testimony* to that *early pollution*; for we are said to be *conceived in sin*, and *transgressors from the Womb*.

We have already seen that indeed the way of *daily creating souls*, cannot come off but with vilely aspersing the *divine attributes*. And it hath been hinted, that neither can *Traduction* solve the business: for if the *Parent* beget the *soul* out of *nothing*, it will be

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as *pure* and *clean* as if God himself were it's *immediate Creator*; for though a *clean* thing cannot come out of an *unclean*, when any thing of the *substance* of the *producent* is imparted to the *effect*; yet where 'tis made out of *nothing*, the reason is very different: Yea, the *soul* in all the *powers* that are concern'd in this *production* is now as *clean* and *pure* as ever 'twas; for it is suppos'd to do it by a *capacity* given, at its first *creation* while *pure* and *innocent*; in which respect it is not capable of *moral contagion*; this being an ability meerly *natural* and *plastick*, and not at all under the *imperium* or *command* of the *will*, the only seat of *moral good* and *evil*. Or, if our souls are but *particles* and *decerptions* of our *parents*, then I must have been guilty of all the *sins* that ever were committed by my *Progenitors* ever since *Adam*; and by this time, my *soul* would have been so *deprav'd* and *debauch'd*, that it would be now *brutish*, yea *diabolical*. Thus then we see, that even upon this reason, 'tis necessary, to pitch upon some other *Hypothesis*, to give an account of the *pravity* of our *natures*; which both these fail in the *solution* of. And, since the former commits such *violence* upon the honour of the *divine attributes*, since the latter is so contrary to the nature of things, and since neither can give any satisfaction in the great affairs of providence and our natures, or have any incou-

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ragement from the *Sacred Volume*; 'Tis I think, very excuſable for us to caſt our eyes abroad, to ſee if there be no other way, that may probably unriddle thoſe *myſteries*, and relieve the minds of *anxious* and *contemplative* inquirers. In which ſearch, if we light on any thing that doth ſweetly accord with the *Attributes* of God, the *nature* of *things*, and unlocks the intricacies of *Providence*; I think we have found, what the two former *opinions* aim at, but cannot make good their pretences to; And may ſalute the *truth* with a joyful Εὕρηκα. Wherefore from the *modern* diſputants, let us look towards the *ancient Sages*, thoſe *Eaſtern Sophi*, that have fill'd the world with the fame of their *wiſdom*; And ſince our inquiries are *benighted* in the *Weſt*, let us look towards the *Eaſt*, from whence 'tis likely the deſired *light may* diſplay it ſelf, and chaſe away the *darkneſs* that covers the *face* of thoſe *theories*. Therefore it was the *opinion* of the *Indian Brachmans*, the *Perſian Magi*, the *Ægyptian Gymnoſophiſts*, the *Jewiſh Rabbins*, ſome of the *Gracian Philoſophers*, and *Chriſtian Fathers*, that the ſouls of men were created all at firſt; and at ſeveral times and occaſions upon forfeiture of their better life and condition, dropt down into theſe *terreſtrial* bodies. This the learned among the *Jews* made a part of their *Cabbala*, and pretend to have received

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it from their great *Law-giver*, *Moſes*; which *Hypotheſis*, if it appear but probable to an *impartial* inquiry, will even on that account be preferrible to both the former, which we have ſeen to be deſperate.

CHAP. IV.

(1) *Præexiſtence cannot be diſproved.* Scripture *ſaith nothing againſt it. It's ſilence is no prejudice to this Doctrine, but rather an Argument for it, as the caſe ſtandeth. Præexiſtence was the common opinion of our Saviour's times. How, probably, it came to be loſt in the Chriſtian Church.*

THerefore let us ſee what title it can ſhew for our *aſſent*, or whether it can prove it ſelf worthy of the *Patronage* of thoſe great *Authors* that have owned it.

(1) Then, Whether this Doctrine be *true* or no; I'm confident it cannot be proved *falſe*: for if all *Souls* were not *made* together, it muſt be, either becauſe God *could* not do it;

it; or becauſe he *would* not. For the firſt; I ſuppoſe very few have ſuch *narrow Conceptions* of the *divine power*, as to affirm that *omnipotence* could not produce all thoſe beings at firſt, which apart he is ſuppos'd to *create daily*; which implies no *contradiction*, or as much as *difficulty*, to be *conceived*; and which *de facto* he hath done in the caſe of *Angels*. Or, if *inconſiſtence* with any *Attribute* ſhould be pretended, *that* ſhall be prov'd quite otherwiſe hereafter; And the *amicable* conſiſtence of this *Hypotheſis* with them, yea, the *neceſſity* of it, from this very conſideration of the *divine Attributes*, ſhall be argued in the proceſs.

Therefore, whoever concludes that *God* made not all *ſouls* of old, when he produced the world out of nothing, muſt confeſs the reaſon of this aſſertion to be, becauſe he *would not*. And then I would ask him, how he came to know what he affirms ſo boldly? Who acquainted him with the *Divine Counſels?* Is there a word ſaid in his *revealed Will* to the contrary? or, hath he by his *holy* penmen told us that either of the other ways was more ſutable to his *beneplaciture*? Indeed, 'tis very likely that a ſtrong and ready *phancy*, poſſeſt with a perſwaſion of the falſhood of this *Hypotheſis*, might find ſome half phraſes in *Scripture*, which he might ſuborn to ſing to the tune of his *imagination*. For, in ſuch a

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Miſcellaneous piece as the *Bible* is, it will not be difficult for a man that's ſtrongly reſolv'd againſt an opinion, to find ſomewhat or other that may ſeem to him to ſpeak the language of his *phancy*; And therefore it ſhall go hard, but that thoſe whom their *education* or *prejudice* have engaged againſt this *Hypotheſis*, will light on ſome obſcure pieces of *texts*, and broken ſentences or other, that ſhall ſeem to condemn what they diſapprove of. But I am ſecurely confident, that there is not a ſentence in the *ſacred volume*, from end to end, that ever was intended to teach, that all *Souls* were not *made* of *old*; or that, by a legitimate conſequence, would inferr it. And if any there be that ſeem to look another way, I dare ſay they are *collateral*, and were never deſigned by the *divine* Authors for the purpoſe they are made to ſerve, by the enemies of *Præexiſtence*. Wherefore not to conceal any thing that with the leaſt ſhew of probability can be pretended from the *ſacred volume* in diſcountenance of the Doctrine of *Præexiſtence*, I'le bring into view whatever I know to have the leaſt face of a *Teſtimony* to the contrary, in the *divine Revelations*. That ſo, when it ſhall appear that the moſt ſpecious *Texts* that can be alledg'd, have nothing at all in them to diſprove the *ſouls præexiſtence*, we may be ſecure that God hath not diſcovered to us in his

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written will, that 'twas not his *pleaſure* to *create* all *ſouls* together.

Therefore (1.), It may be pretended, that the Doctrine of *Præexiſtence* comports not with that *innocence* and *integrity* in which the *Scripture* determines *Adam* to have been made. Since it ſuppoſeth the *deſcent* into theſe *bodies* to be a *culpable lapſe* from an higher and better ſtate of *Life*, and this to be a ſtate of *incarceration* for former *delinquencies*. To this I *anſwer*,

(1) No one can object any thing to purpoſe againſt *Præexiſtence* from the *unconceiveableneſs* of it, until he know the particular *frame* of the *Hypotheſis*, without which, all *impugnations* relating to the *manner* of the *thing*, will be wide of the mark, and but little to the buſineſs. Therefore, if the Objector would have patience to wait till we come to that part of our undertaking, he would find that there was but little ground for ſuch a *ſcruple*. But however, to prevent all cavillings, in this place I'le ſhew the *invalidity* of this *objection*. Wherefore,

(2) There is no neceſſity from the Doctrine of *Præexiſtence* to ſuppoſe *Adam* a *Delinquent*, before his noted *tranſgreſſion* in a *terreſtrial* body: for conſidering, that his *body* had vaſt *advantages* above ours, in point of *Beauty*, *Purity*, and *Serviceableneſs* to

to the Soul, what harſhneſs is there in conceiving that God might ſend one of thoſe *immaculate Spirits* that he had made, into ſuch a Tenement, that he might be his *ſteward* in the affairs of this *lower Family*; and an *overſeer*, and *ruler* of thoſe other Creatures that he had ordered to have their dwelling upon earth? I am ſure, there is no more contrariety to any of the *Divine Attributes* in this *ſuppoſition*, than there is in that, which makes God to have ſent a *pure* ſpirit, which he had *juſt* made, into ſuch a *body*. Yea,

(3) Suppoſing that ſome *Souls fell*, when the *Angels* did (which the proceſs of our diſcourſe will ſhew to be no unreaſonable ſuppoſition) this was a *merciful proviſion* of our *Maker*, and a generous undertaking for a *Seraphick* and *untainted Spirit*. For by this means, fit and congruous *matter* is prepared for thoſe Souls to reſide and act in, who had rendred themſelves unfit to *live* and *enjoy* themſelves in more *refined bodies*. And ſo thoſe Spirits that had *ſinned* themſelves into a ſtate of *ſilence* and *inactivity*, are by this *ſeaſonable means*, which the *divine Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs* hath contrived for them, put once more into a capacity of acting their parts anew, and coming into play again. Now if it ſeem hard to any to conceive how ſo noble a *Spirit* in ſuch an *advantagious body*,

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ſhould have been impoſed upon by ſo groſs a *deluſion*, and ſubmit ſo *impotently* to the firſt *temptation*; He may pleaſe to conſider, that the difficulty is the ſame, ſuppoſing him juſt then to have been *made*; if we grant him but that *purity* and thoſe great *perfections* both of *will*, and *underſtanding*, which *orthodox theology* allows him.

Yea, again (4) I might ask, What *inconvenience* there is in ſuppoſing, that *Adam* himſelf was one of thoſe *delinquent Souls*, * which the divine *pity* and *compaſſion* had thus ſet up again; that ſo, ſo many of his excellent Creatures might not be loſt and undone irrecoverably; but might act anew, though upon a lower ſtage in the univerſe? A due conſideration of the *infinite fœcundity* and fulneſs of the *divine goodneſs* will, if not *warrant*, yet *excuſe* ſuch a *ſuppoſition*.

But now if it be demanded, What *advantage Adam*'s ſtanding had been to his poſterity, had he continued in the ſtate of *innocence*; and how *ſin* and *miſery* is brought upon us by his *Fall*, according to this *Hypotheſis*? I anſwer, that then among many other great priviledges, he had tranſmitted downwards by way of natural *generation* that *excellent* and *bleſſed temper* of *body*; which ſhould have been like his own *happy craſis*. So that our *apprehenſions* ſhould have been more

more *large* and *free*, our *affections* more *regular* and *governable*; and our *inclinations* to what is good and vertuous, *ſtrong* and *vigorous*. For we cannot but obſerve in this *ſtate*, how vaſt an influence the temper of our *bodies* hath upon our *minds*; both in reference to *intellectual* and *moral diſpoſitions*. Thus, daily experience teacheth us, how that, according to the *ebb* or *flow* of certain humours in our bodies, our wits are either more *quick*, *free*, and *ſparkling*, or elſe more *obtuſe*, *weak*, and *ſluggiſh*. And we find that there are certain *clean* and *healthy* diſpoſitions of *body* which make us *cheerful*, and *contented*; others on the contrary *moroſe*, *melancholy*, and *dogged*. And 'tis eaſie to obſerves how *age* or *ſickneſs* ſowers, and crabbs our natures. I might inſtance in almoſt all other *qualities* of the *mind*, which are ſtrangely influenc't and modifyed according to the bodies *conſtitution*. But none will deny ſo plain a truth; and therefore I forbear to inſiſt further on it. Nor need I mention any more *advantages*; ſo many, and ſuch *great* ones, being conſequent upon *this*. But our great *Protoplaſt* and *repreſentative*, falling through his unhappy *diſobedience*, beſides the integrity and rectitude of his *mind*, he loſt alſo that *bleſſed conſtitution* of *Body*, which would have been ſo great a privileg to his *off-ſpring*: ſo that

it became now *corrupt*, *weak*, and *indiſpoſed* for the nobler exerciſes of the Soul; and he could tranſmit no better to us, than himſelf was owner of. Thus we *fell in him*, and were made *miſerable* by his *tranſgreſſion*. We have bodies conveyed to us, which ſtrangely do *bewitch* and *betray* us. And thus we all bear about us the marks of the *firſt apoſtacy*. There are other ſad effects of his *defection*, but this may ſuffice for my preſent purpoſe. Thus we ſee how that the *derivation* of *original depravity* from *Adam* is as clear in this *Hypotheſis*, as can be pretended in either of the other. And upon other Accounts it ſeems to have much the advantage of both of them. As will appear to the *unprejudiced* in what is further to be diſcourſed of.

Finally, therefore, If the urgers of the *Letter* of *Geneſis* of either ſide, againſt this *Hypotheſis*, would but conſider, *That the Souls that deſcend hither, for their prævarication in another ſtate, lye in a long condition of ſilence and inſenſibility, before they appear in terreſtrial bodies*; each of them then might, from the doctrine of *Præexiſtence* thus ſtated, gain all the *advantages* which he ſuppoſeth to have by his *own opinion*, and avoid all thoſe *abſurdities* which he ſeeth the other run upon. If the Aſſerters of *daily Creation* think it clear from Scripture that

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God is the Father of Spirits, and immediate maker of Souls, they'l find the *ſame* made good and aſſented to in this *Hypotheſis*. And if they are unwilling to hold any thing contrary to the *Nature* of the *ſoul*, which is *immortal* and *indiſcerpible*, the Doctrine of *Præexiſtence* amicably cloſeth with them in this alſo.

And if the Patrons of *Traduction* would have a way, how *ſin* and *miſery* may be *propagated* from our *firſt Parent* without aſperſing the *divine Attributes*, or affirming any thing contrary to the *phænomena* of *Providence*, and *Nature*; this *Hypotheſis* will clear the buſineſs; It giving us ſo fair an Account how we all *dye* in *Adam*, without blotting the *Wiſdom*, *Juſtice*, or *Goodneſs*, of God, or affirming any thing contrary to the *Appearances* of *Nature*.

I have been the longer on this Argument, becauſe 'tis like to be one main *objection*; And we ſee it is ſo far from prejudicing, that it is no inconſiderable evidence of the *truth* of *Præexiſtence*.

And now, beſides this that I have named, I cannot think of any *Arguments* from *Scripture* againſt this Doctrine, conſiderable enough to excuſe a mention of them. However, if the *candid Reader* will pardon the impertinency I'le preſent to view what I find moſt *colourable*.

Therefore (2), It may be ſome are ſo inadvertent as to urge againſt our *ſouls* having been of *old*, that, *Sacred* writ ſays *We are but of Yeſterday*; which expreſſion of *divine Scripture*, is queſtionleſs to be underſtood of our *appearance* on this *ſtage* of *Earth*. And is no more an *Argument* againſt our *Præexiſtence*, than that other phraſe of his, *Before I go hence*, and *Be no more*, is againſt our *future exiſtence* in an other ſtate after the preſent life is ended. Nor will it prove more the buſineſs it is brought for, than the expreſſion of *Rachels weeping for her Children becauſe they were not*, will inferr, that they were, *abſolutely nothing*. Nor can any thing more be made.

(3.) Of that place in *Eccleſiaſtes*, *Yea, better is he than both they*, (meaning the *dead* and *living*) *which hath not yet been*; ſince, beſids that 'tis a like *ſcheme* of *ſpeech* with the former, it ſeems more to favour, than diſcountenance *Præexiſtence*; for what is *abſolutely nothing* can neither be *worſe*, nor *better*. Moreover, we coming from a ſtate of *ſilence* and *inactivity* when we drop into *theſe bodies*, we were before, as if we had *not been*; and ſo there is better ground in this caſe, for ſuch a manner of ſpeaking, than in meer *non-appearance*; which yet Scripture phraſeth a *Not being*.

* And now I cannot think of any place

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in the *Sacred volume* more that could make a tolerable plea againſt this *Hypotheſis*, of our *Souls* having been before they came into theſe *bodies*; except

(4.) Any will draw a *negative Argument* from the *Hiſtory* of the *Creation*, concluding that the *Souls* of men were not made of *old*, becauſe there is no mention there, of any ſuch matter. To which I return briefly, That the ſame Argument concludes againſt the being of *Angels*, of whoſe *Creation* there is no more ſay'd in the firſt *ſtory* than of this *inferiour* rank of *Spirits*, *Souls*. The reaſon of which *ſilence* is commonly taken to be, becauſe *Moſes* had here to do with a rude and *illiterate* people, who had few or no apprehenſions of any thing beyond their *ſenſes*, and therefore he takes notice to them of nothing but what was *ſenſible* and of common obſervation. This reaſon is given alſo why *minerals* were omitted. 'Twere an eaſy matter, to ſhew how the outward *cortex*, the *Letter* of this *Hiſtory* is adapted to mean and vulgar apprehenſions, whoſe *narrowneſs* renders them incapable of *ſublimer ſpeculations*. But that being more than needs for our preſent purpoſe, I ſhall forbear to ſpeak further of it.

I might (2) further add, that great and learned *Interpreters* tell us, that all ſorts of *Spirits*, *Angels*, and *Souls* are *ſymbollically* meant

meant by the *creation* of *heaven*, and *light*. And, if it were directly in the way of our preſent buſineſs, it might be made appear to be no improbable conjecture. But I refer him that is curious in this particular to the great *Reſtorer* of the *antient Cabbala*, the Learned Dr. *H. More* in his *conjectura Cabbaliſtica.*

And now from the conſideration of the *ſilence* of the *firſt Hiſtory*, we deſcend to the laſt and moſt likely to be urged *ſcruple*, which is to this purpoſe.

(5.) We are not to ſtep beyond the *divine Revalations*, and ſince God hath made known no ſuch Doctrine as this, of the Souls *Præexiſtence* any where in his word, we may reaſonably deny it, or at leaſt have no ground to imbrace it. This is the moſt important *objection* of all the reſt, and moſt likely to prepoſſeſs timorous and wary inquirers againſt this *Hypotheſis*; wherefore I conceive that a full anſwer to this doubt, will prevent many ſcrupulous *Hæſitations*, and make way for an unprejudic'd hearing of what I have further to alledge in the behalf of this *opinion.* And

(1.) I wiſh that thoſe that urge *Scripture ſilence* to diſprove *præexiſtence* would conſider, how *ſilent* it is both in the caſe of *Daily Creation*, and *Traduction*; we have ſeen already that there is nothing in *Sacred* writ

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to warrant either, but only ſuch *Generals* from which the *reſpective Patrons* of either Doctrine would inferr their own concluſion, though indeed they all of them with better right and congruity prove *Præexiſtence.*

(2.) I ſuppoſe thoſe that argue from *Scripture-ſilence* in ſuch caſes miſtake the deſign of *Scripture*, which is not to determine *points* of *ſpeculation*, but to be a *rule* of *Life* and *Manners.* Nor doth it otherwiſe deſign the teaching of *Doctrinals*, than as they have a tendency to promote the *divine* life, *righteouſneſs* and *Holineſs.* It was never intended by it's *inſpired* Authors to fill our *Heads* with *notions*, but to regulate our diſorderly *appetites* and *affections*, and to *direct* us the *way* to a nobler *happineſs.* Therefore thoſe that look for a *ſyſteme* of *opinions* in thoſe otherways-deſigned writings, do like him that ſhould ſee for a body of natural Philoſophy, in *Epictetus* his *morals*, or *Seneca's Epiſtles.*

(3.) *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles* ſpoke and writ as the condition of the perſons with whom they dealt adminiſtred occaſion, as as did alſo the other *pen-men.* Therefore doubtleſs there were many noble Theories which they could have made the world acquainted with, which yet for want of a fit occaſion to draw them forth were never

upon Record. And we know, few *ſpeculative* truths are deliver'ed in *Scripture*, but ſuch as were called forth by the *controverſies* of thoſe *times:* And *Præexiſtence* was none of them, it being the conſtant opinion of the *Jews*, as appears by that Queſtion, *Maſter, was it for this man's ſin or his Fathers, that he was born blind*, which ſuppoſeth it of the *Diſciples* alſo. Wherefore

(4.) There was little need of more teaching of that, which thoſe times were ſufficiently inſtructed in: And indeed, as the caſe ſtands, if *Scripture-ſilence* be *Argumentative*, 'twil be for the advantage of *Præexiſtence*; ſince it being the *then common opinion*, and the *diſciples* themſelves being of that belief, 'tis very likely, had it been an errour, that our *Saviour* or his *Apoſtles* would have witneſt againſt it. But there being not a word let fall from them in diſapproval of that *opinion*, though ſometimes occaſions were adminiſtred (as by the *Queſtion* of the Diſciples, and ſome other occurrences) 'tis a good preſumption of the ſoundneſs of it.

Now that *Præexiſtence* was the common opinion of the *Jews*, in thoſe times might be made good with full and convictive evidence, were it worth our labour to inſiſt much upon this Inquiry; but this being only a *by-conſideration*, a brief touch of it will ſuffice us. One of the great *Rabbins* there-

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fore, * Mr. *Ben Iſrael* in his *Problems de Creatione*, aſſures us, that *Præexiſtence* was the *common belief* of all *wiſe* men among the *Jews*, without exception. And the *Author* of the Book of *Wiſdom*, who certainly was a *Jew*, probably *Philo*, plainly ſuppoſeth the ſame Doctrine in that Speech, *For I was a witty Child, and had a good Spirit, wherefore the rather being good, I came into a body undefiled.* As alſo did the Diſciples in their forementionʼd Queſtion to our *Saviour*; For except they ſuppoſed, that he might have *ſinned* before he was *born*, the Queſtion had been *ſenſleſs* and *impertinent*. Again, when Chriſt askt them, *whom men ſaid he was* they anſwered, that ſome ſaid *John the Baptiſt*, others *Elias*, others *Jeremias* or one of the *Prophets*, which ſayings of theirs ſuppoſe their belief of a *Metempſychoſis* and conſequently of *Præexiſtence*. Theſe, one would think, were very proper occaſions for our *Saviour* to have rectified his *miſtaken* followers, had their *ſuppoſition* been an *errour*, as he was wont to do in caſes not more conſiderable. Therefore if the enemies of *Præexiſtence* will needs urge *Scriptures ſuppoſed ſilence* againſt it; they have no reaſon to take it amiſs if I ſhew them how their Argument recoyls upon themſelves, and deſtroy their *own* cauſe, inſtead of their *Adverſaries*.

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(5.) Beſides, there were doubtleſs many Doctrines entertain'd by the *Apoſtles* and the more learned of their followers, which were diſproportion'd to the capacities of the *generality*, who hold but little *Theory*.

There was *ſtrong meat* for the more *grown* and *manly* Chriſtians, as well as *milk* for *babes*, and weaker *Conſtitutions*. Now *Scripture* was deſigned for the benefit of the *moſt*, and *they* could little underſtand, and leſs make uſe of a *ſpeculation* ſo remote from *common conceit*, as *Præexiſtence*. Among us, *wiſe men* count it not ſo proper to deal forth *deep* and *myſterious points* in *Divinity* to common and promiſcuous *Auditories*. Wherefore the Apoſtles and others of their more improv'd and capable *diſciples* might have had ſuch a *Doctrine* among them, though it were never expreſly defined in their *publick writings*. And the Learned *Origen* and ſome other of the *Antients* affirm that *Præexiſtence* was a *Cabbala* which was handed down from the *Apoſtolick* ages, to *their times*; and we know *thoſe* were *early*, and had therefore better advantages of knowing the certainty of ſuch a *Tradition*, than we at ſo vaſt a *diſtance*.

Nor need any wonder how it came at length to be loſt, or at leaſt kept but among *a few*, who conſiders the *groſſneſs* of ſucceeding ages, when ſuch multitudes could

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ſwallow the dull and courſe *Anthropomorphite Doctrines*; much leſs, if he reflects upon that *black night* of *barbarick ignorance* which ſpread it ſelf over this *weſtern* world, upon the *incurſion* of thoſe *rude* and *unciviliz'd Nations* that 'ore-ran the *Empire*: out of which *darkneſs*, 'twas the work of ſome Centuries to recover the then obſcured *Region* of *Civility* and *Letters*. Moreover, it would allay the *admiration* of any one inquiſitive in ſuch reſearches, when he ſhall have taken notice of the ſtarting up and prevailing of *School-Divinity* in the world, which was but *Ariſtotles Philoſophy theologiz'd*. And we know that *Philoſophy* had the luck to *ſwim* in the general *eſteem* and *credit*, when *Platoniſm* and the more *antient wiſdom*, a branch of which, Præexiſtence was, were almoſt quite *ſunk* and *buried*. So that a *Theology* being now made, out of *Ariſtotelian principles*, 'tis no wonder that *Præexiſtence* was left out, nothing being ſuppoſed to have been ſaid of it, by the *great* Author of that *Philoſophy*; and his *admiring Sectators* were loath to borrow ſo conſiderable a *Theory*, from their Maſters neglected Rival, *Plato*.

But (6) at once to remove this *ſtone* of *offence* out of the way, I think *Scripture* is not ſo *ſilent* in this matter as is imagin'd. And I'm confident, more can be ſaid from thoſe

thoſe *divine* writings in behalf of *Præexiſtence*, than for many *opinions*, that it's oppoſers are very fond of, and think to be there evidently aſſerted. And had this been a commonly received Doctrine, and mens Wits as much exerciſed for the defence on't, as they have been for the *common dogmata*, I nothing doubt, but that *Scriptures* would have been heaped up in abundance for it's *juſtification*, and it would have been thought to have been plainly witneſt too, in the inſpired volume. For, as mens, *phancies* will readily furniſh them with a proof of that, of whoſe truth they are ſtrongly prepoſſeſſed; So, on the contrary, they'l be very backward to ſee any evidence of that which is ſtrange to them, and which hath alwaies been reputed an *Abſurdity*. But my *Scripture-evidence* is not ſo proper for this place, I intending to make it an Argument by it ſelf. Therefore if the urger of this *objection*, will but have a little patience till I come ſo far on the way of my *diſcourſe*, I hope he may be ſatisfied that *Præexiſtence* is not ſuch a ſtranger to *Scripture* as he conceits it.

CHAP. V.

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Reaſons againſt Præexiſtence *anſwered. Our* forgetting *the* former ſtate *is no argument to diſprove it: nor are the other Reaſons that can be produc'd, more concluſive. The proof of the* poſſibility *of* Præexiſtence *were enough, all other* Hypotheſes *being abſurd and contradictious. But it is prov'd alſo by* poſitive *Arguments.*

NOw therefore to proceed, let us look back upon our progreſs, and ſo enter on what remains. We have ſeen, that God *could have created* all *Souls at firſt had he ſo pleaſed*, and *that he hath revealed nothing in his written Will to the contrary.* And now if it be found alſo, that he hath not made it known to our *Reaſons* that 'twas not his *will* to do *ſo*, we may conclude this firſt particular, *That no one can ſay, that the Doctrine of Præexiſtence is a falſhood.* Therefore let us call to Account the moſt momentous

tous reaſons that can be laid againſt it, and we ſhall find that they all have not *weight* enough in the leaſt to move ſo *rational* and *ſolid* an *opinion.*

(1.) Then, 'tis likely to be urged, that had we *lived* and acted in a former ſtate, * we ſhould doubtleſs have retain'd ſome *remembrance* of that *condition*; But we having no *memory* of any thing backwards before our appearance upon this *preſent ſtage*, it will be thought to be a conſiderable præſumption, that *Præexiſtence* is but a *phancy.*

But I would deſire ſuch kind of reaſoners to tell me, how much they *remember* of their *ſtate* and condition in the *womb*, or of the *Actions* of their firſt *infancy.* And I could wiſh they would conſider, that not one paſſage in an hundred is *remembred* of their *grown* and *riper* age. Nor doth there ſcarce a *night* paſs but we *dream* of many things which our *waking Memories* can give us no Account of; yea, *old age* and ſome kinds of *diſeaſes* blot out all the *images* of things *paſt*, and even in this *ſtate* cauſe a *total oblivion.* * Now if the *Reaſons* why we ſhould loſe the *remembrance* of our former life be *greater*, than are the *cauſes* of *forgetfulneſs* in the *inſtances* we have produced, I think it will be clear, that this Argument hath but little force againſt the *opi-*

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nion we are inquiring into. Therefore if we do but reflect upon that long ſtate of *ſilence* and *inactivity* that we emerged from, when we came into theſe bodies; and the *vaſt change* we under-went by our ſinking into this new and unwonted *habitation*, it will appear to the conſiderate, that there is greater reaſon why we ſhould have *forgotten* our former *Life*, than any thing in *this*. And if a *diſeaſe* or *old age* can raſe out the *memory* of *paſt actions*, even while we are in one and the ſame *condition* of *Life*, certainly ſo *long* and *deep* a *ſwoon* as is abſolute *inſenſibility* and *inertneſs*, may much more reaſonably be thought to blot out the *memory* of an *other Life*, whoſe paſſages probably were nothing like the *tranſactions* of *this*.

And this alſo might be given as an other Reaſon of our forgetting our former *ſtate*, ſince uſually things are brought to our *remembrance* by ſome *like occurrences*. But

(2.) Some will argue, If *this* be a ſtate of *puniſhment* for *former* miſcarriages, how comes it about then, that 'tis a better condition than that we laſt came from, *viz.* the ſtate of *ſilence* and *inſenſibility*? I anſwer, That if we look upon our preſent *terreſtrial* condition as an effect of our *defection* from the *higher Life*, and in reference to our former happineſs loſt by our own de-

fault

fault, 'tis then a *miſery* and a *puniſhment*. But if we compare our *now*-being with the ſtate of *inactivity* we were delivered from, it may then be called an *After-Game of* the *divine Goodneſs*, and a Mercy. As a *Male-factor*, that is at firſt put into a dark and diſconſolate dungeon, and afterwards is remov'd to a more comfortable and light-ſome priſon, may acknowledge his remove to be a *favour* and *deliverance* compared with the *place* he was laſt confined to; though with reſpect to his *fault* and former *liberty*, even this condition is both a *mulct* and a *miſery*. It is juſt thus in the preſent caſe, and any one may make the application.

But it will be ſaid, (3) If our *Souls* liv'd in a *former ſtate*, did they *act* in *bodies*, or without them? The former they'l ſay is abſurd, and the latter incongruous and unlikely; ſince then all the *powers* the Soul hath to exert in a body, would have been *idle* and to no purpoſe. But (1) the moſt that can be argued from ſuch like *objections*, is, that we know not the *manner* of the *thing*; and are no Arguments againſt the aſſertion it ſelf. And were it granted that the *paticular ſtate* of the *Soul* before it came hither is *inconceivable*, yet this makes no more againſt it, than it doth againſt it's *after-condition*; which theſe very *objectors* hold

to

to be ſo, as to the *particular modus*. But (2) Why is it ſo abſurd that the Soul ſhould have *actuated* another kind of *body*, before it came into *this*? Even *here* 'tis *immediately* united to a purer *vehicle*, moves and acts the groſſer body by it; And why then might it not in its former and *purer ſtate* of *Life* have been joyn'd only to ſuch a *refined body*, which ſhould have been ſuitable to its own *perfection* and *purity*? I'me ſure, many, if not the moſt of the *Antient Fathers*, thought *Angels* themſelves to be *embodied*, and therefore they reputed not *this* ſuch a groſs abſurdity. But an occaſion hereafter will draw our pen this way again, and therefore I paſs it to a third return to this *objection*.

(3.) Therefore, though it were granted that the *Soul* lived afore-times without a *body*, what greater *incongruity* is there in ſuch a *ſuppoſition*, than that it ſhould *live* and *act* after *death* without any union with *matter* or any *body* whatſoever, as the *objectors* themſelves conceive it doth? But all ſuch objections as theſe will fly away as miſts before the Sun, when we ſhall come particularly to ſtate the *Hypotheſis*. And therefore I may be excuſed from further troubling my ſelf and the Reader about them here. Eſpecially ſince, as hath been intimated, they prove nothing at all, but that

the objectors cannot conceive what manner of ſtate that of *Præexiſtence* was, which is no prejudice to the opinion it ſelf; that *our Souls were extant before theſe earthly bodies.*

Thus then I hope I have clearly enough made good *that all Souls might have been Created from the beginning*; for ought any thing that is made known, either in the *Scriptures* or our *reaſons* to the contrary. * And thereby have removed thoſe *prejudices* that Would have ſtood in the way of our *concluſion.* Wherefore we may now without controul, from our proof of, *That it may be ſo*, paſs on to enquire, whether indeed, *it is ſo*; and ſee, whether it may as well be *aſſerted*, as *defended.*

And truly conſidering that both the other ways are *impoſſible*, and this *third* not at all *unreaſonable*, it may be thought needleſs to bring more forces into the field to gain it the victory, after its enemies are quite ſcattered and defeated. Yet however, for the *pomp* and *triumph* of truth, though it need not their ſervice, we ſhall add ſome *poſitive* Arguments, whereby it may appear, that not only all other ways are *dangerous* and *unpaſſable*, and *this irreproveable*; but alſo that there is *direct* evidence enough to prove it *ſolid* and *rational.* And I make my firſt conſideration of this kind, a *ſecond Argument.*

CHAP. VI.

CHAP. VI.

A ſecond Argument for Præexiſtence *drawn from the conſideration of the* Divine Goodneſs, *which always doth what is beſt.*

(2) THen, whoever conceives rightly of *God*, apprehends him to be *infinite* and *immenſe Goodneſs*, who is alwayes ſhedding abroad of his own *exuberant fulneſs*: There is no *ſtraitneſs* in the *Deity*, no *bounds* to the *ocean* of *Love*. Now the *divine Goodneſs* referrs not to himſelf, as ours *extends not unto him*. He acts nothing for any *ſelf-accompliſhment*, being *eſſentially* and *abſolutely compleat* and *perfect*. But the object and term of his *goodneſs* is his creatures *good* and happineſs, in their reſpective capacities. He is that infinite *fountain* that is continually *overflowing*; and can no more ceaſe to ſhed his *influences* upon his *indigent dependents* than the *ſun* to ſhine at *noon*. * Now as the *infinite Goodneſs* of the deity, obligeth him always to do *good*, ſo by the ſame reaſon to do that which is *beſt*; ſince to omit any degrees of *good* would argue a *defect* in *good-*

neſs, ſuppoſing *wiſdom* to *order*, and *power* to *execute*. He therefore that ſuppoſeth *God* not always to do what is *beſt*, and *beſt* for his *Creatures* (for he cannot act for his own *Good*) apprehends him to be leſs *good* than can be *conceived*, and conſequently not *infinitely ſo*. For what is *infinite*, is beyond *meaſure* and *apprehenſion*.

Therefore to direct this to our purpoſe, *God* being *infinitely good*, and that to his *Creatures*, and therefore doing always what is *beſt* for them, methinks it roundly follows that our *ſouls lived* and 'njoy'd themſelves of *old* before they came into theſe *bodies*. For ſince they were *capable* of *living*, and that in a much *better* and *happier* ſtate long before they deſcended into this *region* of *death* and *miſery*; and ſince that condition of *life* and *ſelf-enjoyment* would have been *better*, than *abſolute not-being*; may we not ſafely conclude from a due conſideration of the *divine goodneſs*, that it was *ſo*? What was it that gave us our *being*, but the *immenſe goodneſs* of our *Maker*? And why were we drawn out of our *nothings*, but becauſe it was *better* for us to *be*, than *not* to *be*? Why were our *ſouls* put into *theſe bodies*, and not into ſome more *ſqualid* and *ugly*; but becauſe we are capable of *ſuch*, and 'tis *better* for us to *live* in *theſe*, than in thoſe that are leſs ſutable to

our

our natures? And had it not been *better* for us, to have injoy'd our ſelves and the bounty and favours of our *Maker* of old, as did the other order of *intellectual* creatures, than to have layn in the comfortleſs *night* of *nothing* till t'other day? Had we not been *better* on't to have lived and acted in the joyful regions of light and bleſſedneſs with thoſe Spirits that at firſt had being, than juſt now to jump into this ſad plight, and ſtate of *ſin* and *wretchedneſs*?

Infinite Power could as well have made us all at once, as the *Angels*; and with as good *congruity* to our *natures* we might have *liv'd* and been happy without theſe bodies, as we ſhall be in the *ſtate* of *ſeparation*: ſince therefore it was *beſt* for us, and as eaſie for our *Creator* ſo to have effected it, where was the *defect*, if it was not ſo? Is not this to ſlurr his *goodneſs*, and to *ſtrait-lace* the *divine beneficence*? And doth not the contrary *Hypotheſis* to what I am pleading for, repreſent the *God* of *Love* as leſs *good* and *bountiful*, than a *charitable* Mortal, who would neglect no opportunity within his reach of doing what good he could to thoſe that want his help and aſſiſtance?

I confeſs, the world generally have ſuch *Narrow* and *unbecoming apprehenſions*

of *God*, and draw his *picture* in their *imaginations* ſo like themſelves, that few I doubt will feel the *force* of this *Argument*; and mine own obſervation makes me enter the ſame ſuſpicion of its ſucceſs that ſome others have who have uſed it. 'Tis only a *very deep ſenſe* of the *divine goodneſs* can give it any *perſwaſive energy*. And this noble ſentiment there are very few that are poſſeſt of. However to lend it what ſtrength I can, I ſhall endeavour to remove ſome *prejudices* that hinder it's force and efficacy; And when thoſe *ſpots* and *ſcum* are *wiped* away, that *miſtake* and *inadvertency* have faſtned on it, 'twill be *illuſtrious* by its own brightneſs.

CHAP.

Chap. VII.

This first Evasion, *that God acts* freely, *and his* meer will *is reason enough for his doing, or forbearing any thing, overthrown by four Considerations. Some incident Evasions,* viz. *that Gods* Wisdom, *or his* glory, *may be contrary to this display of the divine* goodness, *in our being made of old, clearly taken off.*

(1.) THerefore, will some say, God worketh *freely*, nor can he be *obliged* to *act* but when he *pleaseth*. And this *will* and *pleasure* of his is the reason of our *beings*, and of the *determinate* time of our *beginning*. Therefore if *God* would not that we should have been made *sooner*, and in a *better* state of life, his *will* is *reason* enough, and we need look no further. To this evasion, I thus Reply.

(1.) 'Tis true indeed, *God* is the most *Free Agent*, because none can *compel* him

him to *act*, none can *hinder* him from *acting*. Nor can his Creatures oblige him to any thing. But then

(2.) The *divine liberty* and *freedom* conſiſts not in his acting by meer *arbitrarious will*, as disjunct from his other *Attributes*. For he is ſaid to *act* according to the *Counſel* of his own *will*. So that his *wiſdom* and *goodneſs* are as it were the *Rules* whereby his *will* is directed. Therefore though he cannot be *obliged* to act by any thing *without himſelf*, yet he may by the *Laws* of his own *eſſential rectitude* and *perfection*. Wherefore I conceive he is ſaid, *not to be able to do* thoſe things (which he might well enough by *abſolute power*) that conſiſt not with his *ever bleſſed Attributes*. Nor by the ſame reaſon can he *omit* that which the *eternal Law* of his moſt perfect nature *obligeth* him to. The ſumm is, * *God* never *acts* by *meer will* or *groundleſs humour*, *that* is a *weakneſs* in his *imperfect* Creatures; but according to the *immutable Rules* of his ever bleſſed *eſſence*. And therefore,

(3) 'Tis a derogation from his *infinite Majeſty* to aſſert any thing contrary to his *Goodneſs* upon pretence of his *will* and *pleaſure*. For whatever is moſt ſutable to this moſt bleſſed *Attribute*, and contradicts no other; *that* be ſure he *willeth*. Wherefore

(4) If

(4) If it be *better*, and more *agreeable* to the *divine goodneſs* that we ſhould have been in an *happier* ſtate, before we came into theſe *bodies*, *Gods will* cannot then be pretended to the contrary, (eſpecially it having been proved already, that he hath no way *revealed* any ſuch *will* of his) but rather it is demonſtratively clear that his *will* was, *it ſhould be ſo.* Since as God never acts in the abſence of his *wiſdom* and *goodneſs*, ſo neither doth he abſtain from acting when thoſe great *Attributes* require it.

Now if it be excepted again (2) That 'tis true that this *Hypotheſis* is moſt ſutable to the *divine goodneſs*, and the conſideration of that alone would inferr it: But how know we but his *Wiſdom* contradicts it? I return briefly, That if it be confeſt to be ſo correſpondent to, and inferrible from one *Attribute*, and cannot be prov'd *inconſiſtent* with another, my buſineſs is determined. Therefore let thoſe that pretend an inconſiſtence, prove it. (2) The *Wiſdom* of God is that Attribute and *eſſential perfection*, whereby the *divine* actions are *directed* to their *end*, which is always *good*, and *beſt*: Therefore to do that which is *beſt*, cannot thwart the *divine wiſdom*, but always includes and ſuppoſeth it: Whence it follows, that what *ſo* comports with *goodneſs*, cannot ſtand oppoſite to *Wiſdom*.

Wiſdom

Wiſdom in *God* being indeed nothing elſe but *goodneſs*, contriving and directing for the Creature's *good* and happineſs. For we muſt remember, what was ſaid above, that *what is infinitely full and perfect, can have no ends for any ſelf-advantage*; and therefore the *ends* of the *divine wiſdom* are ſomething *without himſelf*, and conſequently *the good and perfection* of his *Creatures*. So that unleſs it can be proved to have been contrary to *ours*, or any other Creatures *good*, that we ſhould have been extant as ſoon as the *Light*, it cannot be concluded to have any *contradiction* to the *divine wiſdom*.

But it will be ſaid again, (3) *Gods glory* is his great end, for the promoting of which his wiſdom *directs* all his Actions; and conſequently, that which may be *beſt* for the *Creature*, may not be ſo conducive to the *divine Glory*, and therefore not agreeable with his *wiſdom*.

Now, though I think the world hath a very miſtaken apprehenſion of *Gods glory*, yet I ſhall not here ingage in more controverſies, than I muſt needs. 'Tis enough for my preſent purpoſe to intimate; That *Gods glory* is no *by-end* or *ſelf-accumulation*, nor an *addition* of any thing to Him which he was not eternally poſſeſt of; nor yet is it any thing that ſtands in oppoſition to the *good* of his *Creation*; But the *diſplay* and *communi-*

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cation of his excellencies; among the which, his *goodneſs* is not the leaſt conſiderable, if it be not that moſt *divine* and *fundamental Attribute* which *gives perfection to all the reſt*. So that we may aſſure our ſelves, that when ever his *goodneſs* obligeth him to action, his *glory* never ſtands in *oppoſition*. For even this is his *glory*, to *communicate* to his creatures ſutably to his own *abſolute fulneſs*, and to act according to the direction of his *eſſential perfections*; yea, though we ſhould ſtate his *glory* to conſiſt alone, in the *honour* and *renown* of his Attributes, yet even then the *Hypotheſis* of our having been made in the *beginning* will accumulate to his *praiſes*, and repreſent him to his creatures as more *illuſtrious*; ſince it is a more *magnificent apprehenſion* of his *goodneſs*, and clears his other *Attributes* from thoſe ſtains of diſ-repute that all other ſuppoſitions caſt upon them. And though his *glory* ſhould conſiſt, as too many fondly imagine, in being *praiſed* and admired by his *creatures*, even on this account alſo it would have obliged him to have *made us all of old*, rather than oppoſed it; ſince, then, his excellencies had been ſung forth by a more numerous *Quire*, in continual *Hallelujahs*. Now if it ſhould be urged, * that *God made all things for himſelf*, and therefore is not obliged to conſult the *good* of his creatures in all his Actions:

ons: I rejoyn, that *God's making all things for himſelf*, can argue no more than his making all things for his own *ends*, *viz.* the *ends* of *goodneſs*. Beſides, the beſt *Criticks* make that place to ſpeak no more but this, That *God orders* all things *according* to *himſelf*; that is, according to the rules of his own *nature* and *perfections*.

Thus then, we ſee that for *God* to do that which is *beſt* for his Creatures, is neither contrary to his *will* and *pleaſure*, his *wiſdom*, nor his *glory*, but moſt conſonant to all of them. And therefore ſince the *Præexiſtence* of *Souls*, is ſo agreeable to the divine *goodneſs*, and ſince nothing elſe in the *Deity* oppoſeth, but rather ſweetly conſpires with it, methinks this argument were enough to conclude it. But yet there are other *Evaſions* which would elude this *Demonſtration*; I ſhall name the moſt conſiderable and leave it to the judicious to determine, whether they can diſable it.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

A ſecond general Evaſion, viz. *that our Reaſons cannot tell what God ſhould do, or what is* beſt, *overthrown by ſeveral conſiderations. As is alſo a third,* viz. *that by the ſame Argument God would have been obliged to have made us* impeccable, *and not liable to* Miſery.

WHerefore the *ſecond* general evaſion is, That our *Reaſons* cannot concludewhat God *ſhould do*, there being vaſt fetches in the *divine wiſdom* which we comprehend not, nor can our *natural light* determine what is beſt. I anſwer (1) Our Saviour himſelf, who was the beſt Judge in the caſe, teacheth us, that the Reaſon of a man may in ſome things conclude what *God will do*, in that ſaying of his, *If ye being evil, know how to give good things to your Children, much more ſhall your Father which is in Heaven give his Spirit to them that ask him*: Plainly intimating, that we may ſecurely

curely argue from any thing that is a *perfection* in our ſelves, to the ſame in *God*. And if we, who are *imperfectly good*, will yet do as much *good* as we can, for thoſe we *love* and *tender*; with greater confidence may we conclude, that *God*, who is *infinitely ſo*, will confer upon his *creatures* whatever *good* they are capable of. Thus we ſee our *Saviour* owns the capacity of *reaſon* in a caſe that is very near the ſame that we are dealing in.

And God himſelf appeals to the *reaſons* of men to judge of the *righteouſneſs* and *equity* of his ways. *Ye men of* Iſrael *and inhabitants of* Jeruſalem, *judge between me and my vineyard*; which place I bring to ſhew that meer natural *reaſon* is able to judge in ſome caſes *what is fit for God to do*, and what is ſutable to his *eſſence* and *perfections*. And if in *any*,

Methinks (2) its *capacity* in the caſe before us ſhould be own'd as ſoon as in any. For if *reaſon* cannot determine and aſſure us, that a *bleſſed* and *happy Being* is *better* than *None* at all; and conſequently, that it was *beſt* for our ſouls to have been, before they were in this *ſtate* of *wretchedneſs*; and thence conclude, that it was very congruous to the *divine goodneſs* to have made us in a former and better condition; I think then (1) That *it* cannot give us the aſſurance of any thing,

ſince

ince there is not any principle in *Metaphy-icks* or *Geometry* more clear than this, viz. *That an happy Being, is better than abſolute Not-eing.* And if our *reaſons* can ſecurely determine his, 'tis as much as we need at preſent. Or f this be not certain, how vain are thoſe Learned men that diſpute whether a ſtate of the extremeſt *miſery* a creature is capable of, and that *everlaſting*, be not *better* than *Non-entity*? (2) If we cannot certainly know that it had been *Better* that we ſhould have exiſted in a life of happineſs, proportion'd to our natures of old, than have been meer *nothing*, till ſome few years ſince; we can never then own and acknowledg the *divine goodneſs* to us in any thing we enjoy. For if it might have been as *good* for us *not to Be*, as *to Be*, and *happily*; Then it might have been as *good* for us to have wanted any thing elſe that we enjoy, as to have it; and conſe-quently, we cannot own it as an effect of God's *goodneſs* that he hath beſtowed any bleſſing on us. For if *Being* be not *better* than *Not-being*, then 'tis no effect of goodneſs that we *are*; and if ſo, then 'tis not from goodneſs that we have any thing elſe, * ſince all other things are inferiour to the good of *Being*. If it be ſaid, It had been better indeed for *us*, to have lived in a *former* and *happier* ſtate; but it may be, it had not been *ſo* for the *univerſe*; and the *general good* is to be pre-

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ferr'd before that of *particulars*;

I ſay then, and it may ſerve for a (3) anſwer to the *general objection*: If we may deny that to be done by *almighty goodneſs*, which is undoubtedly *beſt* for a whole *ſpecies* of his creatures, meerly on this account, that, for ought we know, it may be for the advantage of ſome others, though there be not the leaſt appearance of any ſuch matter; we can never then argue any thing from the *divine goodneſs*. It can never then be prov'd from that *glorious Attribute*, that he hath not made ſome of his creatures *on purpoſe* that they might be *miſerable*; nor can it be concluded thence, that he will not *annihilate* all the *pure* and *ſpotleſs* Angels; both which I ſuppoſe, any ſober inquirer will think congruouſly deducible from the *divine goodneſs*. And if to ſay, *for ought we know*, It may be *beſt* for ſome other creatures, that thoſe ſhould be *miſerable*, and theſe *annihilated*, be enough to diſable the Argument; on the ſame account we ſhall never be able to prove ought from *this*, or any other *Attribute*. I might add,

(2) There is not the leaſt colourable pretence for any ſuch ſuſpicion. For, would the *world* have been too little to have contain'd thoſe *ſouls*, without juſtling with ſome others? or, would they by violence have taken any of the priviledges of the other in-

intellectual Creatures from them? If ſo, how comes it about that at laſt they can all ſo well conſiſt together? And, could other Creatures have been more diſadvantag'd by them, when they were *pure* and *innocent*, than they will at laſt, when they are ſo many of them *debauched* and *depraved*?

(3) If this be enough to anſwer an *Argument*, to ſay, *for ought we know, it may be thus and thus*, when there is not the leaſt ſign or appearance of any ſuch thing, then *nothing* can ever be *proved*, and we are condemned to *everlaſting Scepticiſm*. We ſhould never, for inſtance, from the *order*, *beauty*, and *wiſe contrivance* of the things that do appear, prove there is a *God*, if it were ſufficient to anſwer, That things are indeed ſo made in this *earth*, on which we are extant; but, it may be, they are framed very *odly*, *ridiculouſly*, and *ineptly* in ſome other *worlds*, which we know nothing of. If this be *anſwering*, any thing might be *anſwered*. But there is yet another *objection* againſt mine *Argument* from the Divine *Goodneſs*, which looks very formidably at a diſtance, though when we come near it, we ſhall find, it will not bear the tryal. And it may thus be urged.

(3) If the *Goodneſs* of God always obligeth him to do what is *beſt*, and *beſt* for

his *Creatures*, How is it then, that we were not made *impeccable*, and ſo not *obnoxious* to *miſery*? Or how doth it conſiſt with that overflowing *Goodneſs* of the *Deity*, that we were let to lie in a long ſtate of *ſilence* and *inſenſibility*, before we came into theſe bodies? This ſeems a preſſing difficulty, but yet there's hopes we may diſpatch it. Therefore,

(1) Had we been made *impeccable*, we ſhould have been another kind of Creatures than now; ſince we had then wanted the ἀυτεξούσιον or *liberty* of *will* to *good* and *evil*, which is one of our *eſſential Attributes*. Conſequently, there would have been one *ſpecies* of *beings* wanting to compleat the *univerſe*; and it would have been a *ſturre* to the *divine* Goodneſs not to have given being to ſuch Creatures as in the *Idea* were fairly *poſſible*, and contradicted no other *Attribute*. Yea, though he foreſaw that ſome would *ſin* and make themſelves *miſerable*, yet the foreſeen *lapſe* and *miſery* of thoſe, was not an *evil* great enough to over-ballance the *good* the *ſpecies* would reap by being partakers of the *divine* Goodneſs in the *land of the Living*; Therefore however 'twas goodneſs to give ſuch Creatures being. But it will be urged upon us, If *Liberty* to *good* and *evil* be ſo eſſential to our natures, what think we then of the

bleſſed

blessed souls after the *Resurrection*; are not they the same *Creatures*, though without the *liberty* of *sinning*? To return to this; I think those that affirm, that the blessed have not this *natural liberty*, as long as they are united to a *body*, and are capable of resenting it's *pleasures*, should do well to prove it. * Indeed they may be *morally immutable* and *illapsible*: but this is *grace*, not *nature*; a *reward* of *obedience*, not a necessary *annex* of our *Beings*. But will it be said, why did not the divine Goodness endue us all with this *moral inability*? Had it not been better for us to have been made in this condition of *security*, than in a state so *dangerous*? My return to this doubt will be a second Answer to the main *Objection*.

Therefore *Secondly*, * I doubt not, but that 'tis much *better* for *rational* Creatures, that this supream happiness should be the *Reward* of *vertue*, rather than entail'd upon our *natures*. For the procurement of that which we might have mist of, is far more *sensibly gratifying*, than any *necessary* and unacquired injoyment; we find a greater pleasure in what we gain by *industry*, *art*, or *vertue*, than in the things we were *born* to. And had we been made secure from *sin* and *misery* from the first moment of our *Being*, we should not have put so high a *rate* and *value* upon that priviledge.

(3) Had we been at firſt eſtabliſht in an *impoſſibility* of *lapſing* into *evil*; Then many choice *vertues*, excellent branches of the *divine Life* had never been exercis'd, or indeed have been at all. Such are *Patience*, *Faith*, and *Hope*; the objects of which are, *evil*, *futurity*, and *uncertainty*. Yea,

(4) Had we been ſo *fixt* in an *inamiſſible happineſs* from the *beginning*, there had then been no *vertue* in the world; nor any of that matchleſs *pleaſure* which attends the exerciſe thereof. For *vertue* is a kind of *victory*, and ſuppoſeth a *conflict*. Therefore we ſay, that God is *good* and *holy*, but not *vertuous*. Take away a *poſſibility* of *evil*, and in the *Creature* there is no *moral* goodneſs. And then no *Reward*, no *Pleaſure*, no *Happineſs*.

Therefore in ſum (5ly), The *divine Goodneſs* is manifeſted in making all Creatures ſutably to thoſe *Idea's* of their natures, which he hath in his *All-comprehenſive Wiſdom*. And their *good* and *happineſs* conſiſts in *acting* according to thoſe *natures*, and in being furniſht with all things neceſſary for ſuch *actions*. Now the *divine Wiſdom* is no *arbitrary thing*, that can change, or alter thoſe ſetled *immutable Idea's* of things that are there repreſented. It lopps not off *eſſential Attributes* of ſome *Beings*, to *inculate* them upon others: But diſtinctly comprehending all

all things, assigns each *Being* its proper *nature*, and *qualities*. And the *Divine goodness*, according to the *wise* direction of the *eternal Intellect*, in like distinct and orderly manner produceth all things: *viz.* according to all the variety of their respective *Idea's* in the *divine* wisdom. * Wherefore as the *goodness* of God obligeth him not to make every *Planet* a *fixt Star*, or every *Star* a *Sun*; So neither doth it oblige him to make every degree of *Life*, a rational *Soul*, or every *Soul*, an impeccable *Angel*. * For this were to tye him to *contradictions*. Since therefore, such an order of *Beings*, as *rational* and *happy*, though *free*, and therefore *mutable* creatures, were distinctly comprehended in the *Divine Wisdom*; It was an effect of God's *Goodness*, to bring them into being, even in such a condition, and in such manner, as in their *eternal Idea's* they were represented.

Thus then we see, it is not contrary to the infinite *plenitude* of the *Divine Goodness* * that we should have been made *peccable* and lyable to *defection*. And being thus in our very essential constitutions *lapsible*; 'twas no defect in the goodness of our Maker that he did not interpose by his absolute *omnipotence* to prevent our actual *prævarication* and *apostasie*. Since his goodness obligeth him not to secure us upon any terms whatever, but upon such, as may most promote the general

good and advantage. And queſtionleſs, 'twas much better that ſuch, as would *wilfully* depart from the laws of their bleſſed natures, and break through all reſtraints of the divine commands, ſhould feel the ſmart of their *diſobedience*; than that *providence* ſhould diſorder the conſtitution of nature to prevent the puniſhment, which they drew upon themſelves: Since thoſe *apoſtate* ſpirits remain inſtances to thoſe that ſtand, of the *divine juſtice*, and *ſeverity* againſt *ſinners*, and ſo may contribute not a little to their *ſecurity*. And for that long *night* of *ſilence*, in which multitudes of ſouls are buried before they deſcend into *terreſtrial matter*, it is but the due reward of their former diſobedience; for which, conſidering the *happy circumſtances* in which they were made, they deſerv'd to be nothing for ever. And their re-inſtating in a condition of *life* and ſelf-injoyment after ſo highly culpable *delinquencies*, is a great inſtance of the over-flowing fulneſs of the divine *compaſſion* and *benignity*.

Thus then we ſee, That Gods making us *lapſible* and permitting us to *fall*, is no prejudice in the leaſt to the infinite fecundity of his *goodneſs*, and his making all things *beſt*. So that mine Argument for *Præexiſtence* bottom'd on this Foundation, ſtands yet firm and immoveable, notwithſtanding the rude aſſault of this *objection*. From which I paſs to a *fourth*.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

A (4th.) Objection *againſt the Argument from* God's goodneſs, viz. *That it will conclude as well that the* World *is* infinite *and* eternal, *Anſwered. The concluſion of the* ſecond Argument *for* Præexiſtence.

THerefore fourthly, it will be excepted, If we may argue from the *divine goodneſs*, which always doth what is *beſt*, for the *Præexiſtence* of *Souls*; then we may as reaſonably thence conclude, that the *world* is both *infinite* and *eternal*, ſince an *infinite communication* of goodneſs is *better* than a *finite*. To this, becauſe I doubt I have diſtreſt the Readers patience already, I *anſwer* briefly.

(1) Every one that believes the *infiniteneſs* of Gods *goodneſs* is as much obliged to anſwer this *objection*, as I am. For it will be ſaid, *infinite goodneſs* doth *good infinitely*, and conſequently the *effects* to which it doth *communicate* are *infinite*. For if they are not ſo, it might have *communicated* to more, and thereby have done more *good*, than now

'tis ſuppoſed to do, and by conſequence now is not *infinite*. And to affirm that goodneſs is *infinite*, where what it doth and intends to do is but *finite*, will be ſaid to be a *contradiction*, ſince *goodneſs* is a *relative* term, and in God always reſpects ſomewhat *ad extra*. For he cannot be ſaid to be *good* to himſelf, he being a nature that can receive no *additional perfection*. Wherefore this *Objection* makes no more againſt mine *Argument*, than it doth againſt the *Infinity* of the *Divine Goodneſs*, and therefore I am no more concern'd in it than others. Yea (2 *ly.*) the Scripture affirms that which is the very ſtrength of mine Argument, *viz.* That God made all things beſt; *Very Good*, ſaith our Tranſlation: but the *Original*, טוב מאד; and מאד is a *particle* of the *Superlative*. And therefore every one that owns its ſacred *Authority* is intereſted againſt this *Objection*. For it urgeth, it had been far more *ſplendid*, *glorious*, and *magnificent* for God to have made the *univerſe commenſurate* to his own *immenſity*; and to have produced *effects* of his *power* and *greatneſs*, where ever he himſelf is, *viz.* in *infinite ſpace* and *duration*, than to have confined his *omnipotence* to work only in one little *ſpot* of an *infinite inane capacity*, and to begin to act but t'other day. Thus then the late *creation*, and *finiteneſs*, of the *World*, ſeem to conflict with the undoubted *oracle* of

truth

truth as well as with mine *Argument*, and therefore the *Objection* drawn thence is of no *validity*. (3) Thoſe that have moſt ſtrenuouſly defended the orthodox doctrine againſt the *old opinion* of the *eternity* and *infinity* of the world, * have aſſerted it to be *impoſſible* in the *nature* of the *thing*. And ſure the *divine benignity* obligeth him not to do *contradictions*; or ſuch things, as in the very *notion* of them, are *impoſſible*. But in the caſe of *Præexiſtence*, no ſuch thing can be reaſonably pretended, as above hath been declared; and therefore there is no eſcaping by this *Evaſion neither*. Nor can there any thing elſe be urged to this purpoſe, but what whoever believes the *infinity* of the *divine bounty* will be concern'd to anſwer; And therefore 'twill make no more againſt me, than againſt a truth on all hands confeſſed. Let me only add this, That 'tis more becoming us, to inlarge our *apprehenſions* of things ſo, as that they may ſuit the *Divine Beneficence*, than to draw *it* down to a complyance with our *little ſchemes*, and *narrow models*.

Thus then I have done with the *Argument* for *Præexiſtence* drawn from the *Divine Goodneſs*. And I have been the longer on it, becauſe I thought 'twas in vain to propoſe it, without taking to task the *principal* of thoſe *objections*, that muſt needs ariſe in the minds of thoſe that are not uſed to this *way* of *arguing*.

And

And while there was no proviſion made to ſtop up thoſe *Evaſions*, that I ſaw this *Argument* obnoxious to; the uſing of it, I was afraid, would have been a *prejudice*, rather than a *furtherance* of the *cauſe* I ingaged it in. And therefore I hope the ingenious will pardon this ſo neceſſary piece of tediouſneſs.

CHAP. X.

A third Argument for Præexiſtence, *from the great variety of mens* ſpeculative *inclinations; and alſo the diverſity of our* Genius's, *copiouſly urged. If theſe Arguments make Præexiſtence but probable, 'tis enough to gain it the* Victory.

BUt now I proceed to another *Argument*. Therefore, *Thirdly*, If we do but reflect upon what was ſaid above, againſt the Souls *daily Creation*, from that *enormous pravity* which is ſo *deeply rooted* in ſome mens *natures*, we may thence have a conſiderable evidence of *Præexiſtence*. For as this ſtrong *natural propenſity* to *vice* and *impiety* cannot poſſibly conſiſt with the *Hypotheſis* of the *ſouls* coming juſt out of Gods hands *pure* and *im-*

immaculate; ſo doth it moſt aptly ſuit with the doctrine of its *præexiſtence*: which gives a moſt clear and appoſite account of the *phænomenon*. For let us but conceive the Souls of men to have grown *degenerate* in a former *condition* of *life*, * to have contracted ſtrong and inveterate *habits* to vice and lewdneſs, and that in various manners and degrees; we may then eaſily apprehend, when ſome mens *natures* had ſo incredibly a *depraved tincture*, and ſuch *impetuous*, *ungovernable*, *irreclaimable inclinations* to what is vitious; while others have nothing near ſuch wretched propenſions, but by good *education* and good *diſcipline* are *mouldable* to *vertue*; This ſhews a clear way to *unriddle* this *amazing myſtery*, without blemiſhing any of the *divine Attributes*, or doing the leaſt *violence* to our *faculties*.

Nor is it more difficult to conceive, how a *ſoul* ſhould awaken out of the *ſtate* of *inactivity* we ſpeak of, with thoſe *radical inclinations* that by long practice it had contracted, * than how a *Swallow* ſhould return to her old trade of living after her winter *ſleep* and *ſilence*; for thoſe *cuſtoms* it hath been addicted to in the other ſtate, are now ſo deeply faſtened and rooted in the *ſoul*, that they are become even *another nature*.

Now then, if *Præexiſtence* be not the truth, 'tis very ſtrange that it ſhould ſo exactly

actly anſwer the *Phænomena* of our natures, when as no other *Hypotheſis* doth any whit tolerably ſuit them. And if we may conclude that falſe, which is ſo correſpondent to all *appearances*, when we know nothing elſe that can yield any probable account of them, and which is not in the leaſt *repugnant* to any *inducement* of belief, we then ſtrangely forget our ſelves when we *determine* any thing. We can never for inſtance, conclude the *Moon* to be the cauſe of the *flux* and *reflux* of the Sea, from the anſwering of her *approaches* and *receſſes* to its *ebbs* and *ſwellings*. Nor at this rate can the cauſe of any thing elſe be determined in nature.

But yet beſides, (2) we might another way inforce this *Argument*, from the ſtrange difference and diverſity that there is in mens *wits* and *intellectual craſeis*, as well as in the diſpoſitions of their *wills* and *appetites*. Even the natural tempers of mens *minds* are as vaſtly different, as the *qualities* of their *bodies*. And 'tis eaſie to obſerve in things purely *ſpeculative* and *intellectual*, even where neither *education* or *cuſtom* have interpoſed to ſophiſticate the natural νοήματα, that ſome men are ſtrangely *propenſe* to ſome *opinions*, which they greedily drink in, as ſoon as they are duly repreſented; yea, and find themſelves burthened and oppreſt, while their *education* hath kept them in a *contrary belief*, * when

as

as *others* are as fatally ſet againſt theſe *opinions*, and can never be brought favourably to reſent them.

Every *Soul* brings a kind of *ſenſe* with it into the world, whereby it *taſtes* and *reliſheth* what is ſuitable to its peculiar *temper*. And *notions* will never lie eaſily in a mind, that they are not fitted to; ſome can never apprehend *that* for other than *an Abſurdity*, which others are ſo clear in, that they almoſt take it for a *Firſt Principle*. And yet the former hath all the ſame evidence as the latter. This I have remarkably taken notice of, in the opinion of the *extenſion* of a *ſpirit*. Some that I know, and thoſe *inquiſitive*, *free*, and *ingenuous*, by all the proof and evidence that is, cannot be reconciled to it. Nor can they conceive any thing *extended*, but as a *Body*. Whereas other deep and impartial ſearchers into nature, cannot apprehend *it* any thing at all, if not *extended*; but think it muſt then be a *mathematical point*, or a meer non-entity.

I could inſtance in other ſpeculations, which I have obſerv'd ſome to be paſſionate Embracers of upon the firſt propoſal; when as no arguments could prevail on others, to think them tolerable. But there needs no proof of a manifeſt obſervation.

Therefore before I go further, I would demand, whence comes this meer *notional* or

ſpecu-

speculative variety? * Were his *difference* about *sensibles*, yea, or about things depending on the *imagination*, the *influence* of the body might then be suspected for a *cause*. But since it is in the most *abstracted Theories* that have nothing to do with the grosser *phantasmes*; since this *diversity* is found in *minds* that have the greatest care to free themselves from the *deceptions* of *sense*, and intanglements of the body, what can we conclude, but that the soul it self is the *immediate* subject of all this *variety*, and that it came *prejudiced* and *præpossessed* into this *body* with some *implicit notions* that it had learnt in another? And if this *congruity* to some *opinions*, and averseness to others be *congenial* to us, and not *advenient* from any thing in *this state*, 'tis methinks clear that we were in a former. * For the *Soul* in its *first* and *pure* nature hath no *idiosyncrasies*, that is, hath no *proper* natural inclinations which are not competent to others of the same kind and condition. Be sure, they are not fatally *determin'd* by their natures to *false* and *erroneous apprehensions*. And therefore since we find this determination to one or other falshood in many, if not most in this state, and since 'tis very unlikely 'tis derived *only* from the *body*, *custom*, or *education*, what can we conceive on't, but that our Souls were tainted with these *peculiar* and *wrong corruptions*

ons before we were *extant* upon this *ſtage of Earth*?

Beſides, 'tis eaſie to obſerve the ſtrange and wonderful *variety* of our *genius's*; one mans nature inclining him to one kind of ſtudy and imployment, anothers to what is very different. Some almoſt from their very *cradles* will be addicted to the making of figures, and in little *mechanical* contrivances; others love to be *riming* almoſt as ſoon as they can ſpeak plainly, and are taken up in ſmall eſſays of *Poetry*. Some will be ſcrawling *Pictures*, and others take as great delight in ſome pretty offers at *Muſick* and *vocal harmony*. Infinite almoſt are the ways in which this *pure natural diverſity* doth diſcover it ſelf. * Now to ſay that all this variety proceeds primarily from the meer *temper* of our *bodies*, is me thinks a very poor and unſatisfying Account. * For thoſe that are the moſt like in the *Temper*, *Air*, *Complexion* of their bodies, are yet of a vaſtly differing *Genius*. Yea, they that have been made of the ſame clay, caſt in the ſame mould, and have layn at once in the ſame natural bed, the womb; yea whoſe bodies have been as like as their ſtate and fortunes, and their *education* and uſages the ſame, yet even they do not unfrequently differ as much from each other in their *genius* and *diſpoſitions* of the *mind*, as thoſe that in all theſe par-

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ticulars are of very different condition. Beſides, there are all kind of *makes*, *forms*, *diſpoſitions*, *tempers*, and *complexions* of *body*, that are addicted by their natures to the ſame *exerciſes* and *imployments*: ſo that to aſcribe *this* to any *peculiarity* in the *body*, is me ſeems a very improbable ſolution of the *Phænomenon*. And to ſay all theſe *inclinations* are from *cuſtom* or *education*, is the way not to be believed, ſince all experience teſtifies the contrary.

What then can we conjecture is the cauſe of all this *diverſity*, but that we had taken a great *delight* and *pleaſure* in ſome things *like* and *analogous* unto theſe, in a former condition, which now again begins to put forth it ſelf, when we are awakened out of our *ſilent* receſs into a ſtate of *action*? And though the *imployments*, *pleaſures* and *exerciſes* of our former *life*, were without queſtion very different from theſe in the preſent eſtate; yet 'tis no doubt, but that ſome of them were more *conſamiliar* and *analogous* to ſome of our *tranſactions*, than others: ſo that as any exerciſe or imployment here is more ſuitable to the particular diſpoſitions that were prædominant in the other ſtate, with the more peculiar kindneſs is it regarded by us, and the more greedily do our inclinations now faſten on it. Thus if a *Muſician* ſhould be interdicted the uſe of all *muſical* inſtruments, and

yet

yet might have his choice of any other Art or Profeſſion, 'tis likely he would betake himſelf to *Limning* or *Poetry*; theſe exerciſes requiring the ſame *diſpoſition* of *wit* and *genius*, as his beloved *Muſick* did. And *we* in like manner, being by the fate of our wretched *deſcent* hindred from the direct exerciſing our ſelves about the objects of our former *delights* and *pleaſures*, do yet as ſoon as we are able, take to thoſe things which do moſt correſpond to that *genius* that formerly inſpired us.

And now 'tis time to take leave of the *Arguments* from *Reaſon* that give evidence for *Præexiſtence*. If any one think that they are not ſo *demonſtrative*, but that they may be *anſwered*, or at leaſt *evaded*; I pray him to conſider how many demonſtrations he ever met with, that a good wit, reſolv'd in a contrary cauſe, could not ſhuffle from the edge of. Or, let it be granted, that the *Arguments* I have alledged are no *infallible* or *neceſſary proofs*; yet if they render my *cauſe* but *probable*, yea but *poſſible*, I have won what I contended for. For it having been made manifeſt by as good evidence as I think can be brought for any thing, that the way of *new creations* is moſt *inconſiſtent* with the *honor* of the bleſſed *Attributes* of *God*: And that the other of *Traduction* is moſt *impoſſible* and *contradictious* in the *nature* of *things*:

*There being now no other way left but *Præexiſtence*, if *that* be *probable* or but barely *poſſible*, 'tis enough to give it the *victory*. And whether all that hath been ſaid prove ſo much or no, I leave to the *indifferent* to determine. I think he that will ſay it doth not, can bring few proofs for any thing, which according to his way of judging will deſerve to be called *Demonſtrations*.

CHAP. XI.

Great caution to be uſed in alledging Scripture for our ſpeculative opinions. The countenance *that* Præexiſtence *hath from the* ſacred writings *both of the* old *and* new *Teſtament; Reaſons of the ſeeming uncouthneſs of theſe allegations.* Præexiſtence *ſtood in no need of* Scripture-proof.

IT will be next expected, that I ſhould now prove the Doctrine I have undertaken for, by *Scripture evidence*, and make good what I ſaid above, That the *divine oracles* are not ſo ſilent in this matter as is imagined. But truly I have ſo tender a ſenſe of the ſacred Authority of that *Holy volume*, that I dare not be ſo *bold* with it, as to *force* it to ſpeak what I think *it intends* not; A *preſumption*, that is too common among our con-

confident *opinioniſts*, and that hath occaſioned great troubles to the *Church*, and diſrepute to the *inſpired* writings. For, for men to aſcribe the *odd* notions of their *over-heated* imaginations to *the Spirit of God*, and *eternal truth*, is me thinks a very bold and impudent *belying* it. Wherefore I dare not but be very *cautious* what I ſpeak in this matter, nor would I willingly urge *Scripture* as a proof of any thing, but what I am ſure by the *whole tenor* of it, is therein contained: And would I take the *liberty* to fetch in every thing for a *Scripture-evidence*, that with a little *induſtry* a man might make *ſerviceable* to his deſign; I doubt not but I ſhould be able to *fill* my *Margent* with *Quotations*, which ſhould be as much to *purpoſe* as have been cited in general *CATECHISMS* and *CONFESSIONS* of *FAITH*, and that in points that muſt forſooth be dignified with the ſacred title of *FUNDAMENTAL*. But *Reverend ASSEMBLIES* may make more bold with Scripture than *private perſons*; And therefore I confeſs I'm ſo *timorous* that I durſt not follow their example: Though in a matter that I would never have *impoſed* upon the belief of any man, though I were *certain* on't, and had *abſolute* power to enjoyn it. I think the only way to preſerve the *reverence* due to the *oracles* of *Truth*, is never to urge their

Authority but in things very *momentous*, and ſuch as the whole *current* of them gives an *evident ſuffrage* to. But to make them ſpeak every *trivial* conceit that our ſick brains can imagine or *dream* of, (as I intimated) is to *viliſie* and *deflowre* them. Therefore though I think that ſeveral *Texts* of *Scripture* look very fairly upon *Præexiſtence*, and would encourage a man, that conſiders what ſtrong *Reaſons* it hath to back it, to think, that very *probably* they mean ſome thing in *favour* of this *Hypotheſis*; yet I'le not urge them as an *irrefutable* proof, being not willing to lay more ſtreſs upon any thing than it will bear. Yea, I am moſt willing to *confeſs* the *weakneſs* of my *Cauſe* in what joynt ſoever I ſhall diſcover it. And yet I muſt needs ſay, that whoever compares the *Texts* that follow, with ſome particulars mention'd in the *anſwer* to the objection of *Scripture-ſilence*, will not chuſe but acknowledge that there is very fair probability for *Præexiſtence* in the *written* word of God, as there is in that which is *engraven* upon our rational *natures*. Therefore to bring together here what *Scripture* ſaith in this *matter*,

1. I'le lightly *touch* an *expreſſion* or two of the *old* Teſtament, which not *improperly* may be applyed to the buſineſs we are in ſearch of. And methinks God himſelf in his *poſing* the

the great inſtance of patience, *Job*, ſeems to intimate ſomewhat to this purpoſe, *viz.* that all *ſpirits* were in being when the *Foundations* of the *earth* were laid: when ſaith he, *the morning ſtars ſang together, and all the Sons of God ſhouted for joy.* By the *former* very likely were meant the *Angels*, and 'tis not improbable but by the latter may be intended the bleſſed untainted *Souls*. At leaſt the particle *All* me thinks ſhould comprize *this* order of ſpirits alſo. And within the ſame *period* of diſcourſe, having queſtion'd *Job* about the nature and place of the *Light*, he adds, *I know that thou waſt then born, for the number of thy days are many*, as the *Septuagint* render it. * And we know our *Saviour* and his *Apoſtles* have given credit to that *Tranſlation* by their ſo conſtant following it. Nor doth that ſaying of God to *Jeremias* in the beginning of his *charge* ſeem to *intimate* leſs, *Before I formed thee in the Belly I knew thee, and before thou cameſt out of the womb I gave thee wiſdom*; * as reads a very *creditable verſion.* Now though each of theſe places might be drawn to *another* ſenſe, yet that only argues that they are no neceſſary proof for *Præexiſtence*, which I readily acknowledge; nor do I intend any ſuch matter by alledging them. However I hope they will be *confeſt* to be *applicable* to *this* ſenſe; and if there be *other* grounds that

ſwade this *Hypotheſis* to be the *truth*, 'tis I think very probable that theſe Texts *intend* it *favour*, which whether it be ſo or no, we have ſeen already.

2. For the Texts of the *New* Teſtament that ſeem to look pleaſingly upon *Præexiſtence*, I ſhall as briefly *hint* them as I did the *former*. * And *me thinks* that paſſage of our *Saviours* prayer, *Father, Glorifie me with the ſame glory I had with thee before the world began*, ſounds ſomewhat to this purpoſe.

The glory which he prays to be *reſtored* to, ſeems to concern his *humane* nature only; for the *divine* could never loſe it. And therefore it *ſuppoſeth* that he was in his *humanity* exiſtent *before*: And that his *ſoul* was of *old* before his *appearance* in a *Terreſtrial* body. Which ſeems alſo to be intimated * by the expreſſions of his *coming from the Father, deſcending from Heaven*, and *returning thither* again, which he very frequently makes uſe of. And we know the *Divinity* that fills *all* things, cannot *move to*, or *quit* a place, it being a manifeſt *imperfection*, and contrary to his *Immenſity*.

I might add thoſe other expreſſions of our Saviour's taking upon him the *form* of a *Servant*, of *rich* for our ſakes becoming *poor*, and many others of like *import*, all which are very clear if we *admit* the doctrine of *Præexiſtence*, but *without* it ſomewhat *perplex*

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and *intricate*: since these things, applyed to him as *God*, are very *improper* and *disagreeing*, but *appositely* suit his *Humanity*, to which if we refer them, we must suppose our *Hypothesis* of *Præexistence*. But I omit further *prosecution* of this matter, * since these places have been more *diffusely* urged in a *late discourse* to this purpose.

Moreover the *Question* of the Disciples, **Was it for this mans sin, or for his Fathers that he was born blind?* and that *answer* of theirs to our Saviours demand, whom men said he was; in that some said he was *John* the *Baptist*, some *Elias*, or one of the *Prophets*; both which I have mentioned before; do clearly enough argue, that both the *Disciples* and the *Jews* believed *Præexistence*. And our Saviour saith not a *word* to disprove their *opinion*. But I spake of this above.

Now however *uncouth* these *allegations* may seem to those that never heard these Scriptures *thus interpreted*; yet I am confident, had the opinion of *Præexistence* been a received Doctrine, and had these Texts been *wont* to be applyed to the proof on't, they would then have been *thought* to assert it, with clear and convictive *evidence*. But many having never heard of this *Hypothesis*, and those that have, seldom meeting it mentioned but as a *silly dream* or *antiquated* absurdity, 'tis no wonder that they never suspect

pect it to be *lodg'd* in the *Sacred volume*, ſo that any attempt to confirm it *thence*, muſt needs ſeem rather an offer of *wit* than ſerious *judgment*. And the *places* that are cited to that purpoſe having been frequently read and heard of, by thoſe that never diſcerned them to *breath* the leaſt *air* of any ſuch matter as *Præexiſtence*, their *new* and *unexpected* application to a thing ſo *little* thought of, muſt needs ſeem a *wild* fetch of an *extravagant* imagination. But however *unconcluſive* the *Texts* alledged may ſeem to thoſe a ſtrong *prejudice* hath ſhut up againſt the *Hypotheſis*; The *learned* Jews, who were perſwaded of this *Doctrine*, thought it clearly enough contain'd in the *Old* Volume of holy writ, and took the *citations*, named above, for current Evidence. And though I cannot *warrant* for their *Judgment* in *things*, yet doubtleſs they were the *beſt* Judges of their own *Language*. Nor would our School-Doctors have thought it ſo much a ſtranger to the *New*, had it had the luck to have been one of their *opinions*, or did they not too frequently apply the *ſacred Oracles* to their own fore-conceived *notions*.

But whether what I have brought from *Scripture* prove any thing or nothing, 'tis not very material, ſince the *Hypotheſis* of *Præexiſtence* ſtands ſecure enough upon thoſe *Pillars* of *Reaſon*, which have their *Foun-*

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dation in the *Attributes* of God, and the *Phænomena* of the world. And the *Right Reason* of a Man, is one of the *Divine* volumes, in which are written the indeleble *Idea's* of eternal Truth: ſo that what it dictates, is as much the voice of God, as if in ſo many words it were clearly *expreſt* in the *written Revelations*. It is enough therefore for my purpoſe, if there be nothing in the *ſacred* writings contrary to this *Hypotheſis*; which I think is made clear enough already; and though it be granted that *Scripture* is abſolutely *ſilent* as to any aſſertion of *Præexiſtence*, yet we have made it appear that its having ſaid nothing of it, is no *prejudice, but an advantage to the cauſe.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Why the Author thinks himſelf obliged to deſcend to ſome more particular Account of Præexiſtence. *'Tis preſumption poſitively to determine how it was with us of* Old. *The Authors deſign in the* Hypotheſis *that follows.*

NOw becauſe inability to apprehend the *manner of a Thing* is a great prejudice againſt the belief on't; I find my ſelf obliged to go a little further than the bare proof, and defence of *Præexiſtence.* For though what I have ſaid, may poſſibly induce ſome to think favourably of our *concluſion*, That *the ſouls of men were made before they came into theſe bodies*; yet while they ſhall think that nothing can be *conceived* of that *former ſtate*, and that our Præexiſtent condition cannot be repreſented to Humane Underſtanding, but as a *dark black* ſolitude: it muſt needs weaken the perſwaſion of thoſe that are leſs confirmed, and fill the minds of the inquiſitive with a dubious trouble

trouble and Anxiety. For ſearching and contemplative Heads cannot be ſatisfied to be told, That our *ſouls have lived and acted in a former condition*, except they can be helpt to ſome more *particular* apprehenſion of that *State*; How we lived and acted of *old*, and how probably we *fell* from that *better life*, into this Region of miſery and imperfection.

Now though indeed my Charity would prompt me to do what I can for the relief and eaſe of any modeſt Inquirer; yet ſhall I not attempt to ſatisfie punctual and eager *curioſity* in things *hidden* and *unſearchable*. Much leſs ſhall I poſitively determine any thing in matters ſo lubricous and uncertain. And indeed conſidering how imperfect our now *ſtate* is, how miſerable ſhallow our underſtandings are, and how little we know of our preſent ſelves, and the things about us, it may ſeem a deſperate undertaking to attempt any thing in this matter. Yea, when we contemplate the vaſt *circuits* of the *Divine Wiſdom*, and think how much the thoughts and actions of *Eternity* and *Omniſcience* are beyond ours, *who are but of Yeſterday, and know nothing*, it muſt needs diſcourage Confidence it ſelf from determining, how the *Oeconomy* of the *world* of *life* was order'd, in the day the *Heavens* and *Earth* were framed. There are doubtleſs infinite

ways

ways and methods according to which the unſearchable wiſdom of our Maker could have diſpoſed of us, which we can have no conceit of; And we are little more capable of unerringly reſolving our ſelves now, how it was with us of old, than a Child in the womb is to determine, what kind of life it ſhall live when it is ſet at liberty from that *dark incloſure.* Therefore let ſhame and bluſhing cover his face that ſhall confidently affirm that 'twas *thus* or *thus* with us in the *ſtate* of our *Fore-Beings.*

However, to ſhew that it may have been that our *Souls* did *Præexiſt*, though we cannot punctually and certainly conclude upon the *Particular State*, I ſhall preſume to draw up a conceivable *Scheme* of the *Hypotheſis*; And if our narrow minds can think of a way how it might have been, I hope no body will deny that the *divine wiſdom* could have contriv'd it ſo, or infinitely better than we can imagin in our little models.

And now I would not have it thought that I go about to inſinuate or repreſent any opinions of my own, or that I am a votary to all the notions I make uſe of, whether of the *Antient*, or more modern *Philoſophers.* For I ſeriouſly profeſs againſt all determinations in this kind. But my buſineſs only is, by ſome imperfect hints and gueſſes to help to apprehend a little how the ſtate of

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Præexiſtence might have been, and ſo to let in ſome beams of *ancient* and *modern light* upon this *immenſe* darkneſs. * Therefore let the Reader if he pleaſe call it a *Romantick Scheme*, or *imaginary Hypotheſis*, or what name elſe beſt fits his *Phancy*, and he'l not offend me; Nor do I hold my ſelf concern'd at all to vindicate the truth of any thing here that is the fruit of mine own invention or compoſure; Though I confeſs I could beg civilities at leaſt for the notions I have borrowed from great and worthy Sages. And indeed the *Hypotheſis* as to the main, is derived to us from the *Platoniſts*: though in their writings 'tis but *Gold* in *Oar*, leſs pure and perfect: But a late great Artiſt hath excellently refined it. And I have not much work to do, but to bring together what he up and down hath ſcattered, and by a method-order, and ſome connexions and notions of mine own, to work it into an intire and uniform maſs.

Now becauſe the Frame of the *particular Hypotheſis* is originally *Philoſophical*, I ſhall therefore not deprave it by mingling with it the opinions of *modern Theologers*, or diſtort any thing to make it accommodate to their *dogmata*, but ſolely and ſincerely follow the light of *Reaſon* and *Philoſophy*. For I intend not to endeavour the late alteration of the ordinary *Syſteme* of *Divinity*, nor deſign any thing

thing in this place but a repreſentation of ſome harmleſs *Philoſophical* conjectures: In which I ſhall continually guide my ſelf by the Attributes of *God*, the *Phænomena* of the *world*, and the beſt diſcoveries of the *nature* of the *ſoul*.

CHAP. XIII.

(7) Pillars on which the particular *Hypotheſis* ſtands.

NOw the *Fabrick* we are going to build, will ſtand like as the *Houſe* of *Wiſdom* upon *ſeven* Pillars; which I ſhall firſt erect and eſtabliſh, that the *Hypotheſis* may be firm and ſure like a Houſe that hath Foundations. Therefore the *firſt Fundamental Principle* I ſhall lay, is this

First Pillar.

(1) *All the Divine designs and actions are laid and carried on by pure and infinite Goodness.*

AND methinks this should be owned by all for a manifest and indisputable Truth; But some odd opinions in the world are an interest against it, and therefore I must be fain to prove it. Briefly then, Every *rational* Being acts towards some *end* or other; That *end* where the *Agent* acts *regularly* and *wisely*, is either some *self-good* or accomplishment, or 'tis the *good* and *perfection* of some thing else, at least in the *intention.* Now *God* being an *absolute* and *immense fulness*, that is incapable of any the least shadow of *new perfection*, cannot act for any *good* that may accrue to his *immutable self*; and consequently, whatever he acts, is for the good of some other *Being*: so that all the *divine actions* are the *communications* of his *perfections*, and the issues of his *Goodness*; which, being without the base alloy of *self-interest*, or *partial fondness*, and not comprised within any bounds or limits, as his

his other *perfections* are not, but far beyond our narrow conception, we may well call it *pure* and *infinite benignity*. This is the *original* and *root* of all things, so that this blessed, ever blessed *Attribute* being the *Spring* and *Fountain* of all the *Actions* of the Deity, his designs can be no other but the *contrivances* of *Love* for the compassing the *good* and *perfection* of the *universe*. Therefore to suppose God to *act* or *design* any thing that is not for the good of his Creatures, is either to phancy him to *act* for no *end* at all, or for an *end* that is contrary to his *benign Nature*. Finally therefore, the very *notion* of *infinitefulness* is to be *communicating* and *overflowing*; And the most congruous apprehension that we can entertain of the *Infinite* and *eternal Deity*, is * to conceive him as an *immense* and all *glorious Sun*, that is continually *communicating* and sending abroad its *beams* and *brightness*; which conception of our Maker, if 'twere deeply imprinted on us, would I am confident set our apprehensions right in many *Theories*, and chase away those *black* and *dismal* notions which too many have given harbour to. But I come to erect the

Second

Second Pillar.

(2) Then, *There is an exact* Geometrical Justice *that runs through the Universe, and is interwoven in the* contexture *of things.*

THis is a result of that wise and Almighty *Goodness* that præsides over all things. For this *Justice* is but the *distributing* to every thing according to the requirements of its nature. And that *benign wisdom* that contrived and framed the natures of all Beings, doubtless so provided that they should be suitably furnisht with all things proper for their respective conditions.

And that this *Nemesis* should be twisted into the very *natural constitutions* of things themselves, is methinks very reasonable; since questionless, *Almighty Wisdom* could so perfectly have formed his works at first, as that all things that he saw were *regular*, *just*, and for the good of the *Universe*, should have been brought about by those *stated Laws*, which we call *nature*; without an ordinary engagement of *absolute power* to effect them.

And it ſeems to me to be very becoming the wiſe Author of all things ſo to have made them in the beginning, as that by their own *internal ſpring and wheels*, they ſhould orderly bring about whatever he intended them for, without his often *immediate* interpoſal. For this looks like a more magnificent apprehenſion of the *Divine power* and *Preſcience*, ſince it ſuppoſeth him from everlaſting ages to have *foreſeen* all *future* occurrences, and ſo wonderfully to have ſeen and conſtituted the great *machina* of the *world*, that the *infinite* variety of *motions* therein, ſhould effect nothing but what in his *eternal wiſdom* he had concluded *fit* and *decorous*: But as for that which was *ſo*, it ſhould as certainly be compaſt by the *Laws* he appointed long ago, as if his *omnipotence* were at work every *moment*. On the contrary, to engage *Gods abſolute* and extraordinary *power*, in all *events* and *occurrences* of things, is meſeems to think meanly of his *wiſdom*; as if he had made the world ſo, as that it ſhould need *omnipotence* every now and then to mend it, or to bring about thoſe his deſtinations, which by a ſhorter way he could have effected, by his *inſtrument Nature*. Can any one ſay that our *ſuppoſition* derogates from the *Divine concourſe* or *Providence*? For on theſe, depend continually both the being and operations of all things,

ſince

ſince without them they would ceaſe to *act*, and return to their *old nothing*. And doubtleſs God hath not given the ordering of things out of his own hands; but holds the *power*, to *alter*, *innovate*, or change the courſe of nature as he pleaſeth. And to act by extraordinary means, by *abſolute omnipotence*, when he thinks fit to do ſo.

The ſum of what I intend, is, that Gods *works* are perfect; and as his *Goodneſs* is diſcover'd in them, ſo is his *Juſtice* wrought into their very *eſſential conſtitutions*: ſo that we need not ſuppoſe him to be *immediately* engaged in every event and all diſtributions of things in the world, or upon all occaſions to exerciſe his *power* in *extraordinary* actions, but that he leaves ſuch managements to the *Oeconomy* of *ſecond cauſes*. And now *next* to this, (for they are of kin) I raiſe

The third Pillar.

(3) *Things are carried to their proper place and ſtate, by the* congruity *of their natures; where this fails, we may ſuppoſe ſome arbitrary managements.*

THE *Congruity* of *things* is their ſuitableneſs to ſuch or ſuch a ſtate or condition; And 'tis a great *Law* in the *Divine* and firſt *conſtitutions*, that things ſhould incline and move to what is ſuitable to their natures. This in *ſenſibles* is evident in the motions of *conſent* and *ſympathy*. And the *aſcent* of *light*, and *deſcent* of *heavy* bodies, muſt I doubt when all is done, * be reſolv'd into a *principle* that is not meerly corporeal. Yea, ſuppoſing all ſuch things to be done by the *Laws* of *Mechanicks*, why may we not conceive, that the other rank of Beings, *Spirits*, which are not ſubject to corporeal *motions*, are alſo diſpos'd of by a *Law* proper to their natures, which ſince we have no other name to expreſs it by, we may call *congruity*? We read in the ſacred *Hiſtory* that *Judas* went to his *own* place; And 'tis very probable that *Spirits* are conveyed to their proper

proper *ſtates* and *reſidence*, * as *naturally* as the *fire* mounts, or a *ſtone* deſcends. The *Platoniſts* would have the *Soul* of the *world* to be the great *Inſtrument* of all ſuch *diſtributions*, as alſo of the *Phænomena*, that are beyond the *powers* of *matter*: And 'tis no unlikely *Hypotheſis*: But I have no need to ingage further about this: nor yet to ſpeak more of this firſt part of my *Principle*, ſince it ſo nearly depends on what was ſaid in behalf of the former *Maxim*. Yet of the *latter* we need a word or two.

When therefore we cannot give account of things either by the *Laws* of *Mechanicks* or conceivable *Congruities*, (* as likely ſome things relating to the States of *Spirits*, and immaterial Beings can be reſolv'd by neither) I ſay then, we may have recourſe to the *Arbitrary* managements of thoſe *inviſible Miniſters* of *Equity* and *Juſtice*, which without doubt the world is plentifully ſtored with. For it cannot be conceived that thoſe *active Spirits* are *idle* or unimployed in the *momentous* concerns of the *Univerſe*. Yea, the *ſacred* volume gives evidence of their interpoſals in our affairs. I ſhall need mention but that remarkable inſtance in *Daniel*, of the indeavours of the *Prince* of *Perſia*, and of *Grecia*, to hinder *Michael*, and the other Angel, that were ingaged for the affairs of *Judea*; Or if any would evade this, what

think they of all the *apparitions* of *Angels* in the *old* Teſtament, of their *pitching their Tents about us*, and being *Miniſtring Spirits for our good*. To name no more ſuch paſſages. Now if thoſe noble *Spirits* will ingage themſelves in our trifling concernments, doubtleſs they are very ſedulous in thoſe affairs that tend to the *good* and *perfection* of the *Univerſe*. But to be brief; I advance.

The Fourth Pillar.

(4) * *The Souls of men are capable of living in other bodies beſides Terreſtrial; And never act but in ſome body or other.*

FOr (1.) when I conſider how deeply in this ſtate we are immerſed in the *body*, I can methinks ſcarce imagin, that preſently upon the quitting on't, we ſhall be ſtript of all *corporeity*; for this would be ſuch a *jump* as is ſeldom or never made in *nature*; ſince by almoſt all inſtances that come under our obſervation 'tis manifeſt, that ſhe uſeth to act by due and orderly *gradations*, and takes no *precipitous leaps* from one *extream* to another. 'Tis very probable therefore, that

that in our immediately next ſtate we ſhall have another *vehicle*. And then, (2.) conſidering that our Souls are *immediately united* to a more *tenuious* and *ſubtile* body here, than this groſs outſide; 'Tis methinks a good preſumption, that we ſhall not be ſtript and diveſted of our *inward ſtole* alſo, when we leave this *dull Earth* behind us. Eſpecially (3) if we take notice how the higheſt and nobleſt *faculties* and *operations* of the Soul are help'd on by ſomewhat that is *corporeal*, and that it imployeth the bodily *Spirits* in its ſublimeſt *exerciſes*; we might then be perſwaded, that it always uſeth ſome body or other, and never acts without one. And (4) ſince we cannot conceive a *Soul* to *live* or *act* that is *inſenſible*, and ſince we know not how there can be *ſenſe* where there is no *union* with *matter*, we ſhould me ſeems be induc'd to think, that when 'tis *disjunct* from all *body*, 'tis *inert* and *ſilent*. * For in all *ſenſations* there is *corporeal motion*, as all *Philoſophy* and *Experience* teſtifies: And theſe *motions* become *ſenſible* repreſentations, by virtue of the *union* between the *Soul* and its *confederate matter*; ſo that when it is looſe and *diſ-united* from any *body* whatſoever, it will be unconcern'd in all *corporeal motions*, (being a *penetrable* ſubſtance) and no *ſenſe* or *perception* will be conveyed by them.

Nor will it make any thing at all againſt this

this *Argument* to urge, that there are Nay and purely *unembodied Spirits* in the *Univerſe*, which *live* and *act* without relation to any *body*, and yet theſe are not *inſenſible*: For what they *know*, and how they *know* we are very incompetent Judges of, they being a ſort of *Spirits ſpecifically* diſtinct from our order: and therefore their *faculties* and *operations* are of a very *diverſe* conſideration from *ours*. So that for us to *deny* what we may reaſonably argue from the *contemplation* of our own *natures*, becauſe we cannot comprehend the natures of a ſpecies of creatures that are far above us, is a great miſtake in the way of reaſoning.

Now how ſtrange ſoever this *Principle* may ſeem to thoſe, whom *cuſtomary opinions* have ſeaſoned with another *belief*, yet conſidering the Reaſons I have alledged, I cannot forbear concluding it very *probable*; and if it prove hereafter ſerviceable for the helping us in ſome concerning *Theories*, I think the moſt wary and timerous may admit it, till upon good grounds they can diſprove it.

The Fifth Pillar.

(5) *The Soul in every ſtate hath ſuch a body as is fitteſt for thoſe faculties and operations that it is moſt inclined to exerciſe.*

'Tis a known Maxim, *That every thing that is, is for its operation*; and the Contriver and Maker of the World hath been ſo bountiful to all Beings, as to furniſh them with all *ſuitable* and *neceſſary* requiſites for their reſpective *actions*; for there are no *propenſities* and *diſpoſitions* in nature, but ſome way or other are brought into *actual exerciſe*, otherwiſe they were meer *nullities*, and impertinent *appendices*. Now for the imployment of all kinds of *faculties*, and the exerting all manner of *operations*, all kinds of *inſtruments* will not ſuffice, but only ſuch, as are proportion'd and adapted to the *exerciſes* they are to be uſed in, and the *Agents* that imploy them. 'Tis clear therefore, that the *Soul* of *Man*, a *noble* and *vigorous Agent*, muſt be fitted with a *ſuitable body*, according to the *Laws* of that exact *diſtributive Juſtice* that runs through the *Univerſe*; and ſuch a one is moſt *ſuitable*, as is fitteſt for thoſe exer-

exercises *it* propends to; for the *body* is the *Souls instrument*, and a necessary requisite of action: Whereas should it be otherwise, God would then have provided worse for his worthiest Creatures, than he hath for *those* that are of a much *inferiour* rank and order. For if we look about us upon all the Creatures of God, that are exposed to our Observation, we may seal this Truth with an *infallible Induction*; *That there is nothing but what is fitted with all suitable requisites to act according to its nature.* The *Bird* hath *wings* to waft it aloft in the thin and subtile *aire*; the *Fish* is furnisht with *fins*, to move in her liquid *element*; and all other *Animals* have *Instruments* that are proper for their peculiar inclinations: So that should it be otherwise in the case of *Souls*, it would be a great blot to the wise managements of *Providence*; and contrary to its usual *methods*; and thus we should be dis-furnisht of the best and most *convictive Argument*, that we have to prove that a *Principle* of exactest *wisdom* hath made and ordered all things.

The

The Sixth Pillar:

(6) *The Powers and Faculties of the Soul, are either* (1) Spiritual, *and* Intellectual : (2) Senſitive : *Or*, (3) Plaſtick.

NOw (1) by the *intellectual* powers I mean all thoſe that relate to the *ſoul*, in its naked and abſtracted *conception*, as it is a *ſpirit*, and are exerciſed about *immaterial* Objects; as, *vertue*, *knowledge*, and *divine love* : This is the *Platonical* Νε; and that which we call the *mind* : The two other more immediately relate to its eſpouſed *matter* : For (2) the *ſenſitive* are exerciſed about all the objects of *ſenſe*, and are concerned in all ſuch things as either *gratifie*, or *diſguſt* the *body*. And (3) the *Plaſtick* are thoſe faculties of the *ſoul*, whereby it *moves* and *forms* the body, and are without *ſenſe* or *Animadverſion* : The exerciſe of the *former*, I call the *Higher life*; and the operations of the *latter*, the *lower*; and the *life* of the *body*. Now that there are ſuch *faculties* belonging to our natures, and that they are exerciſed upon ſuch and ſuch *objects* reſpectively, plain experience avoucheth,

cheth, and therefore I may be excuſed from going about to prove ſo univerſally acknowledged a truth : Wherefore I paſs to

The Seventh Pillar.

(7) *By the ſame degrees that the higher powers are invigorated, the lower are conſopited and abated, as to their proper exerciſes,* & è contra.

(1) THat thoſe *Powers* ſhould each of them have a *tendency* to *action* and in their turns be exerciſed, is but rational to conceive, ſince otherwiſe they had been *ſuperfluous.* And (2) that they ſhould be *inconſiſtent* in the ſupremeſt *exerciſe* and *inactuation*, is to me as probable. For the *Soul* is a *finite* and limited Being, and therefore cannot operate diverſe ways with equal intention at once. That is, cannot at the ſame time imploy all her faculties in the higheſt degree of exerciſe that each of them is capable of. For doubtleſs did it ingage but one of thoſe alone, the *operations* thereof would be more *ſtrong* and *vigorous*, than when they are conjunctly exercis'd, their Acts and Objects being very divers. So that I ſay, that theſe *faculties* ſhould act together

ther in the higheſt way they are capable of, ſeems to be contrary to the nature of the *Soul*. And I am ſure it comports not with *experience*; for thoſe that are endowed with an high degree of exerciſe of one *faculty*, are ſeldom, if ever, as well provided in the reſt. 'Tis a common and daily obſervation, that thoſe that are of moſt heightned and ſtrong *Imaginations*, are defective in *Judgment*, and the faculty of *cloſe reaſoning*. And your very larg and capacious *Memories*, have ſeldom or never any great ſhare of either of the other *perfections*. Nor do the deepeſt *Judgments* uſe to have any thing conſiderable either of *Memory* or *Phancy*. And as there are fair inſtances even in this ſtate of the *inconſiſtence* of the *faculties* in the higheſt exerciſe; ſo alſo are there others that ſuggeſt unto us,

(3) *That by the ſame degrees that ſome Faculties fail in their ſtrength and vigour, others gain and are improved.* We know that the ſhutting up of the *ſenſes*, is the letting looſe and inlarging of the *Phancy*. And we ſeldom have ſuch *ſtrong imaginations* waking, as in our *dreams* in the *ſilence* of our other *faculties*. As the *Sun* recedes, the *Moon* and *Stars* diſcover themſelves; and when *it* returns, *they* draw in their baffled *beams*, and hide their *heads* in *obſcurity*. But to urge what is more cloſe and preſſing; It is an unerring remarque, that thoſe that want the uſe

use of some one *natural part* or *faculty*, are wont to have very liberal amends made them by an *excellency* in some others. Thus those that nature hath deprived of *sight*, use to have wonderfully *tenacious memories*. And the *deaf* and *dumb* have many times a strange kind of *sagacity*, and very remarkable *mechanical ingenies*: Not to mention other instances, for I'le say no more than I must needs. Thus then experience gives us incouraging probability of the truth of the *Theorem* asserted. And in its self 'tis very reasonable; for (as we have seen) the *Soul* being an *active nature*, is always propending to the exercising of one faculty or other, and that to the utmost it is able, and yet being of a *limited capacity*, it can imploy but one in hight of exercise at once; which when it loseth and abates of its *strength* and supream *vigour*; some other, whose improvement was all this while hindred by this its *ingrossing Rival*, must by consequence begin now to display it self, and awaken into a more *vigorous actuation*: so that as the former loseth, the latter proportionably gaineth.

And indeed 'tis a great instance of the *divine wisdom*, that our *faculties* are made in so *regular* and *equilibrious* an order. For were the same *powers* still *uppermost* in the greatest hight of *activity*, and so *unalterably* con-

conſtituted, there would want the beauty of *variety*, and the other faculties would never act to that pitch of *perfection* that they are capable of. There would be no *Liberty of Will*, and conſequently no *Humane Nature*. Or if the *Higher Powers* might have leſſen'd, and fail'd without a *proportionable increaſe* of the *lower*, and *they* likewiſe have been *remitted*, without any advantage to the other *faculties*, the *Soul* might then at length fall into an irrecoverable *receſs* and *inactivity*.

But all theſe inconveniences are avoided by ſuppoſing the principle we have here inſiſted on; And it is the laſt that I ſhall mention.

Briefly then, and if it may be more plainly, the *higher faculties* are thoſe, whereby the *Soul* acts towards *ſpiritual* and *immaterial* objects: and the *lower* whereby it acts towards the *Body*. Now it cannot with equal *vigour* exerciſe it ſelf both ways together; and conſequently the more it is taken up in the *higher operations*, the more prompt and vigorous it will be in *theſe exerciſes*, and leſs *ſo* about *thoſe* that concern the *body*, *& è Converſo*.

Thus when we are very deeply ingaged in *intellectual contemplations*, our outward *ſenſes* are in a manner *ſhrunk* up and *cramped*: And when our *ſenſes* are highly exerciſed

ciſed and gratified, thoſe operations *monopolize* and *imploy* us. Nor is this leſs obſervable in relation to the *Plaſtick*. For frequent and ſevere *Meditations* do much *mortifie* and *weaken* the *body*; And we are moſt *nouriſht* in our *ſleep* in the *ſilence* of our *ſenſes*. Now what is thus true in reſpect of *acts* and *particular exerciſes*, is as much ſo in *ſtates* and *habits*. Moreover, 'tis apparent that the *Plaſtick* is then moſt ſtrong and vigorous when our other faculties are wholly unimployed, from the *ſtate* of the *womb*. For *nature* when ſhe is at her *Plaſtick* work, ceaſeth all other operations. The ſame we may take notice of, in *Silk-worms* and other *Inſects*, which lie as if they were *dead* and *inſenſible*, while their *lower powers* are forming them into another *appearance*. All which things put together, give good evidence to the truth of our Axiom.

I'le conclude this with one Remark more, to prevent miſtake; Therefore briefly; As the *Soul* always acts by the *Body*; ſo in its higheſt *exerciſes* it uſeth ſome of the *inferiour powers*; which, therefore muſt operate alſo. So that ſome *ſenſes*, as *ſight* and ſomewhat *analagous* to *hearing* may be imployed in conſiderable degree, even when the *higheſt life* is moſt *predominant*; but then it is at the command and in the ſervices of thoſe *nobler powers*; wherefore the *ſenſitive life* can-

cannot for this cauſe be ſaid to be *invigorated*, ſince 'tis under *ſervitude* and *ſubjection*, and its *guſts* and *pleaſures* are very *weak* and *flaccid*. And this is the reaſon of that clauſe in the *Principle* (*as to their proper exerciſes.*)

Having thus laid the Foundation, and fixt the Pillars of our building, I now come to advance the Superſtructure.

CHAP. XIV.

A Philoſophical Hypotheſis of the Souls Præexiſtence.

THE *Eternal* and *Almighty Goodneſs*, the bleſſed *ſpring* and *root* of *all things*, made all his *creatures*, in the *beſt*, *happieſt*, and moſt *perfect* condition, that their reſpective natures rendred them capable of, By *Axiom* the *firſt*; and therefore they were then conſtituted in the *inactuation* and *exerciſe* of their *nobleſt* and moſt *perfect powers*. Conſequently, the *ſouls* of men, a conſiderable part of the *divine* workmanſhip, were at firſt made in the *higheſt invigoration* of the *ſpiritual* and *intellective* faculties which were exerciſed in *vertue*, and in bliſful *contemplation* of the *ſupream Deity*; wherefore now by *Axiom* 6 and 7, * the *ig-*

 nobler

nobler and *lower powers*, or the *life of the body*, were *languid* and *remiſs*.

So that the moſt *tenuious*, *pure* and *ſimple matter* being the fitteſt *inſtrument* for the moſt *vigorous* and *ſpiritual* faculties according to *Principle* 2, 4, and 5. The Soul in this condition was *united* with the moſt *ſubtile* and *æthereal matter* that it was capable of *inacting*; and the *inferior powers*, thoſe relating to the *body*, being at a very *low ebb* of *exerciſe*, were wholly *ſubſervient* to the *ſuperiour*, and imployed in nothing but what was *ſerviceable* to that *higher life*: So that the *ſenſes* did but preſent occaſions for *divine love*, and *objects* for *contemplation*; * and the *plaſtick* had nothing to do, but to *move* this *paſſive* and *eaſie body*, accordingly as the concerns of the *higher faculties* required. Thus then did we at firſt live and act in a *pure* and *æthereal* body; and conſequently in a place of *light* and *bleſſedneſs*, by *Principle* 3d. But particularly to deſcribe and point at this *paradiſaical reſidence*, can be done only by thoſe that live in thoſe *ſerene* regions of *lightſome* glory: Some *Philoſophers* indeed have adventured * to pronounce the *place* to be the *Sun*, that vaſt *Orb* of *ſplendor* and *brightneſs*; though it may be 'tis more probable, that thoſe *immenſe* tracts of *pure* and *quiet æther* that are above *Saturn*, are the joyous place of our ancient *celeſtial* abode:

bode: But there is no determination in matters of ſuch lubricous uncertainty, where ever it is, 'tis doubtleſs a place and ſtate of wonderful *bliſs* and *happineſs*, and the *higheſt* that our natures had fitted us to.

In this *ſtate* we may be ſuppoſed to have lived in the bliſsful exerciſe of *vertue*, *divine love* and *contemplation*, through very long tracts of *duration*.

But though we were thus *unconceivably happy*, * yet were we not *immutably ſo*; for our higheſt perfections and nobleſt faculties being but *finite*, may after long and vigorous exerciſe, ſomewhat abate and remit in their ſublimeſt operations, and *Adam* may fall *aſleep*; In which time of *remiſſion* of the *higher powers*, the *lower* may advance and more livelily diſplay themſelves than they could before, by *Axiom* 7; for the *ſoul* being a little ſlackt in its purſuits of *immaterial* objects, the *lower powers* which before were almoſt wholly taken up and imployed in thoſe high ſervices, are ſomewhat more releaſt to follow a little the *tendencies* of their proper natures. And now they begin to convert towards the *body*, and warmly to reſent the delights and pleaſures thereof; Thus is *Eve* brought forth, while *Adam* ſleepeth. The *lower life*, that of the body is now conſiderably *awakened*, and the *operations* of the *higher*, proportionably abated.

However, there is yet no *anomy* or *diſobedience*, for all this is but an innocent exerciſe of thoſe faculties which God hath given us to *imploy*, and as far as is conſiſtent with the *divine laws* to *gratifie*. For it was no fault of ours that we did not unceſſantly keep our *ſpiritual powers* upon the moſt *intenſe* exerciſes that they were capable of exerting; * we were made on ſet purpoſe *defatigable*, that ſo all *degrees* of *life* might have their exerciſe; and our *Maker* deſigned that we ſhould feel and taſte the joys of our *congenite* bodies, as well as the pleaſures of thoſe *ſeraphick aſpires* and injoyments.

And me thinks it adds to the *felicity* of that *ſtate*, that our happineſs was not one *uniform* piece, or continual *repetition* of the ſame, but conſiſted in a moſt *grateful variety*, *viz.* in the pleaſure of all our faculties, the *lower* as well as the *higher*; for thoſe are as much gratified by ſuitable exerciſes and enjoyments as *theſe*; and conſequently according to their *proportion* capable of as great an *happineſs*: Nor is it any more derogation from the *divine goodneſs*, that the *nobleſt* and *higheſt life* was not always exerciſed to the height of its capacity, than that we were not made all *Angels*, all the *Planets* ſo many *Suns* and all the *variety* of the Creatures formed into one *Species*: Yea, as was intimated above; 'tis an inſtance of the *divine benigni-*

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ty, that he produced things into being, according to the vaſt *plenitude* of Forms that were in his *all-knowing mind*; and gave them *operations* ſuitable to their reſpective *natures*; ſo that it had rather ſeemed a defect in the divine diſpenſations, if we had not had the pleaſure of the proper exerciſe of the *lower faculties* as well as of the *higher*. * Yea, me thinks 'tis but a reaſonable reward to the *body*, that it ſhould have its delights and gratifications alſo, whereby it will be fitted for further ſerviceableneſs. For doubtleſs it would be in time ſpent and exhauſted were it continually imployed in thoſe *high* and leſs proportioned *operations*.

Wherefore God himſelf having ſo order'd the matter, that the inferiour life ſhould have its turn of *invigoration*; it can be no evil in us, * that that is executed which he hath ſo determined, as long as we paſs not the bounds that he hath ſet us. *Adam* therefore was yet innocent, though he joyed in his beloved *Spouſe*, yea, and was permitted to feed upon all the fruits of this Paradiſe, the various reſults of corporeal pleaſure, as long as he followed not his own *will* and *appetites* contrarily to the *divine commands* and *appointments*.

But at length unhappily the *delights* of the *body* betray us, through our over indulgence to them, and lead us captive to *anomy*

and *diſobedience*. The ſenſe of what is *grateful* and *pleaſant* by inſenſible degrees gets head over the apprehenſion of what is *juſt* and *good*; the *Serpent* and *Eve* prove ſucceſsful *tempters*; * *Adam* cannot withſtand the *inordinate appetite*, but feeds on the *forbidden fruit*, viz. the dictates of his *debauched will*, and *ſenſual pleaſure*. And thus now the *body* is gotten uppermoſt, the *lower faculties* have greater exerciſe and command than the higher, thoſe being very vigorouſly *awakened*, and theſe proportionably *ſhrunk up*, and *conſopited*; wherefore by *Axiom* 3. and 5. the ſoul contracts a leſs pure body, which may be more accommodate to *ſenſitive operations*; and thus we fall from the higheſt Paradiſe the bliſsful regions of *life and glory*, and become Inhabitants of the *Air*.

Not that we are preſently quite diveſted of our *Æthereal ſtate*, as ſoon as we deſcend into this leſs perfect condition of life, for retaining ſtill conſiderable exerciſes of the *higher life*, though not ſo ruling and vigorous ones as before, the *ſoul* muſt retain part of its former *vehicle*, to ſerve it as its *inſtrument*, in thoſe its *operations*: For the *æthereal body* contracts *craſſneſs* and *impurity* by the ſame degrees as the *immaterial faculties* abate in their *exerciſe*; ſo that we are not immediately upon the expiring of the higheſt congruity wholly ſtript of all remains

of

of our *celestial bodies*, but still hold some portion of them, within the *grosser vehicle*, while the *spirit*, or *higher life* is in any *degree* of *actuation*.

Nor are we to suppose that every *slip* or *indulgence* to the *body* can detrude us from our *æthereal happiness*; but such a *change* must be wrought in the *soul*, as may spoil its *congruity* to a *celestial body*, which in time by degrees is effected: Thus we may probably be supposed to have fallen from our supream felicity.

But *others* of our *order* have made better use of their *injoyments*, and the indulgences of their Maker; and though they have had their *Perigæ*'s as well as their *Apogæ*'s: I mean their Verges towards the body and its joys, as well as their Aspires to nobler and sublimer objects, yet they kept the station of their Natures, and made their orderly *returns*, without so remarkable a *defection*: And though possibly some of them may sometimes have had their *slips*, and have waded further into the pleasures of the body than they ought to have done, yet partly by their own timely care and consideration, and partly by the divine assistance, they recover themselves again to their condition of *primigenial innocence*. But we must leave them to their *felicity*, and go on with the *History* of our own *descent*. Therefore

after we are *detruded* from our *æthereal condition*, we next deſcend into the *Aereal*.

The Aereal State.

NOw our bodies are more or leſs *pure* in this condition, proportionably to the degrees of our *apoſtacy*: So that we are not abſolutely miſerable in our firſt ſtep of *deſcent*; but indeed *happy* in compariſon of our now condition: As yet there may be very conſiderable remains of *vertue* and *divine love*, though indeed the *lower life*, that of the body be grown very *ſtrong* and *rampant*: So that as yet we may be ſuppoſed to have lapſt no lower than the beſt and pureſt Regions of the *Air*, by Axiom 2 and 3. And doubtleſs there are ſome, who by ſtriving againſt the *inordinacy* of their *Appetites*, may at length get the victory again over their *bodies*, and ſo by the aſſiſtance of the *Divine Spirit*, who is always ready to promote and aſſiſt good beginnings, may re-enkindle the *higher life*, and ſo be tranſlated again to their old *celeſtial habitations* without *deſcending* lower.

But others irreclaimably perſiſting in their *Rebellion*, and ſinking more and more into the *body*, and the reliſh of its *joys* and *pleaſures*, *theſe* are ſtill verging to a *lower* and more degenerate *ſtate*; ſo that at the laſt

the

the *higher powers* of the Soul being almoſt quite laid *aſleep* and *conſopited*, and the *ſenſitive* alſo by long and tedious exerciſes being much tired, and abated in their vigour, * the *plaſtick faculties* begin now fully to *awaken*; ſo that a body of *thin* and *ſubtile air* will not ſuffice its now ſo highly exalted *energy*, no more than the *ſubtile Æther* can ſuffice us *terreſtrial animals* for *reſpiration*; wherefore the *aereal congruity* of *life* expires alſo, and thus are we ready for an *earthly body*.

But now ſince a *ſoul* cannot *unite* with any *body*, but with ſuch only as is fitly prepared for it, by *Principle* 3. and there being in all likelyhood more *expirations* in the *Air*, than there are prepared *bodies* upon *earth*, it muſt needs be, that for ſome time it muſt be deſtitute of any *congruous matter* that might be joyned with it; And conſequently by *Principle* 4. 'twill lye in a *ſtate* of *inactivity* and *ſilence*. Not that it will for ever be loſt in that forgotten *receſs* and *ſolitude*, * for it hath an *aptneſs* and *propenſity* to act in a *terreſtrial* body, which will be reduced into *actual exerciſe*, when fit *matter* is prepared. The Souls therefore, that are now laid up in the *black night* of *ſtupidity* and *inertneſs* will in their proper ſeaſons be *awakened* into *life* and *operation* in ſuch *bodies* and *places* of the earth, as by their diſpoſitions they are fitted

fitted for. So that no ſooner is there any matter of due *vital* temper, afforded by *generation*, but immediately a *ſoul* that is ſuitable to ſuch a *body*, * either by meer *natural congruity*, the *diſpoſition* of the *ſoul* of the *world*, or ſome more *ſpontaneous agent* is *attracted*, or *ſent* into this ſo *befitting tenement*, according to Axiom 2 and 3.

Terreſtrial State.

NOw becauſe in this ſtate too we uſe our *ſenſitive faculties*, and have ſome, though very ſmall reliques of the *higher life* alſo; therefore the *ſoul* firſt makes it ſelf a *vehicle* out of the moſt *ſpiritous* and yielding parts of this *ſpumous terreſtrial matter*, which hath ſome analogy both with its *æthereal* and *aereal* ſtate. This is as it were its *inward veſt*, and immediate *inſtrument* in all its operations. By the help of this it *underſtands*, *reaſons*, and *remembers*, yea *forms* and *moves* the body. And that we have ſuch a *ſubtile aery* vehicle within this *terreſtrial*, our manifeſt *ſympathizing* with that element, and the neceſſity we have of it to all the *functions* of *life*, as is palpable in *reſpiration*, is me thinks good ground for conjecture. And 'tis not improbable but even within this it may have a *purer fire* and *æther* to which it is *united*, being ſome little remain of what it had of old.

In

In this *ſtate* we grow up merly into the life of *ſenſe*, having little left of the *higher life*, * but ſome apiſh ſhews and imitations of *reaſon*, *vertue*, and *religion*: By which alone with *ſpeech*, we ſeem to be diſtinguiſht from *Beaſts*, while in reality the *brutiſh nature* is *predominant*, and the concernments of the body are our great *end*, our only *God* and *happineſs*; this is the condition of our now degenerate, loſt natures. However, that ever over-flowing *goodneſs* that always aims at the happineſs of his creatures, hath not left us without all means of recovery, but by the gracious and benign diſpenſations which he hath afforded us, hath provided for our *reſtauration*; which ſome (though but very few) make ſo good uſe of, that being aſſiſted in their well meant and ſincere indeavours by the *divine ſpirit*, they in good degree *mortifie* and *ſubdue* the *body*, conquer *ſelf-will*, unruly *appetites*, and diſorderly *paſſions*, and ſo in ſome meaſure by *Principle* 7. awaken the *higher life*, which ſtill directs them upwards to *vertue* and *divine love*; which, where they are perfectly kindled, carry the Soul, when diſmiſt from this priſon, * to its old *celeſtial abode*: For the *ſpirit* and *nobleſt faculties* being ſo recovered to life and exerciſe require an *æthereal body* to be united to, and that an *æthereal place* of reſidence, both which,

which, the divine *Nemeſis* that is wrought into the very nature of things beſtoweth on them by Principle the ſecond.

But they are very few that are thus immediately reſtored to the *celeſtial paradiſe*, upon the quitting of their earthly bodies. For others that are but in the way of recovery, and dye imperfectly vertuous, meer *Philoſophy* and *natural reaſon* (within the bounds of which we are now diſcourſing) can determin no more, * but that they ſtep forth again into *aery vehicles*; that *congruity* of life immediately awakening in them after *this* is expired. In this ſtate their happineſs will be more or leſs, proportionably to their *vertues*, in which if they perſevere, (we ſhall ſee anon how they will be recover'd. But for the preſent we muſt not break off the clue of our account, by going backwards before we have arriv'd to the utmoſt verge of *deſcent* in this *Philoſophical Romance*, or *Hiſtory*; the Reader is at his choice to call it which he pleaſeth.

Wherefore let us caſt our eyes upon the *Moſt*, in whom their life on earth hath but confirmed and ſtrengthened, their *degenerate ſenſual*, and *brutiſh propenſions*; And ſee what is like to become of them, when they take their leave of theſe *terreſtrial* bodies.

Only firſt a word of the *ſtate* of *dying Infants*, and I come immediately to the next

ſtep

ſtep of *deſcent.* *Thoſe therefore that paſs out of *theſe bodies*, before the *terreſtrial congruity* be *ſpoil'd*, *weakened*, or orderly *unwound*; according to the tenour of this *Hypotheſis*, muſt return into the ſtate of *inactivity.*

For the *Plaſtick* in them is too highly *awakened*, to inactuate only an *aereal* body; And, there being no other more *congruous*, ready, and at hand for it to enter, it muſt needs ſtep back into its former ſtate of *inſenſibility*, and there wait its turn, till befitting *matter* call it forth again into *life* and *action.* This is a conjecture that *Philoſophy* dictates, which I vouch not for a truth; *but only follow the clue of this *Hypotheſis.* Nor can there any danger be hence conceived that thoſe whoſe *congruities* orderly expire, ſhould fall back again into a ſtate of *ſilence* and *inertneſs*; *ſince by long and hard exerciſes in this body, the *plaſtick life* is well tamed and debilitated, ſo that now its activity is proportioned to a more *tenuious* and *paſſive vehicle*, which it cannot fail to meet with in its next condition. For 'tis only the *terreſtrial body* is ſo long a *preparing.* But to

The next ſtep of Deſcent, or After-ſtate.

TO give an Account of the *After-ſtate* of the more *degenerate* and yet *deſcending* ſouls, ſome fancy a very odd *Hypotheſis*, imagining that they paſs hence into ſome other more courſe and inferior *Planet*, in which, they are provided with bodies ſuitable to their ſo depraved natures; But I ſhall be thought *extravagant* for the mention of ſuch a ſuppoſition; Wherefore I come to what is leſs *obnoxious*.

When our ſouls go out of theſe bodies therefore, they are not preſently diſcharged of all the matter that belonged to this condition, but carry away their *inward* and *aereal* ſtate to be partakers with them of their *after fortunes*; only leaving the uſeleſs earth behind them. For they have a *congruity* to their *aery* bodies, though that which they had to a *terreſtrial*, is worn out and defaced.

Nor need we to wonder how it can now have an *aereal aptitude*, when as that *congruity expired* before we *deſcended* hither; If we conſider the reaſon of the *expiration* of its former *vital aptitude*, which was not ſo much through any defect of power to actuate ſuch a body, but through the exceſs of *invigoration* of the *Plaſtick*, which was then grown ſo *ſtrong*, * that an *aereal* body

was

was not enough for it to diſplay its force upon. But now the caſe is altered, theſe *lower powers* are *worn* and *wearied* out, by the toylſome exerciſe of *dragging* about and managing ſuch a *load* of *fleſh*; wherefore being ſo *caſtigated*, they are duly attemper'd to the more *eaſie* body of *air* again, as was intimated before; to which they being already *united*, they cannot miſs of a proper habitation.

But conſidering the *ſtupor*, *dulneſs* and *inactivity* of our *declining* age, it may ſeem unlikely to ſome, that after death we ſhould immediately be reſuſcitated into ſo *lively* and *vigorous* a *condition*, as is the *aereal*, eſpecially, ſince all the *faculties* of *ſenſe* and *action*, are obſerved gradually to fail and abate as we draw nearer to our *exit* from this *Stage*; which ſeems to threaten, that we ſhall next *deſcend* into a ſtate of more *ſtupor* and *inertneſs*. But this is a groundleſs *jealouſie*; for the *weakneſs* and *lethargick inactivity* of old age, ariſeth from a *defect* of thoſe *Spirits*, that are the *inſtruments* of all our *operations*, which by long exerciſe are at laſt *ſpent* and *ſcattered*. So that the remains can ſcarce any longer ſtand under their unweildy *burthen*; much leſs, can they perform all *functions* of *life* ſo vigorouſly as they were wont to do, when they were in their due *temper*, *ſtrength*, and *plenty*. However notwithſtanding this

ina-

inability to manage a *sluggish*, *stubborn*, and *exhausted terrestrial* body, there is no doubt, but the *Soul* can with great ease, when it is discharged of its former *load*, actuate its *thin aery* vehicle; and that with a brisk *vigour* and *activity*. As a man that is overladen, may be ready to faint and sink, till he be relieved of his burthen; and *then*, he can run away with a cheerful vivacity. So that this decrepit condition of our decayed natures cannot justly prejudice our belief, that we shall be erected again, into a state of *life* and *action* in *aereal* bodies, after this *congruity* is expired.

But if all alike live in *bodies* of *air* in the next *condition*, * where is then the difference between the *just* and the *wicked*, in *state*, *place* and *body*? For the *just* we have said already, that some of them are re-instated in their *pristine* happiness and felicity; and others are in a *middle* state, within the confines of the Air, perfecting the *inchoations* of a better *life*, which commenc'd in this: As for the *state* and *place* of those that have lived in a continual course of *sensuality* and *forgetfulness* of God; I come now to declare what we may fancy of it, by the help of *natural light*, and the conduct of *Philosophy*.

And in order to this discovery I must premise somewhat concerning the *Earth*, this

Globe

Globe we live upon; which is, that we are not to conceive it to be a full *bulky mass* to the *center*, but rather that 'tis somewhat like a ſuckt Egg, in great part, an hollow ſphere, ſo that what we tread upon, is but as it were, an Arch or Bridge, to divide between the *upper* and the *lower regions*: Not that this *inward hollowneſs* is a meer void *capacity*, for there are no ſuch *chaſms* in nature, but doubtleſs repleniſht it is with ſome fluid bodies or other, and it may be a kind of *air*, *fire* and *water*: Now this *Hypotheſis* will help us eaſily to imagin how the *earth* may *move*, notwithſtanding the pretended indiſpoſition of its Bulk, and on that account I believe it will be ſomewhat the more acceptable with the free and ingenious.

Thoſe that underſtand the *Carteſian Philoſophy*, will readily admit the *Hypotheſis*, at leaſt as much of it as I ſhall have need of: But for others, I have little hopes of perſwading them to any thing, and therefore I'le ſpare my labour of going about to prove what they are either uncapable of, or at firſt daſh judge ridiculous: And it may be *moſt* will grant as much as is requiſite for my purpoſe, which is, *That there are huge vaſt cavities within the body of the Earth*; and it were as needleſs, as preſumptuous, for me to go about to determine more. Only I ſhall mention a *probability*, that this *groſs*

cruſt which we call *earth*, is not of ſo vaſt a *profundity* as is ſuppoſed, and ſo come more preſs to my buſineſs.

'Tis an ordinary obſervation among them that are imployed in *Mines* and *ſubterraneous vaults* of any depth, that *heavy* bodies loſe much of their *gravity* in thoſe hollow *caverns*: So that what the ſtrength of ſeveral men cannot ſtir above ground, is eaſily moved by the ſingle force of one under it: Now to improve this experiment, 'tis very likely that *gravity* proceeds from a kind of *magnetiſm* and *attractive* vertue in the *earth*, which is by ſo much the more ſtrong and vigorous, by how much more of the *attrahent* contributes to the *action*, and proportionably *weaker*, where leſs of the *magnetick* Element exerts its *operation*; ſo that ſuppoſing the *ſolid earth*, to reach but to a certain, and that not very great diſtance from the ſurface, and 'tis obvious this way to give an account of the *Phænomenon*.

*For according to this *Hypotheſis* the *gravity* of thoſe bodies is *leſs*, becauſe the *quantity* of the *earth* that draws them is *ſo*; whereas were it of the ſame nature and ſolidity to the *center*, this diminution of its *bulk*, and conſequently *vertue* would not be at all conſiderable, nor in the leaſt ſenſible: Now though there are other cauſes pretended for this effect, yet there is none ſo like-

likely, and eaſie a ſolution as this, though I know *it* alſo is obnoxious to exceptions, which I cannot now *ſtand* to meddle with; all that I would have, is, that 'tis a *probability*, * and the mention of the *fountains* of the *great deep* in the *ſacred Hiſtory*, as alſo the *flaming Vulcano's* and *ſmoaking mountains* that all relations ſpeak of, are others.

* Now I intend not that after a certain diſtance all is *fluid matter* to the *center*. For the *Carteſian Hypotheſis* diſtributes the *ſubterranean* ſpace into diſtinct regions of *divers matter*, which are divided from each other by as *ſolid walls*, as is the open air from the *inferiour Atmoſphere*: Therefore I ſuppoſe only that under this *thick outſide*, there is next a *vaſt* and large region of *fluid matter*, * which for the moſt part very likely is a *groſs* and *fetid* kind of *air*, as alſo conſiderable proportions of *fire* and *water*, under all which, there may be other *ſolid* floors, that may incompaſs and cover more vaults, and vaſt hollows, the contents of which 'twere vanity to go about to determine; only 'tis very likely, that as the admirable *Philoſophy* of *Des Cartes* ſuppoſeth, * the loweſt and *central* Regions may be filled with *flame* and *æther*, which ſuppoſitions, though they may ſeem to ſome to be but the groundleſs *excurſions* of buſie *imaginations*; yet thoſe that know the *French Philoſophy*, and ſee

there the Reaſons of them, will be more candid in their cenſures, and not ſo ſevere to thoſe not ill-framed *conjectures*.

Now then being thus provided, I return again to proſecute my main intendment; Wherefore 'tis very probable, that the *wicked* and *degenerate* part of mankind, * are after death committed to thoſe ſqualid *ſubterraneous* habitations; in which *dark priſons*, they do ſevere *penance* for their paſt *impieties*, and have their *ſenſes*, which upon earth they did ſo fondly indulge, and took ſuch care to gratifie, now perſecuted with *darkneſs*, *ſtench*, and *horror*. Thus doth the *divine juſtice* triumph in puniſhing thoſe vile *Apoſtates* ſuitably to their *delinquencies*.

Now if thoſe vicious ſouls are not carried down to the *infernal caverns* by the meer *congruity* of their natures, as is not ſo eaſie to imagine; we may then reaſonably conceive, * that they are driven into thoſe *dungeons* by the *inviſible Miniſters* of *Juſtice*, that manage the affairs of the *world* by *Axiom* 3. For thoſe pure *Spirits* doubtleſs have a deep *ſenſe* of what is *juſt*, and for the *good* of the *univerſe*; and therefore will not let thoſe inexcuſable wretches to eſcape their deſerved *caſtigations*; or permit them to reſide among the *good*, leſt they ſhould infect and poyſon the better world, by their examples. Wherefore, I ſay, they are diſpoſed of into thoſe

thoſe *black under-Abyſſes*, where they are ſuited with company like themſelves, and match't unto *bodies* as *impure*, as are their depraved *inclinations*. Not that they are all in the ſame *place*, and under the like *torments*; but are variouſly diſtributed according to the merits of their *natures* and *actions*; ſome only into the *upper priſons*,* others to the *Dungeon*: And ſome to the moſt intolerable *Hell*, the *Abyſs* of *fire*. Thus doth a juſt *Nemeſis* viſit all the quarters of the *Univerſe*.

Now thoſe miſerable priſoners cannot eſcape from the places of their confinement; for 'tis very likely that thoſe watchful *ſpirits* that were inſtrumental in committing them, *have a ſtrict and careful eye upon them to keep them within the confines of their goal, that they rove not out into the regions of *light* and *liberty*, yea, 'tis probable that the *bodies* they have contracted in thoſe *ſqualid* manſions, may by a kind of fatal *magnetiſme* be chained down to this their *proper* element. Or, they having now a *congruity* only to ſuch *fetid vehicles*, may be no more able to abide the *clear* and *lightſome* Air; than the *Bat* or *Owl* are able to bear the *Suns* noon-day *beams*; or, the *fiſh* to live in theſe thinner Regions. This may be the reaſon of the *unfrequency* of their appearance; and that they moſt commonly get them away at the approach

of *light.* Beſides all this, ſome there are who ſuppoſe that there is a kind of *polity* among themſelves, which may * under ſevere penalties, prohibit all unlicenſed *excurſions* into the *upper world*: though I confeſs this ſeems not ſo probable, and we ſtand in no need of the ſuppoſition. For though the *laws* of their natures ſhould not detain them within their *proper reſidences*; yet the care and overſight of thoſe watchful Spirits, who firſt committed them, will do it effectually. And very oft when they do appear, they ſignifie that they are under reſtraint, and come not abroad, but by permiſſion; as by ſeveral credible Stories I could make good: But for brevity I omit them.

Now though I intend not this *Hypotheſis*, either for a diſcovery of infallible truth, or declarement of mine own opinions, yet I cannot forbear to note the ſtrange *coincidence* that there is between *Scripture expreſſions* in this matter, ſome main ſtroaks of the *Orthodox* Doctrine, and this *Philoſophical* conjecture of the *ſtate* and *place* of the *wicked.* 'Tis repreſented in the *Divine Oracles* as a *deep pit*, a *priſon*, a place of *darkneſs*, *fire*, and *brimſtone*; and the *going thither*, is named a *deſcent.* All which moſt appoſitely agree with the *repreſentation* we have made; And the uſual *Periphraſis* of *Hell torments*, *fire*, and *brimſtone*, is wonderfully applicable

cable to the place we have been deſcribing; ſince it abounds with *fuliginous flames*, and *ſulphureous ſtench* and *vapours*; And, as we have conjectur'd, the loweſt *cavity*, is nothing *elſe* but a *vault* of *fire*. For the other expreſſions mentioned, every one can make the application. So that when a man conſiders this, he will almoſt be tempted to think, that the *inſpired writers* had ſome ſuch thing in their *fancies*. And we are not to run to *tropes* and *figures* for the *interpretation* of *plain* and *literal deſcriptions*; except ſome weighty reaſon force us to ſuch a *Refuge*.

Moreover *Hell* is believed among the *Orthodox* to have degrees of *torments*, to be a place of uncomfortable *horror*, and to ſtand at the greateſt diſtance from the *ſeat* and *habitation* of the *bleſſed*. All which, and more that I could reckon up, cannot more clearly be made out and explained, than they are in this *Hypotheſis*.

Thus then we ſee the *irreclaimably wicked* lodg'd in a place and condition very *wretched* and *calamitous*. If any of them ſhould be taught by their *miſeries* to renounce and forſake their *impieties*; or ſhould have any *diſpoſitions* to *vertue* and *divine love* re-inkindled in them; meer *Philoſophy* would conclude, that in time they might then be delivered from their ſad *durance*; But we know what *Theology* hath determined. And in-

deed thoſe *brutiſh Apoſtates* are ſo *fixt* and *rooted* in their *ſenſual* and *rebellious propenſions*, that thoſe who are not yet as far diſtant from their *Maker* as they can be, are ſtill verging *downwards*; And poſſibly being quite void of the *divine grace*, and any conſiderable exerciſes of *reaſon* and *conſcience*, they may never ſtop till they have run through all the *infernal ſtages*, and are arriv'd to the *extremeſt* degree of miſery, that as yet any are obnoxious to.

Wherefore the *earth* and all the *infernal Regions* being thus monſtrouſly depraved; 'tis time for the *Divine Juſtice* to ſhew ſome remarkable and more than ordinary *ſeverity* upon thoſe *remorſeleſs Rebels*; and his goodneſs is as ready to deliver the virtuous from this *ſtage* of *wretchedneſs* and *impiety*. When therefore *thoſe* have compleated the number of their iniquities, and theſe are fit for the mercy of ſo great a *deliverance*; then ſhall the great *decree* for *judgment* be *executed*; which though it cannot be expected that meer *Philoſophy* ſhould give an unerring and punctual account of, yet we ſhall follow *this light* as far as it will lead us; not intrenching upon the *ſacred rights* of *Divinity*, nor yet *baulking* what the ancient *Eaſtern Cabbala*, aſſiſted by later *diſcoveries* into nature, will dictate; But ſincerely following the *Hypotheſis*, we ſhall leave all its *errours* and

and *miſguidances* to be corrected by the more ſacred *Canons*. So that where we ſhall diſcern the *wiſdom* of the *World* to have miſdirected the moſt *knowing* and ſedulous *inquirers*, we may duly acknowledge the great benefit of that *light* which we have received to guide us in matters of ſuch vaſt and concerning *ſpeculation*,

The Conflagration of the Earth.

THerefore at length, when the time preappointed by the *divine wiſdom* for this *execution*, is come; * The *internal*, *central fire* ſhall have got ſuch ſtrength and *irreſiſtible* vigour, that it ſhall eaſily melt and diſſolve that *fence* that hath all this while incloſed it; And all thoſe other ſmaller *fires*, which are lodged in ſeveral parts of the *lower Regions* joyning themſelves with this mighty *flame*, ſhall prey upon what ever is *combuſtible*, and ſo rage firſt within the bowels of the *earth*, beginning the *tragick execution* upon thoſe *damned ſpirits* that are there *confined*; theſe having been reſerved *in the chains of darkneſs to the judgment of this great day*; and now ſhall their hell and miſery be compleated, and they receive the full reward of their *impieties*, which doubtleſs will be the moſt intolerable and ſevere torment that can be imagined, theſe fierce and mercileſs

flames

flames ſticking cloſe to, yea, piercing through and through their bodies, which can remove no where to avoid this *fiery* over-ſpreading *vengeance.*

And now the *ſubterranean vaults* being thus all on fire, it cannot be long ere this *prevailing cumbuſtion* take hold of the upper *regions*, wherefore at laſt with irreſiſtible violence it breaks forth upon *theſe* alſo: So that the great *pyre* is now *kindled*, *ſmoak*, *fire*, *darkneſs*, *horror* and *confuſion*, cover the face of all things. Wherefore the miſerable inhabitants of the *earth* and *inferiour air*, will be ſeized on by the devouring *Element*, and ſuffer in that *fire that was reſerved for the perdition of ungodly men.*

But ſhall the righteous periſh with the wicked? And ſhall not the Judge of all the earth do right? Will not the ſincere and vertuous both in the Earth and Air be ſecured from this *ſad fate*? And how can their deliverance be effected? Doubtleſs *Providence* that in all things elſe hath been righteous and equal, will not fail in this laſt *ſcene*; but proviſion will be made for their recovery from this vengeance that hath taken hold of the wicked. But all natural cauſes failing here, ſince their bodies are not pure enough to waft them up the quiet *regions* of the *un infeſted æther*; and the *higher*

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congruity of *life*; being yet but imperfectly *inchoated*; they would be detained priſoners here below by the *chains* of their *unhappy natures*, were there not ſome *extraordinary interpoſure* for their reſcue and inlargement; wherefore when we contemplate the *infinite fertility* of the *divine goodneſs*, we cannot think, that he will let thoſe *ſeeds* of *piety* and *vertue*, which himſelf hath ſown and given ſome increaſe to, to come to nought; or the honeſt *poſſeſſors* of them, fatally to miſcarry: But that he will imploy his *power* for the compleating what he hath begun, and the deliverance of thoſe, who have relyed upon his mercies. But for the particular way and method how this great *tranſaction* will be accompliſht, *Philoſophy* cannot determine it.

Happy therefore are we, who have the diſcoveries of a more certain *Light*, which doth not only ſecure us of the thing, but acquaints us with the way and means, that the *Divine Wiſdom* hath reſolv'd on, for the *delivery* of the *righteous*. So that hereby we are aſſured that our ever bleſſed *Redeemer* ſhall appear in the *clouds* before this fiery Fate ſhall have quite taken hold of the Earth, and its condemned inhabitants. The Glory of his appearance with his *Cæleſtial Legions*, ſhall raiſe ſuch ſtrong *love*, *joy*, and *triumph* in his now paſſionately ena-

enamoured expectants, as ſhall again enkindle that *high* and *potent* principle, the Spirit, which being throughly awakened and excited, will melt the groſſeſt conſiſtence into *liquid Æther*, ſo that our bodies being thus turned into the *pureſt flame*, we ſhall aſcend in thoſe *fiery Chariots* with our Glorious *Redeemer*, and his illuſtrious and bleſſed Attendants to the *Cœleſtial* habitations. This is the Reſurrection of the juſt, and the Recovery of our antient bleſſedneſs.

Thus have ſome repreſented this great tranſaction; But I dare warrant nothing in this matter beyond the declarations of the Sacred Scriptures; therefore to proceed in our *Philoſophical conjectures*, However the *good* ſhall be delivered, be ſure the *wicked* ſhall be made a prey to the *Scorching Element*, which now rageth every where, and ſuffer the Judgment threatned. But yet the moſt degenerate part of Mankind (if we conſult meer *Reaſon* and the Antient *Eaſtern Cabbala*) who are detained Priſoners in the now *inflamed Atmoſphere*, ſhall not for ever be abandon'd to miſery and ruin. For they are ſtill pretended to be under the eye and tender care of that *Almighty goodneſs*, that made and preſerveth all things, that puniſheth not out of *malice* or *revenge*, and therefore will not purſue them to their utter

utter undoing for ever: But hath ſet bounds to their *deſtruction*, and in *infinite Wiſdom* hath ſo ordered the matter that none of his Creatures ſhall be loſt eternally, or indure ſuch an endleſs miſery, than which *not Being* it ſelf were more *eligible*. Wherefore thoſe curious contemplators phancy, that the unſupportable pain and anguiſh which hath long ſtuck to thoſe miſerable creatures, will at length ſo conſume and deſtroy that *inſenſible pleaſure* and *congruity* that unites Soul and Body, that the thus miſerably *cruciated Spirit* muſt needs quit it's unfit habitation; and there being no other body within its reach that is capable of a *vital* union, according to the tenor of this *Hypotheſis*, it muſt become *ſenſeleſs* and *unactive* by Axiom, 4. And ſo be buried in a ſtate of *ſilence* and *inertneſs*.

At length when theſe *greedy flames* ſhall have devoured what ever was *combuſtible*, and converted into a *ſmoak* and *vapour* all groſſer *concretions*, that great *orb* of *fire* that the *Carteſian Philoſophy* ſuppoſeth to conſtitute the *center* of this *Globe*, ſhall perfectly have recovered its priſtine *nature*, * and ſo following the Laws of its *proper motion*, ſhall fly away out of this *vortex*, and become a *wandring Comet*, till it ſettle in ſome other.

But if the next *Conflagration* reach not ſo

so *low* as the inmost regions of the *Earth*, * so that the central fire remains unconcern'd, and unimploy'd in this *combustion*, this *Globe* will then retain its wonted place among the *Planets*. And that so it may happen, is not improbable, since there is plenty enough both of *fiery principles* and *materials* in those Regions that are nearer to the surface, to set the Earth into a Lightsome *flame*, and to do all that execution that we have spoken of. Some conceive therefore, that the *conflagration* will not be so *deep* and *universal* as this opinion supposeth it; But that it may take beginning from a less distance, and spend it self upwards. And to this purpose they represent the sequel of their *Hypothesis*.

The General Restitution.

THose *thick* and *clammy* vapours which erstwhile ascended in such vast measures, and had fill'd the *vault* of Heaven with *smoak* and *darkness*, must at length obey the Laws of their nature and gravity, and so descend again in abundant *showres*, and mingle with the *subsiding ashes*, which will constitute a *mudd vegetative* and *fertile*. For those warm and benign beams, that now again begin to visit the *desolate* Earth, will excite those *seminal principles* into action,

on, which the *Divine Wiſdom* and *goodneſs* hath mingled with all things. Wherefore they operating according to their natures, and the diſpoſitions which they find in the reſtored matter, will ſhoot forth in all ſorts of *flowers*, *herbs*, and *trees*; making the whole *Earth* a *Garden* of *delight* and *pleaſure*; And erecting all the *Phænomena* proper to this *Element*. By this time the *Air* will be grown *vital* again and far more pure and pleaſant, than before the *fiery purgation*. Wherefore they conceive, that the diſbodyed Souls ſhall return from their unactive and *ſilent* receſs, and be joyned again to bodies of purified and duly prepared *Air*. For their *radical aptitude* to matter ſtill remained, though they fell *aſleep* for want of bodies of fit temper to unite with.

This is the ſumm of the *Hypotheſis* as it is repreſented by the profoundly Learned Dr. *H. More*, with a *copious* and *pompous eloquence*.

Now ſuppoſing ſuch a *receſs* of any Souls into a ſtate of inactivity, ſuch a *Reſtitution* of them to *life* and *action* is very reaſonable; ſince it is much better for them to *live* and *operate* again, than to be uſeleſs in the *univerſe*, and as it were nothing for ever. And we have ſeen above, that the *Divine goodneſs* doth always what is *beſt*,

and

and his *wiſdom* is not ſo ſhallow as to make his Creatures ſo as that he ſhould be fain to baniſh them into a ſtate that is next to *non-entity*, there to remain through all *duration*. Thus then will thoſe lately tormented Souls, having ſmarted for their paſt iniquities, be recovered both from their *ſtate* of *wretchedneſs* and *inſenſibility*; and by the unſpeakable *benignity* of their *Maker*, placed once more in ſuch conditions, wherein by their own endeavours, and the divine aſſiſtance they may amend what was formerly amiſs in them, and purſue any *good Reſolutions* that they took while under the laſh of the fiery tortures; Which thoſe that do, when their *good inclinations* are perfected, and the *Divine Life* again enkindled, they ſhall in due time re-aſcend the *Thrones* they ſo unhappily fell from, and be circled about with unexpreſſible felicity. But thoſe that for all this, follow the ſame ways of *ſenſuality* and *rebellion* againſt their merciful deliverer, they ſhall be ſure to be met with by the ſame *methods* of *puniſhment*; and at length be as miſerable as ever.

Thus we ſee the *Air* will be *re-peopled* after the *conflagration*: but how the *Earth* will ſo ſoon be reſtored to *Inhabitants*, is a matter of ſome difficulty to determine, ſince it uſeth to be furniſht from the

the *Aereal* regions, which now will have none left that are fit to plant it. For the *good* were delivered thence before the *conflagration*: And thoſe that are newly come from under the fiery laſh and latter ſtate of *ſilence*, are in a hopeful way of *recovery*; At leaſt, their aereal *congruity* cannot be ſo ſoon expired, as to fit them for an early return to their *terreſtrial priſons*. Wherefore to help our ſelves in this rencounter, we muſt remember, that there are continually multitudes of ſouls in a ſtate of *inactivity*, for want of ſuitable bodies to unite with, there being more that dye to the æry ſtate, than are born into this *terreſtrial*. In this condition were *myriads*, when the general *Fever* ſeiz'd this great *deſtemper'd body*; who therefore were unconcern'd in the *conflagration*, and are now as ready to return into *life* and *action* upon the *Earth's* happy *reſtauration*, as if no ſuch thing had happned.

Wherefore they will not fail to deſcend into fitly *prepared matter*, and to exerciſe all the functions proper to this condition. Nor will they alone be inhabitants of the *Earth*: For all the variety of other *Animals*, ſhall live and act upon this *ſtage* with them; all ſorts of ſouls inſinuating themſelves into thoſe bodies, which are fit for their reſpective natures.

Thus then ſuppoſing habitable *congruous* bodies, there is no doubt, but there will be humane *Souls* to *actuate* and *inform* them; but all the difficulty is to conceive how the *matter* ſhall be *prepared*. For who ſhall be the common *Seeds-man* of ſucceeding Humanity, when all mankind is ſwept away by the *fiery deluge*? And to take Sanctuary in a *Miracle* is *unphiloſophical* and *deſperate*. I think therefore, it is not *improbable* (I mean according to the duct of this *Hypotheſis*) but that in this *renewed youth*, of the ſo lately *calcined* and *purified Earth*, there may be ſome pure *efflorescences* of *balmy* matter, not to be found now in its exhauſted and decrepit *Age*, that may be proper *vehicles* of *life*, into which ſouls may deſcend without further *preparation*; And ſo orderly ſhape and form them, as we ſee to this day ſeveral ſorts of other creatures do, without the help of generation. For doubtleſs there will be great plenty of *unctuous ſpirituous matter*, when the moſt inward and *recondite* ſpirits of all things, ſhall be diſlodg'd from their *old* cloſe *reſidences*, and ſcatter'd into the *Air*; where they will at length, when the fierce agitation of the fire is over, gather in conſiderable proportious of *tenuious vapours*; which at length deſcending in a *cryſtalline liquor*, and mingling with the fineſt parts of the *newly modified*

fied Earth, will doubtleſs compoſe as *genital* a matter as any can be prepared in the bodies of *Animals*. And the *calm* and *wholeſome Air* which now is duly purged from its noxious *reeks* and *vapours*, and abounds with their *ſaline ſpirituous humidity*, will queſtionleſs be very propitious to thoſe tender *inchoations* of *life*; and by the help of the Sun's favourable and gentle *beams*, ſupply them with all neceſſary materials.

Nor need we puzzle our ſelves to phancy, how thoſe *Terræ Filii*, thoſe young ſons of the Earth will be fortified againſt the injuries of *weather*, or be able to provide for themſelves in their firſt and tender *infancy*; ſince doubtleſs, if the ſuppoſition be admitted, * thoſe *immediate births* of *unaſſiſted* nature will not be ſo *tender* and *helpleſs* as *we*, into whoſe very conſtitutions *delicacy* and *effeminateneſs* is now twiſted. For thoſe *maſculine productions* which were always expoſed to the open *Air*, and not *cloyſter'd* up as we, will feel no more incommodity from it, than the young fry of fiſhes do from the coldneſs of the water they are ſpawn'd in. And even now much of our tenderneſs and *delicacy* is not natural but *contracted*. For *poor* Children will indure that hardſhip that would quickly diſpatch thoſe that have had a more careful and officious nurture. And without queſtion we ſhould do many things

for *ſelf-preſervation* and *proviſion*, which now we yield no ſigns of; had not cuſtom prevented the *endeavours* of *nature*, and made it expect aſſiſtance. For the *Indian Infants* will ſwim currently, when aſſoon as they are born, they are thrown into the water. And nature put to her ſhifts, will do many things more than we can ſuſpect her able for the performance of; which conſider'd, 'tis not hard to apprehend, but that thoſe Infant *Aborigines* are of a very different temper and condition from the weak products of now decayed nature; having queſtionleſs, more pure and *ſerviceable bodies*, *ſenſes* and other *faculties* more *active* and *vigorous*, and *nature* better exerciſed; ſo that they may by a like *ſenſe* to that which carries all creatures to their proper food, purſue and take hold of that nutriment which the *free* and *willing Earth* now offer'd to their mouths; till being advantaged by *Age* and *growth*, they can move about to make their choice. * But all this is but the *frolick* exerciſe of my pen chuſing a *Paradox*; And 'tis time to give over the purſuit.

To make an end then, we ſee that after the *Conflagration* the earth will be *inhabited* again, and all things proceed much-what in like manner as before. But whether the *Cataſtrophe* of *this* ſhall be like the former or no, I think is not to be determined. For

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as one world hath *periſh't* by *water*, and this preſent *ſhall* by *fire*, 'tis poſſible the next *period* may be by the *Extinction* of the *Sun*. But I am come to the end of the *line*, and ſhall not go beyond this preſent Stage of *Providence*, or wander into an *Abyſſe* of uncertainties, where there is neither *Sun* nor *Star* to guide my notions.

Now of all that hath been repreſented of this *Hypotheſis*, there is nothing that ſeems more *extravagant* and *Romantick* than thoſe notions that come under the two laſt Generals; And yet ſo it falls out, that the main matters contained under them, one would think to have a ſtrange conſonancy with ſome expreſſions in the *Sacred Oracles*. For clear it is from the *divine Volume*, that the *wicked* and the *Devils* themſelves are reſerved to a further and more ſevere *Judgment* than yet afflicteth them; It is as plainly declared to be a *vengeance* of *fire* that abides them, as a compleatment of their torments: And that the *Earth* ſhall be *burnt*, is as explicitely affirmed, as any thing can be ſpoken. Now if we put all theſe together, they look like a probability, that the *conflagration* of the *Earth* ſhall conſummate the *Hell* of the wicked. And * thoſe other expreſſions of *Death*, *Deſtruction*, *Perdition* of the ungodly, and the like, ſeem to ſhow a favourable regard to the State of ſilence

and *inactivity*. Nor is there leſs appearing countenance given to the *Hypotheſis* of *Reſtitution*,* in thoſe paſſages which predict *New Heavens* and a *New Earth*, and ſeem to intimate only a *change* of the preſent.

And yet I would have no body be ſo credulous as to be taken with little appearances, nor do I mention theſe with an intent that they ſhould with full conſent be delivered to intend the aſſerting any ſuch Doctrines; But that there is ſhew enough both in Reaſon and Scripture for theſe Opinions to give an occaſion for an *Hypotheſis*, and therefore that they are not meer *arbitrary* and *idle imaginations*.

Now whatever becomes of this particular *draught* of the Souls ſeveral *conditions* of life and action, * the main Opinion of *Præexiſtence* is not at all concerned. This *Scheme* is only to ſhew, that natural and imperfect Reaſon can frame an *Intelligible Idea* of it; And therefore queſtionleſs the Divine *Wiſdom* could form and order it, either ſo, or with infinitely more *accuracy* and *exactneſs*. How it was with us therefore of *Old*, I know not; But yet that we may have been, and acted before we deſcended hither, I think is very probable. And I ſee no reaſon but why *Præexiſtence* may be admitted without altering any thing conſiderable of the ordinary *Syſteme* of *Theology*. But I ſhut up with

with that modeſt concluſion of the Great *Des Cartes*:

That although theſe matters ſeem hardly otherwiſe intelligible than as I have here explained them:

Yet nevertheleſs remembring I am not infallible, I aſſert nothing; *but ſubmit all I have written to the Authority of the *Church* of *England*, and to the matured judgments of graver and wiſer men; Earneſtly deſiring that nothing elſe may be entertained with credit by any perſons, but what is able to win it by the force of evident and victorious reaſon. *Des Cartes Princ. Philoſ. lib.* 4. §. CVII.

FINIS.

A DISCOURSE OF TRUTH.

BY THE
Reverend Doctor
R U S T,
Late LORD BISHOP of
DROMORE in *IRELAND.*

LONDON,
Printed for *J. Collins*, and *S. Louns* over against *Exeter Exchange* in the *Strand*, 1682.

A

DISCOURSE

OF

TRUTH.

A

LETTER

Concerning the

Subject and the *Author.*

SIR,

I *Have now peruſed, and returned the Manuſcript you ſent me; it had contracted many and great Errours in the Tranſcription, which I have corrected: I was enabled to do it by a written Copy of the ſame Diſcourſe, which I have had divers years in my Hands. The Subject is of great and weighty importance, and the Acknowledgment of the Truths here aſſerted and made good, will lay a Foundation for right conceptions in the Doctrines that concern the* Decrees

crees of God. For the first Errour, which is the ground of the rest, is, That things are good and just, because God Wills them so to be; and if that be granted, we are disabled from using the arguments taken from natural Notions, and the Attributes and Perfections of the Divine Nature, against the Blackest and most Blasphemous Opinions that ever were entertained concerning Gods proceedings with the Sons of Men. If there be no settled Good and Evil, Immutable and Independent on any Will or Understanding, then God may have made his reasonable Creatures on purpose to damn them for ever. He may have absolutely decreed that they should sin, that he may damn them justly; He may most solemnly and earnestly prohibit Sin by his Laws, and declare great displeasure against it; and yet by his ineluctable Decrees force men to all the sin that is committed in the World:

World: He may vehemently proteſt his unfeigned deſire of their Life and Happineſs, and at the ſame time ſecretly reſolve their Eternal Deſtruction; He may make it his Glory and Pleaſure to triumph eternally in the torments of poor Worms, which himſelf hath by his unalterable and irreſiſtible Will made miſerable; yea, (as the diſcourſe inſtanceth) he may after his Decrees concerning the Salvation of the Elect, after the death of his Son for them, and the miſſion of his Spirit to them, and after all the promiſes he hath made to aſſure them; thruſt them *alſo at laſt into the dreadful Regions of Death and Woe; I ſay if there be no immutable reſpects in things, but Juſt and Unjuſt, Honourable and Diſhonourable, Good and Cruel, Faithful and Deceitful, are reſpects made by meer arbitrarious Will, it will be in vain to diſpute from Them againſt any ſuch*

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diſmal Opinions: yea it will be great folly to argue for the Simplicity of the Divine Nature againſt the vile conceits of the old Anthropomorphites, *and the Blaſphemies of the preſent* Muggletonians, *of God's having a Corporal ſhape, Parts and Members, if there be no neceſſary Independent Connexion, betwixt Immenſity, Spirituality and Perfection. But this being eſtabliſhed, that there are immutable reſpects in things, and that ſuch and ſuch are Perfections, and their contrary, Defects and imperfections; hence it will follow, that it is impoſſible the forementioned Doctrines can be true concerning God, who* cannot lye, *cannot* deny himſelf: viz. *He being Abſolute and Infinite Perfection, cannot act any thing that is Evil or imperfect; But all the expreſſions in Scripture, that at firſt ſight look towards ſuch a ſenſe, muſt be interpreted by the gene-*

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ral Analogy *and courſe of them, which declares his Infinite, Immutable Excellencies, and theſe Notions of himſelf, which he hath written on the Souls of Men.*

So that the Subject of this little Diſcourſe, is of vaſt Moment, and the truth aſſerted in it, is, I think, confirmed with an irreſiſtible Strength and force of Reaſoning; and not to be convinced by it, will argue either great weakneſs of Underſtanding, in not perceiving conſequences that are ſo cloſe and plain; or great obſtinacy of Will, in being ſhut up by prejudices, and preconceiv'd Opinions againſt Light that is ſo clear and manifeſt.

The Author was a Perſon with whom I had the Honour and Happineſs of a very particular acquaintance; a man he was of a clear Mind, a deep Judgment and ſearching Wit: greatly learned in all the beſt ſorts of Knowledge, old and new, a thoughtful and diligent

diligent Enquirer, of a free Understanding, and vaſt Capacity, joyn'd with ſingular Modeſty, and unuſual Sweetneſs of Temper, which made him the Darling of all that knew him: He was a perſon of great Piety and Generoſity; a hearty Lover of God and Men: An excellent Preacher, a wiſe Governour, a profound Philoſopher, a quick, forcible, and cloſe Reaſoner, and above all, a true and exemplary Chriſtian. In ſhort, he was one who had all the Qualifications of a Primitive *Biſhop, and of an extraordinary Man. This I ſay not out of kindneſs to my Friend, but out of Juſtice to a Perſon of whom no Commendation can be extravagant. He was bred in* Cambridge, *and Fellow of* Chriſt's *Colledge, where he lived in great Eſteem and Reputation for his eminent Learning and Vertues; he was one of the firſt that overcame the prejudices of the Education of the late un-*

unhappy Times, in that University, and was very Instrumental to enlarge others. He had too great a Soul for the trifles of that Age, and saw early the nakedness of Phrases and Phancies; He out-grew the pretended Orthodoxy of those days, and addicted himself to the Primitive Learning and Theology, in which he even then became a great Master.

After the return of the Government, the excellent Bishop Taylor, foreseeing the vacancy in the Deanery of Connor, sent to Cambridge, for some Learned and Ingenious Man, who might be fit for that Dignity. The motion was made to Dr. Rust, which corresponding with the great Inclination he had to be conversant with that incomparable Person, he gladly accepted of it, and hastn'd into Ireland, where he landed at Dublin about August 1661. He was received with much Respect and Kind-

neſs by that great and good Biſhop, who knew how to value ſuch Jewels; and preferr'd to the Deanery as ſoon as it was void, which was ſhortly after. He continued in that Preferment during the Biſhops Life, always dearly lov'd, and even admir'd by him.

At his Death (that ſad ſtroke to all the Lovers of Religion and Learning) he was choſen for the laſt ſolemn Office to his Deceaſed Father and Friend; and he Preach't ſuch a Funeral Sermon as became that extraordinary Perſon and himſelf. It hath been ſince publiſhed, and I ſuppoſe you may have ſeen it, upon the lamented Death of Biſhop Taylor; *which hapned* Auguſt 13*th.* 1667. *The Biſhopricks were divided;* Dr. Boyle *Dean of* Cork, *was nominated Biſhop of* Downe *and* Connor; *and* Dr. Ruſt *Dean of* Connor, *Biſhop of* Dromore; *he lived in the*

Deanery

Deanery about six years, in the Bishoprick but three; for in December *1670, he dyed of a Fever (in the prime of his years) to the unspeakable grief of all that knew his Worth, and especially of such of them as had been blest by his Friendship, and most sweet and indearing Conversation. He was buried in the Quire of his own Cathedral Church of* Dromore, *in a Vault made for his Predecessour Bishop* Taylor, *whose Sacred Dust is deposited also there: and what Dormitory hath two such Tenants?*

This is the best account I can give you of the Work and the Author: and by it you may perceive his Memory deserves to live, and this product of him: but there is so much reverence due to the Manes *of so venerable a Person, that nothing should be hastily published under his honour'd name. I know, had he designed this Exercitation for the Publick, he would have*

made it much more compleat and exact than we now have it; but as it is, the Diſcourſe is weighty, and ſubſtantial, and may be of great uſe. As it goes about now in written Copies it, is (I perceive) exceedingly depraved; and in danger of being ſtill worſe abuſed; The Publication would preſerve it from further corruptions. However I dare not adviſe any thing in it, but this, that you take the judgment of that Reverend Doctor you mention (the deceaſed Authors Friend and mine,) and act according as he ſhall direct. I am,

Your real Friend,

Joſ. Glanvil.

A DISCOURSE OF TRUTH.

SECT. I.

That Truth is twofold; In the Object, *and in the* Subject. *That in the* Object *what it is; And that it is antecedent to and independent of any Will or Underſtanding whatever.*

TRUTH is of æquivocal ſignification, and therefore cannot be defined before it be diſtinguiſh't. It is twofold; Truth in *things*, which you may call Truth in the Object: and Truth in the *Underſtanding*, which is Truth in the Subject. By the firſt I mean nothing elſe but that Things neceſſarily are what they are: And that there are neceſſary mutual reſpects and relations of Things one unto another.

other. Now that things are what they are, and that there are mutual Reſpects and Relations eternal, and immutable, and in order of Nature* antecedent to any Underſtanding either created or uncreated, is a thing very plain and evident; For it's clearer than the *Meridian* Light, that ſuch Propoſitions as theſe, *Homo eſt animal rationale*, *Triangulum eſt quod habet tres angulos*, are not arbitrarious dependencies upon the Will, Decree, or Underſtanding of God, but are neceſſary and eternal Truths; and wherein 'tis as impoſſible to divide the Subject, and what is ſpoken of it, as it is for a thing not to be what it is, which is no leſs than a Contradiction; And as indiſpenſible are the mutual reſpects and relations of things both in Speculatives and Morals.

SECT. II.

The neceſſity of there being certain Arguments, Means and Objects for certain Concluſions, Ends and Faculties; and that every thing will not ſuit every thing.

FOR can it be imagin'd that every Argument can be made a proportioned *Medium* to prove every Concluſion? * that any thing may be a ſuitable means to any end? that any Object may be conformable to any Facul-

Faculty? Can Omnipotence it self make these Propositions, That twice two are four, or that Parallels cannot interfect, clear and convincing Arguments to prove these grand Truths, *That Christ came into the World to dye for Sinners, and is now exalted as a Prince and a Saviour at the Right Hand of God?* * Is it possible that there should be such a kind of *Geometry*, wherein any problemes should be demonstrated by any Principles; *quidlibet ex quolibet*; as that a *Quadrangle* is that which is comprehended of four right Lines: * Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones?

SECT. III.

An Instance or two of gross and horrid Absurdities, consequent to the denying the mutual respects and relations of things to be eternal and indispensible.

CAN the infinite Wisdom it self make the damning of all the Innocent and the unspotted Angels in Heaven a proportionate means to declare and manifest the unmeasureableness of his Grace and Love, and goodness towards them? Can Lying, Swearing, Envy, Malice, nay Hatred of God and Goodness it self, be made the most acceptable Service of God, and the readiest

way to a mans Happiness? And yet all these must be true, and infinitely more such contradictions than we can possibly imagin, if the mutual respects and relations of things be not eternal and indispensible: which that they are, I shall endeavour to prove.

SECT. IV.

The Entrance into the first part of the Discourse, which is of Truth *in the Object: That the Divine* Understanding *does not make the Respects and Relations of its Objects, but finds them or observes them.*

FIrst, we must premise that * Divine *Understanding* cannot be the Fountain of the Truth of things; * nor the Foundation of the references of one to another. For it is against the nature of all Understanding, to *make* its Objects. * It is the nature of Understanding, *ut moveatur, illuminetur, formetur, &c.* Of its Object, *ut moveat, illuminet, formet. Intellectus in actu primo* hath it self unto its object, as the Eye unto the Sun; it is irradiated, inlightned and actuated by it: And *Intellectus in actu secundo*, hath it self unto its Object, as the Image to that it represents; and the perfection of Understanding consists in being actuated by, and

and in an adæquate Conformity to its object, according to the nature of all Idea's, Images or Repreſentations of things. The Sum is this, * No Idea's or Repreſentations are or make the things they repreſent; all Underſtanding is ſuch; therefore no Underſtanding doth *make* the Natures, Reſpects and Relations of its Objects.

SECT. V.

That the Divine Will *does not determine the References and Dependencies of things, becauſe that would ſubvert his other Attributes.*

* IT remains then, that abſolute, arbitrarious and independent *Will* muſt be the Fountain of all Truth; and muſt determine the References and Dependencies of things: * which aſſertion would in the *Firſt* place deſtroy the nature of God, * and rob him of all his Attributes. For then it's impoſſible that there ſhould be ſuch a thing as Divine *Wiſdom* and *Knowledge*, which is nothing elſe but an apprehenſion of common notions, and the natures and mutual reſpects and relations of things. For if the Nature of God be ſuch, that his arbitrarious imagination that ſuch and ſuch things have ſuch and ſuch natures and Depen-

Dependencies, doth make thoſe things to have thoſe Natures or Dependencies, he may as eaſily Unimagine that Imagination; and then they that before had a mutual Harmony, Sympathy and Agreement with one another, ſhall now ſtand at as great a diſtance and oppoſition. And thus the Divine Underſtanding will be a mere Protæan *Chimæra*, a Caſual Conflux of intellectual Atomes: Contradictions are true, if God will underſtand them ſo, and then the foundation of all Knowledge is taken away, and God may as truly be ſaid to know nothing as every thing; nay, * any Angel or Man may as truly be ſaid to know all things, as God himſelf; for then every thing will be alike certain, and every apprehenſion equally conformable to Truth. Theſe are infallible conſequences, and a thouſand more as abſurd as theſe, if contradictory Propoſitions may be both true: and whether they be ſo or no, it's a meer caſual Dependence upon the Arbitrarious pleaſure of God, if there be not a neceſſary immutability and eternal oppoſition betwixt the being and the not being of the ſame thing, at the ſame time and in the ſame reſpect. Likewiſe all thoſe Truths we call *Common Notions*, (the Syſteme and Comprehenſions of which, is the very Eſſence of Divine Wiſdom; as the concluſions iſſuing

ing from them, not by any operoſe deduction, but a clear intuitive light, are the very Nature of Divine Knowledge, * if we diſtinguiſh thoſe two Attributes in God) I ſay, all theſe propoſitions of immediate and indemonſtrable Truth, if theſe be only ſo, becauſe ſo underſtood by God, and ſo underſtood by God becauſe he pleaſed ſo to have them, and not becauſe there is an indiſpenſible relation of Harmony and Proportion betwixt the Terms themſelves; then it is a thing meerly caſual, and at the pleaſure of God to change his former apprehenſions, and Idea's of thoſe Truths, and to make their contradictories as Evident, Radical and Fundamental as themſelves but even now were; and ſo Divine Wiſdom and Knowledge will be a various, fickle and mutable thing, a meer tumult and confuſion. All theſe conſequences infallibly flow from this certain Principle, That upon a changeable and uncertain Cauſe, Effects muſt needs have a changeable and uncertain Dependence. And there is nothing imaginable in it ſelf, more changeable and uncertain than *Will* not regulated by the dictates of Reaſon and Underſtanding.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

The avoidance of the foregoing ill consequences by making God immutable, with an Answer thereto.

IF any deny these Consequences and Deductions, * because they suppose that God is mutable and changeable; I answer, by bringing this as another absurdity, that if there be no indispensible and eternal respects of things, it will rob God of his Immutability, and unchangeableness: for if there be no necessary dependence betwixt *Unchangeableness* and *Perfection*, what should hinder, but that if God please to *think it so*, it will be his perfection to be changeable? and if *Will*, as *such*, be the only principle of his Actions, it is infallibly his Perfection to be so. For 'tis the Perfection of every Being to act according to the principle of its Nature, and it is the nature of an arbitrarious Principle to act or not, to do or undo upon no account but its own will and pleasure; to be determined, and tied up, either by it self, or from abroad, is violent and contranatural.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

An hideous, but genuine Inference of a Pamphleteer from this principle, that absolute and Sovereign Will is the Spring and Fountain of all Gods actions.

AND therefore from this principle, that absolute and Soveraign Will is the Spring and Fountain of all Gods Actions, it was rightly inferr'd by a late *Pamphleteer*, that God will one day damn all Mankind, Good and Bad, Believers and Unbelievers, notwithstanding all his Promises, Pretensions or Engagements to the contrary; because this damning all mankind in despight of his Faithfulness, Justice, Mercy and Goodness will be the greatest advancement of his *Soveraignty*, *Will* and *Prerogative* imaginable. His words are, *God hath stored up Destruction both for the perfect and the wicked, and this does wonderfully set forth his Soveraignty; his exercising whereof is so perfect, that when he hath tied himself up fast as may be, by never so many promises, yet it should still have its scope, and be able to do what it will, when it will, as it will*: Here you have this principle improved to the height. And however you may look upon this Author as some new Light, or *Ignis fatuus* of the

the times, yet I assure you in some pieces by him set forth, he is very sober and rational.

SECT. VIII.

That the Denial of the mutual Respects and Relations of things unto one another to be eternal and unchangeable, despoils God of that universal Rectitude of his Nature.

IN the next place, to deny the mutual respects and *rationes rerum* to be immutable and indispensible, * will spoil God of that *universal rectitude* which is the greatest Perfection of his Nature. For then Justice, Faithfulness, Mercy, Goodness *&c.* will be but contingent and arbitrarious Issues of the Divine Will. This is a clear and undeniable Consequence. For if you say these be indispensible perfections in God, for instance, if *Justice* be so, then there is an eternal relation of Right and Equity betwixt every Being and the giving of it that which is its propriety; if *Faithfulness*, then there is an indispensible agreement betwixt a promise and the performance of it; if *Mercy*, then there is an immutable and unalterable suitableness and harmony between an indigent Creature, and pity and commiseration; if *Goodness*, then there is an everlasting Pro-

portion

portion and ſymmetry between fulneſs and its overflowing and diſpreading of it ſelf, which yet is the thing denyed: * For to ſay they are indiſpenſibly ſo, becauſe God underſtands them ſo, ſeems to me extream incogitancy; for that is againſt the nature of all underſtanding, which is but the Idea and Repreſentation of things, and is then a true and perfect Image, when it is exactly conformed to its Object: And therefore, if things have not mutual reſpects and relations eternal and indiſpenſible, then all thoſe perfections do ſolely and purely depend upon abſolute and independent Will, as *Will*; And conſequently, it was and is indifferent in it ſelf that the contrary to theſe, as, *Injuſtice*, *Unfaithfulneſs*, *Cruelty*, *Malice*, *Hatred*, *Spite*, *Revenge*, *Fury*; and whatever goes to the conſtitution of Hell it ſelf, ſhould have been made the top and higheſt perfections of the Divine Nature: which is ſuch Blaſphemy as cannot well be named without horror and trembling. For inſtead of being a God, ſuch a nature as this is, joyned with Omnipotency, would be a worſe Devil than any is in Hell. And yet this is a neceſſary and infallible conſequence from the denial of theſe mutual reſpects and relations of things unto one another, to be eternal and unchangeable.

SECT.

SECT. IX.

That the Denial of the unchangeableness of the said mutual Respects and Relations of things to one another, takes away all Knowledge of God *and of our* own Happiness, *and lays a Foundation of the most incurable* Scepticism *imaginable.*

AND as by the denial of these, the Nature of God is wholly destroyed, so in the second place, the *mind* of *Man* would have no certainty of Knowledge, or assurance of Happiness. He can never come to know there is a God, and consequently not the Will and Mind of God, which if there be no intrinsecal and indispensible respects and relations of things, must be the ground and foundation of all Knowledge; for what means or arguments should we use to find out, or prove a Divine Nature? It were folly and madness to sit down and consider the admirable contrivement and artifice of this great Fabrick of the Universe; how that all natural things seem to act for some end, though themselves take no Cognizance of it: How the Sun by its motion and situation, or (which is all one) by being a Centre of the Earths Motion, provides Light and Heat, and Life for this inferiour World,

World, how living Creatures bring forth a moſt apt compoſure and ſtructure of parts and members, and with that a being endued with admirable Faculties, and yet themſelves have no inſight into, nor conſultation about this incomparable Workmanſhip; how they are furniſhed with Powers and Inclinations for the preſervation of this Body when it is once brought into the World; how without prævious deliberation they naturally take in that Food which without their intention or animadverſion is concocted in their Ventricle, turned into Chyle, that Chyle into Bloud, that Bloud diffuſed through the Veins and Arteries, and therewith the ſeveral Members nouriſhed, and decays of ſtrength repaired; I ſay, the gathering from all theſe (which one would think were a very natural conſequence) that there is a wiſe Principle which directs all theſe Beings unknown to you, in their ſeveral motions, to their ſeveral ends, (ſuppoſing the dependence and relations of things to be contingent and arbitrarious) were a piece of folly and incogitancy; For how can the Order of thoſe things ſpeak a wiſe and underſtanding Being, which have no relation or reſpect unto one another, but their whole agreement, ſuitableneſs and proportion is a meer caſual iſſue of abſolute and independent Will? If any thing may be the cauſe of any effect, and a proportio

nate mean to any end, who can infer infinite Wisdom from the dependence of things and their relations unto one another? * For we are to know that there is a God, and the Will of that God before we can know the mutual Harmony, or Disproportion of things; and yet, if we do not know these principal respects that things have among themselves, it is impossible we should ever come to the knowledge of a God: For these are the only arguments that any Logick in the world can make use of to prove any conclusion. But suppose we should come to know that there is a God, which, as I have demonstrated, denying the necessary and immutable truth of common Notions, and the indispensible and eternal relations of things, is altogether impossible: However, let it be supposed; yet how shall we know that these common Notions, and principles of natural instinct, which are the foundation of all Discourse and Argumentation, are certain and infallible Truths; and that our *Senses*, (which with these former Principles, we suppose this Divine Nature to have given us to converse with this outward world) were not on purpose bestowed upon us, to befool, delude and cheat us; if we be not first assured of the *Veracity* of God? And how can we be assured of that, if we know not

not that Veracity is a perfection? and how ſhall we know it is ſo, unleſs there be an intrinſecal relation betwixt Veracity and Perfection? For if it be an arbitrarious reſpect depending upon the Will of God, there is no way poſſible left whereby we ſhould come to know that it is in God at all; And therefore we have fully as much reaſon to believe that all our common Notions and Principles of natural inſtinct, whereupon we ground all our reaſonings and diſcourſe, are meer Chimæra's to delude and abuſe our faculties; and all thoſe Idea's, Phantaſms and Apprehenſions of our external ſenſes, we imagine are occaſioned in us by the preſence of outward objects, are meer Spectrums and Gulleries, wherewith poor mortals are befooled and cheated; as that they are given us by the firſt Goodneſs and Truth to lead us into the Knowledge of himſelf and Nature.

This is a clear and evident conſequence, and cannot be denyed by any that doth not complain of darkneſs in the brighteſt and moſt Meridian Light. And here you have the foundations laid of the higheſt Scepticiſm; for who can ſay he knows any thing, when he hath no baſis on which he can raiſe any true concluſions?

SECT.

SECT. X.

That the denying the Eternal and immutable Reſpects of things fruſtrates all the noble Eſſays of the mind or underſtanding of man.

THus you ſee the noble faculties of man, his Mind and Underſtanding, will be to no end and purpoſe, but for a Rack and Torture; for what greater unhappineſs or torment can there be imagined, than to have Faculties, whoſe Accompliſhment and Perfection conſiſts in a due conformation unto their objects, and yet to have no objects unto which they may be conformed; to have a Soul unmeaſurably breathing after the embraces of Truth and Goodneſs, and after a ſearch and enquiry after one and the other, and to find at laſt they are but aiery, empty and uncertain Notions, depending upon the arbitrarious determinations of boundleſs and independent Will; which determinations ſhe ſees it beyond her reach ever to come to any knowledge of?

SECT.

SECT. XI.

That in the aboveſaid denial are laid the Foundations of Rantiſm, Debauchery, and all Diſſoluteneſs of Life.

HEre you have likewiſe the true Foundations of that we call *Rantiſm*; for if there be no diſtinction 'twixt Truth and Falſhood, Good and Evil, in the nature of the things themſelves, and we never can be aſſured what is the mind and pleaſure of the ſupream and abſolute Will (becauſe Veracity is not intrinſecally and *ex natura rei*, a Perfection, but only an Arbitrarious, if *any* Attribute in the Deity) * then it infallibly follows, that it is all one what I do, or how I live; and I have as much reaſon to believe that I am as pleaſing unto God, when I give up my ſelf unto all Filthineſs, Uncleanneſs and Sin; when I ſwell with Pride, Envy, Hatred and Malice, *&c.* as when I endeavour with all my Might and Strength to purge and purifie my Soul from all pollution and defilement both of Fleſh and Spirit; and when I purſue the mortification of all my carnal Luſts and Inclinations. And I have fully as much ground and aſſurance, that the one is the ready Way to Happineſs, as the other.

SECT. XII.

That our assurance of future Happiness is quite cut off by the Denying of the Eternal and immutable respects of things.

AND this is another branch of this *second* Absurdity, from the denial of the intrinsecal and eternal respects and relations of things, that a man would not have any assurance of future Happiness; for though it be true indeed, or at least we fancy to our selves, that God hath sent *Jesus Christ* into the world, and by him hath made very large and ample promises, that whosoever believes in him and conforms his life unto his precepts, shall be made heir of the same Inheritance and Glory which Christ is now possessed of and invested with in the Kingdom of his Father; yet what ground have we to believe that God does not intend only to play with and abuse our Faculties, and in conclusion to damn all those that believe and live as is above expressed; and to take *them only* into the Injoyments of Heaven and Happiness, who have been the great Opposers of the Truth, and Gospel, and Life and Nature of *Jesus Christ* in the world? For if there be no eternal and indispensible Relation of

Things, then there's no intrinsecal Evil in Deceiving and Falsifying, in the damning the Good, or saving obstinate and contumacious Sinners (whilst such) notwithstanding any promises or threatnings to the contrary: and if the things be in themselves indifferent, it is an unadvised Confidence to pronounce determinately on either side. Yea further, suppose we should be assured that God is *Verax*, and that the Scripture doth declare what is his Mind and Pleasure; yet if there be not an intrinsecal opposition betwixt the Being and not Being, of a thing at the same time, and in the same respect; then God can make a thing that hath been *done*, *undone*; and that whatever hath been done or spoken either by himself, or Christ, or his Prophets, or Apostles, should never be done, or spoken by him or them; though He hath come into the world, yet that He should not be come; though he hath made these promises, yet that they should not be made; though God hath given us Faculties, that are capable of the enjoyment of himself, yet that he should not have given them us; and that yet we should have no Being, nor think a thought while we fancy and speak of all these contradictions. In fine, it were impossible we should know any thing, * if the opposition of contradictory terms depend upon the

arbitrarious resolves of any Being whatsoever. If any should affirm, that the terms of common Notions have an eternal and indispensible relation unto one another, and deny it of other truths, he exceedingly betrays his folly and incogitancy; for these common Notions and principles are foundations, and radical truths upon which are built all the deductions of reason and Discourse, and with which, so far as they have any truth in them, they are inseparably united. All these consequences are plain and undeniable, and therefore I shall travel no further in the confirmation of them.

SECT. XIII.

Several Objections propounded against the scope of this Discourse hitherto, from the Independency *of the* Divine Understanding *and* Will.

AGainst this Discourse will be *objected*, that it destroys God's *Independency* and *Self-sufficiency*; *for if there be truth antecedently to the Divine Understanding, the Divine Understanding will be a meer passive principle, acted and inlightened by something without itself, as the Eyes, by the Sun, and lesser Objects, which the Sun irradiates: and if there be mu-

mutual congruities, and dependencies of things in a moral ſenſe, and ſo, that ſuch and ſuch means have a natural and intrinſecal tendency, or repugnance to ſuch and ſuch ends, then will God be determined in his actions from ſomething without himſelf, * which is to take away his independency, and Self-ſufficiency. The pardoning of Sin to repenting Sinners ſeems to be a thing very ſuitable to infinite Goodneſs and Mercy, if there be any ſuitableneſs, or agreement in things antecedently to Gods Will; therefore in this caſe will God be moved from abroad, and as it were determined to an act of Grace. This will alſo undermine and ſhake many principles and opinions which are look'd upon as Fundamentals, and neceſſary to be believed: It will unlink and break that chain and method of Gods Decrees, which is generally believed amongſt us. God's great plot, and deſign from all Eternity, as it is uſually held forth, was to advance his Mercy and Juſtice in the Salvation of ſome, and Damnation of others; We ſhall ſpeak only of that part of Gods deſign, the advancement of his Juſtice in the Damnation of the greateſt part of Mankind, as being moſt pertinent for the improving of the ſtrength of the Objection againſt our former Diſcourſe.

SECT.

SECT. XIV.

A main Objection more fully insisted on, namely how well the advancement of Gods Justice in the Damnation of the greatest part of Mankind consists with the scope of this Discourse, especially it being stated as is here set down.

THat God may do this, He decrees to create man, and being created, decrees that man should sin; and because, as some say, man is a meer passive principle, not able, no not in the presence of objects, to reduce himself into action; Or because in the moment of his creation, as others, he was impowered with an indifferency to stand or fall; Therefore, lest there should be a frustration of God's great design; he decrees in the next place, infallibly to determine the Will of man unto Sin, that having sinned he might accomplish his Damnation; and what he had first, and from all eternity in his intentions, the advancement of his Justice. Now if there be such an intrinsecal relation of things, as our former Discourse pretends unto, this Design of God will be wholly frustrated. For it may seem clear to every mans understanding, that it is not for the Honour and Advance-

ment

ment of Justice to determine the Will of man to sin, and then to punish him for that sin unto which he was so determined; Whereas if God's Will, as such, be the only Rule and Principle of Actions, this will be an accommodate means (if God so please to have it) unto his design. The Summ is, We have seemed in our former discourse to bind and tye up God, who is an absolute and independent Being, to the petty formalities of Good and Evil, * and to fetter and imprison freedom, and liberty it self, in the fatal and immutable chains, and respects of things.

SECT. XV.

An Answer to that Objection that concerns the Understanding of God, shewing that the Divine Understanding does not depend upon the natures and mutual respects of things, though they be its Objects.

I Answer, This objection concerns partly the Understanding of God, and partly his Will; As for the divine understanding, the Case is thus; There are certain Beings, or natures of things which are Logically possible; it implyes no contradiction that they should be, although it were supposed, there were no power that could bring them into

into being; which natures, or things, supposing they were in being, would have mutual relations of agreement or opposition unto one another, which would be no more distinguished from the things themselves, than Relations are from that which founds them. Now the Divine Understanding is a representation, or comprehension of all those natures or beings thus *logically*, and in respect of God absolutely possible, and consequently it must needs be also a comprehension of all these Sympathies, and Antipathies, either in a natural or a moral way, which they have one unto another: for they, as I said, do necessarily, and immediately flow from the things themselves, as relations do, *posito fundamento, & termino*. Now the Divine understanding doth not at all depend upon these natures, or relations, though they be its Objects; for the nature of an Object doth not consist in being *motivum facultatis*, as it is usually with us, whose apprehensions are awakened by their presence; but its whole nature is sufficiently comprehended in this, that it is *terminativum Facultatis*; and this precisely doth not speak any dependency of the faculty upon it, especially in the divine understanding; where this *objective*, *terminative* presence flows from the fœcundity of the Divine Nature: for the things themselves are so far

I

from

from having any being antecedently to the Divine Underſtanding; that had not it been their exemplary pattern, and *Idea*, they had never been created, and being created they would lye in darkneſs; (I ſpeak of things that have not in them a Principle of underſtanding, not conſcious of their own natures, and that beauteous harmony they have among themſelves) were they not irradiated by the Divine Underſtanding, which is as it were an univerſal Sun that diſcovers and diſplays the natures and reſpects of things, and does as it were draw them up into its beams.

SECT. XVI.

An Anſwer to that Objection which concerns the Will of God, *ſhewing, that Liberty in the Power or Principle, is no where a Perfection, where there is not an Indifferency in the things or actions about which it is converſant.*

TO the ſecond part of the *Objection*, the ſtrength whereof is, that * to tye up God in his actions to the reaſon of things, deſtroys his Liberty, Abſoluteneſs, and Independency. I anſwer, it is no imperfection for God to be determined to Good; It is no bondage, ſlavery, or contraction, to be bound

bound up to the eternal Laws of Right and Justice. It is the greatest impotency and weakness in the world to have a power to evil, and there is nothing so diametrically opposite to the very being and nature of God. *Stat pro ratione voluntas*, unless it be as a redargution and check to impudent and daring Inquirers, is an account no where justifiable. The more any Being partakes of reason and understanding, the worse is the imputation of acting arbitrariously, *& pro imperio.* We can pardon it in Women and Children, as those from whom we do not expect that they should act upon any higher principle; but for a man of reason and understanding, that hath the Laws of goodness and rectitude (which are as the Laws of the *Medes* and *Persians* that cannot be altered) engraven upon his mind, for him to cast off these golden reins, and to set up arbitrarious Will for his Rule and Guide, is a piece of intolerable rashness and presumption. This is an infallible rule, that liberty in the power or principle is no where a perfection, where there is not an indifferency in the things or actions about which it is conversant: And therefore it is a piece of our weakness and imbecillity, that we have nature so indetermined to what is good. These things need no proof, indeed cannot well be proved, otherwise than they prove them-

themſelves: for they are of immediate truth, and prove themſelves they will, to a pure unprejudiced mind.

SECT. XVII.

That the Diſcourſe hitherto does not infer any dependency of God *upon any thing* without himſelf; *But only occaſions are offered to him of acting according to his own intimate nature and eſſence.*

2. *OUR former Diſcourſe doth not infer any dependency of God, upon any thing without himſelf; for God is not excited to his actions by any forreign, or extrinſecal motives; what he does, proceeds from the eternal immutable reſpects, and relations, or reaſons of things, and where are theſe to be found, but in the eternal and divine Wiſdom? For what can infinite Wiſdom be, but a ſteady, and immoveable comprehenſion of all thoſe natures and relations? and therefore God in his actions, does not look abroad, but only conſults, (if I may ſo ſpeak) the *Idea's* of his own mind. What Creatures do, is but the offering a particular caſe, for the reducement of a general principle into a particular action: or the preſentment of an occaſion for God to act according to the principles of his own na-

nature; when we ſay that God pardoneth Sin upon repentance, God is not moved to an act of Grace from any thing without himſelf; for this is a Principle in the divine Wiſdom, that pardon of Sin to repenting Sinners, is a thing very ſuitable to infinite goodneſs, and this Principle is a piece of the Divine Nature: Therefore when God upon a particular act of repentance puts forth a particular act of grace, it is but as it were a particular inſtance to the general rule, which is a portion of Divine Perfection, when 'tis ſaid, *to him that hath ſhall be given, and he ſhall have abundance*; the meaning is, He that walks up unto that light, and improves that ſtrength, that God hath already communicated unto him, ſhall have more abundant Incomes of light and ſtrength from God: It doth not follow that God is moved from without to impart his Grace. For this is a branch of Divine Wiſdom; it is agreeable to the infinite goodneſs of God, to take notice of, and reward the ſincere, though weak endeavours of his Creatures, after him; ſo that what is from abroad, is but a particular occaſion to thoſe Divine Principles to exert, and put forth themſelves.

SECT.

SECT. XVIII.

The ſecond part of the Diſcourſe, which briefly treats of Truth *in the* Subject; *what it is: What in God, and what in the Creature; And that in both it is, A Repreſentation or Conception in the mind, conformable to the unchangeable Natures and mutual Reſpects of things.*

THus have we ſpoken concerning the *truth* of *things*, or *Truth in the Object*. It follows that we ſpeak

Concerning *Truth* in the *power*, or faculty, which we called *Truth in the Subject*; which we ſhall diſpatch in a few words.

* Truth in the power, or faculty is nothing elſe but a conformity of its conceptions or *Idea's* unto the natures and relations of things, which in God we may call an actual, ſteady, immoveable, eternal Omniformity, as *Plotinus* calls the Divine Intellect, παντα, which you have largely deſcribed by him. And this the *Platoniſts* truly call the Intellectual World, for here are the natures of all things pure, and unmix'd, purged from all thoſe dregs, refined from all that droſs and alloy which cleave unto them in their particular inſtances. All inferiour and ſublunary things,

not excluding Man himſelf, have their excreſcences, and defects; Exorbitances, or privations are moulded up in their very frames and conſtitutions. There is ſomewhat extraneous, heterogeneous, and preternatural in all things here below, as they exiſt amongſt us; but in that other world, like the moſt purely fined gold, they ſhine in their native and proper glory. Here is the firſt goodneſs, the benign Parent of the whole Creation, with his numerous off-ſpring, the infinite throng of Created Beings: Here is the fountain of Eternal Love, with all its ſtreams, and rivulets: Here is the Sun of uncreated glory, ſurrounded with all his rayes, and beams: Here are the eternal, and indiſpenſible Laws of right and Juſtice, the immediate and indemonſtrable principles of Truth, and goodneſs: Here are ſteady and immoveable rules, for all caſes and actions, however circumſtantiated, from which the Will of God, though never ſo abſolute, and independent, from everlaſting to everlaſting, ſhall never depart one Tittle. * Now all that Truth that is in any Created Being, is by participation and derivation from this firſt underſtanding, and fountain of intellectual light. And that truth in the power of faculty is nothing but the conformity or its conceptions, or *Ideas* with the natures and

and relations of things, is clear and evident in it ſelf, and neceſſarily follows from what hath been formerly proved concerning the truth of things themſelves, * antecedently to any *underſtanding*, or *will*; * for things are what they are, and cannot be otherwiſe without a contradiction, and their mutual reſpects and dependences Eternal and unchangeable, as hath been already ſhew'd: ſo that the conceptions and *Ideas* of theſe natures and their relations, can be only ſo far true * as they conform and agree with the things themſelves, and the harmony which they have one to another.

FINIS.

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Annotations

UPON THE

Two foregoing TREATISES,

LUX ORIENTALIS,

OR,

An Enquiry into the OPINION

OF THE

EASTERN SAGES

Concerning the

Præ-existence of Souls;

AND THE

Discourse of TRUTH.

Written for the more fully clearing and further confirming the main DOCTRINES in each TREATISE.

By one not unexercized in these kinds of SPECULATION.

LONDON: Printed for *J. Collins*, and *S. Lounds*, over against *Exeter-Change* in the *Strand*. 1682.

Annotations

Annotations
UPON
LUX ORIENTALIS.

THese two Books, *Lux Orientalis* and the *Discourse of Truth*, are luckily put together by the *Publisher*, there being that suitableness between them, and mutual support of one another. And the Arguments they treat of being of the greatest importance that the Mind of man can entertain herself with, the consideration thereof has excited so sluggish a Genius as mine to bestow some few *Annotations* thereon, not very anxious or operose, but such as the places easily suggest; and may serve either to rectifie what may seem any how oblique, or illustrate what may seem less clear, or make a supply or adde strength where there may seem any further need. In which I would not be so understood as that I had such an anxiety and

fondneſs for the Opinions they maintain, as if all were gone if they ſhould fail; but that the Dogmata being more fully, clearly, and preciſely propounded, men may more ſafely and conſiderately give their Judgments thereon; but with that modeſty as to admit nothing that is contrary to the Judgment of the truly Catholick and Apoſtolick Church.

Chap. 2. p. 4. *That he made us pure and innocent*, &c. This is plainly ſignified in the general Moſaick Hiſtory of the Creation, that all that God made he ſaw it was good; and it is particularly declared of *Adam* and *Eve*, that they were created or made in a ſtate of Innocency.

Pag. 4. *Matter can do nothing but by motion, and what relation hath that to a moral Contagion?* We muſt either grant that the figures of the particles of Matter and their motion, have a power to affect the Soul united with the Body, (and I remember *Joſephus* ſomewhere ſpeaking of Wine, ſays, it does μεταγεννᾶν τὴν ψυχήν, *regenerate*, as it were, *the Soul* into another life and ſenſe of things) or elſe we muſt acknowledge that the parts of Matter are alterable into qualifications, that cannot be reſolved into mere mechanical motion and figure; whether they be thus altered by the vital power of the *Spirit of Nature*, or however it comes to paſs. But that Matter has a conſiderable in-

influence upon a Soul united thereto, the Author himself does copiously acknowledge in his fourth Chapter of this Book; where he tells us, that according to the disposition of the Body, our Wits are either more quick, free, and sparkling, or more obtuse, weak, and sluggish; and our Mind more chearful and contented, or else more morose, melancholick, or dogged, &c. Wherefore that he may appear the more consistent with himself, it is likely he understands by this Moral Contagion the very venome and malignity of vitious Inclinations, how that can be derived from Matter, especially its power consisting in mere motion and figuration of parts. The Psalmist's description is very apposite to this purpose, *Psal.* 58. *The ungodly are froward even from their mothers womb; as soon as they are born they go astray and speak lyes. They are as venomous as the poyson of a serpent, even like the deaf adder that stoppeth her ear.* That there should be such a difference in the Nativity of some from that of others, and haply begot also of the same Parents, is no slight intimation that their difference is not from their Bodies, but their Souls; in which there is so sudden Eruptions of vitious Inclinations which they had contracted in their former state, not repressed nor extinct in this, by reason of *Adam*'s lapse, and his losing the Paradisiacal body in which he was created, and which should, if it

had not been for his Fall, been tranſmitted to his Poſterity; but that being loſt, the ſeveral meaſures of the priſtine Vitioſity of humane Souls diſcover themſelves in this life, according to the juſt Laws of the Divine Nemeſis eſſentially interwoven into the nature of things.

Pag. 5. *How is it that thoſe that are under continual temptations to Vice, are yet kept within the bounds of Vertue*, &c. That thoſe that are continually under temptations to Vice from their Childhood, ſhould keep within the bounds of Vertue, and thoſe that have perpetual outward advantages from their Childhood to be vertuous, ſhould prove vitious notwithſtanding, is not rationally reſolved into their free will; for in this they are both of them equal: and if they had been equal alſo in their external advantages or diſadvantages, the different event might well be imputed to the freedom of their Will. But now that one, notwithſtanding all the diſadvantages to Vertue ſhould prove vertuous, and the other, notwithſtanding all the advantages to Vertue ſhould prove vitious; the reaſon of this certainly to the conſiderate will ſeem to lie deeper than the meer liberty of Will in man. But it can be attributed to nothing, with a more due and tender regard to the Divine Attributes, than to the *pre-exiſtent* ſtate of humane Souls, according to the Scope of the Author.

Pag.

Pag. 9. *For ſtill it ſeems to be a diminutive and diſparaging apprehenſion of the infinite and immenſe goodneſs of God, that he ſhould detrude ſuch excellent Creatures*, &c. To enervate this reaſon, there is framed by an ingenious hand this Hypotheſis, to vie with that of Pre-exiſtence: That Mankind is an Order of Beings placed in a middle ſtate between Angels and Brutes, made up of contrary Principles, *viz. Matter* and *Spirit*, indued with contrary faculties, *viz. Animal* and *Rational*, and encompaſſed with contrary Objects proportioned to their reſpective faculties, that ſo they may be in a capacity to exerciſe the Vertues proper and peculiar to their compounded and heterogeneal nature. And therefore though humane Souls be capable of ſubſiſting by themſelves, yet God has placed them in Bodies full of brutiſh and unreaſonable Propenſions, that they may be capable of exerciſing many choice and excellent Vertues, which otherwiſe could never have been at all; ſuch as Temperance, Sobriety, Chaſtity, Patience, Meekneſs, Equanimity, and all other Vertues that conſiſt in the Empire of *Reaſon* over *Paſſion* and *Appetite*. And therefore he conceives that the creating of humane Souls, though pure and immaculate, and uniting them with ſuch brutiſh Bodies, is but the conſtituting and continuing ſuch a Species of Being, which is an Order betwixt *Brutes* and *Angels*; into which

latter Order, if men uſe their faculties of the *Spiritual* Principle in them well, they may aſcend: Foraſmuch as God has given them in their *Spiritual* Principle (containing *Free Will*, and *Reaſon* to diſcern what is beſt) a power and faculty of overcoming all their inordinate Appetites.

This is his Hypotheſis, moſtwhat in his own words, and all to his own ſence, as near as I could with brevity expreſs it: And it ſeems ſo reaſonable to himſelf, that he profeſſes himſelf apt to be poſitive and dogmatical therein. And it might very well ſeem ſo to him, if there were a ſufficient faculty in the Souls of men in this World, to command and keep in order the Paſſions and Appetites of their Body, and to *be* and *do* what their Reaſon and Conſcience tells them they ſhould *be* and *do*, and blames them for not *being* and *doing*. So that they know more by far than they find an ability in themſelves to perform. Extreamly few there are, if any, but this is their condition: Whence all *Philoſophers* (that had any ſenſe of Vertue and Holineſs) as well as *Jews* and *Chriſtians*, have looked upon Man as in a lapſed ſtate, not blaming God, but deploring the ſad condition they found themſelves in by ſome foregoing lapſe or fault in Mankind. And it is ſtrange that our own Conſciences ſhould flie in our faces for what we could never have helped.

It

It is witty indeed which is alleadged in the behalf of this Hypotheſis, *viz.* That the *Rational* part of man is able to command the lower *Appetites*; becauſe if the ſuperiour part be not ſtrong enough to govern the inferiour, it deſtroys the very being of *moral* Good and Evil: Foraſmuch as thoſe acts that proceed out of *neceſſity* cannot be *moral*, nor can the ſuperiour Faculties be obliged to govern the inferiour, if they are not able, becauſe nothing is obliged to impoſſibilities. But I anſwer, if inabilities come upon us by our *own fault*, the defects of action then are upon the former account *moral*, or rather *immoral*. And our Conſciences rightly charge us with the Vitioſities of our Inclinations and Actions, even before we can mend them here, becauſe they are the conſequences of our former Guilt.

Wherefore it is no wonder that there is found a flaw in a ſubtilty that would conclude againſt the univerſal Experience of men, who all of them, more or leſs, that have any ſenſe of Morality left in them, complain that the inferiour powers of the Soul, at leaſt for a time, were too hard for the ſuperiour. And the whole maſs of Mankind is ſo generally corrupt and abominable, that it would argue the wiſe and juſt God a very unequal Matcher of innocent Souls with brutiſh Bodies, they being univerſally ſo hugely foiled or overcome in the conflict, if he indeed were the immediate Matcher

Matcher of them. For how can that be the effect of an equilibrious or ſufficient Free Will and Power, that is in a manner perpetual and conſtant? But there would be near as many Examples one way as the other, if the Souls of men in this ſtate were not by ſome precedent lapſe become unable to govern, as they ought, all in them or about them that is to be ſubjected to their Reaſon. No fine Fetches of Wit can demoliſh the ſteady and weighty ſtructure of ſound and general Experience.

Pag. 9. *Wherein he ſeeth it, ten thouſand to one but that they will corrupt,* &c. The Expreſſion [ten thouſand to one] is figurative, and ſignifies how hugely more like it is that the Souls would be corrupted by their Incorporation in theſe Animal or Brutiſh Bodies, than eſcape Corruption. And the effect makes good the Aſſertion: for *David* of old (to ſay nothing of the days of *Noah*) and *Paul* after him, declare of Mankind in general, that they are altogether become abominable; there is none that doth good, no not one. Wherefore we ſee what efficacy theſe Bodies have, if innocent Souls be put into them by the immediate hand of God, as alſo the force of Cuſtom and corrupt Education to debauch them; and therefore how unlikely it is that God ſhould create innocent Souls to thruſt them into ſuch ill circumſtances.

Pag. 10. *To ſuppoſe him aſſiſtent to unlawful*

and

and unclean Coitions, by creating a Soul to animate the impure Fœtus, &c. This seemed ever to those that had any sense of the Divine Purity and Sanctity, or were themselves endued with any due sensibleness and discernment of things, to be an Argument of no small weight. But how one of the more rude and unhewen Opposers of *Pre-existence* swaggers it out of countenance, I think it not amiss to set down for a pleasant Entertainment of the Reader.

Admit, says he, *that Gods watchful Providence waits upon dissolute Voluptuaries in their unmeet Conjunctions, and sends down fresh created Spirits to actuate their obscene Emissions, what is here done which is not very high and becoming God, and most congruous and proportionable to his immense Grandeur and Majesty*, viz. To bear a part amongst Pimps and Bawds, and pocky Whores and Woremasters, to rise out of his Seat for them, and by a free Act of Creation of a Soul, to set his Seal of Connivance to their Villanies; who yet is said to be of more pure Eyes than to endure to behold Wickedness. So that if he does (as his Phrase is) pop in a Soul in these unclean Coitions, certainly he does it winking. But he goes on: *For in the first place*, says he, *his condescension is hereby made signal and eximious; he is gloriously humble beyond a parallel, and by his own Example lessons us to perform the meanest works, if fit and profitable, and to be content even to drudge*

drudge for the common benefit of the World. Good God! what a Rapture has this impure Scene of Venerie put this young Theologer into, that it ſhould thus drive him out of his little Wits and Senſes, and make him ſpeak inconſiſtences with ſuch an affected Grace and lofty Eloquence! If the act of Gods freely creating Souls, and ſo of aſſiſting wretched Sinners in their foul acts of Adultery and Whoredom, be a *glorious* action, how is it an *Abaſement* of him, how is it his *Humiliation*? and if it be an *humbling* and debaſing of him, how is it *glorious*? The joyning of two ſuch ἀσύμβολα, are indeed without *parallel.* The creating of an humane Soul immortal and immaculate, and ſuch as bears the Image of God in it, as all immaculate Souls do, is one of the moſt glorious actions that God can perform; ſuch a Creature is it, as the Schools have judged more of value than the frame of the whole viſible World. But to joyn ſuch a Creature as this to ſuch impure corporeal matter, is furthermore a moſt tranſcendent Specimen of both his *Skill* and *Soveraignty*; ſo that this is an act of further *Super-exaltation* of himſelf, not of *Humiliation.* What remains then to be his *Humiliation*, but the condeſcending to aſſiſt and countenance the unclean endeavours of Adulterers and Adultereſſes? Which therefore can be no Leſſon to us for *Humility*, but a Cordial for the faint-hearted in

Debau-

Debauchery, and degeneracy of Life; wherein they may plead, ſo inſtructed by this rural Theolog, that they are content to drudge for the common profit of the World. But he proceeds.

And ſecondly, ſays he, *hereby he elicits Good out of Evil, cauſing famous and heroick perſons to take their Origine from baſe occaſions; and ſo converts the Luſts of ſenſual Varlets to nobler ends than they deſigned them.* As if an heroick Off-ſpring were the genuine effect of Adultery or Fornication, and the moſt likely way to People the World with worthy Perſonages. How this raw Philoſopher will make this comply with his Profeſſion of Divinity, I know not; whenas, it teaches us, that Marriage is honourable, but Whoremongers and Adulterers God will judge; and that he puniſhes the Iniquities of the Parents on their Children. But this bold Sophiſt makes God adjudge the nobleſt Off-ſpring to the defiled Bed, and not to puniſh, but reward the Adultery or Whoredom of debauched perſons, by giving them the beſt and braveſt Children: Which the more true it could be found in experience, it would be the ſtronger Argument for Pre-exiſtence; it being incredible that God, if he created Souls on purpoſe, ſhould crown Adultery and Whoredom with the choiceſt Off-ſpring.

And then *thirdly and laſtly*, ſays he, *hereby he*

he often detects the lewdneſs of Sinners, which otherwiſe would be ſmothered, &c. As if the All-wiſe God could find no better nor juſter means than this to diſcover this Villany. If he be thus immediately and in an extraordinary way aſſiſtant in theſe Coitions, were it not as eaſie for him, and infinitely more decorous, to charge the Womb with ſome *Mola* or *Ephemerous Monſter*, than to plunge an immaculate humane Soul into it? This would as effectually diſcover the Villany committed, and beſides prevent the charge Pariſhes are put to in maintaining Baſtards. And now that we have thus ſeen what a mere nothing it is that this Strutter has pronounced with ſuch ſonorous Rhetorick, yet he is not aſhamed to conclude with this Appeal to I know not what blind Judges: *Now*, ſays he, *are not all theſe Actions and Concerns very graceful and agreeable to God?* Which words in theſe circumſtances no man could utter, were he not of a craſs, inſenſible, and injudicious Conſtitution, or elſe made no Conſcience of ſpeaking againſt his Judgment. But if he ſpeak according to his Conſcience, it is manifeſt he puts Sophiſms upon himſelf, in arguing ſo weakly.

As he does a little before in the ſame place, where that he may make the coming of a Soul into a baſe begotten Body in ſuch a ſeries of time and order of things as the *Pre-exiſtentiaries*

tiaries ſuppoſe, and Gods putting it immediately upon his creating it into ſuch a Body, to be equally paſſable, he uſes this ſlight Illuſtration: *Imagine*, ſaith he, *God ſhould create one Soul, and ſo ſoon as he had done, inſtantly pop it into a baſe begotten Body; and then create another the matter of an hours ſpace before its precipitation into ſuch a Receptacle: which of theſe Actions would be the moſt diminutive of the Creators honour? would not the difference be inſenſible, and the ſcandal, if any, the ſame in both? Yet thus lies the caſe juſt betwixt the* Pre-exiſtentiaries *and us.* Let the Reader conſider how ſenſeleſs this Author is in ſaying the caſe betwixt the *Pre-exiſtentiaries* and him is *juſt* thus, when they are juſt *nothing* akin: for his two Souls are both unlapſed, but one of the *Pre-exiſtentiaries* lapſed, and ſo ſubjected to the Laws of Nature. In his caſe God acts freely, raiſing himſelf, as it were, out of his Seat to create an immaculate Soul, and put into a foul Body; but in the other caſe God onely is a looker on, there is onely his Permiſſion, not his Action. And the vaſt difference of time, he ſalves it with ſuch a Quibble as this, as if it were nothing, becauſe thouſands of Ages ago, in reſpect of God and his Eternity, is not an hour before. He might as well ſay the difference betwixt the moſt glorious Angel and a Flea is nothing, becauſe in compariſon of God both are ſo indeed. Wherefore this

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Anti-Pre-exiſtentiary is ſuch a Trifler, that I am half aſhamed that I have brought him upon the Stage.

But yet I will commend his Craft, though not his Faithfulneſs, that he had the wit to omit the propoſing of *Buggery* as well as of *Adultery*, and the endeavouring to ſhew how *graceful and agreeable to God, how congruous and proportionate it were to his immenſe Grandeur and Majeſty*, to create a Soul on purpoſe (immaculate and undefiled) to actuate the obſcene Emiſſions of a Brute having to do with a Woman, or of a Man having to do with a Brute: For both Women and Brutes, have been thus impregnated, and brought forth humane Births, as you may ſee abundantly teſtified in *Fortunius Licetus*; it would be too long to produce Inſtances.

This Opinion of Gods creating Souls, and putting them into Bodies upon inceſtuous and adulterous Coitions, how exceeding abſurd and unbecoming the Sanctity of the Divine Majeſty it ſeemed to the Churches of *Æthiopia*, you may ſee in the Hiſtory of *Jobus Ludolphus*. How intolerable therefore and execrable would this Doctrine have appeared unto them, if they had thought of the prodigious fruits of ſucceſsful Buggery? The words of *Ludolfus* are theſe: *Perabſurdum eſſe ſi quis Deum aſtrictum dicat pro adulterinis & inceſtuoſis partubus animas quotidie novas creare.* Hiſt. Æthiop.

Æthiop. lib. 3. cap. 5. What would they then say of creating a new Soul, for the Womb of a Beast bugger'd by a Man, or of a Woman bugger'd by a Beast!

Pag. 12. *Methinks that may be done at a cheaper rate*, &c. How it may be done with more agreeableness to the Goodness, Wisdom, and Justice of God, has been even now hinted by me, nor need I repeat it.

Pag. 13. *It seems very incongruous and unhandsome, to suppose that God should create two Souls for the supply of one monstrous Body.* And there is the same reason for several other Monstrosities, which you may take notice of in *Fortunius Licetus*, lib. 2. cap. 58. One with seven humane heads and arms, and Ox-feet; others with Mens bodies, but with a head the one of a Goose, the other of an Elephant, &c. In which it is a strong presumption humane Souls lodged, but in several others certain. How does this consist with Gods fresh creating humane Souls pure and innocent, and putting them into Bodies? This is by the aforesaid *Anti-Pre-existentiary* at first answered onely by a wide gape or yawn of Admiration. And indeed it would make any one stare and wonder how this can consist with Gods immediately and freely intermeddling with the Generation of Men, as he did at first in the Creation. For out of his holy hands all things come clean and neat. Many little efforts he

makes afterwards to ſalve this difficulty of Monſters, but yet in his own judgment the ſureſt is the laſt; *That God did purpoſely tye freſh created Souls to theſe monſtrous ſhapes, that they whoſe Souls ſped better, might humbly thank him.* Which is as wiſely argued, as if one ſhould firſt with himſelf take it for granted that God determines ſome men to monſtrous Debaucheries and Impieties, and then fancy this the uſe of it, that the Spectators of them may with better pretence than the Phariſee, cry out, Lord, we thank thee that we are not as theſe men are. There is nothing permitted by God, but it has its uſe ſome way or other; and therefore it cannot be concluded, becauſe that an Event has this or that uſe, therefore God by his immediate and free Omnipotence effected it. A *Pre-exiſtentiary* eaſily diſcerns that theſe Monſtroſities plainly imply that God does not create Souls ſtill for every humane Coition, but that having pre-exiſted, they are left to the great *Laws* of the *Univerſe* and *Spirit of Nature*; but yet dares not conclude that God by his free Omnipotence determines thoſe monſtrous Births, as ſerviceable as they ſeem for the evincing ſo noble a Theory.

Pag. 15. *That God on the ſeventh day reſted from all his works.* This one would think were an Argument clear enough that he creates nothing ſince the celebration of the firſt

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ſeventh days reſt. For if all his works are reſted from, then the creation of Souls (which is a work, nay a Maſter-piece amongſt his works ſcarce inferiour to any) is reſted from alſo. But the above-mentioned Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence is not at a loſs for an Anſwer; (for his Anſwers being ſlight, are cheap and eaſie to come by:) He ſays therefore, That this ſuppoſeth onely that after that time he ceaſed from creating new Species. A witty Invention! As if God had got ſuch an eaſie habit by once creating the things he created in the ſix days, that if he but contained himſelf within thoſe kinds of things, though he did hold on ſtill creating them, that it was not *Work*, but mere *Play* or *Reſt* to him, in compariſon of his former labour. What will not theſe men fancy, rather than abate of their prejudice againſt an opinion they have once taken a toy againſt! When the Author to the Hebrews ſays, *He that has entred into his reſt, has ceaſed from his own works, as God ceaſed from his*; verily this is ſmall comfort or inſtruction, if it were as this *Anti-Pre-exiſtentiary* would have it: for if God ceaſed onely from creating new Species, we may, notwithſtanding our promiſed *Reſt*, be tyed to run through new inſtances of *labours* or *ſins*, provided they be but of thoſe kinds we experienced before. To any unprejudiced underſtanding, this ſence muſt needs ſeem forced and unnatural, thus to

reſtrain Gods Reſt to the *Species* of things, and to engage him to the dayly task of creating *Individuals*. The whole *Æthiopian* Church is of another mind: *Qui animam humanam quotidiè non creari hoc argumento aſſerunt, quòd Deus ſexto die perfecerit totum opus Creationis.* See *Ludolfus* in the place above-cited.

Chap. 3. pag. 17. *Since the Images of Objects are very ſmall and inconſiderable in our brains*, &c. I ſuppoſe he mainly relates to the Objects of Sight, whoſe chief, if not onely Images, are in the fund of the Eye; and thence in vertue of the Spirituality of our Soul extended thither alſo, and of the due qualification of the Animal Spirits are tranſmitted to the *Perceptive* of the Soul within the brain. But how the bigneſſes and diſtances of Objects are conveyed to our cognoſcence, it would be too tedious to ſignifie here. See Dr. *H. Moore's Enchiridion Metaphyſicum*, cap. 19.

Pag. 17. *Were it not that our Souls uſe a kind of Geometry*, &c. This alludes to that pretty conceit of *Des Cartes* in his *Dioptricks*, the ſolidity of which I muſt confeſs I never underſtood. For I underſtand not but that if my Soul ſhould uſe any ſuch Geometry, I ſhould be conſcious thereof, which I do not find my ſelf. And therefore I think thoſe things are better underſtood out of that Chapter of the Book even now mentioned.

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Pag. 17. *And were the Soul quite void of all ſuch implicit Notions, it would remain as ſenſeleſs,* &c. There is no ſenſitive Perception indeed, without Reflection; but the Reflection is an immediate attention of the Soul to that which affects her, without any circumſtance of Notions intervening for enabling her for ſenſitive Operations. But theſe are witty and ingenious Conjectures, which the Author by reading *Des Cartes*, or otherhow, might be encouraged to entertain. To all ſenſitive Objects the Soul is an *Abraſa Tabula*, but for *Moral* and *Intellectual* Principles, their Idea's or Notions are eſſential to the Soul.

Pag. 18. *For Senſe teacheth no general Propoſitions,* &c. Nor need it do any thing elſe but exhibit ſome particular Object, which our Underſtanding being an *Ectypon* of the *Divine Intellect* neceſſarily, when it has throughly ſifted it, concludes it to anſwer ſuch a determinate Idea eternally and unalterably one and the ſame, as it ſtands in the Divine Intellect, which cannot change; and therefore that Idea muſt have the ſame properties and reſpects for ever. But of this, enough here. It will be better underſtood by reading the *Diſcourſe of Truth*, and the Annotations thereon.

Pag. 18. *But from ſomething more ſublime and excellent.* From the *Divine* or *Archetypal* Intellect, of which our Underſtanding is the *Ectypon*, as was ſaid before.

Pag. 21. *And ſo can onely tranſmit their natural qualities.* They are ſo far from tranſmitting their *Moral* Pravities, that they tranſmit from themſelves no qualities at all. For to create a Soul, is to concreate the qualities or properties of it, not out of the Creator, but out of nothing. So that the ſubſtance and all the properties of it are out of nothing.

Pag. 22. *Againſt the nature of an immaterial Being, a chief property of which is to be indiſcerpible.* The evaſion to the force of this Argument by ſome *Anti-Pre-exiſtentiaries* is, that it is to philoſophize at too high a rate of confidence, to preſume to know what the nature of a Soul or Spirit is. But for brevities ſake, I will refer ſuch Anſwerers as theſe to Dr. *H. Moore*'s brief Diſcourſe of the *true Notion of a Spirit*, printed lately with *Saduciſmus Triumphatus*; and I think he may be thence as ſure that *Indiſcerpibility* is an eſſential property of a Spirit, as that there are any Spirits in the Univerſe: and this methinks ſhould ſuffice any ingenuous and modeſt Oppoſer. But to think there is no knowledge but what comes in at our Senſes, is a poor, beggarly, and precarious Principle, and more becoming the dotage of *Hobbianiſm*, than men of clearer Parts and more ſerene Judgments.

Pag. 22. *By ſeparable Emiſſions that paſs from the flame*, &c. And ſo ſet the Wick and Tallow on motion. But theſe ſeparable Emiſſi-

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ons that paſs from the flame of the lighted Candle, paſs quite away, and ſo are no part of the flame enkindled. So weak an Illuſtration is this of what theſe Traducters would have.

Chap. 4. pag. 32. *Which the Divine Piety and Compaſſion hath ſet up again, that ſo, ſo many of his excellent Creatures might not be loſt and undone irrecoverably, but might act anew,* &c. To this a more elegant Pen and refined Wit objects thus: Now is it not highly derogatory to the infinite and unbounded Wiſdom of God, that he ſhould detrude thoſe Souls which he ſo ſeriouſly deſignes to make happy, into a ſtate ſo hazardous, wherein he ſeeth it to be ten thouſand to one but that they will corrupt and defile themſelves, and ſo make them more miſerable here and to eternity hereafter? A ſtrange method of recovering this, to put them into ſuch a fatal neceſſity of periſhing: 'tis but an odd contrivance for their reſtauration to Happineſs, to uſe ſuch means to compaſs it which 'tis ten thouſand to one but will make them infinitely more miſerable. This he objects in reference to what the Author of *Lux Orientalis* writes, *chap.* 2. where he ſays, *It is a thouſand to one but Souls detruded into theſe bodies will corrupt and defile themſelves, and ſo make themſelves miſerable here and to eternity hereafter.*

And much he quotes to the ſame purpoſe

out of the *Account of Origen.* Where the Souls great diſadvantages to Vertue and Holineſs, what from the ſtrong inclinations of the Body, and what from National Cuſtoms & Education in this Terreſtrial State, are lively ſet out with a moſt moving and tragical Eloquence, to ſhew how unlikely it is that God ſhould put innocent and immaculate Souls of his own creation immediately, into ſuch Bodies, and ſo hard and even almoſt fatal condition of miſcarrying. Upon which this ſubtile *Anti-Pre-exiſtentiary*: Thus you ſee, ſaith he, what ſtrong Objections and Arguments the *Pre-exiſtentiaries* urge with moſt noiſe and clamour, are againſt themſelves. If therefore theſe Phænomena be inexplicable, without the *Origenian* Hypotheſis, they are ſo too with it; and if ſo, then the reſult of all is, that they are not ſo much Arguments of *Pre-exiſtence* as Aſperſions of *Providence.* This is ſmartly and ſurprizingly ſpoken. But let us conſider more punctually the ſtate of the matter.

Here then we are firſt to obſerve, how cunningly this ſhrewd Antagoniſt conceals a main ſtroke of the Suppoſition, *viz.* That the Divine Pity and Compaſſion to lapſed Souls, that had otherwiſe fallen into an eternal ſtate of Silence and Death, had ſet up *Adam* for their relief, and endued him with ſuch a Paradiſiacal body of ſo excellent a conſtitution to be tranſmitted to all his Poſterity, and inveſted him,

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in vertue of this, with ſo full power *non peccandi*, that if he and his Poſterity were not in an happy flouriſhing condition as to their eternal intereſt of Holineſs and Vertue, it would be long of himſelf. And what could God do more correſpondently to his Wiſdom and Goodneſs, dealing with free Agents, ſuch as humane Souls are, than this? And the thing being thus ſtated, no Objections can be brought againſt the Hypotheſis, but ſuch as will invade the inviolable Truths of Faith and Orthodox Divinity.

Secondly, We are to obſerve, how this cunning Objector has got theſe two *Pre-exiſtentiaries* upon the hip for their youthful flowers of Rhetorick, when one ſays, it is hundreds to one; the other, ten thouſand to one, that Souls will miſcarry put into theſe diſadvantages of the Terreſtrial ſtate, by which no candid Reader will underſtand any more, than that it is exceeding difficult for them to eſcape the pollutions of this lower World once incorporated into Terreſtrial Bodies. But it being granted poſſible for them to emerge, this is a great grace and favour of the Divine Goodneſs to ſuch peccant wretches, that they are brought out of the ſtate of eternal *Silence* and *Death*, to try their Fortunes once more, though incumbred with ſo great difficulties which the Divine *Nemeſis* ſuffers to return upon them. That therefore they are *at all* in a condition

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of recovery, is from the *Goodneſs* and *Mercy* of God; that their condition is ſo *hard*, from his *Juſtice*, they having been ſo foully peccant. And his wiſdom being only to contrive what is moſt agreeable to his Mercy and Juſtice, it is not at all derogatory to the infinite and unbounded Wiſdom of God thus to deal with lapſed Souls. For though he does ſeriouſly intend to make them happy, yet it muſt be in a way correſpondent to his *Juſtice* as well as *Mercy*.

Thirdly and Laſtly, Beſides that the Spirit of the Lord pervades the whole Earth ready to aſſiſt the ſincere; there is moreover a mighty weight of mercy added in the Revelation of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt to the world, ſo that the retriving of the Souls of men out of their *Death* and *Silence* into this Terreſtrial ſtate, in which there is theſe helps to the ſincere, it is manifeſtly worthy the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs. For thoſe it takes no effect with, (they beginning the world again on this ſtage) they ſhall be judged onely according to what they have done here, there being an eternal obliteration as well as oblivion of the acts of their Pre-exiſtent ſtate; but thoſe that this merciful Diſpenſation of God has taken any effect upon here, their ſincere deſires may grow into higher accompliſhments in the future ſtate. Which may ſomething mitigate the horrour of that ſeeming univerſal

ſal ſqualid eſtate of the Sons of men upon earth. Which in that it is ſo ill, is rightly imputed by both *Jews* and *Chriſtians* and the divineſt *Philoſophers* to a Lapſe, and to the *Mercy* and Grace *of God* that it is no worſe: From whence it may appear, that that argument for *Pre-exiſtence*, that God does not put newly created innocent Souls into ſuch diſadvantageous circumſtances of a terreſtrial Incorporation, though partly out of *Mercy*, partly out of *Juſtice*, he has thought fit lapſed Souls ſhould be ſo diſpoſed of, that this I ſay is no aſperſion of Divine Providence.

Pag. 36. *And now I cannot think of any place in the ſacred Volume more, that could make a tolerable plea againſt this Hypotheſis*, &c. It is much that the ingenious Author thought not of *Rom.* 9. 11. [For the Children being not yet born, neither having done either good or evil, that the purpoſe of God according to Election might ſtand, not of works, but of him that calleth.] This is urged by *Anti-pre-exiſtentiaries*, as a notable place againſt *Pre-exiſtence*. For, ſay they, how could *Eſau* and *Jacob* be ſaid neither to have done good nor evil, if they pre-exiſted before they came into this world? For if they pre-exiſted, they acted; and if they acted, they being rational Souls, they muſt have done either good or evil. This makes an handſome ſhew at firſt ſight; but if we conſult *Gen.* 25. we ſhall plainly

ly ſee that this is ſpoke of *Jacob* and *Eſau* yet ſtrugling in the Womb; as it is ſaid in this Text, *For the Children being not yet born*; but ſtrugling in the Womb, as you may ſee in the other. Which plainly therefore reſpects their actions in this life, upon which certainly the mind of St. *Paul* was fix'd. As if he ſhould have expreſly ſaid: For the Children being not yet born, but ſtrugling in the Womb, neither having done either good or evil in this life as being ſtill in the Womb, it was ſaid of them to *Rebeckah, The elder ſhall ſerve the younger.* Which ſufficiently illuſtrates the matter in hand with St. *Paul*; that as *Jacob* was preferred before *Eſau* in the Womb, before either of them was born to act here on the Earth, and that therefore done without any reſpect to their actions; ſo the purpoſe of God touching his people ſhould be of free Election, not of Works.

That of *Zachary* alſo, Chap. 12. 1. I have heard alledged by ſome as a place on which no ſmall ſtreſs may be laid. The Lord is there ſaid to be the *Former of the Spirit of Man within him.* Wherefore they argue, If the Spirit of Man be formed *within him*, it did never pre-exiſt *without him.* But we anſwer, That πνῦμα ἀνθρώπου ἐν αὐτῷ is but the ſame that πνῦμα ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ. And then the ſence is eaſie and natural, that the Spirit that is in man, God is the Former or Creator of it. But this Text de-

defines nothing of the time of forming it. There are ſeveral other Texts alledged, but it is ſo eaſie to anſwer them, and would take up ſo much time and room, that I think fit to omit them, remembring my ſcope to be ſhort *Annotations*, not a tedious *Commentary*.

Pag. 41. *Mr.* Ben Iſrael *in his Problems De Creatione aſſures us, that Pre-exiſtence was the common belief*, &c. That this was the common opinion of the wiſer men amongſt the Jews, R. *Menaſſe Ben Iſrael* himſelf told me at *London* with great freedom and aſſurance, and that there was a conſtant tradition thereof; which he ſaid in ſome ſence was alſo true concerning the Trinity, but that more obſcure. But this of Pre-exiſtence is manifeſt up and down in the Writings of that very ancient and learned Jew *Philo Judæus*; as alſo ſomething toward a Trinity, if I remember aright.

Chap. 5. Pag. 46. *We ſhould doubtleſs have retained ſome remembrance of that condition.* And the rather, as one ingeniouſly argues, becauſe our ſtate in this life is a ſtate of puniſhment. Upon which he concludes, *That if the calamities of this life were inflicted upon us only as a puniſhment of ſins committed in another, Providence would have provided ſome effectual means to preſerve them in our memories. And therefore, becauſe we find no remainders of any ſuch Records in our minds*, 'tis, ſays he, *ſufficient evi-*

evidence to all ſober and impartial inquirers, that our living and ſinning in a former ſtate is as falſe as inevident.

But to this it may be anſwered, That the ſtate we are put in, is not a ſtate *only* of puniſhment, but of a merciful trial; and it is ſufficient that we find our ſelves in a lapſed and ſinful condition, our own Conſciences telling us when we do amiſs, and calling upon us to amend. So that it is needleſs particularly to remember our faults in the other world, but the time is better ſpent in faithfully endeavouring to amend our ſelves in this, and to keep our ſelves from all faults of what nature ſoever. Which is a needleſs thing our memory ſhould diſcover to us to have been of old committed by us, when our Conſciences urge to us that they are never to be committed; and the Laws of holy Law-givers and divine Inſtructers, or wiſe Sages over all the world, aſſiſt alſo our Conſcience in her office. So that the end of Gods Juſtice by theſe inward and outward Monitors, and by the croſs and afflicting Rancounters in this preſent ſtate, is to be attained to, *viz.* the amendment of Delinquents if they be not refractory.

And we were placed on this ſtage as it were to begin the world again, ſo as if we had not exiſted before. Whence it ſeems meet, that there ſhould be an utter obliteration of all that is paſt, ſo as not to be able by memory

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to connect the former life and this together. The memory whereof, if we were capable of it, would be inconsistent with the orderly proceedings of this, and overdoze us and make us half moped to the present Scene of things. Whenas the Divine Purpose seems to be, that we should also experience the natural pleasures and satisfactions of this life, but in an orderly and obedient way, keeping to the prescribed rules of Virtue and Holiness. And thus our faithfulness being exercised ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις in those things which are more *estranged* from our nobler and diviner nature, God may at last restore us to what is more properly our own.

But in the mean time, that saying which the Poet puts in the mouth of *Jupiter*, touching the inferiour Deities, may not misbeseem the mercy and wisdom of the true God concerning lapsed Souls incorporate into terrestrial Bodies.

Has quoniam cœli nondum dignamur honore,
Quas dedimus certè terras habitare sinamus.

Let them not be distracted betwixt a sensible remembrance of the Joys and Glories of our exteriour Heaven above, and the present fruition of things below, but let them live an holy and heavenly life upon Earth, exercising their Graces and Vertues in the use and enjoyment of these lower earthly Objects, till I call them

them up again to Heaven, where, after this long ſwoond they are fallen into, they will more ſeaſonably remember their former Paradiſiacal ſtate upon its recovery, and reagnize their ancient home. Wherefore if the remembring or forgetting of the former ſtate depend abſolutely upon the free contrivance of the Divine Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Juſtice, as this ingenious Oppoſer ſeems to ſuppoſe, I ſhould even upon that very point of fitneſs conceive that an utter oblivion of the former ſtate is interwoven into the fate and nature of lapſed Souls by a Divine *Nemeſis*, though we do not conceive explicitely the manner how. And yet the natural reaſons the Author of *Lux Orientalis* produces in the ſequel of his Diſcourſe, ſeem highly probable.

For firſt, As we had forgot ſome lively Dream we dreamt but laſt night, unleſs we had met with ſomething in the day of a peculiar vertue to remind us of it, ſo we meeting with nothing in this lower ſtage of things that lively reſembles thoſe things in our former ſtate, and has a peculiar fitneſs to rub up our Memory, we continue in an utter oblivion of them. As ſuppoſe a man was lively entertain'd in his ſleep with the pleaſure of dreaming of a fair Cryſtal River, whoſe Banks were adorned with Trees and Flags in the flower, and thoſe large Flies with blue and golden-colour'd Bodies, and broad thin Wings curiouſly wrought

wrought and transparent, hovering over them, with Birds also singing on the Trees, Sun and Clouds above, and sweet breezes of Air, and Swans in the River with their wings sometimes lifted up like sails against the wind. Thus he passed the night, thinks of no such thing in the morning, but rising goes about his occasions. But towards evening a Servant of a Friend of his presents him with a couple of Swans from his Master. The sight of which Swans striking his *Perceptive* as sensibly as those in his Dream, and being one of the most extraordinary and eximious Objects of his Night-vision; presently reminds him of the whole scene of things represented in his sleep. But neither Sun, nor Clouds, nor Trees, nor any such ordinary thing could in any likelihood have reminded him of his Dream. And besides, it was the lively resemblance betwixt the Swans he saw in his sleep, and those he saw waking, that did so effectually rub up his memory. The want therefore of such occurrences in this life to remind us of the passages of the former, is a very reasonable account why we remember nothing of the former state.

But here the Opposers of Pre-existence pretend that the joyous and glorious Objects in the other state do so pierce and transport the Soul, and that she was inured to them so long, that though there were nothing that resembled

them here, the impreſſion they make muſt be indelible, and that it is impoſſible ſhe ſhould forget them. And moreover, that there is a ſimilitude betwixt the things of the upper World and the lower, which therefore muſt be an help to memory.

But here, as touching the firſt, they do not conſider what a Weapon they have given into my hand againſt themſelves. For the long inuredneſs to thoſe Celeſtial Objects abates the piercingneſs of their tranſport; and before they leave thoſe Regions, according to the *Platonick* or *Origenian* Hypotheſis, they grow cooler to ſuch enjoyments: ſo that all the advantages of that piercing tranſport for memory, are loſt. And beſides, in vertue of that piercing Tranſport, no Soul can call into memory what ſhe enjoyed formerly, but by recalling herſelf into ſuch a Tranſport, which her Terreſtrial Vehicle makes her uncapable of.

For the memory of external Tranſactions is ſealed upon us by ſome paſſionate corporeal impreſs in conjunction with them (which makes them whip Boys ſometimes at the boundaries of their Pariſh, that they may better remember it when they are old men;) which Impreſs if it be loſt, the memory of the thing it ſelf is loſt. And we may be ſure it is loſt in Souls incorporate in Terreſtrial Vehicles, they having loſt their Aereal and Cele-

Celeſtial, and being fatally incapacitated ſo much as to conceit how they were affected by the External Objects of the other World, and ſo to remember how they felt them. And therefore all the deſcriptions that men of a more Æthereal and Entheous temper adventure on in this life, are but the Roamings of their Minds in vertue of their Conſtitution towards the nature of the heavenly things in general, not a recovery of the memory of paſt Experience; this State not affording ſo lively a repreſentment of the *Pathos* that accompanied the actual *ſenſe* of thoſe things, as to make us *think* that we once *really* enjoyed them before. That is onely to be collected by Reaſon; the noble exerciſe of which faculty, in the diſcovering of this *Arcanum* of our Pre-exiſtence, had been loſt, if it could have been detected by a compendious Memory. But if ever we recover the memory of our former State, it will be when we are re-entred into it; we then being in a capacity of being really ſtruck with the ſame Pathos we were before, in vertue whereof the Soul may remember this was her priſtine condition.

And therefore to anſwer to the ſecond, Though there may be ſome faintneſs of reſemblance betwixt the things of the other State and this, yet other peculiarities alſo being required, and the former ſenſible Pathos to be recovered, which is impoſſible in this State, it

is likewiſe impoſſible for us to remember the other in this.

The ſecond Argument of the Author for the proving the unlikelineſs of our remembring the other State is, the *long intermiſſion* and *diſcontinuance from thinking of thoſe things*. For 'tis plain that ſuch diſcontinuance or deſuetude bereaves us of the memory of ſuch things as we were acquainted with in this World. Inſomuch as if an ancient man ſhould read the Verſes or Themes he made when he was a School-boy, without his name ſubſcribed to them, though he pumpt and ſweat for them when he made them, could not tell they were his own. How then ſhould the Soul remember what ſhe did or obſerv'd many hundreds, nay thouſands of years ago?

But yet our Authors Antagoniſt has the face to make nothing of this Argument neither: Becauſe, forſooth, it is not ſo much the deſuetude of thinking of one thing, but the thinking of others, that makes us forget that one thing. What a ſhuffle is this! For if the Soul thought on that one thing as well as on other things, it would remember it as well as them. Therefore it is not the thinking of other things, but the not thinking of *that*, that makes it forgotten. *Uſus promptus facit*, as in general, ſo in particular. And therefore diſuſe in any particular ſlackens at firſt, and after aboliſhes the readineſs of the Mind to think thereof.

thereof. Whence ſleepineſs and ſluggiſhneſs is the Mother of Forgetfulneſs, becauſe it diſuſes the Soul from thinking of things. And as for thoſe ſeven Chronical Sleepers that ſlept in a Cave from *Decius* his time to the reign of *Theodoſius junior*, I dare ſay it would have beſotted them without a Miracle, and they would have roſe out of their ſleep no more wiſe than a Wiſp; I am ſure not altogether ſo wiſe as this awkward Arguer for memory of Souls in their Pre-exiſtent ſtate after ſo hugely long a diſcontinuance from it. But for their immediately coming out of an Æthereal Vehicle into a Terreſtrial, and yet forgetting their former ſtate, what Example can be imagined of ſuch a thing, unleſs that of the *Meſſias*, who yet ſeems to remember his former glorious condition, and to pray that he may return to it again? Though for my part I think it was rather Divine Inſpiration than Memory, that enabled him to know that matter, ſuppoſing his Soul did pre-exiſt.

Our Authors third and laſt Argument to prove that lapſed Souls in their Terreſtrial condition forget their former ſtate, is from obſervation how deteriorating changes in this earthly Body ſpoils or quite deſtroys the Memory, the Soul ſtill abiding therein; ſuch as Caſualties, Diſeaſes, and old Age, which changes the tenour of the Spirits, and makes them leſs uſeful for memory, as alſo 'tis likely the

Brain it ſelf. Wherefore there being a more deteriorating change to the Soul in coming into an earthly Body, inſtead of an aereal or æthereal, the more certainly will her memory of things which ſhe experienced in that ſtate, be waſhed out or obliterated in this.

Here our Authors Antagoniſt anſwers, That though changes *in body* may often weaken, and ſometimes utterly ſpoil the memory of things paſt, yet it is not neceſſary that the Souls changing *of her body* ſhould therefore do ſo, becauſe it is not ſo injurious to her faculties. Which if it were, not onely our *Memory*, but *Reaſon* alſo ſhould have been caſheered and loſt by our migration out of thoſe Vehicles we formerly actuated, into theſe we now enliven; but that ſtill remaining ſound and entire, it is a ſigne that our Memory would do ſo too, if we had pre-exiſted in other bodies before, and had any thing to remember. And beſides, if the bare tranſlocation of our Souls out of one body into another, would deſtroy the memory of things the Soul has experienced, it would follow, that when People by death are ſummoned hence into the other ſtate, that they ſhall be quite bereaved of their Memory, and ſo carry neither applauſe nor remorſe of Conſcience into the other World; which is monſtrouſly abſurd and impious. This is the main of his Anſwer, and moſtwhat in his own words. But of what ſmall force it is, we ſhall now diſcover, and how little pertinent to the buſineſs.

For

For firſt, we are to take notice that the deteriorating change in the Body, or deteriorating ſtate by change of Bodies, is underſtood of a debilitative, diminutive, or privative, not depravative deterioration; the latter of which may be more injurious to the faculties of the Soul, though in the ſame Body, ſuch a deteriorating change cauſing Phrenſies and outragious Madneſs. But as for diminutive or privative deterioration by change, the Soul by changing her Aereal Vehicle for a Terreſtrial, is (comparing her latter ſtate with her former) much injured in her faculties or operations of them; all of them are more ſlow and ſtupid, and their aptitude to exert the ſame Phantaſms of things that occurred to them in the other State, quite taken away, by reaſon of the heavy and dull, though orderly conſtitution of the Terreſtrial Tenement; which weight and ſtupor utterly indiſpoſes the Soul to recall into her mind the ſcene of her former ſtate, this load perpetually ſwaying down her thoughts to the Objects of this.

Nor does it at all follow, becauſe Reaſon is not loſt, therefore Memory, if there were any ſuch thing as Pre-exiſtence, would ſtill abide. For the univerſal principles of Reaſon and Morality are eſſential to the Soul, and cannot be obliterated, no not by any death: but the knowledge of any particular external Objects is not at all eſſential to the Soul, nor conſe-

quently the memory of them; and therefore the Soul in the ſtate of ſilence being ſtript of them, cannot recover them in her incorporation into a Terreſtrial Body. But her Reaſon, with the general principles thereof, being eſſential to her, ſhe can, as well as this State will permit, exerciſe them upon the Objects of this Scene of the Earth and viſible World, ſo far as it is diſcovered by her outward ſenſes, ſhe looking out at thoſe windows of this her earthly Priſon, to contemplate them. And ſhe has the faculty and exerciſe of *Memory* ſtill, in ſuch a ſenſe as ſhe has of *ſenſitive* Perception, whoſe Objects ſhe does remember, being yet to all former impreſſes in the other ſtate a mere *Abraſa Tabula.*

And laſtly, it is a mere miſtake of the Oppoſer, or worſe, that he makes the *Pre-exiſtentiaries* to impute the loſs of memory in Souls of their former ſtate, merely to their coming into other Bodies; when it is not bare change of Bodies, but their deſcent into worſer Bodies more dull and obſtupifying, to which they impute this loſs of memory in lapſed Souls. This is a real death to them, according to that ancient Ænigm of that abſtruſe Sage, ζῶμεν μὲν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸν ἐκείνων βίον· *We live their death*, namely of ſeparate Souls, *but are dead to their life.* But the changing of our Earthly Body for an Aereal or Æthereal, this is not *Death*, but *Reviviſcency*, in which all the energies

gies of the Soul are (not depreſſed, but) exalted, and our Memory with the reſt quickened; as it was in *Eſdras* after he had drunk down that Cup offered to him by the Angel, full of Liquor like Fire, which filled his Heart with Underſtanding, and ſtrengthned his Memory, as the Text ſays.

Thus we ſee how all Objections againſt the three Reaſons of lapſed Souls loſing the memory of the things of the other ſtate, vaniſh into ſmoak. Wherefore they every one of them ſingle being ſo found, all three put together methinks ſhould not fail of convincing the moſt refractory of this Truth, That though the Soul did pre-exiſt and act in another ſtate, yet ſhe may utterly forget all the Scenes thereof in this.

Pag. 46. *Now if the reaſons why we loſe the remembrance of our former life be greater*, &c. And that they are ſo, does appear in our Anſwer to the Objections made againſt the ſaid Reaſons, if the Reader will conſider them.

Pag. 50. *And thereby have removed all prejudices*, &c. But there is yet one Reaſon againſt Pre-exiſtence which the ingenious Author never thought of, urged by the *Anti-Pre-exiſtentiaries*, namely, That it implies the reſt of the Planets peopled with Mankind, it being unreaſonable to think that all Souls deſcended in their lapſe to this onely Earth of Ours. And if there be lapſed Souls there, how ſhall they be

be recovered? ſhall Chriſt undergo another and another death for them? But I believe the ingenious Author would have looked upon this but as a mean and trifling Argument, there being no force in any part thereof. For why may not this Earth be the onely Hoſpital, *Noſocomium* or *Cæmeterium*, ſpeaking Platonically, of ſinfully lapſed Souls? And then ſuppoſe others lapſed in other Planets, what need Chriſt die again for them, when one drop of his Bloud is ſufficient to ſave myriads of Worlds? Whence it may ſeem a pity there is not more Worlds than this Earth to be redeemed by it. Nor is it neceſſary they ſhould hiſtorically know it. And if it be, the Eclipſe of the Sun at his Paſſion by ſome inſpired Prophets might give them notice of it, and deſcribe to them as orderly an account of the *Redemption*, as *Moſes* does of the *Creation*, though he ſtood not by while the World was framed, but it was revealed to him by God. And laſtly, it is but a raſh and precarious Poſition, to ſay that the infinite Wiſdom of God has no more ways than one to ſave lapſed Souls. It is ſufficient that we are aſſured that this is the onely way for the ſaving of the Sons of *Adam*; and theſe are the fixt bounds of revealed Truth in the Holy Scripture which appertains to us Inhabitants on Earth. But as for the Oeconomy of his infinite Wiſdom in the other Planets, if we did but reflect upon

our

our abſolute ignorance thereof, we would have the diſcretion not to touch upon that Topick, unleſs we intended to make our ſelves ridiculous, while we endeavour to make others ſo.

Chap. 6. pag. 51. *Now as the infinite goodneſs of the Deity obligeth him always to do good, ſo by the ſame to do that which is beſt*, &c. To elude the force of this chief Argument of the *Pre-exiſtentiaries*, an ingenious Oppoſer has deviſed a way which ſeems worth our conſidering, which is this; *viz.* By making the Idea of God to conſiſt mainly in Dominion and Soveraignty, the Scriptures repreſenting him under no other notion than as the Supream Lord and Soveraign of the Univerſe. Wherefore nothing is to be attributed to him that enterferes with the uncontroulableneſs of his Dominion. And therefore, ſays he, they that aſſert Goodneſs to be a neceſſary Agent that cannot but do that which is beſt, directly ſupplant and deſtroy all the Rights of his Power and Dominion. Nay, he adds afterwards, That this notion of Gods goodneſs is moſt apparently inconſiſtent, not onely with his Power and Dominion, but with all his other moral Perfections. And for a further explication of his mind in this matter, he adds afterwards, *That the Divine Will is indued with the higheſt kind of liberty, as it imports a freedom not onely from*

from foreign Violence, but alſo from inward Neceſſity: For ſpontaneity, or immunity from coaction, without indifferency, carries in it as great neceſſity as thoſe motions that proceed from Violence or Mechaniſm. From whence he concludes, *That the Divine Will cannot otherwiſe be determined than by its own intrinſick energie.* And laſtly, Foraſmuch as no Courtiſie can oblige, but what is received from one that had a power not to beſtow them, if God neceſſarily acted according to his Goodneſs, and not out of mere choice and liberty of Will, there were no thanks nor praiſe due to him; which therefore would take away the duties of Religion. This is the main of his Hypotheſis, whereby he would defeat the force of this Argument for the Pre-exiſtence of Souls, taken from the Goodneſs of God. Which this Hypotheſis certainly would do, if it were true; and therefore we will briefly examine it.

First therefore I anſwer, That though the Scriptures do frequently repreſent God as the Lord and Soveraign of the Univerſe, yet it does not conceal his other Attributes of Goodneſs and Mercy, and the like. But that the former ſhould be ſo much inculcated, is in reference to the begetting in the People Awe and Obedience to him. But it is an invalid conſequence, to draw from hence that the Idea of God does mainly conſiſt in Dominion and Soveraignty; which abſtracted from his other

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Attributes of Wisdom and Goodness, would be a very black and dark representation of him, and such as this ingenious Writer could not himself contemplate without aversation and horror. How then can the Idea of God chiefly consist in this? It is the most terrifying indeed, but not the most noble and accomplishing part in the Idea of the Deity.

This Soveraignty then is such as is either bounded or not bounded by any other Attributes of God. If bounded by none, then he may do as well unwisely as wisely, unjustly as justly. If bounded by Wisdom and Justice, why is it bounded by them, but that it is better so to be than otherwise? And Goodness being as essential to God as Wisdom and Justice, why may not his Soveraignty be bounded by that as well as by the other, and so he be bound from himself of himself to do as well what is best as what is better. This consists with his absolute Soveraignty, as well as the other. And indeed what can be absolute Soveraignty in an intelligent Being, if this be not? *viz.* fully and entirely to follow the will and inclinations of its own nature, without any check or controul of any one touching those over whom he rules.

Whence, in the second place, it appears that the asserting that Gods goodness is a necessary Agent (in such a sense as Gods Wisdom and Justice are, which can do nothing but what is wise

wiſe and juſt) the aſſerting, I ſay, that it cannot but do that which is the *beſt*, does neither directly nor indirectly ſupplant or deſtroy any Rights of his Power or Dominion, foraſmuch as he does fully and plenarily act according to his own inclinations and will touching thoſe that are under his Dominion. But that his Will is always inclined or determined to what is beſt, it is the Prerogative of the Divine Nature to have no other Wills nor Inclinations but ſuch.

And as for that in the third place, That this notion of Gods Goodneſs is inconſiſtent with all his other moral Perfections, I ſay, that it is ſo far from being inconſiſtent with them, that they cannot ſubſiſt without it, as they reſpect the dealings of God with his Creatures. For what a kind of Wiſdom or Juſtice would that be that tended to no good? But I ſuſpect his meaning is by *moral* Perfections, Perfections that imply ſuch a power of doing or not doing, as is in *humane* actions; which if it be not allowed in God, his Perfections are not *moral*. And what great matter is it if they be not, provided they be as they are and ought to be, *Divine*? But to fancy *moral* actions in God, is to admit a ſecond kind of *Anthropomorphitiſm*, and to have unworthy conceits of the Divine Nature. When it was juſt and wiſe for God to do ſo or ſo, and the contrary to do otherwiſe, had he a freedom to decline the

the doing so? Then he had a freedom to do unjustly and unwisely.

And yet in the fourth place he contends for the highest kind of liberty in the Divine Will, such as imports a freedom not onely from forreign Violence, but also from inward Necessity, as if the Divine Will could be no otherwise determined, than by its own intrinsick Energie, as if it willed so because it willed so; which is a sad principle. And yet I believe this learned Writer will not stick to say, that God cannot tye, cannot condemn myriads of innocent Souls to eternal Torments. And what difference betwixt *Impossibility* and *Necessity*? For Impossibility it self is onely a Necessity of not doing; which is here internal, arising from the excellency and absolute perfection of the Divine Nature. Which is nothing like Mechanism for all that; Forasmuch as it is from a clear understanding of what is best, and an unbyassed Will, which will most certainly follow it, nor is determined by its own intrinsick Energy. That it is otherwise with us, is our imperfection.

And lastly, That Beneficence does not oblige the Receiver of it to either Praise or Thanksgiving when it is received from one that is so essentially good, and constantly acts according to that principle, when due occasion is offered, as if it were as absurd as to give thanks to the Sun for shining when he can do no

no otherwiſe; I ſay, the caſe is not alike, becauſe the Sun is an inanimate Being, and has neither Underſtanding nor Will to approve his own action in the exerting of it. And he being but a Creature, if his ſhining depended upon his Will, it is a greater perfection than we can be aſſured would belong to him, that he would unfailingly adminiſter Light to the World with ſuch a ſteadineſs of Will, as God ſuſtains the Creation.

Undoubtedly all Thanks and Praiſe is due to God from us, although he be ſo neceſſarily good, that he could not but create us and provide for us; foraſmuch as he has done this for our ſakes merely (he wanting nothing) not for his own. Suppoſe a rich Chriſtian ſo inured to the works of Charity, that the Poor were as certain of getting an Alms from him, as a Traveller is to quench his thirſt at a publick Spring near the Highway; would thoſe that received Alms from him think themſelves not obliged to Thanks? It may be you will ſay, they will thank him, that they may not forfeit his Favour another time. Which Anſwer diſcovers the ſpring of this Miſconceit, which ſeems founded in ſelf-love, as if all Duty were to be reſolved into that, and as if there were nothing owing to another, but what implied our own profit. But though the Divine Goodneſs acts neceſſarily yet it does not blindly, but according to the Laws of Decorum

and

and Juſtice; which thoſe that are unthankful to the Deity, may find the ſmart of. But I cannot believe the ingenious Writer much in earneſt in theſe points, he ſo expreſly declaring what methinks is not well conſiſtent with them. For his very words are theſe: '*God can never act contrary to his neceſſary and eſſential properties, as becauſe he is eſſentially wiſe, juſt and holy, he can do nothing that is fooliſh, unjuſt, and wicked.* Here therefore I demand, Are we not to thank him and praiſe him for his actions of Wiſdom, Juſtice, and Holineſs, though they be neceſſary?

And if *Juſtice, Wiſdom,* and *Holineſs,* be the *eſſential* properties of God, according to which he does neceſſarily act and abſtain from acting, why is not his *Goodneſs?* when it is expreſly ſaid by the Wiſdom of God incarnate, *None is good ſave one, that is God.* Which muſt needs be underſtood of his eſſential Goodneſs. Which therefore being an eſſential property as well as the reſt, he muſt neceſſarily act according to it. And when he acts in the Scheme of Anger and Severity, it is in the behalf of Goodneſs; and when he imparts his Goodneſs in leſſer meaſures as well as in greater, it is for the good of the *Whole,* or of the *Univerſe.* If all were Eye, where were the Hearing, *&c.* as the Apoſtle argues? So that his Wiſdom moderates the prompt outflowings of his Goodneſs, that it may not outflow ſo, but that in

the general it is for the beſt. And therefore it will follow, that if the Pre-exiſtence of Souls comply with the *Wiſdom*, *Juſtice*, and *Holineſs* of God, that none of theſe reſtrain his prompt and parturient Goodneſs, that it muſt have cauſed humane Souls to pre-exiſt or exiſt ſo ſoon as the Spirits of Angels did. And he muſt have a ſtrange quick-ſightedneſs that can diſcern any claſhing of that act of Goodneſs with any of the aboveſaid Attributes.

Chap. 7. pag. 56. *God never acts by mere Will or groundleſs Humour*, &c. We men have unaccountable inclinations in our irregular and depraved Compoſition, have blind luſts or deſires to do this or that, and it is our preſent eaſe and pleaſure to fulfil them; and therefore we fancy it a priviledge to be able to execute theſe blind inclinations of which we can give no rational account, but that we are pleaſed by fulfilling them. But it is againſt the Purity, Sanctity, and Perfection of the Divine Nature, to conceive any ſuch thing in Him; and therefore a weakneſs in our Judgments to fancy ſo of him, like that of the *Anthropomorphites*, that imagined God to be of Humane ſhape.

Pag. 59. *That God made all things for himſelf.* It is ignorance and ill nature that has made ſome men abuſe this Text to the proving that God acts out of either an humourous or ſelfiſh prin-

principle, as if he did things merely to pleaſe himſelf as ſelf, not as he is that ſoveraign *unſelf-inrereſſed Goodneſs*, and perfect *Rectitude*, which ought to be the meaſure of all things. But the Text implies no ſuch matter: For if you make למענהו a Compound of a Prepoſition and Pronoun, that ſo it may ſignifie [for himſelf] which is no more than *propter ſe*, it then will import that he made all things to ſatisfie his own *Will* and *Pleaſure*, whoſe *Will* and *Pleaſure* reſults from the richneſs of his eternal *Goodneſs* and *Benignity* of Nature, which is infinite and ineffable, provided always that it be moderated by Wiſdom, Juſtice, and Decorum. For from hence his Goodneſs is ſo ſtinted or modified, that though he has made all things for his own Will and Pleaſure who is infinite Goodneſs and Benignity, yet there is a day of Evil for the Wicked, as it follows in the Text, becauſe they have not walked anſwerably to the Goodneſs that God has offered them; and therefore their puniſhment is in behalf of abuſed Goodneſs. And *Bayns* expreſly interprets this Text thus: *Univerſa propter ſeipſum fecit Dominus*; that is, ſays he, *Propter bonitatem ſuam; juxta illud Auguſtini, DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA, Quia bonus eſt Deus, ſumus & in quantum ſumus boni ſumus.*

But למענהו may be a Compound of a Participle and a Pronoun, and then it may ſignifie

[for them that anſwer him] that is, walk anſwerably to his Goodneſs which he affords them, or [for them that obey him] either way it is very good ſence. And then in oppoſition to theſe, it is declared, that the Wicked, that is, the Diſobedient or Deſpiſers of his Goodneſs, he has (not made them wicked, but they having made themſelves ſo) appointed them for the day of Evil. For ſome ſuch Verb is to be ſupplied as is agreeable to the matter, as in that paſſage in the Pſalms ; *The Sun ſhall not burn thee by day, neither the Moon by night.* Where [burn] cannot be repeated, but ſome other more ſuitable Verb is to be ſupplied.

Chap. 8. pag. 63. *Since all other things are inferiour to the good of Being.* This I ſuppoſe is to be underſtood in ſuch a ſence as that ſaying in *Job, Skin for skin, and all that a man has, will he give for his life.* Otherwiſe the condition of Being may be ſuch, as it were better not to be at all, whatever any dry-fancied Metaphyſicians may diſpute to the contrary.

Pag. 67. *Indeed they may be morally immutable and illapſable; but this is Grace, not Nature,* &c. Not unleſs the Divine Wiſdom has eſſentially interwoven it into the natural conſtitution of our Souls, that as after ſuch a time of the exerciſe of their Plaiſtick on theſe Terreſtrial Bodies, they, according to the courſe of Nature, emerge into a plain uſe of their Reaſon,

ſon, when for a time they little differed from Brutes; ſo after certain periods of time well improved to the perfecting their Nature in the ſenſe and adherence to Divine things, there may be awakened in them ſuch a *Divine Plaiſtick faculty*, as I may ſo ſpeak, as may eternally fix them to their Celeſtial or Angelical Vehicles, that they ſhall never relapſe again. Which Faculty may be alſo awakened by the free Grace of the Omnipotent more maturely; Which if it be, Grace and Nature conſpire together to make a Soul everlaſtingly happy. Which *actual Immutability* does no more change the ſpecies of a Soul, than the *actual* exerciſe of *Reaſon* does after the time of her ſtupour in Infancy and in the Womb.

Pag. 67. *I doubt not but that it is much better for rational Creatures*, &c. Namely, ſuch as we experience our humane Souls to be. But for ſuch kind of Intellectual Creatures as have nothing to do with matter, they beſt underſtand the priviledges of their own ſtate, and we can ſay nothing of them. But for us under the conduct of our faithful and victorious Captain, the Soul of the promiſed *Meſſias*, through many Conflicts and Tryals to emerge out of this lapſed ſtate, and regain again the poſſeſſion of true Holyneſs and Vertue, and therewith the Kingdom of Heaven with all its Beauty and Glories, will be ſuch a gratification to us, that we had never been capable

of ſuch an exceſs thereof, had we not experienced the evils of this life, and the vain pleaſures of it, and had the remembrance of the endearing ſufferings of our bleſſed Saviour, of his Aids and Supports, and of our ſincere and conſcientious adhering to him, of our Conflicts and Victories to be enrolled in the eternal Records of the other World.

Pag. 69. *Wherefore as the Goodneſs of God obligeth him not to make every Planet a fixt Star, or every Star a Sun*, &c. In all likelihood, as *Galilæus* had firſt obſerved, every fixed Star is a Sun. But the compariſon is framed according to the conceit of the Vulgar. A thing neither unuſual with, nor misbecoming Philoſophers.

Pag. 69. *For this were to tye him to Contradictions*, viz. to turn one ſpecifical form or eſſence into another. Matter indeed may receive ſeveral modifications, but is ſtill real Matter, nor can be turned into a Spirit; and ſo Spirits ſpecifically different, are untranſmutable one into another, according to the diſtinct Idea's in the eternal Intellect of God. For elſe it would imply that their eſſential properties were not eſſential properties, but looſe adventitious Accidents, and ſuch as the eſſence and ſubſtance of ſuch a Spirit, could ſubſiſt as well without as with them, or as well with any others as with theſe.

Pag. 69. *That we ſhould have been made peccable*

cable and liable to defection. And this may the more easily be allowed, because this defection is rather the affecting of a less good, than any pursuing of what is really and absolutely evil. To cavil against Providence for creating a Creature of such a double capacity, seems as unreasonable as to blame her for making *Zoophiton's*, or rather *Amphibion's*. And they are both to be permitted to live according to the nature which is given them. For to make a Creature fit for either capacity, and to tye him up to one, is for God to do repugnantly to the Workmanship of his own hands. And how little hurt there is done by experiencing the things of either Element to Souls that are reclaimable, has been hinted above. But those that are wilfully obstinate, and do despite to the Divine Goodness, it is not at all inconsistent with this Goodness, that they bear the smart of their obstinacy, as the ingenious Author argues very well.

Chap. 9. pag. 73. *Have asserted it to be impossible in the nature of the thing*, &c. And this is the most solid and unexceptionable Answer to this Objection, That it is a Repugnancy in Nature, that this visible World that consists in the motion and succession of things, should be either *ab æterno*, or infinite in extension. This is made out clearly and amply in Dr. *H. Moore's Enchiridion Metaphysicum*,

cap. 10. which is alſo more briefly toucht upon in his Advertiſements upon Mr. *Joſ. Glanvil's* Letter written to him upon the occaſion of the Stirs at *Tedworth*, and is printed with the ſecond Edition of his *Saduciſmus Triumphatus*. We have now ſeen the moſt conſiderable Objections againſt this Argument from the Goodneſs of God for proving the Pre-exiſtence of Souls, produced and anſwered by our learned Author.

But becauſe I find ſome others in an Impugner of the Opinion of Pre-exiſtence urged with great confidence and clamour, I think it not amiſs to bring them into view alſo, after I have taken notice of his acknowledgment of the peculiar ſtrength of this Topick, which he does not onely profeſs to be in truth the ſtrongeſt that is made uſe of, but ſeems not at all to envy it its ſtrength, while he writes thus.

That God is infinitely good, is a Poſition as true as himſelf; nor can he that is furniſhed with the Reaſon of a man, offer to diſpute it. Goodneſs conſtitutes his very Deity, making him to be himſelf: for could he be arayed with all his other Attributes ſeparate and abſtract from this, they would be ſo far from denominating him a God, that he would be but a prodigious Fiend, and plenipotentiary Devil. This is ſomething a rude and uncourtly Aſſeveration, and unluckly diſvulſion of the Godhead into two parts, and calling one part a Devil. But it is not to be

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imputed to any impiety in the Author of *No-Pre-exiſtence*, but to the roughneſs and boariſhneſs of his ſtyle, the texture whereof is not onely *Fuſtian*, but over-often hard and ſtiff *Buckram*. He is not content to deny his aſſent to an Opinion, but he muſt give it diſgraceful Names. As in his Epiſtle to the Reader, this darling Opinion of the greateſt and divineſt Sages of the World viſiting of late the Studies of ſome of more than ordinary Wit and learning, he compares it to a Bug and ſturdy Mendicant, that pretends to be ſome Perſon of Quality; but he like a skilful Beadle of Beggars, lifting up the skirts of her Veil, as his Phraſe is, ſhews her to be a Counterfeit. How this buſie Beadle would have behaved himſelf, if he had had the opportunity of lifting up the skirts of *Moſes*'s Veil when he had deſcended the Mount, I know not. I dare not undertake for him, but that according to the coarſneſs of his phancy he would have miſtaken that lucid Spirit ſhining through the skin of *Moſes*'s face, for ſome *fiery Fiend*, as he has ſomewhere the *Spirit of Nature* for an *Hobgobling*. But there is no pleaſure in inſiſting upon the rudeneſſes of his ſtyle; he is beſt where he is moſt unlike himſelf, as he is here in the reſidue of his Deſcription of the Divine Goodneſs.

'Tis Goodneſs, ſays he, *that is the Head and Glory of Gods perfect Eſſence; and therefore when* Moſes

Moſes *importuned him for a Viſion of his Glory, he engaged to diſplay his Goodneſs to him.* Could a man think that one that had engaged thus far for the *infiniteneſs* of Gods Goodneſs, for its *Headſhip* over the other Attributes, for its *Glory* above the reſt, nay for its *Conſtitutiveneſs* of the very Deity, as if this were the onely Ἀντίθεος, or *God himſelf*, the reſt of Him divided from this, a prodigious Fiend, or plenipotentiary Devil, ſhould prove the Author of *No-Pre-exiſtence* a very contradiction to this Declaration? For to be able to hold *No-Pre-exiſtence*, he muſt deſert the Αὐτοθεότης of God, and betake himſelf to the Devil-part of him, as he has rudely called it, to avoid this pregnant proof for Pre-exiſtence taken from the *infinite Goodneſs of God.* And indeed he has pickt out the very worſt of that black part of God to ſerve his turn, and that is *Self-will* in the worſt ſence. Otherwiſe Goodneſs making God to be himſelf, if it were his true and genuine Self-will, it were the Will of his infinite Goodneſs, and ſo would neceſſarily imply Pre-exiſtence.

But to avoid the dint of this Argument, he declares in the very ſame Section for the Supremacy of the *Will* over the *Goodneſs* of the Divine Nature. Which is manifeſtly to contradict what he ſaid before, That Goodneſs is the *Head* and *Glory* of Gods perfect Eſſence. For thus *Will* muſt have a *Supremacy* over the

Head

Head of the Deity. So that there will be an Head over an Head, to make the Godhead a Monſter. And what is moſt inſufferable of all, That he has choſen an Head out of the *Devil-part* of the Deity, to uſe his own rude expreſſion, to controul and *lord* it over what is the *onely God himſelf*, the reſt a Fiend ſeparate from this, according to his own acknowledgment. Theſe things are ſo infinitely abſurd, that one would think that he could have no heart to go about to prove them; and yet he adventures on it, and we ſhall briefly propoſe and anſwer what he produceth.

And this Supremacy of the *Will*, ſaith he, over the Goodneſs of the Divine Nature, may be made out both by Scripture and other forcible Evidences. The Scriptures are three; the firſt, *Pſal.* 135. 6. *Whatſoever the Lord pleaſed, that did he in heaven, and in the earth, and in the ſeas, and in all deep places.* Now if we remember but who this Lord is, *viz.* he whom Goodneſs makes to be himſelf, we may eaſily be aſſured what pleaſed him, namely, that which his Wiſdom diſcerned to be the beſt to be done; and therefore it is very right, that whatſoever he pleaſed he ſhould do throughout the whole Univerſe. The ſecond place is *Mat.* 20. 15. *Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?* Yes I trow, every one muſt acknowledge that God has an ἐξουσία (for the

the word is ἐξεστιν in the Original) to diſpoſe of what is his own; and indeed all is his. No one has either a right or power to controul him. But this does not prove that he ever diſpoſes of any thing otherwiſe than according to his Wiſdom and Goodneſs. If his Goodneſs be ever limited, it is limited by his Wiſdom, but ſo then as diſcerning ſuch a limitation to be for the beſt. So that the meaſure of Wiſdoms determination is ſtill Goodneſs, the only Head in the Divine Nature, to which all the reſt is ſubordinate. For that there are different degrees of the Communication of the Divine Goodneſs in the Univerſe, is for the good of the Whole. It is ſufficient to hint theſe things; it would require a Volume to enlarge upon them. And then for the laſt place, *Exod.* 33. 19. *I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious.* This onely implies that he does *pro ſuo jure*, and without any motive from any one but himſelf, communicate more of his Goodneſs to ſome Men or Nations than others. But that his Wiſdom has not diſcovered this to be beſt for the whole conſtitution of things, I challenge any one to prove. But of this we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more afterward. Theſe are the Scriptures.

The other forcible Evidences are theſe: The firſt, The late Production of the World. The ſecond, The patefaction of the Law but to one ſingle People, namely, the Jews. The third,

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The timing the *Messias*'s Nativity, and bringing it to pass, not in the Worlds Infancy or Adolescence, but ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τῶν ἡμερῶν, *Heb.* 1. 2. in its declining Age. The fourth, The perpetuity of Hell, and interminableness of those Tortures which after this life shall incessantly vex the impious. The fifth and last, God's not perpetuating the Station of Pre-existent Souls, and hindering them from lapsing into these Regions of Sin and Death. These he pretends to be forcible Evidences of the Soveraignty of Gods Will over his Goodness, forasmuch as if the contrary to all these had been, it had been much more agreeable to the Goodness of God.

As for the first of these forcible Arguments, we have disarmed the strength thereof already, by intimating that the World could not be *ab æterno*. And if it could not be *ab æterno*, but must commence on this side of Eternity, and be of finite years, I leave to the Opposer to prove that it has not been created as soon as it could be; and that is sufficient to prove that its late Production is not inconsistent with that principle, that Gods Goodness always is the measure of his Actions. For suppose the World of as little continuance as you will, if it was not *ab æterno*, it was once of as little; and how can we discern but that this is that very time which seems so little to us?

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As for the ſecond, which ſeems to have ſuch force in it, that he appeals to any competent Judge, if it had not been infinitely better that God ſhould have apertly diſpenſed his Ordinances to all Mankind, than have committed them onely to *Iſrael* in ſo private and clancular a manner; I ſay, it is impoſſible for any one to be aſſured that it is at all better. For firſt, If this Priviledge which was peculiar, had been a Favour common to all, it had loſt its enforcement that it had upon that leſſer number. Secondly, It had had alſo the leſs ſurprizing power with it upon others that were not Jews, who might after converſe with that Nation, and ſet a more high price upon the Truths they had travelled for, and were communicated to them from that People. Thirdly, The nature of the thing was not fitted for the univerſality of Mankind, who could not be congregated together to ſee the Wonders wrought by *Moſes*, and receive the Law with thoſe awful circumſtances from Mount *Sinai* or any Mount elſe. Fourthly, All things happened to them in Types, and themſelves were a Type of the true *Iſrael* of God to be redeemed out of their Captivity under Sin and Satan, which was worſe than any *Ægyptian* Servitude: Wherefore it muſt be ſome peculiar People which muſt be made ſuch a Type, not the whole World. Fifthly, Conſidering the great load of the Ceremonial Law

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which came along with other more proper Priviledges of the Jews, ſetting one againſt another, and conſidering the freedom of other Nations from it, unleſs they brought any thing like it upon themſelves, the difference of their Conditions will rather ſeem ſeveral Modifications of the communicated Goodneſs of God to his Creatures, than the neglecting of any: Foraſmuch as, ſixthly and laſtly, though all Nations be in a lapſed condition, yet there are the Reliques of the Eternal Law of Life in them. And that things are no better with any of them than they are, that is a thouſand times more rationally reſolved into their demerits in their pre-exiſtent ſtate than into the bare Will of God, that he will have things for many Ages thus ſqualid and forlorn, merely becauſe he will. Which is a Womans Reaſon, and which to conceive to belong to God, the Author of *No-Pre-exiſtence* has no reaſon, unleſs he will alleadge that he was ſtyled Ἀρρενόθηλυς of the Ancients for this very cauſe.

Wherefore the Divine Nemeſis lying upon the lapſed Souls of men in this Terreſtrial State, whoſe ſeveral Delinquencies in the other World and the degrees thereof God alone knows, and according to his Wiſdom and Juſtice diſpoſes of them in this: It is impoſſible for any one that is not half crazed in his Intellectuals, to pretend that any Acts of Providence that have been ſince this Stage of the Earth

Earth was erected, might have been infinitely better otherwise than they have been, or indeed better at all.

Power, Wisdom, Goodness, sure did frame
This Universe, and still guide the same;
But thoughts from Passion sprung, deceive
Vain Mortals: No man can contrive
A better course than what's been run
Since the first circuit of the Sun.

This Poetical Rapture has more solid truth in it than the dry Dreams and distorted Fancies, or Chimerical Metamorphoses of earthly either Philosophers or Theologs, that prescinding the rest of the Godhead from his Goodness, make that remaining part a foul Fiend or Devil; and yet almost with the same breath pronounce the *Will* of this Devil of their own making, which is the most poysonous part of him, to have a Supremacy other the Ἀντίθεος, over the *Divine Goodness*; which makes God to be *Himself*, that is, to be God, and not a plenipotentiary Devil. Wherefore we see from these few small hints, (for it were an infinite Argument fully to prosecute) how feeble or nothing forcible this second Evidence is.

Now for the third Evidence, The timing of the *Messiah*'s Nativity, That it was not in the Infancy of the World, but rather in its declining Age, or in the latter times. In which

times

times the *Ancient* of Days, according to his counſel and purpoſe, (which the Eternal *Wiſdom* that was to be incarnate aſſented and ſubſcribed to) ſent his Son into the World, the promiſed *Meſſiah*. This did the *Ancient* of Days and the Eternal *Wiſdom* agree upon. But oh the immenſe Priviledge of *Youth* and Confidence! The Author of *No-Pre exiſtence* ſays, it had been better by far, if they had agreed upon the Infancy of the World. As if this *young* Divine were wiſer than the *Ancient of Days*, or the *Eternal Wiſdom* itſelf. I, but he will modeſtly reply, That he acknowledges that the Ancient of Days and the Eternal Wiſdom are wiſer than he, but that they would not make uſe of their Wiſdom. They ſaw as clearly as could be, that it was far better that the *Meſſiah* ſhould come in the Infancy of the World; but the Father would not ſend him then, merely becauſe he would not ſend him: That his *Will* might act freely as *mere Will* preſcinded from Wiſdom and Goodneſs. This is the plain ſtate of the buſineſs, and yet admitted by him, who with that open freeneſs and fulneſs profeſſes, that preſcind the Divine Goodneſs from the Godhead, what remains is a prodigious Fiend or Devil. What is then mere *Will* and *Power* left alone, but a blind *Hurricane* of *Hell*? which yet muſt have the Supremacy, and over-power the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs itſelf. His Zeal againſt Pre-

existence has thus infatuated and blinded this young Writers Intellectuals, otherwise he had not been driven to these Absurdities, if he had been pleased to admit that Hypothesis.

As also that Wisdom and Justice, and Fitness and Decorum attend the Dispensation of Divine Goodness; so that it is not to be communicated to every Subject after the most ample manner, nor at every time, but at such times, and to such Subjects, and in such measures as, respecting the whole compages of things, is for the best. So that Goodness bears the Soveraignty, and according to that Rule, perpetually all things are administred, though there be a different Scene of things and particulars in themselves vastly varying in Goodness and Perfection one from another as the parts of the Body do. And so for Times and Ages, every season of the year yield different Commodities: nor are we to expect Roses in Winter, nor Apples and Apricocks in Spring. Now the infinite and incomprehensible Wisdom of God comprehending the whole entire Scene of his Providence, and what references there are of one thing to another, that this must be thus and thus, because such and such things preceded; and because such things are, such and such must be consequent; which things past and to come lie not under our eye: I say, if this hasty Writer had considered this, he need not have been driven to such a rude solution of this

this preſent Problem, why the *Meſſiah* came no ſooner into the World, *viz.* Merely becauſe God willed it ſhould be ſo, though it had been far better if it had been otherwiſe; but he would have roundly confeſſed, that undoubtedly this was the beſt time and the fitteſt, though it was paſt his reach to diſcover the reaſons of the fitneſs thereof.

This as it had been the more modeſt, ſo it had been the more ſolid ſolution of this hard Problem. I but then it had not put a bar to this irrefragable Argument from the Goodneſs of God, for proving Pre-exiſtence: Which he is perſwaded in his own Conſcience is no leſs than a demonſtration, unleſs it be acknowledged that the *Will* of God has a *Supremacy* over his Goodneſs; and therefore in ſpight to that abhorred Dogma of Pre-exiſtence, he had rather broach ſuch wild ſtuff againſt the glory of God, than not to purchaſe to himſelf the ſweet conceit of a glorious victory over ſuch an Opinion that he has taken a groundleſs toy againſt, and had rather adventure upon groſs Blaſphemies than entertain it.

The devout Pſalmiſt, *Pſal.* 36. ſpeaking of the Decrees of God and his Providence over the Creation, *Thy righteouſneſs*, ſays he, *is as the great mountains, thy judgments are a great deep.* And St. *Paul*, *Rom.* 11. after he has treated of intricate and amazing points, cries out, Ὦ βάθος, *Oh the depth of the riches both of the wiſdom*

and knowledge of God! How unſearchable are his judgments, and his ways paſt finding out! Now according to the rudeneſs of our young Writer, there is no ſuch depth of Wiſdom, or unſearchableneſs in the Judgments and Decrees of God and his Providences in the World that moſt amaze us, but the reaſons of them lie very obvious and ſhallow. Where we fancy that things might have been better otherwiſe, (though of never ſo grand import, as the coming of the *Meſſiah* is) it is eaſily reſolved into the *Supremacy* of the *Will* of God, which it has over his *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs*. He willed it ſhould be ſo, becauſe he would it ſhould be ſo, though it had been far better if the *Meſſiah* had come ſooner. But ſee the difference betwixt an inſpired Apoſtle, and a young hotheaded Theologiſt: This latter reſolves theſe unſearchable and unintelligible Decrees of God and paſſages of Providence, into the mere *Will* of God, *lording* it over the *Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs:* But the Apoſtle, by how much more unſearchable his Judgments and Decrees are, and the ways of his Providence paſt finding out, the greater he declares the depth of the richneſs of his Wiſdom, which is ſo ample, that it reaches into ways and methods of doing for the beſt beyond the Underſtandings of men. For moſt aſſuredly, while the depth of the *Wiſdom* of God is acknowledged to carry on the ways of Providence, it muſt be alſo acknow-

knowledged that it acts like itself, and chuseth such ways as are best, and most comporting with the Divine Goodness; or else it is not an act of Wisdom, but of Humour or Oversight.

But it may be the Reader may have the curiosity to hear briefly what those great Arguments are, that should induce this young Writer so confidently to pronounce, that it had been far better that the *Messiah* should have come in the Infancy of the World, than in the times he came. The very quintessence of the force of his arguing extracted out of the verbosity of his affected style, is neither more nor less than this: That the World before the coming of Christ, who was to be the Light of the World, was in very great Darkness; and therefore the sooner he came, the better. But to break the assurance of this Arguer for the more early coming of Christ,

First, we may take notice out of himself, chap. 3. *That the Light of Nature is near akin not onely to the* Mosaick *Law, but to the Gospel itself; and that even then there were the assistances of the Holy Ghost to carry men on to such vertuous Accomplishments as might avail them to eternal Salvation.* This he acknowledges probable, and I have set it down in his own words. Whence considering what a various Scene of things there was to be from the Fall of *Adam* to the end of the World, it became the great and wise *Dramatist* not to bring upon the Stage

the beſt things in the firſt Act, but to carry on things pompouſly and by degrees; ſomething like that Saying of *Elias*, Two thouſand years under the Light of Nature, two thouſand under the Law, and then comes the Nativity of the *Meſſiah*, and after a due ſpace the happy Millennium, and then the Final Judgment, the compleated Happineſs of the Righteous in Heaven, and the Puniſhment of the Wicked in Hell-fire. But to haſten too ſuddenly to the beſt, is to expect Autumn in Spring, and Virility or Old Age in Infancy or Childhood, or the *Cataſtrophe* of a Comedy in the firſt Act.

Secondly, we may obſerve what a weak Diſprover he is of Pre-exiſtence, which like a Gyant would break in upon him, were it not that he kept him out by this falſe Sconce of the *Supremacy* of the Divine *Will* over his *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs*; which Conceit, how odious and impious it is, has been often enough hinted already. But letting Pre-exiſtence take place, and admitting that there is, according to Divine Providence, an orderly inſemination of lapſed Souls into humane Bodies, through the ſeveral Ages of the World, whoſe lapſes had ſeveral circumſtantial differences, and that men therefore become differently fitted Objects of Grace and Favour; how eaſie is it to conceive God according to the fitneſſes of the generality of Souls in ſuch or ſuch periods of

times,

times, as it was more juſt, agreeable, or needful for them, ſo and in ſuch meaſures to have diſpenſed the Gifts of his ever-watchful and all-comprehending Providence to them, for both time and place. This one would think were more tolerable than to ſay, That God wills merely becauſe he wills; which is the Character of a frail Woman, rather than of a God, or elſe, as this Writer himſelf acknowledges, of a Fiend or Devil. For ſuch, ſays he, is God in the reſt of his Attributes, if you ſeclude his Goodneſs. What then is that action which proceeds onely from that part from which Goodneſs is ſecluded? So that himſelf has dug down the Sconce he would entrench himſelf in, and lets *Pre-exiſtence* come in upon him, whether he will or no, like an armed Giant; whom let him abhor as much as he will, he is utterly unable to reſiſt.

And thirdly and laſtly, Suppoſe there were no particular probable account to be given by us, by reaſon of the ſhortneſs of our Underſtandings, and the vaſt fetches of the all-comprehenſive Providence of God, why the coming of the *Meſſiah* was no earlier than it was; yet according to that excellent Aphoriſm in Morality and Politicks, *Optimè præſumendum eſt de Magiſtratu*, we ſhould hope, nay be aſſured it was the beſt that he came when he did, it being by the appointment of the infinitè good and all-wiſe God, and cry out with St.

Paul. Oh the depth of the riches of both the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! And in the Psalmist, *Thy judgments are like a great deep, O Lord, thou preservest man and beast.* And so acknowledge his Wisdom and Goodness in the ordering his Creatures, even there where his ways are to our weak and scant Understandings most inexplicable and unsearchable. Which Wisdom and Goodness as we have all reason to acknowledge in all matters, so most of all in matters of the greatest concernment, that there most assuredly God wills not thus or thus merely because he wills, but because his Wisdom discerns that it is for the best. And this is sufficient to shew the weakness of this third Evidence for proving the *Supremacy* of the Divine *Will* over his *Wisdom* and *Goodness*.

His fourth Evidence is, *The Perpetuity of Hell*, and interminableness of those Tortures which after this life vex the Wicked. For, says he, had the penalties of mens sins here been rated by *pure* Goodness, free and uncontrouled by any other principle, it is not probable that they should have been punished by an eternal Calamity, the pleasures of them being so transient and fugitive. Thus he argues, and almost in the very same words; and therefore concludes, that the authority of Gods *Will* interposed, and *pro suo jure*, having the

Supre-

Supremacy over his *Goodneſs*, over-ſwayed the more benign Decree; and *Will*, becauſe it would have it ſo, doomed ſinners to theſe *eternal* Torments. But I would ask this Sophiſter, Did the *Will* of God in good earneſt ſentence ſinners thus in Decree, merely becauſe he willed it, not becauſe it was either good or juſt? What a black and diſmal Reproach is here caſt upon the Divine Majeſty! That he ſentences ſinners thus becauſe he will, not becauſe it is juſt. The ſence whereof is, So he will do, right or wrong. But the Patriarch *Abraham* was of another mind, *Shall not the Judge of the whole Earth do right?* This he ſaid even to Gods face, as I may ſo ſpeak. Wherefore God doing nothing but what is *juſt*, does nothing but what is alſo *good*. For *Juſtice* is nothing but *Goodneſs modified*.

Nor is it aſſerted by thoſe that make *Goodneſs* the meaſure of Gods Providence, that the modification and moderation thereof is not by his *Wiſdom* and *Juſtice*. So that this Sophiſter puts [pure] to Goodneſs, merely to obſcure the ſence, and put a Fallacy upon his Reader. The ſins of men here are not rated by *pure* Goodneſs, but by that *modification* of *Goodneſs* which is termed *Juſtice*; which is not a diſtinct principle from Goodneſs, but a branch thereof, or Goodneſs it ſelf under ſuch a modification, not mere *Will* acting becauſe it will, right or wrong, good or evil. Where-

fore

fore the ſtate of the Queſtion is not, whether the eternal Torments of Hell are conſiſtent with the *pure* Goodneſs of God, but with his Juſtice. But if they are eternal merely from his *Will*, without any reſpect to *Juſtice*, his *Will* does will what is infinitely beyond the bounds of what is juſt, becauſe endleſs is infinitely beyond that which has an end. Such groſs Abſurdities does this Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence run into, to fetch an Argument from the ſuppoſititious *Supremacy* of the *Will* of God over his *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs*.

But as touching the Queſtion rightly propoſed, whether the Perpetuity of Hell to ſinners conſiſts with the Juſtice of God, a man ought to be chary and wary how he pronounces in this point, that he ſlip not into what may prove diſadvantageous to the Hearer. For there are that will be ſcandalized, and make it ſerve to an ill end, whether one declare for eternal Torments of Hell, or againſt them. Some being ready to conclude from their *Eternity*, that Religion itſelf is a mere *Scarecrow* that frights us with ſuch an incredible *Mormo*; others to indulge to their Pleaſures, becauſe the Commination is not frightful enough to deter them from extravagant Enjoyments, if Hell Torments be not eternal. But yet I cannot but deem it a piece of great levity in him that decided the Controverſie, as the compleſant Parſon did that about the May-pole; they

of

of his Pariſh that were for a May-pole, let them have a May-pole; but they that were not for a May-pole, let them have no May-pole. But this in ſobriety one may ſay, that the uſe of Αἰὼν and Αἰώνιος in Scripture is indifferent to ſignifie either that which is properly everlaſting, or that which laſts a long time. So that by any immediate infallible Oracle, we are not able to pronounce for the Eternity or Perpetuity of Hell-torments. And the Creeds uſe the phraſe of Scripture, and ſo ſome may think that they have the ſame latitude of interpretation. But it is the ſafeſt to adhere to the ſence of the Catholick Church, for thoſe that be bewilder'd in ſuch Speculations.

But what the Writer of *No-Pre-exiſtence* argues from his own private Spirit, though it be not inept, yet it is not over-firm and ſolid. *But that the Penancies of Reprobates are endleſs, I ſhall ever thus perſwade my ſelf,* ſaith he, *either the Torments of Hell are eternal, or the Felicities of Heaven are but temporary (which I am ſure they ſhall never be:) for the very ſame word that is uſed to expreſs the permanence of the one, meaſures out the continuance of the other; and if* Ζωὴ αἰώνιος *denotes everlaſting life, a bleſſedneſs that ſhall never end,* (Mat. 25. ult.) *what can* Κόλασις αἰώνιος *in the ſame verſe ſignifie, but perpetual puniſhment, a miſery that ſhall never ceaſe?* This is pretty handſomly put together, but as I ſaid, does not conclude firmly what is driven at.

at. For it being undeniably true that αἰώνιος signifies as well that which onely is of a *long continuance*, as what is *properly everlasting*; and it being altogether rational, that when words have more significations than one, that signification is to be applied that is most agreeable to the subject it is predicated of, and αἰώνιος in that higher sence of property and *absolutely everlasting*, not being applicable to κόλασις, but upon this Writers monstrous supposition that the *Will* of God has a *Supremacy* over his *Wisdom, Goodness*, and *Justice* (as if the righteous God could act against his own Conscience, which no honest man can do) it is plain, that though αἰώνιος in ζωὴ αἰώνιος signifie properly everlasting, that there is no necessity that it should signifie so in κόλασις αἰώνιος, but have that other signification of *long continuance*, though not of *everlastingness*, and that continuance *so long*, as if *considered*, would effectually rouze any man out of his sins; and *Eternity* not *considered*, will not move him. This one would think were enough to repress the confidence of this young Writer.

But I will adde something more out of his fellow *Anti-Pre-existentiary*. That *Comminations* are not, though *Promises* be obligatory. Forasmuch as in *Comminations* the *Comminator* is the *Creditor*, and he that is menaced the *Debtor* that owes the punishment (with which that Latine Phtase well agrees, *dare pœnas*) but

but in *Promiſes*, he that promiſeth becomes *Debtor*, and he to whom the Promiſe is made, *Creditor*. Whence the *Promiſer* is plainly obliged to make good his Promiſe, as being the *Debtor*: But the *Comminator*, as being the *Creditor*, is not obliged to exact the puniſhment, it being in the power of any *Creditor* to remit the Debt owing him if he will. Wherefore in this Commination of *eternal fire*, or everlaſting puniſhment, though αἰώνιος ſignifie here *properly everlaſting*, as well as in *everlaſting life*, yet becauſe this latter is a *Promiſe*, the other onely a *Commination*, it does not follow, that as ſurely as the Righteous ſhall be rewarded with everlaſting life, ſo ſurely ſhall the Wicked be puniſhed with everlaſting fire, in the moſt proper and higheſt extent of the ſignification of the word. Becauſe God in his *Comminations* to the Wicked is onely a *Creditor*, and has ſtill a right and power to remit either part or the whole Debt; but to the Righteous, by vertue of his *Promiſe*, he becomes a *Debtor*, and cannot recede, but muſt punctually keep his word.

To all which I adde this Challenge: Let this Writer, or any elſe if they can, demonſtrate that a Soul may not behave herſelf ſo perverſely, obſtinately, and deſpightfully againſt the Spirit of Grace, that ſhe may deſerve to be made an everlaſting Hackſtock of the Divine *Nemeſis*, even for ever and ever. And if ſhe deſerve it, it is but juſt that ſhe have it;

it; and if it be juſt, it is likewiſe good. For *Juſtice* is nothing elſe but *Goodneſs modified* in ſuch ſort, as *Wiſdom* and ſenſe of *Decorum* ſees fitteſt. But the Election of *Wiſdom* being always for the beſt, all things conſidered, it is plain that Juſtice and the execution thereof, is for the beſt; and that ſo *Goodneſs*, not *mere Will* upon pretence of having a *Supremacy* over *Goodneſs*, would be the meaſure of this ſentencing ſuch obdurate ſinners to eternal puniſhment. And this eternal puniſhment as it is a piece of vindicative Juſtice upon theſe obdurate ſinners, ſo it naturally contributes to the eſtabliſhment of the Righteous in their Celeſtial Happineſs. Which, this Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence objects ſomewhere, if Souls ever fell from, they may fall from it again. But theſe eternal Torments of Hell, if they needed it, would put a ſure bar thereto. So that the *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs* alſo of God is upon this account concerned in the eternal puniſhments of Hell, as well as his *Juſtice*. That it be to the unreclaimable, as that *Orphick Hemiſtichium* calls it,

——ἀνυπόστατος ὁ τίσις ἀνάγκη.

The fifth and laſt forcible Argument, as he calls them, for the proving the Soveraignty of Gods Will over his Goodneſs, is this. If Gods *Goodneſs*, ſaith he, be not under the command of his *Will*, but does always what is beſt, why did it not perpetuate the Station of Pre-exiſtent

ſtent Souls, and hinder us (if ever we were happy in a ſublimer ſtate) from lapſing into theſe Regions of Sin and Death? But who does not at firſt ſight diſcern the weakneſs of this Allegation? For it is plainly ἄλογόν τι καὶ ἄτοπον, an abſurd thing, and contrary to Reaſon, to create ſuch a ſpecies of Being, whoſe nature is free and mutable, and at the firſt daſh to dam up or ſtop the exerciſe of that freedom and capacity of change, by confining it to a fixt Station. As ridiculous as to ſuppoſe a living Creature made with wings and feet, and yet that the Maker thereof ſhould take ſpecial care it ſhould never flie nor go. And ſo likewiſe, that the mere making of ſuch an Order of Beings as have a freedom of Will, and choice of their Actions, that this is misbecoming the Goodneſs of God, is as dull and idiotical a conceit, and ſuch as implies that God ſhould have made but one kind of Creature, and that the moſt abſolutely and immutably happy that can be, or elſe did not act according to his Goodneſs, or for the beſt: Which is ſo obvious a Falſhood, that I will not confute it. But it is not hard to conceive that he making ſuch a free-willed Creature as the Souls of men, *ſimul cum mundo condito*, and that in an happy condition, and yet not fixing them in that Station, may excellently well accord with the *Soveraignty* of his *Goodneſs*, nor any one be conſtrained to have recourſe to the *Supremacy* of

of his *Will* over his *Goodneſs*, as if he did it becauſe he would do it, and not becauſe it was beſt.

For what can this freedom of Will conſiſt in ſo much as in a temptableneſs by other Objects that are of an inferiour nature, not ſo divine and holy as the other, to which it were the ſecurity of the Soul to adhere with all due conſtancy, and therefore her duty. But in that ſhe is temptable by other Objects, it is a ſigne that her preſent enjoyment of the more Divine and Heavenly Objects, are not received of her according to their excellency, but according to the meaſure and capacity of her preſent ſtate, which though very happy, may be improved at the long run, and in an orderly ſeries of times and things, whether the Soul lapſe into ſin or no. For acceſſion of new improvements increaſeth Happineſs and Joy. Now therefore, I ſay, ſuppoſe ſeveral, and that great numbers, even innumerable myriads of pre-exiſtent Souls, to lapſe into the Regions of Sin and Death, provided that they do not ſin perverſely and obſtinately, nor do deſpight to the Spirit of Grace, nor refuſe the advantageous offers that Divine Providence makes them even in theſe ſad Regions, why may not their once having deſcended hither tend to their greater enjoyment, when they ſhall have returned to their priſtine Station? And why may not the ſpecifical nature of the Soul be

ſuch,

ſuch, that it be eſſentially interwoven into our Being, that after a certain period of times or ages, whether ſhe ſin or no, ſhe may arrive to a fixedneſs at laſt in her heavenly Station with greater advantage to ſuch a Creature, than if ſhe had been fixed in that ſtate at firſt.

The thing may ſeem leaſt probable in thoſe that deſcend into theſe Regions of Sin and Mortality. But in thoſe that are not obſtinate and refractorie, but cloſe with the gracious means that is offered them for their recoverie, their having been here in this lower State, and retaining the memorie (as doubtleſs they do) of the tranſactions of this Terreſtrial Stage, it naturally enhances all the enjoyments of the priſtine felicitie they had loſt, and makes them for ever have a more deep and vivid reſentment of them. So that through the richneſs of the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, and through the Merits and conduct of the Captain of their Salvation, our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt, they are, after the ſtrong conflicts here with ſin and the corruptions of this lower Region, made more than Conquerours, and greater gainers upon the loſſes they ſuſtained before from their own folly. And in this moſt advantageous ſtate of things, they become Pillars in the Temple of God, there to remain for ever and ever. So that unleſs ſtraying Souls be exceedingly perverſe and obſtinate, the exitus of things will be but as in a

Tragick Comedy, and their perverſeneſs and obſtinacie lies at their own doors: for thoſe that finally miſcarrie, whoſe number this confident Writer is to prove to be ſo conſiderable that the enhanced happineſs of *the ſtanding* part of pre-exiſtent Souls and *the recovered* does not far preponderate the infelicitie of the others condition. Which if he cannot do, as I am confident he cannot, he muſt acknowledge, That God in not forcibly *fixing* pre-exiſtent Souls in the ſtate they were firſt created, but leaving them to themſelves, acted not from the *Supremacy* of his *Will* over his *Goodneſs*, but did what was *beſt*, and according to that Soveraign Principle of Goodneſs in the Deitie.

And now for that ſnitling Dilemma of this eager Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence, touching the freedom of acting and mutabilitie in humane Souls, whether this mutabilitie be a *Specifick* properly and eſſential to them, or a ſeparable *Accident*. For if it were eſſential, ſays he, then how was Chriſt a perfect man, his humane nature being ever void of that lapſabilitie which is eſſential to humanitie? and how come men to retain their ſpecifick nature ſtill, that are tranſlated to Celeſtial happineſs, and made unalterable in the condition they then are? To this I anſwer, That the *Pre-exiſtentiaries* will admit, that the Soul of the *Meſſiah* was created as the reſt, though in an hap-

happie condition, yet in a lapſable; and that it was his peculiar merit, in that he ſo faithfully, conſtantly, and entirely adhered to the Divine Principle, incomparably above what was done by others of his Claſſis, notwithſtanding that he might have done otherwiſe; and therefore they will be forward to extend that of the Author to the *Hebrews*, chap. 1. v. 8. (*Thy Throne, O God, is for ever and ever, the Scepter of Righteouſneſs is the Scepter of thy Kingdom. Thou haſt loved Righteouſneſs, and hated Iniquity; therefore God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the Oyl of Gladneſs above thy Fellows*) to his behaviour in his pre-exiſtent ſtate, as well as in this. And whenever the Soul of Chriſt did exiſt, if he was like us in all things, ſin onely excepted, he muſt have a capacitie of ſinning, though he would not ſin; that capacitie not put into act being no ſin, but an Argument of his Vertue, and ſuch as if he was always devoid of, he could not be like us in all things, ſin onely excepted. For *poſſe peccare non eſt peccatum.*

And as for humane Souls changing their Species in their unalterable heavenly happineſs, the Species is not then changed, but perfected and compleated; namely, that facultie or meaſure of it in their *Plaſtick*, eſſentially latitant there, is by the Divine Grace ſo awakened, after ſuch a ſeries of time and things, which they have experienced, that now they are

firmly united to an heavenly Body or ethereal Vehicle for ever. And now we need say little to the other member of the Dilemma, but to declare, that free will, or mutability in humane Souls, is no *ſeparable Accident*, but of the eſſential contexture of them; ſo as it might have its turn in the ſeries of things. And how conſiſtent it was with the Goodneſs of God and his Wiſdom, not to ſuppreſs it in the beginning, has been ſufficiently intimated above. Wherefore now foraſmuch as there is no pretext that either the *Wiſdom* or *Juſtice* of God ſhould ſtreighten the time of the creation of humane Souls, ſo that their exiſtence may not commence with that of Angels, or of the Univerſe, and that this figment of the *Supremacy* of Gods mere *Will* over his other Attributes is blown away, it is manifeſt that the Argument for the Pre-exiſtence of Souls drawn from the Divine Goodneſs, holds firm and irrefragable againſt whatever Oppoſers.

We have been the more copious on this Argument, becauſe the Oppoſer and others look upon it as the ſtrongeſt proof the *Pre exiſtentiaries* produce for their Opinion. And the other Party have nothing to ſet againſt it but a fictitious *Supremacy* of the *Will* of God over his *Goodneſs* and other Attributes. Which being their onely Bulwark, and they taking Sanctuary nowhere but here, in my apprehenſion they plainly herein give up the cauſe, and eſta-

bliſh

bliſh the Opinion which they ſeem to have ſuch an antipathy againſt. But it is high time now to paſs to the next Chapter.

Chap. 10. p. 75. *To have contracted ſtrong and inveterate habits to Vice and Lewdneſs, and that in various manners and degrees,* &c. To the unbyaſſed this muſt needs ſeem a conſiderable Argument, eſpecially when the Parties thus irreclaimably profligate from their Youth, ſome as to one Vice, others to another, are found ſuch in equal circumſtances with others, and advantages, to be good; born of the ſame Parents, educated in the ſame Family, and the like. Wherefore having the ſame bodily Extraction, and the ſame advantages of Education, what muſt make this great difference as they grow up in the Body, but that their Souls were different before they came into it? And how ſhould they have ſuch a vaſt difference in the proclivity to Vice, but that they lived before in the ſtate of Pre-exiſtence, and that ſome were much deeper in rebellion againſt God and the Divine Reaſon, than others were, and ſo brought their different conditions with them into theſe Terreſtrial Bodies?

Pag. 75. *Then how a Swallow ſhould return to her old trade of living after her Winter ſleep,* &c. Indeed the Swallow has the advantages of Memory, which the incorporate Soul has not in her incorporation into a Terreſtrial

Body after her ſtate of *Silence*. But the vital inclinations, which are mainly if not onely fitted in the *Plaſtick*, being not onely revived, but (ſignally vitious of themſelves) revived with advantage, by reaſon of the corruption of this coarſe earthly Body into which the Soul is incorporate, they cannot fail of diſcovering themſelves in a moſt ſignal manner, without any help of memory, but from the mere pregnancie of a corrupt Body, and formerly more than ordinarily debauched *Plaſtick* in the ſtate of Pre-exiſtence.

Pag. 76. *Whenas others are as fatally ſet against the Opinions*, &c. And this is done, as the ingenious Author takes notice, even where neither Education nor Cuſtom have interpoſed to ſophiſticate their Judgments or Sentiments. Nay, it is moſt certain, that they ſometime have Sentiments and entertain Opinions quite contrary to their Education. So that that is but a ſlight account, to reſtore this Phænomenon into Education and Cuſtom, whenas Opinions are entertained and ſtiffly maintained in deſpight of them. This I muſt confeſs implies that the aerial Inhabitants philoſophize, but conjecturally onely, as well as the Inhabitants of the Earth. And it is no wonder that ſuch Spirits as are lapſed in their *Morals*, ſhould be at a loſs alſo in their *Intellectuals*; and though they have a deſire to know the truth in Speculations, it ſuiting ſo well with their pride, that yet they ſhould be ſubject to various errours

and

and hallucinations as well as we, and that there should be different, yea opposite Schools of Philosophie among them. And if there be any credit to be given to *Cardans* story of his Father *Facius Cardanus*, things are thus *de facto* in the aereal Regions. And two of the Spirits which *Facius Cardanus* saw in that Vision (left upon Record by him, and of which he often told his Son *Hieronymus* while he was living) were two Professors of Philosophie in different Academies, and were of different Opinions; one of them apertly professing himself to be an *Aven-Roist*. The story is too long to insert here. See Dr. *H. Moore* his *Immortality of the Soul*, book 3. chap. 17.

So that lapsed Souls philosophizing in their Aerial State, and being divided into Sects, and consequently maintaining their different or opposite Opinions with heat and affection which reaches the *Plastick*, this may leave a great propension in them to the same Opinions here, and make them almost as prone to such and such Errours, as to such and such Vices. This, I suppose, the ingenious Author propounds as an Argument credible and plausible, though he does not esteem it of like force with those he produced before. Nor does his Opposer urge any thing to any purpose against it. The main thing is, That these Propensities to some one Opinion are not universal, and blended with the constitution of every

perſon, but are thin ſown, and grow up ſparingly. Where there are five, ſays he, naturally bent to any one Opinion, there are many millions that are free to all. If ſome, ſays he, deſcend into this life big with aptneſſes and proclivities to peculiar Theories, why then ſhould not all, ſuppoſing they pre-exiſted together, do the like? As if all in the other Aereal State were Profeſſors of Philoſophie, or zealous Followers of them that were. The ſolution of this difficulty is ſo eaſie, that I need not inſiſt on it.

Pag. 78. *Were this difference about ſenſibles, the influence of the body might then be ſuſpected for a cauſe*, &c. This is very rationally alleadged by our Author, and yet his Antagoniſt has the face from the obſervation of the diverſity of mens Palates and Appetites, of their being differently affected by ſuch and ſuch ſtrains of Muſick, ſome being pleaſed with one kind of Melodie, and others with another, ſome pleaſed with Aromatick Odours, others offended with them, to reaſon thus: If the Bodie can thus cauſe us to love and diſlike *Senſibles*, why not as well to approve and diſlike *Opinions* and *Theories*? But the reaſon is obvious why not; becauſe the liking or diſliking of theſe Senſibles depends upon the grateful or ungrateful motion of the Nerves of the Bodie, which may be otherwiſe conſtituted or qualified in ſome complexions than in other ſome.

But

But for Philoſophical Opinions and Theories, what have they to do with the motion of the Nerves? It is the Soul herſelf that judges of thoſe abſtractedly from the Senſes, or any uſe of the Nerves or corporeal Organ. If the difference of our Judgment in Philoſophical Theories be reſolvible into the mere conſtitution of our Bodie, our Underſtanding itſelf will hazard to be reſolved into the ſame Principle alſo: And Bodie will prove the onely difference betwixt Men and Brutes. We have more intellectual Souls becauſe we have better Bodies, which I hope our Authors Antagoniſt will not allow.

Pag. 78. *For the Soul in her firſt and pure nature has no Idioſyncraſies*, &c. Whether there may not be certain different Characters proper to ſuch and ſuch Claſſes of Souls, but all of them natural and without blemiſh, and this for the better order of things in the Univerſe, I will not raſhly decide in the Negative. But as the Author himſelf ſeems to inſinuate, if there be any ſuch, they are not ſuch as fatally determine Souls to falſe and erroneous apprehenſions. For that would be a corruption and a blemiſh in the very natural Character. Wherefore if the Soul in Philoſophical Speculations is fatally determined to falſhood in this life, it is credible it is the effect of its being inured thereto in the other.

Pag. 79. *Now to ſay that all this variety pro-*

proceeds primarily from the mere temper of our Bodies, &c. This Argument is the leſs valid for Pre-exiſtence, I mean that which is drawn from the wonderful variety of our Genius's, or natural inclinations to the employments of life, becauſe we cannot be aſſured but that the Divine Providence may have eſſentially, as it were, impreſſed ſuch Claſſical Characters on humane Souls, as I noted before. And beſides, if that be true which *Menander* ſays,

Ἅπασι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται
Εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου.

That *every man, as ſoon as he is born, has a Genius appointed him to be his Inſtructer and Guide of his Life:* That ſome are carried with ſuch an impetus to ſome things rather than others, may be from the inſtigations of his aſſiſting *Genius*. And for that Objection of the Author's Antagoniſt againſt his Opinion touching thoſe inclinations to Trades, (which may equally concern this Hypotheſis of *Menander*) that it would then be more univerſal, every one having ſuch a *Genius*; this truth may be ſmothered by the putting young people promiſcuouſly to any Trade, without obſerving their Genius. But the *Chineſes* ſuppoſe this truth, they commonly ſhewing a Child all the Employs of the Citie, that he may make his own choice before they put him to any.

But if the Opinion of *Menander* be true, that every

every man has his guardian *Genius*, under whoſe conduct he lives; the Merchant, the Muſician, the Plowman, and the reſt; it is manifeſt that theſe Genii cannot but receive conſiderable impreſſions of ſuch things as they guide their Clients in. And pre-exiſtent Souls in their aereal eſtate being of the ſame nature with theſe Dæmons or Genii, they are capable of the ſame Employment; and ſo tincture themſelves deep enough with the affairs of thoſe parties they preſide over. And therefore when they themſelves, after the ſtate of *Silence*, are incorporated into earthly Bodies, they may have a proneneſs from their former tincture to ſuch methods of life as they lived over whom they did preſide. Which quite ſpoils the beſt Argument our Author's Antagoniſt has againſt this Topick; which is, That there are ſeveral things here below which the Geniuſſes of men purſue and follow with the hotteſt chaſe, which have no ſimilitude with the things in the other ſtate, as Planting, Building, Husbandrie, the working of Manufactures, *&c.* This beſt Argument of his, by *Menander*'s Hypotheſis, which is hard to confute, is quite defeated.

And to deny nothing to this Oppoſer of Preexiſtence which is his due, himſelf ſeems unſatisfied, in reſolving theſe odd Phænomena into the temper of Bodie. And therefore at laſt hath recourſe to a *ſecret Cauſality*, that is, to he

he knows not what. But at laſt he pitches upon ſome ſuch Principle as that whereby the Birds build their Neſt, the Spider weaves her Webs, the Bees make their Combs, &c. Some ſuch thing he ſays (*though he cannot think it that prodigious Hobgoblin* the Spirit of Nature) may produce theſe ſtrange effects, may byaſs alſo the fancies of men in making choice of their Employments and Occupations. If it be not the *Spirit of Nature*, then it muſt be that Claſſical Character I ſpoke of above. But if not this, nor the preponderancies of the Pre-exiſtent ſtate, nor *Menander*'s Hypotheſis, the *Spirit of Nature* will bid the faireſt for it of any beſides, for determining the inclinations of all living Creatures in theſe Regions of Generation, as having in itſelf *vitally*, though not *intellectually*, all the Laws of the Divine Providence implanted into its eſſence by God the Creator of it. And ſpeaking in the Ethnick Dialect, the ſame deſcription may belong to it that *Varro* gives to their God Genius. *Genius eſt Deus qui præpoſitus eſt, ac vim habet omnium rerum gignendarum*, and that is the Genius of every Creature that is congenit to it in vertue of its generation. And that there is ſuch a *Spirit of Nature* (not a God, as *Varro* vainly makes it, but an unintelligent Creature) to which belongs the *Naſcency* or *Generation* of things, and has the management of the whole matter of the Univerſe, is copiouſly proved to

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be the Opinion of the Nobleſt and Ancienteſt Philoſophers, by the learned Dr. *R. Cudworth* in his *Syſtem of the Intellectual World*, and is demonſtrated to be a true Theorem in Philoſophie by Dr. *H. Moore* in his *Enchiridion Metaphyſicum*, by many, and thoſe irrefutable Arguments; and yet I dare ſay both can eaſily pardon the miſtake and bluntneſs of this rude Writer, nor are at all ſurprized at it as a Noveltie, that any ignorant rural *Hobthurſt* ſhould call the *Spirit of Nature* (a thing ſo much beyond his capacitie to judge of) a prodigious *Hobgoblin*.

But to conclude, be it ſo that there may be other cauſes beſides the priſtine inurements of the Pre-exiſtent Soul, that may ſomething forcibly determine her to one courſe of life here, yet when ſhe is moſt forcibly determined, if there be ſuch a thing as Pre-exiſtence, this may be rationally ſuppoſed to concur in the efficiencie. But that it is not ſo ſtrong an Argument as others to prove Pre-exiſtence, I have hinted alreadie.

Pag. 79. *For thoſe that are moſt like in the Temper, Air, Complexion of their Bodies*, &c. If this prove true, and I know nothing to the contrarie, this vaſt difference of Genius's, were it not for the Hypotheſis of their Claſſical Character imprinted on Souls at their very creation, would be a conſiderably tight Argument. But certainly it is more honeſt than

for

for the avoiding Pre-exiſtence to reſolve the Phænomenon into a *ſecret Cauſality*, that is to ſay, into one knows not what.

Pag. 82. *There being now no other way left but Pre-exiſtence*, &c. This is a juſt excuſe for his bringing in any Argument by way of overplus that is not ſo apodictically concluding. If it be but ſuch as will look like a plauſible ſolution of a Phænomenon (as this of ſuch a vaſt difference of Genius's) Pre-exiſtence once admitted, or otherwiſe undeniably demonſtrated, the propoſing thereof ſhould be accepted with favour.

Chap. 11. pag. 85. *And we know our Saviour and his Apoſtles have given credit to that Tranſlation*, &c. And it was the authentick Text with the Fathers of the Primitive Church. And beſides this, if we read according to the Hebrew Text, there being no object of *Job*'s knowledge expreſſed, this is the moſt eaſie and natural ſence: *Knoweſt thou that thou waſt then, and that the number of thy days are many?* This therefore was reckoned amongſt the reſt of his ignorances, that though he was created ſo early, he now knew nothing of it. And this eaſie ſence of the Hebrew Text, as well as that Verſion of the Septuagint, made the Jews draw it in to the countenancing of the Tradition of the παλιγγενεσια, that is, the Pre-exiſtence of Souls, as *Grotius* has noted of them.

Pag.

Pag. 85. *As reads a very credible Version.* *R. Menasse Ben Israel* reads it so: [I gave thee Wisdom,] which Version, if it were sure and authentick, this place would be fit for the defence of the Opinion it is produced for. But no Interpreters besides, that I can find, following him, nor any going before him, whom he might follow, I ingenuously confess the place seems not of force enough to me to infer the conclusion.

He read, I suppose, יִדַּעְתִּיךָ in *Piel*, whence he translated it, *Indidi tibi Sapientiam*; but the rest read it in *Cal.*

Pag. 86. *And methinks that passage of our Saviours Prayer, Father, glorifie me with the glorie I had before the World began,* &c. This Text, without exceeding great violence, cannot be evaded. As for that of *Grotius* interpreting [that I had] *that which was intended for me to have,* though it make good sence, yet it is such Grammar as that there is no School-boy but would be ashamed of it; nor is there, for all his pretences, any place in Scripture to countenance such an extravagant Exposition by way of Parallelism, as it may appear to any one that will compare the places which he alleadges, with this; which I leave the Reader to do at his leisure. Let us consider the Context, *Joh.* 17.4. *I have glorified thee upon earth,* during this my Pilgrimage and absence from thee, being sent hither by thee. *I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do,* and

and for the doing of which I was ſent, and am thus long abſent. *And now, O Father, gloriſie me,* παρὰ σεαυτῷ, *apud teipſum,* in thine own preſence, *with the glorie which I had before the world was,* παρὰ σοὶ, *apud te,* or in thy preſence. What can be more expreſſive of a Glorie which Chriſt had *apud Patrem*, or at his Fathers home, or in his preſence before the world was, and from which for ſuch a time he had been abſent?

Now for others that would ſalve the buſineſs by communication of Idioms, I will ſet down the words of an ingenious Writer that goes that way: *Thoſe Predicates,* ſays he, *that in a ſtrict and vigorous acception agreed onely to his Divine Nature, might by a communication of Idioms (as they phraſe it) be attributed to his Humane, or at leaſt to the whole Perſon compounded of them both, than which nothing is more ordinarie in things of a mixt and heterogeneous nature, as the whole man is ſtiled immortal from the deathleſſneſs of his Soul:* thus he. And there is the ſame reaſon if he had ſaid that man was ſtiled mortal (which certainly is far the more ordinarie) from the real death of his Bodie, though his Soul be immortal. This is wittily excogitated. But now let us apply it to the Text, expounding it according to his communication of Idioms, affording to the Humane Nature what is onely proper to the Divine, thus.

Father,

Father, glorifie me [my Humane Nature] *with the glorie that I* [my Divine Nature] *had before the world was.* Which indeed was to be the Eternal, Infinite, and Omnipotent brightneſs of the Glory of the Father Ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρός. This is the Glory which his Divine Nature had before the World was. But how can this Humane Nature be glorified with that Glory his Divine Nature had before the world was, unleſs it ſhould become the Divine Nature, that it might be ſaid to have pre-exiſted? (But that it cannot be. For there is no confuſion of the Humane and Divine Nature in the Hypoſtaſis of Chriſt:) Or elſe becauſe it is hypoſtatically united with the Divine Nature; but if that be the Glory, that he then had already, and had it not (according to the Oppoſers of Pre-exiſtence) before the world was. So we ſee there is no ſence to be made of this Text by communication of Idioms, and therefore no ſence to be made of it without the Pre-exiſtence of the Humane Nature of Chriſt. And if you paraphraſe [me] thus, My Hypoſtaſis conſiſting of my Humane and Divine Nature, it will be as untoward ſence. For if the Divine Nature be included in [me] then Chriſt prays for what he has aleady, as I noted above. For the Glory of the eternal *Logos* from everlaſting to everlaſting, is the ſame, as ſure as he is the ſame with himſelf.

Pag. 86. *By his expreſſions of coming from the*

Father, deſcending from Heaven, and returning thither again, &c. I ſuppoſe theſe Scriptures are alluded to, *John* 3. 13. 6. 38. 16. 28. *I came down from Heaven not to do my own will, but the will of him that ſent me. I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world, and go to the Father.* Whereupon his Diſciples ſaid unto him, *Lo now ſpeakeſt thou plainly, and ſpeakeſt no Parable.* But it were a very great Parable, or Ænigm, that one ſhould ſay truly of himſelf, that he came from Heaven, when he never was there. And as impoſſible a thing is it to conceive how God can properly be ſaid to come down from Heaven, who is alwaies preſent every where. Wherefore that in Chriſt which was not God, namely his Soul, or Humane Nature, was in Heaven before he appeared on Earth, and conſequently his Soul did pre-exiſt. Nor is there any refuge here in the communication of Idioms. For that cannot be attributed to the whole Hypoſtaſis, which is competent to neither part that conſtitutes it. For it was neither true of the Humane Nature of Chriſt, if you take away Pre-exiſtence, nor of the Divine, that they deſcended from Heaven, &c. And yet *John* 3. 13, 14. where Chriſt propheſying of his Crucifixion and Aſcenſion, ſaith, *No man hath aſcended up to Heaven, but he that came down from Heaven, even the Son of man,* [ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ] *who was in*

Hea-

Heaven. So *Eraſmus* ſaith, it may be rendred a Participle of the preſent tenſe, having a capacity to ſignifie the time paſt, if the ſence require it, as it ſeems to do here. *Qui erat in Cœlo,* viz. *antequam deſcenderat.* So *Eraſmus* upon the place.

Wherefore theſe places of Scripture touching Chriſt being ſuch inexpugnable Arguments of the Pre-exiſtence of the Soul of the *Meſſiah*; the Writer of *No Pre-exiſtence*, methinks, is no where ſo civil or diſcreet as in this point. Where, he ſaies, *he will not ſquabble about this, but readily yield that the Soul of Chriſt was long extant before it was incarnate.* But then he preſently flings dirt upon the *Pre-exiſtentiaries*, as guilty of a ſhameful preſumption and inconſequence, to conclude the Pre-exiſtence of all other Humane Souls from the Pre-exiſtence of his. *Becauſe he was a peculiar favourite of God, was to undergo bitter ſufferings for Mankind; and therefore ſhould enjoy an happy Pre-exiſtence for an* Anti-præmium. *And ſince he was to purchaſe a Church with his own moſt precious Bloud, it was fit he ſhould pre-exiſt from the beginning of the world, that he might preſide over his Church as Guide and Governour thereof; which is a thing that cannot be ſaid of any other ſoul beſide.*

This is a device which, I believe, the *Pre-exiſtentiaries*, good men, never dreamt of, but they took it for granted, that the creation of

all Humane Souls was alike, and that the Soul of Chriſt was like ours in all things, ſin onely excepted; as the Emperour *Juſtinian*, in his Diſcourſe to *Menas* Patriarch of *Conſtantinople*, argues from this very Topick to prove the Non-pre-exiſtence of our Souls, from the Non-pre-exiſtence of Chriſts, *he being like us in all things, ſin onely excepted.* And therefore as to Exiſtence and Eſſence there was no difference. Thus one would have verily thought to have been moſt ſafe and moſt natural to conclude, as being ſo punctual according to the declaration of Scripture, and order of things. For it ſeems almoſt as harſh and repugnant to give Angelical Exiſtence to a Species not Angelical, as Angelical Eſſence. For according to them, it belongs to Angels onely to exiſt *a mundo condito*, not to Humane ſouls. Let us therefore ſee what great and urgent occaſions there are, that the Almighty ſhould break this order.

The firſt is, That he may remonſtrate the Soul of the *Meſſiah* to be his moſt ſpecial Favourite. Why? That is ſufficiently done, and more opportunely, if other ſouls pre-exiſted to be his corrivals. But his faithful adheſion above the reſt to the Law of his Maker, as it might make him ſo great a Favourite: ſo that tranſcendent priviledge of being hypoſtatically united with the Godhead, or Eternal *Logos*, would, I trow, be a ſufficient Teſtimony of

Gods

Gods ſpecial Favour to him above all his fellow Pre-exiſtent Souls.

And then, which is the ſecond thing for his *Anti-præmial* Happineſs (though it is but an *Hyſteron Proteron*, and prepoſterous conceit, to fancie wages before the work) had he leſs of this by the coexiſtence of other ſouls with him, or was it not rather the more highly encreaſed by their coexiſtencie? And how oddly does it look, that one ſolitary Individual of a Species ſhould exiſt for God knows how many ages alone? But ſuppoſe the ſoul of the *Meſſiah*, and all other ſouls created together, and ſeveral of them fallen, and the Soul of the *Meſſiah* to undertake their recovery by his ſufferings, and this declared amongſt them; ſurely this muſt hugely inhance his Happineſs and Glory through all the whole order of Humane ſouls, being thus conſtituted or deſigned Head and Prince over them all. And thus, though he was rejected by the Jews and deſpiſed, he could not but be careſſed and adored by his fellow-ſouls above, before his deſcent to this ſtate of humiliation. And who knows but this might be part at leaſt of that Glory which, he ſays, he had before the world was? And which this ungrateful world denied him, while he was in it, who crucified the Lord of life.

And as for the third and laſt, That the Soul of the Meſſiah was to pre-exiſt, that he might preſide over the Church all along from the be-

ginning of it: What neceſſity is there of that? Could not the Eternal *Logos* and the Miniſtry of Angels ſufficiently diſcharge that Province? But you conceive a congruity therein; and ſo may another conceive a congruity that he ſhould not enter upon his Office till there were a conſiderable lapſe of Humane Souls which ſhould be his care to recover; which implies their Pre-exiſtence before this ſtage of the Earth: And if the Soul of the Meſſiah, united with the *Logos*, preſided ſo early over the Church; that it was meet that other unlapſed ſouls, they being of his own tribe, ſhould be his *Satellitium*, and be part of thoſe miniſtring Spirits that watch for the Churches good, and zealouſly endeavour the recovery of their ſiſter-ſouls, under the conduct of the great Soul of the *Meſſiah*, out of their captivity of ſin and death.

So that every way Pre-exiſtence of other ſouls will handſomly fall in with the Pre-exiſtence of the ſoul of the *Meſſiah*, that there may be no breach of order, whenas there is no occaſion for it, nor violence done to the Holy Writ, which expreſsly declares Chriſt to have been *like to us in all things* (as well in *Exiſtence* as *Eſſence*) *ſin onely excepted*; as the Emperour earneſtly urges to the Patriarch *Menas*. Wherefore we finding no neceſſity of his particular pre-exiſting, nor convenience, but what will be doubled if other Souls pre-exiſt with him;

him; it is plain, if he pre-exiſt, it is as he is an Humane ſoul, not as ſuch a particular ſoul; and therefore what proves his ſoul to pre-exiſt, proves others to pre-exiſt alſo.

Pag. 87. *Since theſe places have been more diffuſely urged in a late diſcourſe to this purpoſe.* I ſuppoſe he means in the *Letter of Reſolution* concerning *Origen*, Where the Author opens the ſenſe of *Philip.* 2. 6. learnedly and judiciouſly, eſpecially when he acknowledges Chriſts being *in the form of God*, to be underſtood of his Phyſical Union with the Divine *Logos*. Which is the Ancient Orthodox Expoſition of the Primitive Fathers, they taking this for one notable Teſtimony of Scripture, for the Divinity of Chriſt. Whenas they that underſtand it Politically of Chriſts Power and Authority onely, take an excellent weapon out of the hands of the Church wherewith ſhe uſed to oppoſe the Impugners of Chriſts Divinity. But how can Chriſt being God (*verus Deus*, as *Vatablus* expounds ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ,) empty himſelf, or any way deteriorate himſelf as to his Divinity, by being incarnate, and taking upon him μορφὴν δούλου the *form* of the *terreſtrial* Adam? For every *earthly* man is δοῦλος φθορᾶς, as the Apoſtle ſeems to intimate, *Rom.* 8. 21. as this ingenious Writer has noted; and the Apoſtle likewiſe ſeems ſo to expound it in the Text, by adding preſently by way of Exegeſis, καὶ ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος, *and was made in the likeneſs of men;*

men; like that Gen. 5. 3. *Adam begot a ſon in his own likeneſs*, a terreſtrial man as himſelf was. Wherefore the Incarnation of Chriſt being no exinanition to his *Divinity*, there was an *Humanity* of Chriſt, *viz.* his *Soul*, in a glorious ſtate of Pre-exiſtence, to which this voluntary exinanition belonged.

Pag. 87. *Was it for this mans ſin, or his fathers, that he was born blind?* For the avoiding the force of this Argument for proving that Pre-exiſtence was the Opinion of the Jews; and that Chriſt when it was ſo plainly implied in the Queſtion, by his ſilence, or not reproving it, ſeemed to admit it, or at leaſt to eſteem it no hurtful Opinion: They alledge theſe two things: Firſt, That theſe Enquirers having ſome notions of the Divine Preſcience, might ſuppoſe that God foreknowing what kind of perſon this blind man would prove, had antedated his puniſhment. The other is, That the Enquirers may be conceived to underſtand the blind mans original ſin. So that when they enquired whether the man was born blind for his own or his Parents ſin, they might onely ask whether that particular Judgment was the effect of his Parents, or of his own original pravity. This is *Camerons*.

But ſee what forced conceits Learned men will entertain, rather than not to ſay ſomething on a Text. What a diſtorted and pre-

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posterous account is that found, that God should punish men before they sin, because he foresees they will sin? And he onely produces this example, and a slight one too, That *Jeroboams* hand was dried up as he stretched it forth to give a sign to apprehend the Prophet. And the other is as fond an account, That God should send such severe Judgments on men for their original Pravity, which they cannot help. And original Pravity being so common to all, it could be no reason why this particular man should be born blind, more than others. Wherefore *Grotius* far more ingenuously writes thus upon the place: *Quærunt ergo an ipse peccaverit, quia multi Judæorum credebant* μετεμψυχωσιν *animarum.* And as our Saviour Christ passed it for an innocent Opinion, so did the Primitive Church, the *Book of Wisdom* being an allowable book with them, and read in publick, though it plainly declare for Pre-existence, *Chap.* 8. 20.

Chap. 12. p. 93. *Therefore let the Reader, if he please, call it a Romantick Scheme, or imaginary Hypothesis,* &c. This is very discreetly and judiciously done of the Author, to propose such things as are not necessary members or branches of Pre-existence, and are but at the best conjectural, as no part of that otherwise-useful Theory. For by tacking too fast these unnecessary tufts or tassels to the main Truth, it will

will but give occaſion to wanton or wrathful whelps to worry her, and tug her into the dirt by them. And we may eaſily obſerve how greedily they catch at ſuch occaſions, though it be not much that they can make out of them, as we may obſerve in the next Chapter.

Chap. 13. pag. 96. Pill. 1. *To conceive him as an immenſe and all-glorious Sun, that is continually communicating*, &c. And this as certainly as the Sun does his light, and as reſtrainedly. For the Suns light is not equally imparted to all ſubjects, but according to the meaſure of their capacity. And as Nature limits here in *natural* things, ſo does the Wiſdom and Juſtice of God in *free* Creatures. He imparts to them as they capacitate themſelves by improving or abuſing their Freedom.

Pag. 100. Pill. 3. *Be reſolved into a Principle that is not meerly corporeal.* He ſuſpects that the deſcent of heavy bodies, when all is ſaid and done, muſt be reſolved into ſuch a Principle. But I think he that without prejudice peruſes the Eleventh and Thirteenth Chapters (with their *Scholia*) of Dr. *Mores Enchiridion Metaphyſicum*, will find it beyond ſuſpition, that the Deſcent of heavy bodies is to be reſolved into ſome corporeal Principle; and that the *Spirit of Nature*, though you ſhould call it with the *Cabaliſts* by that aſtartling

ling name of *Sandalphon*, is no ſuch prodigious *Hobgoblin*, as rudeneſs and preſumptuous ignorance has made that Buckeram Writer in contempt and deriſion to call it.

Pag. 101. *As naturally as the fire mounts, and a ſtone deſcends.* And as theſe do not ſo (though naturally) meerly from their own intrinſick nature, but in vertue of the *Spirit of the Univerſe*; ſo the ſame reaſon there is in the diſpoſal of Spirits. *The Spirit of Nature* will range their *Plaſticks* as certainly and orderly in the Regions of the World, as it does the matter it ſelf in all places. Whence that of *Plotinus* may fitly be underſtood, That a Soul enveigled in vitiouſneſs, both here and after death, according to her nature ἄδηλοι ἡ ἴξις, is thruſt into the ſtate and place ſhe is, ὥσπερ τισὶν ἐκ μηχάνης φύσεως ἕλξεσι; as if ſhe were drawn thither by certain inviſible or Magical ſtrings of Natures own pulling. Thus is he pleaſed to expreſs this power or vertue of the *Spirit of Nature* in the Univerſe. But I think that tranſpoſition ſhe makes of them is rather ἔκθεσις, than either ἕλξις or ὦσις, a *tranſvection* of them, rather than *pulſion* or *traction*. But theſe are over-nice Curioſities.

Pag. 101. *As likely ſome things relating to the ſtate of Spirits*, &c. That is to ſay, Spirits by the miniſtry of other Spirits may be carried into ſuch regions as the *Spirit of Nature* would not have tranſmitted them to, from the place where

where they were before, whether for good or evil. Of the latter kind whereof, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more particularly in my Notes on the next Chapter.

Pag. 102. Pill. 4. *The ſouls of men are capable of living in other bodies beſides terreſtrial*, &c. For the *Pre-exiſtentiaries* allow her ſucceſſively to have lived, firſt, in an *Ethereal* body, then in an Aereal; and laſtly, after the ſtate of *Silente*, to live in a Terreſtrial. And here I think, though it be ſomething early, it will not be amiſs to take notice what the *Anti-pre-exiſtentiaries* alledged againſt this Hypotheſis; for we ſhall have the leſs trouble afterwards.

Firſt, therefore, they ſay, That it does not become the Goodneſs of God to make Mans Soul with a triple *Vital Congruity*, that will fit as well an *Aereal* and *Terreſtrial* condition, as an *Æthereal*. For from hence it appears, that their Will was not ſo much in fault that they ſinned, as the conſtitution of their Eſſence: And they have the face to quote the account of *Origen*, pag. 49. for to ſtrengthen this their firſt Argument. The words are theſe: *They being originally made with a capacity to joyn with this terreſtrial matter, it ſeems neceſſary according to the courſe of nature that they ſhould ſink into it, & ſo appear terreſtrial men.* And therefore, ſay they, there being no deſcending into theſe earthly bodies without a lapſe or previous ſin, their very conſtitution neceſſitated them to ſin.

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The ſecond Argument is, That this Hypotheſis is inconſiſtent with the bodies Reſurrection. For the *Aereal* bodie immediately ſucceeding the *Terreſtrial*, and the *Æthereal* the *Aereal*, the buſineſs is done, there needs no reſuſcitation of the *Terreſtrial* body to be glorified. Nor is it the ſame *numerical body* or *fleſh* ſtill, as it ought to be, if the Reſurrection-body be *Æthereal*.

The third is touching the *Aereal* Body; That if the ſoul after death be tyed to an *Aereal* body (and few or none attain to the *Æthereal* immediately after death) the ſouls of very good men will be forced to have their abode amongſt the very Devils. For their Prince is the Prince of the Air, as the Apoſtle calls him; and where can his ſubjects be, but where he is? So that they will be enforced to endure the companie of theſe foul Fiends; beſides all the incommodious changes in the Air, of Clouds, of Vapours, of Rain, Hail, Thunder, tearing Tempeſts and Storms; and what is an Image of Hell it ſelf, the darkneſs of Night will overwhelm them every four and twenty hours.

The fourth Argument is touching the *Æthereal* ſtate of Pre-exiſtence. For if ſouls when they were in ſo Heavenly and happy an eſtate could lapſe from it, what aſſurance can we have, when we are returned thither, that we ſhall abide in it? it being but the ſame Happineſs we were in before: and we having the

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ſame *Plaſtick* with its triple *Vital Congruity*, as we had before. Why therefore may we not lapſe as before?

The fifth and laſt Argument is taken from the ſtate of *Silence*. Wherein the Soul is ſuppoſed devoid of perception. And therefore their number being many, and their attraction to the place of conception in the Womb being merely Magical, and reaching many at a time, there would be many attracted at once; ſo that ſcarce a *Fœtus* could be formed which would not be a multiform Monſter, or a cluſter of Humane *Fœtus*'s, not one ſingle *Fœtus*. And theſe are thought ſuch weighty Arguments, that Pre-exiſtence muſt ſink and periſh under their preſſure. But, I believe, when we have weighed them in the balance of unprejudiced Reaſon, we ſhall find them light enough.

And truly, for the firſt; It is not only weak and ſlight, but wretchedly diſingenuous. The ſtrength of it is nothing but a maimed and fraudulent Quotation, which makes a ſhew as if the Author of the *Account* of *Origen*, bluntly affirmed, without any thing more to do, that ſouls being originally made with a capacity to joyn with this terreſtrial matter, it ſeems neceſſary, according to the courſe of nature, that they ſhould ſink into it, and ſo appear terreſtrial men: Whenas if we take the whole Paragraph as it lies, before they caſt themſelves into

to this fatal neceſſity, they are declared to have a freedom of will, whereby they might have ſo managed their happy Eſtate they were created in, that they need never have faln. His words are theſe: *What then remains, but that through the faulty and negligent uſe of themſelves, whilſt they were in ſome better condition of life, they rendred themſelves leſs pure in the whole extent of their powers, both Intellectual and Animal; and ſo by degrees became diſpoſed for the ſuſception of ſuch a degree of corporeal life, as was leſs pure, indeed, than the former; but exactly anſwerable to their preſent diſpoſition of Spirit. So that after certain Periods of time they might become far leſs fit to actuate any ſort of body, than the terreſtrial; and being originally made with a capacity to joyn with this too, and in it to exerciſe the Powers and functions of life, it ſeems neceſſary,* &c.

Theſe are the very words of the Author of the Account of *Origen*, wherein he plainly affirms, that it was the fault of the Souls themſelves, that they did not order themſelves then right when they might have done ſo, that caſt them into this terreſtrial condition. But what an Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence is this, that will thus ſhameleſly falſifie and corrupt a Quotation of an ingenious Author, rather than he will ſeem to want an Argument againſt his Opinion! Wherefore briefly to anſwer to this Argument, It does as much become the Goodneſs

neſs of God to create ſouls with a triple *Vital Congruity*, as to have created *Adam* in Paradiſe with free Will, and a capacity of ſinning.

To the Second, the Pre-exiſtentiaries will anſwer, That it is no more abſurd to conceive (nor ſo much) that the ſoul after death hath an Airy body, or it may be ſome an *Ethereal* one, than to imagine them ſo highly happy after death without any body at all. For if they can act ſo fully and beatifically without any body, what need there be any Reſurrection of the body at all? And if it be moſt natural to the ſoul to act in ſome body, in what a long unnatural eſtate has *Adams* ſoul been, that ſo many thouſand years has been without a body? But for the ſoul to have a body, of which ſhe may be the ἐντελέχια, certainly is moſt natural, or elſe ſhe will be in an unnatural ſtate after the Reſurrection to all Eternitie. Whence it is manifeſt, that it is moſt natural for the ſoul, if ſhe act at all, to have a body to act in. And therefore, unleſs we will be ſo dull as to fall into the drouzie dream of the *Pyſchopannychites*, we are to allow the ſoul to have ſome kind of body or other till the very Reſurrection.

But thoſe now that are not *Pſychopannychites*, but allow good Souls the joys and glories of Paradiſe before the Reſurrection of the Body, let them be demanded to what end the ſoul ſhould have a Reſurrection-body; and what they

they would anſwer for themſelves; the *Pre-exiſtentiaries* will anſwer for their poſition that holds the Soul has an Æthereal body already, or an Aereal one which may be changed into an Æthereal body. If they will alledge any Concinnity in the buſineſs, or the firm promiſe of more highly compleating our Happineſs at the union of our terreſtrial bodies with our ſouls at the Reſurrection; This, I ſay, may be done as well ſuppoſing them to have bodies in the mean time as if they had none. For thoſe bodies they have made uſe of in the interval betwixt their Death and Reſurrection, may be ſo thin and dilute, that they may be no more conſiderable than an *Interula* is to a Royal Robe lined with rich Furrs, and embroidered with Gold. For ſuppoſe every mans bodie at the Reſurrection framed again out of its own duſt, bones, ſinews and fleſh, by the miraculous Power of God, were it not as eaſie for theſe ſubtile Spirits, as it is in the ἀπρόσιτον, to enter theſe bodies, and by the Divine Power aſſiſting, ſo to inactuate them, that that little of their Vehicle they brought in with them, ſhall no more deſtroy the individuation of the Body, than a draught of wine drunk in, does the individuation of our body now, though it were, immediately upon the drinking, actuated by the Soul. And the ſoul at the ſame inſtant actuating the whole Aggregate, it is exquiſitely the ſame numerical bo-

die, even to the utmoſt curioſity of the Schoolmen. But the Divine Aſſiſtance working in this, it is not to be thought that the ſoul will looſe by reſuming this Reſurrection-body, but that all will be turned into a more full and ſaturate Brightneſs and Glory, and that the whole will become an heavenly, ſpiritual, and truly glorified Body, immortal and incorruptible.

Nor does the being thus turned into an heavenly or ſpiritual Body, hinder it from being ſtill the ſame Numerical body, foraſmuch as one and the ſame Numerical matter, let it be under what modifications it will, is ſtill the ſame numerical matter or body; and it is groſs ignorance in Philoſophie that makes any conceive otherwiſe.

But a rude and ill-natured Oppoſer of Preexiſtence is not content that it be the ſame numerical body, but that this ſame numerical body be ſtill fleſh, peeviſhly and invidiouſly thereby to expoſe the Author of the *Account* of *Origen*, who, pag. 120. writes thus: *That the bodie we now have, is therefore corruptible and mortal, becauſe it is fleſh; and therefore if it put on incorruption and immortality, it muſt put off it ſelf firſt, and ceaſe to be fleſh.* But queſtionleſs that ingenious Writer underſtood this of *natural* fleſh and bloud, of which the Apoſtle declares, *That fleſh and bloud cannot inherit the Kingdom of God.* But as he ſays

ἔστι σῶμα ψυχικὸν καὶ ἔστι σῶμα πνευματικόν, *There is a natural body and there is a ſpiritual body*: So if he had made application of the ſeveral kinds of *Fleſh* he mentions, of Men, of Beaſts, of Fiſhes, and Birds, he would have preſently ſubjoyned, ἔστι σὰρξ ψυχικὴ καὶ ἔστι σὰρξ πνευματική, *There is a natural fleſh and there is a ſpiritual fleſh.* And 'tis this *ſpiritual* Fleſh to which belongs incorruption and immortality, and which is capable of the Kingdom of Heaven. But for the σὰρξ ψυχικὴ, the *natural fleſh*, it muſt put off it ſelf, and ceaſe to be *natural* fleſh, before it can put on immortality and incorruption.

So little inconſiſtency is there of this Hypotheſis (as touching the ſouls acting in either an Aereal or Æthereal Vehicle, during the interval betwixt the Reſurrection and her departure hence) with the Reſurrection of the bodie. But in the mean time, there is a ſtrong bar thereby put to the dull dream of the *Pſychopannychiles*, and other harſhneſſes alſo eaſed or ſmoothed by it.

Now as for the third Argument, which muſt needs ſeem a great *Scare-crow* to the illiterate, there is very little weight or none at all in it. For if we take but notice of the whole *Atmoſphere*, what is the dimenſion thereof, and of the three Regions into which it is diſtributed, all theſe Bugbears will vaniſh. As for the Dimenſion of the whole Atmoſphere, it is by the skilful reputed about fifty to Italick miles

high, the *Convex* of the middle Region thereof about four ſuch miles, the *Concave* about half a mile. Now this diſtribution of the Air into theſe three *Regions* being thus made, and the Hebrew tongue having no other name to call the *Expanſum* about us, but שמים *Heaven*, here is according to them a diſtribution of Heaven into *three*, and the higheſt Region will be part of the *third* Heaven.

This therefore premiſed, I anſwer, That though the ſouls of good men after death be detained within the Atmoſphere of the Air, (and the Air it ſelf haply may reach much higher than this Atmoſphere that is bounded by the mere aſcent of exhalations and vapours) yet there is no neceſſity at all that they ſhould be put to thoſe inconveniencies, which this Argument pretends, from the company of Devils, or incommodious changes and diſturbances of the Air. For ſuppoſe ſuch inconveniencies in the middle and loweſt Region, yet the upper Region, which is alſo part of the third Heaven, thoſe parts are ever calm and ſerene. And the Devils Principality reaching no further than through the middle and loweſt Region next the earth, (not to advertiſe that his quarters may be reſtrained there alſo) the ſouls of the departed that are good, are not liable to be peſter'd and haunted with the ungrateful Preſence or Occurſions of the deformed and grim Retinue, or of the vagrant vaſ-

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ſals of that foul Feind, that is Prince of the Air, he being onely ſo of theſe lower parts thereof, and the good ſouls having room enough to conſociate together in the upper Region of it.

Nor does that promiſe of our Saviour to the thief on the Croſs, that that very day he ſhould be with him in Paradiſe, at all claſh with this Hypotheſis of Aereal Bodies, both becauſe Chriſt by his miraculous power might confer that upon the penitent thief his fellow-ſufferer, which would not fall to the ſhare of other penitents in a natural courſe of things; and alſo becauſe this third Region of the Air may be part of Paradiſe it ſelf: (*In my Fathers houſe there are many Manſions*) and ſome learned men have declared Paradiſe to be in the Air, but ſuch a part of the Air as is free from groſs Vapours and Clouds; and ſuch is the third Region thereof. In the mean time we ſee the ſouls of good men departed, freed from thoſe Panick fears of being infeſted either by the unwelcome company of Fiends and Devils, or incommodated by any dull cloudy obſcurations, or violent and tempeſtuous motions of the Air.

Onely the ſhadowy Vale of the Night will be caſt over them once in a *Nycthemeron*. But what incommodation is that, after the brisk active heat of the Sun in the day-time, to have the variety of the more mild beams of the

Moon, or gentle, though more quick and chearful, ſcintillations of the twinkling Stars? This variety may well ſeem an addition to the felicity of their ſtate. And the ſhadowyneſs of the Night may help them in the more compoſing Introverſions of their contemplative mind, and caſt the ſoul into ineffably pleaſing ſlumbers and Divine extaſies; ſo that the tranſactions of the Night may prove more ſolacing and beatifick ſometimes, than thoſe of the day. Such things we may gueſs at afar off, but in the mean time be ſure, that theſe good and ſerious Souls know how to turn all that God ſends to them to the improvement of their Happineſs.

To the fourth Argument we anſwer, That there are not a few reaſons from the nature of the thing that may beget in us a ſtrong preſumption that ſouls recovered into their Celeſtial Happineſs will never again relapſe, though they did once.

For firſt, it may be a miſtake that the Happineſs is altogether the ſame that it was before. For our firſt Paradiſiacal Bodies from which we lapſed, might be of a more crude and dilute Æther, not ſo full and ſaturate with Heavenly glory and perfection as our Reſurrection-body is.

Secondly, The ſoul was then unexperienced, and lightly coming by that Happineſs ſhe was in, did the more heedleſsly forgo it, before ſhe

ſhe was well aware; and her mind roved after new adventures, though ſhe knew not what.

Thirdly, It is to be conſidered, whether Regeneration be not a ſtronger tenour for enduring Happineſs, than the being created happie. For this being wrought ſo by degrees upon the *Plaſtick*, στεναγμοῖς ἀλαλήτοις, *with ineffable groans and piercing deſires after that Divine Life, that the Spirit of God co-operating exciteth in us*; when Regeneration is perfected and wrought to the full by theſe ſtrong Agonies, this may rationally be deemed a deeper tincture in the ſoul than that ſhe had by mere Creation, whereby the ſoul did indeed become Holy, innocent and happie, but not coming to it with any ſuch ſtrong previous conflicts and eager workings and thirſtings after that ſtate, it might not be ſo firmly rooted by far as in Regeneration begun and accompliſhed by the operation of Gods Spirit, gradually but more deeply renewing the Divine Image in us.

Fourthly, It being a renovation of our Nature into a priſtine ſtate of ours, the ſtrength and depth of impreſſion ſeems increaſed upon that account alſo.

Fifthly, The remembrance of all the hardſhips we underwent in our lapſed condition, whether of Mortification or croſs Rancounters, this muſt likewiſe help us to perſevere when once returned to our former Happineſs.

Sixthly, The comparing of the evanid pleasures of our lapsed or terrestrial life, with the fulness of those Joys that we find still in our heavenly, will keep us from ever having any hankering after them any more.

Seventhly, The certain knowledge of everlasting punishment, which if not true, they could not know, must be also another sure bar to any such negligencies as would hazard their setled felicity. Which may be one reason why the irreclaimable are eternally punished, namely, that it may the better secure eternal Happiness to others.

Eighthly, Though we have our triple *Vital Congruity* still, yet the *Plastick* life is so throughly satisfied with the *Resurrection-body*, which is so considerably more full and saturate with all the heavenly richness and Glorie than the former, that the *Plastick* of the soul is as entirely taken up with this one Bodie, as if she enjoyed the pleasures of all three bodies at once, *Æthereal*, *Aereal*, and *Terrestrial*.

And lastly, Which will strike all sure, He that is *able* to save to the *utmost*, and has promised us *eternal life*, is as *true* as *able*, and therefore cannot fail to perform it. And who can deny but that we in this State I have described, are as capable of being *fixed* there, and confirmed therein, as the Angels were after *Lucifer* and others had faln?

And now to the fifth and last Argument a-

gainst

gainſt the ſtate of *Silence*, I ſay it is raiſed out of mere ignorance of the moſt rational as well as moſt *Platonical* way of the ſouls immediate deſcent εἰς γένεσιν. For the firſt Mover or ſtirrer in this matter, I mean in the formation of the *Fœtus*, is the *Spirit of Nature*, the great λόγος πανσέληνος of the Univerſe, to whom *Plotinus* ſomewhere attributes τὴν πρώτην ἐγγραφὴν καὶ ὕλην πρὸ ἐμψύχου ἐνδόσεις καὶ ὕλην *The firſt Predelineations and prodrome Irradiations into the matter*, before the particular ſoul, it is preparing for, come into it. Now the *Spirit of Nature* being ſuch a ſpirit as contains *Spermatically* or *Vitally* all the Laws contrived by the Divine Intellect, for the management of the Matter of the World, and of all Eſſences elſe *unperceptive*, or *quatenus unperceptive*, for the good of the Univerſe; we have all the reaſon in the world to ſuppoſe this *Vital* or *Spermatical* Law is amongſt the reſt, *viz.* That it tranſmit but one ſoul to one prepared conception. Which will therefore be as certainly done, unleſs ſome rare and odd caſualty intervene, as if the Divine Intellect it ſelf did do it. Wherefore one and the ſame *Spirit of Nature* which prepares the matter by ſome general Predelineation, does at the due time tranſmit ſome one ſoul in the ſtate of *Silence* by ſome particularizing Laws (that fetch in ſuch a ſoul rather than ſuch, but moſt ſure but one, unleſs as I ſaid ſome ſpecial caſualty happen) into the prepared Matter, act-

ing at two places at once according to its *Synenergetical* vertue or power.

Hence therefore it is plain, that there will be no ſuch cluſters of *Fœtus*'s and monſtrous deformities from this Hypotheſis of the ſouls being in a ſtate of *Silence*. But for one to ſhuffle off ſo fair a ſatisfaction to this difficulty, by a precarious ſuppoſing there is no ſuch Being as the Spirit of Nature, when it is demonſtrable by ſo many irrefragable Arguments that there is, is a Symptome of one that philoſophizes at random, not as Reaſon guides. For that is no reaſon againſt the exiſtence of the Spirit of Nature, becauſe ſome define it *A Subſtance incorporeal, but without ſenſe and animadverſion*, &c. as if a ſpirit without ſenſe and animadverſion were a contradiction. For that there is a *Spirit of Nature* is demonſtrable, though whether it have no ſenſe at all is more dubitable. But though it have no ſenſe or perception, it is no contradiction to its being a Spirit, as may appear from Dr. *H. Mores Brief Diſcourſe* of the *true Notion of a Spirit*. To which I direct the Reader for ſatisfaction, I having already been more prolix in anſwering theſe Arguments than I intended. But I hope I have made my preſage true, that they would be found to have no force in them to overthrow the Hypotheſis of a threefold *Vital Congruity* in the Plaſtick of the ſoul. So that this fourth *Pillar*, for any execution they can do, will ſtand unſhaken.

Pag.

Pag. 103. *For in all ſenſation there is corporeal motion*, &c. And beſides, there ſeems an eſſential relation of the Soul to Body, according to *Ariſtotles* definition thereof, he defining it ἐντελέχεια σώματος, *that which actuates the body*. Which therefore muſt be idle when it has nothing to actuate, as a Piper muſt be ſilent, as to piping, if he have no Pipe to play on.

Chap. 14. pag. 113. *The ignobler and lower properties or the life of the body were languid and remiſs*, viz. as to their proper exerciſes or acting for themſelves, or as to their being regarded much by the Soul that is taken up with greater matters, or as to their being much reliſhed, but in ſubſerviency to the enjoyment of thoſe more Divine and ſublime Objects; as the Author intimates towards the end of his laſt Pillar.

Pag. 114. *And the Plaſtick had nothing to do but to move this paſſive and eaſie body*, &c. It may be added, and keep it in its due form and ſhape. And it is well added [accordingly as the concerns of the higher faculties required] For the *Plaſtick* by reaſon of its *Vital* Union with the vehicle, is indeed the main inſtrument of the motion thereof. But it is the Imperium of the *Perceptive* that both excites and guides its motion. Which is no wonder it can do, they being both but one ſoul.

Pag. 114. *To pronounce the place to be the Sun*,

Sun, &c. Which is as rationally gueſſed by them, as if one ſhould fancy all the Fellows and Students Chambers in a Colledge to be contained within the area of the Hearth in the Hall, and the reſt of the Colledge uninhabited. For the Sun is but a common *Focus* of a *Vortex*, and is leſs by far to the *Vortex*, than the Hearth to the Ichnographie of the whole Colledge, that I may not ſay little more than a Tennis-ball to the bigneſs of the earth.

Pag. 115. *Tet were we not immutably ſo*, &c. But this mutability we were placed in, was not without a proſpect of a more full confirmation and greater accumulation of Happineſs at the long run, as I intimated above.

Pag. 116. *We were made on ſet purpoſe defatigable, that ſo all degrees of life*, &c. We being ſuch Creatures as we are and finite, and taking in the enjoyment of thoſe infinitely perfect and glorious Objects onely *pro modulo noſtro*, according to the ſcantneſs of our capacity, diverſion to other Objects may be an eaſe and relief. From whence the promiſe of a glorified body in the Chriſtian Religion, as it is moſt grateful, ſo appears moſt rational. But in the mean time it would appear moſt irrational to believe we ſhall have eyes and ears and other organs of external ſenſe, and have no ſuitable Objects to entertain them.

Pag. 117. *Tea, methinks 'tis but a reaſonable reward to the body*, &c. This is ſpoken ſome-

thing

thing popularly and to the ſenſe of the vulgar, that imagine the body to feel pleaſure and pain, whenas it is the ſoul onely that is perceptive and capable of feeling either. But 'tis fit the body ſhould be kept in due plight for the lawful and allowable corporeal enjoyments the ſoul may reap therefrom for ſeaſonable diverſion.

Pag. 117, *That that is executed which he hath ſo determined*, &c. Some fancy this may be extended to the enjoying of the fruits of the Invigouration of all the three *Vital Congruities* of the *Plaſtick*, and that for a ſoul orderly and in due time and courſe to paſs through all theſe diſpenſations, provided ſhe keep her ſelf ſincere towards her Maker, is not properly any lapſe or ſin, but an harmleſs experiencing all the capacities of enjoying themſelves that God has beſtowed upon them. Which will open a door to a further Anſwer touching the reſt of the Planets being inhabited, namely, That they may be inhabited by ſuch kind of ſouls as theſe, who therefore want not the Knowledge and aſſiſtance of a Redeemer. And ſo the earth may be the onely *Noſocomium* of ſinfully lapſed ſouls. This may be an anſwer to ſuch far-fetched Objections till they can prove the contrarie.

Pag. 118. *Adam cannot withſtand the inordinate appetite*, &c. Namely, after his own remiſſneſs and heedleſſneſs in ordering himſelf, he

he had brought himself to such a wretched weakness.

Pag. 121. *The Plastick faculties begin now fully to awaken*, &c. There are three *Vital Congruities* belonging to the *Plastick* of the Soul, and they are to awake orderly, that is, to operate one after another downward and upward, that is to say, In the lapse, the *Aereal* follows the *Æthereal*, the *Terrestrial* the *Aereal*. But in their Recovery or Emergency out of the lapse, The *Aereal* follows the *Terrestrial*, and the *Æthereal* the *Aereal*. But however, a more gross turgency to *Plastick* operation may haply arise at the latter end of the Aereal Period, which may be as it were the disease of the soul in that state, and which may help to turn her out of it into the state of *Silence*, and is it self for the present silenced therewith. For where there is no union with bodie, there is no operation of the Soul.

Pag. 121. *For it hath an aptness and propensity to act in a Terrestrial body*, &c. This aptness and fitness it has in the state of *Silence*, according to that essential order of things interwoven into its own nature, and into the nature of the *Spirit* of the *World*, or great *Archeus* of the Universe, according to the eternal counsel of the Divine Wisdom. By which Law and appointment the soul will as certainly have a fitness and propensity at its leaving the *Terrestrial* body to actuate an *Aereal* one.

Pag.

Pag. 122. *Either by mere natural Congruity, the diſpoſition of the ſoul of the world, or ſome more ſpontaneous agent*, &c. Natural Congruity and the diſpoſal of the *Plaſtick* ſoul of the world (which others call the *Spirit of Nature*) may be joyned well together in this Feat, the Spirit of Nature attracting ſuch a ſoul as is moſt congruous to the predelineated Matter which it has prepared for her. But as for the ſpontaneous Agent, I ſuppoſe, he may underſtand his miniſtry in ſome ſupernatural Birth. Unleſs he thinks that ſome Angels or Genii may be imployed in putting ſouls into bodies, as Gardiners are in ſetting Peaſe and Beans in the beds of Gardens. But certainly they muſt be no good Genii then that have any hand in aſſiſting or ſetting ſouls in ſuch wombs as have had to do with Adulterie, Inceſt, and Buggery.

Pag. 123. *But ſome apiſh ſhews and imitations of Reaſon, Vertue and Religion*, &c. The Reaſon of the unregenerate in Divine things is little better than thus, and Vertue and Religion which is not from that Principle which revives in us in real Regeneration, are, though much better than ſcandalous vice and profaneſs, mere pictures and ſhadows of what they pretend to.

Pag. 123. *To its old celeſtial abode*, &c. For we are Pilgrims and ſtrangers here on the earth, as the holy Patriarchs of old declared.

And

And they that ſpeak ſuch things, ſaith the Apoſtle, plainly ſhew ὅτι πατρίδα ἐπιζητοῦσιν, *that they ſeek their native country*, for ſo πατρὶς properly ſignifies. And truly if they had been mindful of that earthly country out of which they came, they might, ſaith he, have had opportunity of returning. But now they deſire a better, to wit, an heavenly, *Hebr.* 11.

Pag. 124. *But that they ſtep forth again into Airy Vehicles.* This is their natural courſe, as I noted above. But the examples of *Enoch* and *Elias*, and much more of our ever Bleſſed Saviour, are extraordinary and ſupernatural.

Pag. 125. *Thoſe therefore that paſs out of theſe bodies before their Terreſtrial Congruity be ſpoyled, weakened, or orderly unwound, according to the tenour of this Hypotheſis*, &c. By the favour of this ingenious Writer, this Hypotheſis does not need any ſuch obnoxious Appendage as this, *viz.* That ſouls that are outed theſe *Terreſtrial* bodies before their *Terreſtrial Congruity* be ſpoiled, weakned, or orderly unwound, return into the ſtate of *Inactivity*. But this is far more conſonant both to *Reaſon* and *Experience* or Storie, that though the *Terreſtrial Congruity* be ſtill vigorous, as not having run out it may be the half part, no not the tenth part of its Period, the ſoul immediately upon the quitting of this body is inveſted with a bodie of Air, and is in the ſtate of *Activity* not

not of *Silence* in no ſenſe. For ſome being murdered have in all likelyhood in their own perſons complained of their murderers, as it is in that ſtory of *Anne Walker*; and there are many others of the ſame nature.

And beſides, it is far more reaſonable, there being ſuch numerous multitudes of *ſilent* ſouls, that their leaſt continuance in theſe *Terreſtrial* bodies ſhould at their departure be as it were a Magical *Rue* or *Teſſera* forthwith to the *Aereal Congruity of life* to begin to act its part upon the ceaſing of the other, that more ſouls may be rid out of the ſtate of *Silence*. Which makes it more probable that every ſoul that is once beſmeared with the unctuous moiſture of the Womb, ſhould as it were by a *Magick Ointment* be carried into the *Air* (though it be of a ſtill-born Infant) than that any ſhould return into the ſtate of *Silence* or *Inactivity* upon the pretence of the remaining vigour of the *Terreſtrial Congruity* of life. For theſe Laws are not by any conſequential neceſſity, but by the free counſel of the Eternal Wiſdom of God conſulting for the beſt.

And therefore this being ſo apparently for the beſt, this Law is interwoven into the *Spirit of the World* and every particular ſoul, that upon the ceaſing of her *Terreſtrial* Union, her *Aereal* Congruity of life ſhould immediately operate, and the Spirit of Nature aſſiſting, ſhe ſhould be dreſt in Aereal robes, and be found

among the Inhabitants of thoſe Regions. If ſouls ſhould be remanded back into the ſtate of Silence that depart before the Terreſtrial Period of *Vital Congruity* be orderly unwound, ſo very few reach the end of that Period, that they muſt in a manner all be turned into the ſtate of *Inactivity*. Which would be to weave *Penelope*'s Web, to do and undo becauſe the day is long enough, as the Proverb is, whereas it rather ſeems too ſhort, by reaſon of the numeroſity of *Silent* ſouls that expect their turn of Recovery into Life.

Pag. 125. *But onely follow the clew of this Hypotheſis.* The Hypotheſis requires no ſuch thing, but it rather claſhes with the firſt and chiefeſt *Pillar* thereof, *viz. That all the Divine deſigns and actions are laid and carried on by Infinite Goodneſs.* And I have already intimated how much better it is to be this way that I am pleading for, than that of this otherwiſe-ingenious Writer.

Pag. 125. *Since by long and hard exerciſe in this body, the Plaſtick Life is well tamed and debilitated,* &c. But this is not at all neceſſary, no not in thoſe ſouls whoſe *Plaſtick* may be deemed the moſt rampant. Diſ-union from this Terreſtrial body immediately tames it, I mean, the *Terreſtrial Congruity of Life*; and its operation is ſtopt, as ſurely as a ſtring of a Lute never ſo ſmartly vibrated is ſtreightways ſilenced by a gentle touch of the finger, and ano-

ther ſingle ſtring may be immediately made to ſound alone, while the other is mute and ſilent. For, I ſay, theſe are the *free* Laws of the *Eternal Wiſdom*, but *fatally* and *vitally*, not *intellectually* implanted in the *Spirit of Nature*, and in all Humane Souls or Spirits. The whole Univerſe is as it were the Automatal Harp of that great and true *Apollo*; and as for the general ſtriking of the ſtrings and ſtopping their vibrations, they are done with as exquiſite art as if a free intellectual Agent plaid upon them. But the *Plaſtick* powers in the world are not ſuch, but onely *Vital* and *Fatal*, as I ſaid before.

Pag. 126. *That an Aereal body was not enough for it to diſplay its force upon*, &c. It is far more ſafe and rational to ſay, that the ſoul deſerts her Aereal Eſtate by reaſon that the Period of the *Vital Congruity* is expired, which according to thoſe fatal Laws I ſpoke of before is determined by the Divine Wiſdom. But whether a ſoul may do any thing to abbreviate this Period, and excite ſuch ſymptoms in the Plaſtick as may ſhorten her continuance in that ſtate, let it be left to the more inquiſitive to define.

Pag. 128. *Where is then the difference betwixt the juſt and the wicked, in ſtate, place, and body?* Their difference in place I have ſufficiently ſhewn, in my Anſwer to the third Argument againſt the *triple Congruity of Life* in the

Plaſtick of Humane Souls, how fitly they may be diſpoſed of in the Air. But to the rude Buffoonry of that crude Oppoſer of the Opinion of Pre-exiſtence, I made no Anſwer. It being methinks ſufficiently anſwered in the Scholia upon *Sect.* 12. *Cap.* 3. *Lib.* 3. of Dr. *H. More's Immortalitas Animæ*, if the Reader think it worth his while to conſult the place. Now for State and Body the difference is obvious. The *Vehicle* is of more pure Air, and the Conſcience more pure of the one than of the other.

Pag. 130. *For according to this Hypotheſis, the gravity of thoſe bodies is leſs, becauſe the quantity of the earth that draws them is ſo*, &c. This is an ingenious invention both to ſalve that Phænomenon, why Bodies in Mines and other deep ſubterraneous places ſhould ſeem not ſo heavy nor hard to lift there, as they are in the ſuperiour Air above the earth; and alſo to prove that the cruſt of the earth is not of ſo conſiderable a thickneſs as men uſually conceive it is. I ſay, it is ingenious, but not ſo firm and ſure. The Quick-ſilver in a *Torricellian* Tube will ſink deeper in an higher or clearer Air, though there be the ſame Magnetiſm of the earth under it that was before. But this is not altogether ſo fit an illuſtration, there being another cauſe than I drive at conjoyned thereto.

But that which I drive at is ſufficient of it ſelf

ſelf to ſalve this Phænomenon. A Bucket of water, while it is in the water comes up with eaſe to him that draws it at the Well; but ſo ſoon as it comes into the Air, though there be the ſame earth under it that there was before, it feels now exceeding more weighty. Of which I conceive the genuine reaſon is, becauſe the *Spirit of Nature*, which ranges all things in their due order, acts proportionately ſtrongly to reduce them thereto, as they are more heterogeniouſly and diſproportionately placed as to their conſiſtencies. And therefore by how much more craſs and ſolid a body is above that in which it is placed, by ſo much the ſtronger effort the Spirit of Nature uſes to reduce it to its right place; but the leſs it exceeds the craſſneſs of the Element it is in, the effort is the leſs or weaker.

Hence therefore it is, that a ſtone or ſuch like body in thoſe ſubterraneous depths ſeems leſs heavy, becauſe the air there is ſo groſs and thick, and is not ſo much diſproportionate to the groſſneſs of the ſtone as our air above the earth here is; nor do I make any doubt, but if the earth were all cut away to the very bottom of any of theſe Mines, ſo that the Air might be of the ſame conſiſtency with ours, the ſtone would then be as heavy as it is uſually to us in this ſuperioor ſurface of the earth. So that this is no certain Argument for the proving that the 'cruſt of the earth is of ſuch

thinneſs as this Author would have it, though I do not queſtion but that it is thin enough.

Pag. 131. *And the mention of the Fountains of the great Deep in the Sacred Hiſtory*, &c. This is a more conſiderable Argument for the thinneſs of the cruſt of the earth; and I muſt confeſs I think it not improbable but that there is an Aqueous hollow *Sphæricum*, which is the Baſis of this habitable earth, according to that of Pſalm 24. 2. *For he hath founded it upon the ſeas, and eſtabliſhed it upon the flouds.*

Pag. 131. *Now I intend not that after a certain diſtance all is fluid matter to the Centre*; That is to ſay, After a certain diſtance of earthly Matter, that the reſt ſhould be fluid Matter, namely, Water and Air, to the Centre, &c. But here his intention is directed by that veneration he has for *Des Cartes*. Otherwiſe I believe if he had freely examined the thing to the bottom, he would have found it more reaſonable to conclude all fluid betwixt the *Concave* of the Terreſtrial Cruſt and the *Centre* of the Earth, as we uſually phraſe it, though nothing be properly Earth but that Cruſt.

Pag. 131. *Which for the moſt part very likely is a groſs and fœtid kind of air*, &c. On this ſide of the *Concave* of the Terreſtrial Cruſt there may be ſeveral Hollows of fœtid air and ſtagnant water, which may be ſo many particular lodgings for lapſed and unruly Spirits.

But

But there is moreover a conſiderable Aqueous *Sphericum* upon which the earth is founded, and is moſt properly the Abyſs; but in a more comprehenſive notion, all from the *Convex* thereof to the *Centre* may be termed the Abyſs, or the Deepeſt place that touches our imagination.

Pag. 131. *The loweſt and central Regions may be filled with flame and æther,* &c. That there was the Reliques of a Sun after the Incruſtation of the Earth and Aqueous Orb, is according to this Hypotheſis reaſonable enough. And a kind of Air and Æther betwixt this diminiſhed Sun and the *Concave* of this Aqueous Orb, but no craſs and opake concamerations of hard Matter interpoſed betwixt.

Which is an Hypotheſis the moſt kind to the ingenious Author of *Telluris Theoria Sacra*, that he could wiſh. For he holding that there was for almoſt two thouſand years an opake earthy Cruſt over this Aqueous Orb unbroke till the Deluge, which he aſcribes to the breaking thereof, it was neceſſary there ſhould be no opake Orb betwixt the Central Fire and this Aqueous Orb; for elſe the Fiſhes for ſo long a time had lived in utter darkneſs, having eyes to no purpoſe, nor ability to guide their way or hunt their prey. Onely it is ſuppoſed, which is eaſie to do, that they then ſwam with their backs toward the Centre, whenas as now

they ſwim with their bellies thitherward; they then plying near the *Concave*, as now near the *Convex* of this watry Abyſs. Which being admitted, the difference of their poſture will neceſſarilly follow according to the Laws of Nature, as were eaſie to make out, but that I intend brevity in theſe Annotations.

Onely I cannot forbear by the way to advertiſe how probable it is that this Central Fire which ſhone clear enough to give light to the Fiſhes ſwimming near the *Concave* of this Watry Orb, might in proceſs of time grow dimmer and dimmer, and exceeding much abate of its light, by that time the Cruſt of the Earth broke and let in the light of the Sun of this great *Vortex* into this Watry Region, within which, *viz.* in the Air or Æther there, there has been ſtill a decay of light, the Air or Æther growing more thick as well as that little Central Fire or Sun, being more and more inveloped with fuliginous ſtuff about it. So that the whole Concavity may ſeem moſt like a vaſt duskiſh Vault, and this dwindling overclouded Sun a Sepulchral Lamp, ſuch as, if I remember right, was found in the Monuments of *Olybius* and *Tulliola*. An hideous diſmal forlorn Place, and fit Receptacle for the *Methim* and *Rephaim*.

And the Latin Tranſlation, *Job* 26. 5. excellently well accords with this ſad Phænomenon. *Ecce Gigantes gemunt ſub Aquis, & qui habi-*

habitant cum eis. Here is that συναγωγὴ γηγενῶν or θιασώτων, as *Symmachus* tranſlates the word. And it follows in the verſe, *Nudus eſt Infernus coram eo*, Hell is naked before God. And *Symmachus* in other places of the Proverbs puts ἅιδης and ἀπώλεια together, which therefore is the moſt proper and the nethermoſt Hell. And it will be ἅιδης in the higheſt ſenſe, whenever this lurid Light (as it ſeems probable to me it ſometime will be) is quite extinct, and this *Central Fire* turned into a *Terrella*, as it may ſeem to have already happened in *Saturn*. But we muſt remember, as the Author ſometimes reminds us, that we are embelliſhing but a Romantick Hypotheſis, and be ſure we admit no more than Reaſon, Scripture, and the Apoſtolick Faith will allow.

Pag. 132. *Are after death committed to thoſe ſqualid ſubterraneous Habitations*, &c. He ſeems to ſuppoſe that all the wicked and degerate ſouls are committed hither, that they may be leſs troubleſom to better ſouls in this air above the earth. But conſidering the Devil is call'd the Prince of the Air, & that he has his Clients and Subjects in the ſame place with him; we may well allow the lower Regions of the Air to him, and to ſome wicked or unregenerate ſouls promiſcuouſly with him, though there be ſubterraneous Receptacles for the worſt and moſt rebellious of them, and not ſend them all packing thither.

Pag.

Pag. 132. *That they are driven into those Dungeons by the invisible Ministers of Justice*, &c. He speaks of such Dungeons as are in the broken Caverns of the Earth, which may be so many vexatious Receptacles for rebellious Spirits which these invisible Ministers of Justice may drive them into, and see them commited; and being confined there upon far severer penalties if they submit not to that present punishment which they are sentenced to, they will out of fear of greater Calamity be in as safe custody as if they were under lock and key. But the most dismal penalty is to be carried into the Abyss, the place of the *Rephaim* I above described. This is a most astonishing commination to them, and they extreamly dread that sentence. Which makes the Devils, *Luke* 8. 31. so earnestly beseech Christ that he would not command them εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον ἀπελθεῖν to pack away into the Abyss.

This punishment therefore of the Abyss where the *Rephaim* or γηγενεῖς groan, is door and lock that makes them, whether they will or no, submit to all other punishments and confinements on this side of it. *Michael Psellus* takes special notice how the Dæmons are frighted with the menaces τὸ εἰς τὰς ἀβύσσους καὶ τοὺς ὑπογείους τόπους ἀποπεμφθῆναι, with the menaces *of the sending them away packing into the Abyss and subterraneous places*. But these may signifie no more than Cavities that are in the ruptues of the earth,

earth, and they may ſteal out again if they will adventure, unleſs they were perpetually watched, which is not ſo probable. Wherefore they are imprifoned through fear of that great horrid Abyſs above deſcribed, and which as I ſaid is an iron lock and door of braſs upon them.

But then you will ſay, What is the door and lock to this terrible place? I anſwer, The inviolable Adamantine Laws of the great *Sandalphon* or *Spirit* of the *Univerſe*. When once a rebellious Spirit is carried down by a Miniſter of Juſtice into this Abyſs, he can no more return of himſelf, than a man put into a Well forty fathoms deep is able of himſelf to aſcend out of it.

The unlapſed Spirits, it is their priviledge that their Vehicles are wholly obedient to the will of the Spirit that inactuates them, and therefore they have free ingreſs and egreſs everywhere; and being ſo *little paſſive* as they are, and ſo *quick* and *ſwift* in their motions, can perform any Miniſtries with little or no incommodation to themſelves. But the Vehicles of lapſed Spirits are *more paſſive*, and they are the very chains whereby they are tyed to certain Regions by the iron Laws of the Spirit of the Univerſe, or Hylarchick Principle, that unfailingly ranges the Matter everie where according to certain orders. Wherefore this Serjeant of Juſtice having once depoſited his Priſoner within

in the *Concave* of the *Aqueous Orb*, he will be as certainly kept there, and never of himself get out again, as the man in the bottom of the Well above-mentioned. For the Laws of the same Spirit of Nature that keeps the man at the bottom of the Well (that everie thing may be placed according to the measure of its consistencie) will inhibit this Captive from ever returning to this Superiour Air again, because his Vehicle is, though foul enough, yet much thinner than the Water; and there will be the the same ranging of things on the *Concave* side of the *Aqueous Orb*, as there is on the *Convex*.

So that if we could suppose the Ring about *Saturn* inhabited with any living creatures, they would be born toward the *Concave* of the Ring as well as toward the *Convex*, and walk as steadily as we and our Antipodes do with our feet on this and that side of the earth one against another. This may serve for a brief intimation of the reason of the thing, and the intelligent will easily make out the rest themselves, and understand what an ineluctable fate and calamity it is to be carried into that duskish place of dread and horrour, when once the Angel that has the Keys of the Abyss or bottomless pit has shut a rebellious Spirit up there, & chained him in that hideous Dungeon.

Pag. 133. *Others to the Dungeon, and some to the most intolerable Hell the Abyss of fire.* The Dungeon here, if it were understood with an

Emphasis, would most properly denote the Dungeon of the *Rephaim*, of which those parts nearest the Centre, may be called the Abyss of Fire more properly than any Vulcano's in the Crust of the earth. Those souls therefore that have been of a more fierce and fiery nature, and the Causers of Violence and Bloodshed, and of furious Wars and cruel Persecutions of innocent and harmless men, when they are committed to this Dungeon of the *Rephaim*, by those inevitable Laws of the subteraqueous *Sandalphon*, or *Demogorgon* if you will, they will be ranged nearest the Central Fire of this Hellish Vault. For the Vehicles of souls symbolizing with the temper of the mind, those who are most haughty, ambitious, fierce, and fiery, and therefore, out of Pride and contempt of others in respect of themselves and their own Interest, make nothing of shedding innocent blood, or cruelly handling those that are not for their turn, but are faithful adherers to their Maker, the Vehicles of these being more thin and fiery than theirs who have transgressed in the *Concupiscible*, they must needs surmount such in order of place, and be most remote from the *Centre* of the *Aqueous Orb* under which the *Rephaim groan*, and so be placed at least the nearest to that Abyss of Fire, which our Author terms the most intolerable Hell.

Pag. 133. *Have a strict and careful eye upon them, to keep them within the confines of their* Goal,

Goal, &c. That this, as it is a more tedious Province, so a needless one, I have intimated above, by reason that the fear of being carried into the Abyss will effectually detain them in their confinements. From whence if they be not released in time, the very place they are in may so change their Vehicles, that it may in a manner grow natural to them, and make them as uncapable of the Superiour Air as Bats and Owls are, as the ingenious Author notes, to bear the Suns Noon-day-Beams, or the Fish to live in these thinner Regions.

Pag. 134. *Under severe penalties prohibit all unlicensed excursions into the upper World, though I confess this seems not so probable*, &c. The Author seems to reserve all the Air above the earth to good souls onely, and that if any bad ones appear, it must be by either stealth or license. But why bad souls may not be in this lower Region of the Air as well as Devils, I understand not. Nor do I conceive, but that the Kingdom of Darkness may make such Laws amongst themselves, as may tend to the ease and safety of those of the Kingdom of Light. Not out of any good-will to them, but that themselves may not further smart for it if they give license to such and such exorbitancies. For they are capable of pain and punishment, and though they are permitted in the world, yet they are absolutely under the power of the Almighty, and of the Grand Minister

nister of his Kingdom, the glorious Soul of the Messiah.

Pag. 137. *The internal Central Fire should have got such strength and irresistible vigour,* &c. But how or from whence, is very hard to conceive: I should rather suspect, as I noted above, that the Fire will more and more decay till it turn at last to a kind of *Terrella*, like that observed within the Ring of *Saturn*, and the Dungeon become utter Darkness, where there will be weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth, as well as in the furnace of Fire.

Pag. 141. *And so following the Laws of its proper motion shall fly away out of this Vortex,* &c. This looks like an heedless mistake of this ingenious Writer, who though he speak the language of *Cartesius*, seems here not to have recalled to mind his *Principles*. For the Earth according to his Principles is never like to become a *Sun* again. Nor if it had so become, would it then become a *Comet*. Forasmuch as *Comets* according to his Philosophie are *incrustated Suns*, and *Planets* or *Earths* in a manner, and so to be deemed so soon as they settle in any Vortex, and take their course about the Centre thereof. Nor if the Earth become a Sun again, is it like to leave our *Vortex* according to the *Cartesian* Principles, but rather be swallowed down into the Sun of our *Vortex*, and increase his magnitude; the ranging of the Planets according to *Des Cartes* Mechanical

Laws

Laws being from the difference of their solidities, and the least solid next to the Sun. Whither then can this *Sol redivivus* or the *Earth* turned wholly into the *Materia subtilissima* again be carried, but into the Sun it self? This seems most likely, especially if we consider this *Sol Redivivus* or the Earth turned all into the *Materia subtilissima*, in it self. But if we take into our consideration its particular *Vortex* which carries about the Moon, the business may bear a further debate which will require more time than to be entred upon here. But it seems plain at first sight, that though this *Sol Redivivus* should by vertue of its particular *Vortex* be kept from being swallowed down into the Sun the Centre of the great *Vortex*, yet it will never be able to get out of this great *Vortex*, according to the frame of *Des Cartes* Philosophy. So that there will be two Suns in one Vortex, a *Planetary* one and a *fixt* one. Which unexpected monstrositie in Nature will make any cautious *Cartesian* more wary how he admits of the Earths ever being turned into a Sun again; but rather to be content to let its Central Fire to incrustrate it self into a *Terrella*, there seeming to be an example of this in that little Globe in the midst of the Ring of *Saturn*; but of an Earth turned into a Sun no example at all that I know of.

Pag. 142. *So that the Central Fire remains unconcerned*, &c. And so it well may, it being

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ſo conſiderable a diſtance from the *Concave* of the *Aqueous Orb*, and the Aqueous Orb it ſelf betwixt the Cruſt of the Earth and it. But the Priſoners of this Gaol of the *Rephaim* will not be a little concerned. This Hell of a ſuddain growing ſo ſmothering hot to them all, though the Central Fire no more than it was. And whatever becomes of thoſe Spirits that ſuffer in the very Conflagration it ſelf, yet *Ab hoc Inferno nulla eſt redemptio.*

Pag. 147. *Thoſe immediate births of unaſſiſted nature will not be ſo tender*, &c. Beſides, the Air being repleniſht with benign *Dæmons* or *Genii*, to whom it cannot but be a pleaſant Spectacle to behold the inchoations and progreſſes of reviving Nature, they having the Curioſitie to contemplate theſe births, may alſo in all likelihood exerciſe their kindneſs in helping them in their wants; and when they are grown up, aſſiſt them alſo in the methods of Life, and impart as they ſhall find fit the Arcana of Arts and Sciences and Religion unto them, nor ſuffer them to ſymbolize overmuch in their way of living with the reſt of their fellow terreſtrial Creatures. If it be true that ſome hold, that even now when there is no ſuch need, every one has his παραγωγὸς θεῖος, his *Genius* or Guardian Angel, it is much more likely that at ſuch a ſeaſon as this, every tender *Fœtus* of their common Mother the Earth, would be taken into the care of ſome good

Dæmon or other, even at their very firſt budding out into life.

Pag. 148. *But all this is but the frolick exerciſe of my Pen chooſing a Paradox.* And let the ſame be ſaid of the Pen of the *Annotator*, who has beſtowed theſe pains not to gain Proſelytes to the Opinions treated of in this Diſcourſe, but to entertain the Readers Intellectuals with what may ſomething inlarge his thoughts; and if he be curious and anxious, help him at a pinch to ſome eaſe of mind touching the ways of God and his wonderful Providence in the World.

Pag. 149. *Thoſe other expreſſions of Death, Deſtruction, Perdition of the ungodly*, &c. How the entring into the ſtate of *Silence* may well be deemed a real Death, Deſtruction and Perdition, that paſſage in *Lucretius* does marvelouſly well ſet out.

Nam ſi tantopere eſt animi mutata poteſtas,
Omnis ut actarum exciderit retinentia rerum,
Non, ut opinor, ea ab letho jam longiter errat
Quapropter fateare neceſſe eſt, quæ fuit ante.
Interiiſſe, &c. De Rerum Natura, Lib. 3.

And again in the ſame book he ſays, though we were again juſt as we were before, yet we having no memory thereof, it is all one as if we were perfectly loſt. And yet this is the condition of the ſoul which the Divine Nemeſis

ſends

ſends into the ſtate of Silence, becauſe afterwards ſhe remembers nothing of her former life. His words are theſe:

Nec, ſi materiam noſtram collegerit ætas
Poſt obitum, rurſúmq; redegerit ut ſita nunc eſt,
Atq; iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitæ,
Pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoq; factum
Interrupta ſemel quom ſit retinentia noſtri.

Pag. 150. *In thoſe paſſages which predict new Heavens and a new Earth*, &c. I ſuppoſe he alludes eſpecially to that place in the Apocalypſe, *Chap.* 21. where preſently upon the Deſcription of the Lake of Fire in the precedent Chapter which anſwers to the Conflagration, it is ſaid, *And I ſaw a new Heaven and a new Earth.* But queſtionleſs that paſſage, as in other places, is *Politically* to be underſtood, not *Phyſically*, unleſs this may be the ingenious Authors meaning, That the Writer of the Apocalypſe adorning his ſtyle with alluſions to the moſt rouzing and moſt notable real or Phyſical Objects (which is obſervable all along the Apocalypſe) it may be a ſign that a new Heaven and a new Earth ſucceeding the Conflagration, is one of thoſe noble Phænomena true and real amongſt the reſt, which he thought fit to adorn his ſtyle with by alluding thereto. So that though the chief intended

ſenſe of the Apocalypſe be *Political*, yet by its alluſions it may countenance many noble and weighty Truths whether *Phyſical* or *Metaphyſical*. As, The exiſtence of Angels, which is ſo perpertually inculcated all along the Book from the beginning to the ending: The Divine Shechina in the celeſtial Regions: The Dreadful Abyſs in which rebellious Spirits are chained, and at the commination whereof they ſo much tremble: The Conflagration of the Earth; and laſtly, The renewing and reſtoring this Earth and Heaven after the Conflagration.

Pag. 150. *The main Opinion of Pre-exiſtence is not at all concerned*, &c. This is very judiciouſly and ſoberly noted by him. And therefore it is by no means fairly done by the Oppoſers of Pre-exiſtence, while they make ſuch a pudder to confute any paſſages in this Hypotheſis, which is acknowledged by the *Pre-exiſtentiaries* themſelves to be no neceſſary or eſſential part of that Dogma. But this they do, that they may ſeem by their Cavils (for moſt of them are no better) againſt ſome parts of this unneceſſarie Appendage of Pre-exiſtence, to have done ſome execution upon the Opinion it ſelf; which how far it extends, may be in ſome meaſure diſcovered by theſe Notes we have made upon it. Which ſtated as they direct, the Hypotheſis is at leaſt poſſible; but that it is abſolutely the true one, or ſhould be thought

thought ſo, is not intended. But as the ingenious Author ſuggeſts, it is either this way or ſome better, as the infinite Wiſdom of God may have ordered. But this poſſible way ſhews Pre-exiſtence to be neither impoſſible nor improbable.

Pag. 151. *But ſubmit all that I have written to the Authority of the Church of England*, &c. And this I am perſwaded he heartily did, as it is the duty of every one, in things that they cannot confirm by either a plain demonſtration, clear authority of Scripture, Manifeſtation of their outward Senſes, or ſome rouzing Miracle, to compromiſe with the Deciſions of the National Church where Providence has caſt them, for common peace and ſettlement, and for the eaſe and ſecurity of Governours. But becauſe a fancy has taken a man in the head, that he knows greater *Arcana* than others, or has a more orthodox belief in things not neceſſarie to Salvation than others have, for him to affect to make others Proſelytes to his Opinion, and to wear his badge of Wiſdom, as of an extraordinarie Maſter in matters of Theory, is a mere vanitie of Spirit, a ridiculous piece of pride and levitie, and unbeſeeming either a ſober and ſtanched man or a good Chriſtian. But upon ſuch pretences to gather a Sect, or ſet up a Church or Independent Congregation, is intolerable Faction and Schiſm, nor can ever bear a free and ſtrict ex-

amination according to the meaſures of the trueſt *Morals* and *Politicks*.

But becauſe it is the fate of ſome men to believe Opinions, to others but probable, nor it may be ſo much (as the motion of the Earth ſuppoſe, and *Des Cartes* his *Vortices*, and the like) to be certain Science, it is the intereſt of every National Church to define the truth of no more Theories than are plainly neceſſary for Faith and good manners; becauſe if they either be *really*, or *ſeem* to be miſtaken in their unneceſſary Deciſions or Definitions, this with thoſe that are more knowing than ingenuous will certainly leſſen the Authority and Reverence due to the Church, and hazard a ſecret enmity of ſuch againſt her. But to adventure upon no Deciſions but what have the Authority of Scripture (which they have that were the Deciſions of General Councils before the Apoſtaſie) and plain uſefulneſs as well as Reaſon of their ſide, this is the greateſt Conſervative of the Honour and Authority of a Church (eſpecially joyned with an exemplary life) that the greateſt Prudence or Politicks can ever excogitate. Which true Politicks the Church of *Rome* having a long time ago deſerted, has been fain, an horrid thing to think of it! to ſupport her Authority and extort Reverence by mere Violence and Bloud. Whenas, if ſhe had followed theſe more true and Chriſtian Politicks, ſhe would never

never have made herſelf ſo obnoxious, but for ought one knows, ſhe might have ſtood and retained her Authority for ever.

In the mean time, this is ſuitable enough, and very well worth our noting, That foraſmuch as there is no aſſurance of the Holy Ghoſt's aſſiſting unneceſſary Deciſions, though it were of the Univerſal Church, much leſs of any National one, ſo that if ſuch a point be determined, it is uncertainly determined, and that there may be ſeveral ways of holding a neceſſary Point, ſome more accommodate to one kind of men, others to another, and that the Deciſions of the Church are for the Edification of the people, that either their *Faith* may be more firm, or their *Lives* more irreprehenſible: theſe things, I ſay, being premiſed, it ſeems moſt prudent and Chriſtian in a Church to decline the Deciſion of the circumſtances of any neceſſary point, foraſmuch as by deciding and determining the thing one way, thoſe other handles by which others might take more faſt hold on it are thereby cut off, and ſo their aſſent made leſs firm thereto.

We need not go far for an example, if we but remember what we have been about all this time. It is neceſſarie to believe that we have in us an Immortal Spirit capable of Salvation and Damnation, according as we ſhall behave ourſelves. This is certainly revealed to us, and is of indiſpenſable uſefulneſs. But though

this Opinion or rather Article of Faith be but one, yet there are ſeveral waies of holding it. And it lies more eaſie in ſome mens minds, if they ſuppoſe it created by God at every conception in the Womb; in otherſome, if they conceive it to be *ex Traduce*; and laſtly in others, if it pre-exiſt. But the waies of holding this Article ſignifie nothing but as they are ſubſervient to the making us the more firmly hold the ſame. For the more firmly we believe it, the greater influence will it have upon our lives, to cauſe us to live in the fear of God, and in the waies of Righteouſneſs like good Chriſtians.

Wherefore now it being ſuppoſed that it will ſtick more firm and fixt in ſome mens minds by ſome one of theſe three waies, rather than by either of the other two, and thus of any one of the three; It is manifeſt, it is much more prudently done of the Church not to cut off two of theſe three handles by a needleſs, nay, a harmful Deciſion, but let every one chooſe that handle that he can hold the Article faſteſt by, for his own ſupport and Edification. For thus every one laying firm hold on that handle that is beſt fitted for his own graſp, the Article will carry all theſe three ſorts of believers ſafe up to Heaven, they living accordingly; whenas two ſorts of them would have more ſlippery or uncertain hold, if they had no handle offered to them but

thoſe which are leſs ſuitable to their graſp and Genius.

Which ſhews the Prudence, Care, and Accuracy of Judgment in the Church of *England*, that as in other things, ſo in this, ſhe has made no ſuch needleſs and indeed hurtful Deciſions, but left the modes of conceiving things of the greateſt moment, to every ones ſelf, to take it that way that he can lay the faſteſt hold of it, and it will lie the moſt eaſily in his mind without doubt and wavering. And therefore there being no one of theſe handles but what may be uſeful to ſome or other for the more eaſie and undoubted holding that there is in us an Immaterial and Immortal Soul or Spirit, my having taken this ſmall pains to wipe off the ſoil, and further the uſefulneſs of one of them by theſe Annotations, if it may not merit thanks, it muſt, I hope, at leaſt deſerve excuſe with all thoſe that are not of too ſowre and tetrick a Genius, and prefer their own humours and ſentiments before the real benefit of others.

But now if any one ſhall invidiouſly object, that I prefer the Chriſtian Diſcretion of my own Church the Church of *England*, before the Judgment and Wiſdom of a General Council, namely, the fifth Oecumenical Council held at *Conſtantinople* in *Juſtinians* time under the Patriarch *Eutychius*, who ſucceeded *Menas* lately deceaſed, to whom *Juſtinian* ſent that Diſcourſe

courſe of his againſt *Origen* and his errours, amongſt which *Pre-exiſtence* is reckoned one: In anſwer to this, ſeveral things are to be conſidered, that right may be done our Mother.

Firſt, What number of Biſhops make a general Council, ſo that from their *Numeroſity* we may rely upon their Authority and infallibility that they will not conclude what is falſe.

Secondly, Whether in whatſoever matters of debate, though nothing to the Salvation of mens ſouls, but of curious Speculation, fitter for the Schools of Philoſophers than Articles of Faith for the edification of the people (whoſe memory and conſcience ought to be charged with no notions that are not ſubſervient to the rightly and duly honouring God and his onely begotten Son our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, and to the faithful diſcharging their duty to man) the aſſiſtance of the Spirit of God can rationally be expected; or onely in ſuch things as are neceſſary to be profeſſed by the people, and very uſeful for the promoting of Life and Godlineſs. And as *Moſes* has circumſcribed his Narrative of the Creation within the limits of *Mundus Plebeiorum*, and alſo the Chronology of time according to Scripture is bounded from the firſt *Adam* to the coming again of the ſecond to Judgment, and Sentencing the wicked to everlaſting puniſhment, and the righteous to

life

life everlasting: so whether the Decisions of the Church are not the most safely contained within these bounds, and they faithfully discharge themselves in the conduct of Souls, if they do but instruct them in such truths only as are within this compass revealed in sacred Scripture. And whether it does not make for the Interest and Dignity of the Church to decline the medling with other things, as unprofitable and unnecessary to be decided.

Thirdly, Whether if a General Council meet not together *in via Spiritus Sancti*, but some stickling imbitter'd Grandees of the Church out of a pique that they have taken against some persons get through their interest a General Council called, whether is the assistance of the Holy Ghost to be expected in such a meeting, so that they shall conclude nothing against truth.

Fourthly, Whether the Authority of such General Councils as Providence by some notable prodigie may seem to have intimated a dislike of, be not thereby justly suspected, and not easily to be admitted as infallible deciders.

Fifthly, Whether a General Council that is found mistaken in one point, anathematizing that for an Heresie which is a truth, forfeits not its Authority in other points, which then whether falshoods or truths, are not to be deemed

med ſo from the Authority of that Council, but from other Topicks.

Sixthly, Since there can be no commerce betwixt God and man, nor he communicate his mind and will to us but by ſuppoſition, That our ſenſes rightly circumſtantiated are true, That there is skill in us to underſtand words and Grammar, and ſchemes of ſpeech, as alſo common notions and clear inferences of Reaſon, whether if a General Council conclude any thing plainly repugnant to theſe, is the Concluſion of ſuch a Council true and valid; and whether the indeleble Notices of truth in our mind that all Mankind is poſſeſſed of, whether Logical, Moral, or Metaphyſical, be not more the dictates of God, than thoſe of any Council that are againſt them.

Seventhly, If a Council, as general as any has been called, had in the very midnight of the Churches Apoſtaſie and ignorance met, and concluded all thoſe Corruptions that now are obtruded by the Church of *Rome*, as Tranſubſtantiation, Invocation of Saints, Worſhipping of Images, and the like, whether the Deciſions of ſuch a Council could be held infallible or valid. What our own excellently well Reformed Church holds in this caſe, is evident out of her Articles. For,

Eighthly, The Church of *England* plainly declares, *That General Councils when they be gathered together, forasmuch as they be an Aſ-*

ſembly

ſembly of men whereof all are not governed with the Spirit and Word of God, they may err, and ſometimes have erred even in things pertaining to God. Wherefore, ſaith ſhe, *things ordained by them as neceſſary to Salvation have neither ſtrength nor Authority, unleſs it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture.* Artic. 21.

Ninthly, And again, *Artic.* 20. where ſhe allows the Church to have power to decree Rites and Ceremonies, and Authority in Controverſies of Faith, but with this reſtriction, *That it is not lawful for the Church to ordain any thing that is contrary to Gods Word written, neither may it ſo expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another*: ſhe concludes: *Wherefore although the Church be a Witneſs and Keeper of Holy Writ, yet as it ought not to decree any thing againſt the ſame, ſo beſides the ſame ought it not to inforce any thing to be believed for neceſſity of Salvation.* What then, does ſhe null the Authority of all the General Councils, and have no deference for any thing but the mere Word of God to convince men of Hereſie? No ſuch matter. What her ſenſe of theſe things is, you will find in 1 *Eliz. cap.* 1. Wherefore,

Tenthly and laſtly, What General Councils the Church of *England* allows of for the conviction of Hereticks you may underſtand out of theſe words of the Statute: *They ſhall not adjudge*

adjudge any matter or cauſe to be Hereſies, but onely ſuch as heretofore have been adjudged to be Hereſie by the Authority of the Canonical Scriptures, or by the firſt four General Councils or any of them, or by any other General Council wherein the ſame was declared Hereſie by the expreſs and plain words of the ſaid Canonical Scriptures,

By brief reflections upon ſome of theſe ten Heads, I ſhall endeavour to leſſen the Invidiouſneſs of my *ſeeming* to prefer the Diſcretion of the Church of *England* before the Judgment of a *General Council*, I mean of ſuch a General Council as is ſo unexceptionable that we may relie on the Authority of their Deciſions, that they will not fail to be true. Of which ſort whether the fifth reputed General Council be, we will briefly firſt conſider.

For reflecting on the firſt head, It ſeems ſcarcely numerous enough for a General Council. The firſt General Council of *Nice* had above three hundred Biſhops; That of *Chalcedon* above ſix hundred: This fifth Council held at *Conſtantinople* had but an hundred ſixty odd. And which ſtill makes it more unlike a General Council, in the very ſame year, *viz.* 553, the Weſtern Biſhops held a Council at *Aquileia*, and condemned this fifth Council held at *Conſtantinople*.

Secondly, The Pre-exiſtence of Souls being a mere Philoſophical Speculation, and indeed held

held by all Philoſophers in the affirmative that held the Soul incorporeal; we are to conſider whether we may not juſtly deem this caſe referrible to the ſecond Head, and to look ſomething like Pope *Zacharies* appointing a Council to condemn *Virgilius* as an Heretick, for holding *Antipodes*.

Thirdly, We may very well doubt whether this Council proceeded *in via Spiritus Sancti*, this not being the firſt time that the lovers and admirers of *Origen* for his great Piety and Knowledge, and ſingular good ſervice he had done to the Church of Chriſt in his time, had foul play plai'd them. Witneſs the ſtory of *Theophilus* Biſhop of *Antioch*, who to revenge himſelf on *Dioſcorus* and two others that were lovers of *Origen* and *Anti-Anthropomorphites*, ſtickled ſo, that he cauſed *Epiphanius* in his See, as he did in his own, to condemn the Books of *Origen* in a Synod. To which condemnation *Epiphanius* an *Anthropomorphite*, and one of more Zeal than Knowledge, would have got the ſubſcription of *Chryſoſtome* the Patriarch of *Conſtantinople*; but he had more Wiſdom and Honeſty than to liſten to ſuch an injurious demand.

And as it was with thoſe Synods called by *Theophilus* and *Epiphanius*, ſo it ſeems to be with the fifth Council. Piques and Heart-burnings amongſt the Grandees of the Church ſeemed to be at the bottom of the buſineſs. *Binius*

nius in his History of this fifth Council takes notice of the enmity betwixt *Pelagius*, Pope *Vigilius*'s Apocrisiarie, and *Theodorus* Bishop of *Cæsarea Cappadociæ* an *Origenist*. And *Spondanus* likewise mentions the same, who says, touching the business of *Origen*, that *Pelagius* the Popes Apocrisiarie, *eam quæstionem in ipsius Theodori odium maviſſe existimabatur*. And truly it seems to me altogether incredible, unless there were some hellish spight at the bottom, that they should not have contented themselves to condemn the errours supposed to be *Origens* (but after so long a time after his death, there being in his writings such choppings and changings and interpolations, hard to prove to be his) but have spared his name, for that unspeakable good service he did the Church in his life-time. See Dr. *H. Mores* Preface to his *Collectio Philosophica*, Sect. 18. where *Origens* true Character is described out of *Eusebius*. Wherefore whether this be to begin or carry on things *in via Spiritus Sancti*, so that we may rely on the Authority of such a Council, I leave to the impartial and judicious to consider.

Fourthly, In reference to the fourth Head, That true wisdom and moderation, and the holy assistance of Gods Spirit did not guide the affairs of this Council, seems to be indicated by the Divine Providence, who to shew the effect of their unwise proceedings in the self-

ſelf-ſame year the Council ſate, ſent a moſt terrible Earthquake for forty days together upon the City of *Conſtantinople* where the Council was held, and upon other Regions of the Eaſt, even upon *Alexandria* it ſelf and other places, ſo that many Cities were levelled to the ground. Upon which *Spondanus* writes thus: *Hæc verò præſagia fuiſſe malorum quæ ſunt prædictam Synodum conſecuta, nemo negare poterit quicunq; ab eventis facta noverit judicare.*

This alſo reminds me of a Prodigy as it was thought that happened at the ſixth reputed General Council, where nigh three hundred Fathers were gathered together to decide this nice and ſubtile Point, namely, whether an operation or volition of Chriſt were to be deemed, *Una operatio ſive volitio* [illegible] according to that Axiom of ſome Metaphyſicians, that *Actio eſt ſuppoſiti*, and ſo the Humane and Divine Nature of Chriſt being coaleſcent into *one perſon*, his *volition* and *operation* be accounted *one* as his perſon is but *one*; or becauſe of the *two Natures*, though but one perſon, there are to be conceived *two operations* or two volitions. This latter Dogma obtained, and the other was condemned by this third *Conſtantinopolitan Council:* whereupon, as *Paulus Diaconus* writes, abundance of Cobwebs or Spiders webs fell or rained, as it were, down upon the heads of the people, to their very great aſtoniſhment. Some interpret the Cobwebs of

Hereſies; others haply more rightfully of troubling the Church of Chriſt with over-great niceties and curioſities of ſubtile Speculation, which tend nothing to the corroborating her Faith, and promoting a good Life; and are ſo obſcure, ſubtile, and lubricous, that look on them one way they ſeem thus, and another way thus.

To this ſixth General Council there ſeemed *two Operations* and *two Wills* in Chriſt, becauſe of his *two Natures*. To a Council called after by *Philippicus* the Emperour, and *John* Patriarch of *Conſtantinople*, conſidering Chriſt as *one perſon*, there appeared *Numeroſiſſimo Orientalium Epiſcoporum collecto Conventui*, as *Spondanus* has it: but as *Binius*, *Innumeræ Orientalium Epiſcoporum multitudini congregatæ*, but *one will* and *one operation*. And certainly this numerous or innumerable company of Biſhops muſt put as fair for a General Council as that of leſs than three hundred. But that the Authority of both theſe Councils are leſſened upon the account of the ſecond Head, in that the matter they conſulted about tended nothing to the corroboration of our Faith, or the promotion of a good Life, I have already intimated.

Theſe things I was tempted to note, in reference to the tenth Head. For it ſeems to me an undeniable Argument, that our *Firſt Reformers*, which are the *Riſen Witneſſes*, were

either

either exquiſitely well ſeen in Eccleſiaſtick Hiſtory, or the good Hand of God was upon them that they abſolutely admitted onely the four firſt General Councils; but after them, they knew not where to be, or what to call a General Council, and therefore would not adventure of any ſo called for the adjudging any matters Hereſie. But if any pretended to be ſuch, their Authority ſhould no further prevail, than as they made out things by expreſs and plain words of Canonical Scripture. And for other Synods, whether the Seventh, which is the ſecond of *Nice*, or any other that the Church of *Rome* would have to be General in defence of their own exorbitant points of *Faith* or *Practice*, they will be found of no validity, if we have recourſe to the ſixth, ſeventh, eighth and ninth Heads.

Fifthly, In reference to the fifth Head. This fifth Council loſeth its Authority in anathematizing what in *Origen* ſeems to be true according to that expreſs Text of Scripture, John 16.28. (eſpecially compared with others. See Notes on *Chap.* 11.) *I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world, and go to the Father.* He came forth from his Father which is in Heaven, accordingly as he taught us to pray to him (the Divine *Shechina* being in a peculiar manner there) He leaves the world and goes to the Father, which all underſtand of his Aſcenſion into Heaven,

whence his coming from the Father muſt have the ſame ſenſe, or elſe the Antitheſis will plainly fail. Wherefore it is plain he came down from Heaven (as he ſignifies alſo in other places) as well as returns thither. But he can neither be truly ſaid to come from heaven, nor return thither, according to his Divine Nature. For it never left Heaven, nor removes from one place to another; and therefore this Scripture does plainly imply the Pre exiſtence of the Soul of the Meſſiah, according to the Doctrine of the *Jews*, before it was incarnate. And this ſtricture of the old *Cabala* may give light to more places of St. *Johns* Writings than is fit to recite in this haſte; I will onely name one by the by, 1 *John* 4. 2. *Every Spirit that confeſſeth* Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα, *that Jeſus is the Chriſt come in the fleſh*, that is to ſay, is the Chriſt incarnate, *is of God*. For the Meſſiah did exiſt, *viz.* his Soul, before he came into the fleſh, according to the Doctrine of the *Jews*. Which was ſo well known, that upon the above-cited ſaying (*John* 16. 28.) of our Saviour, they preſently anſwered, *Lo, now ſpeakeſt thou plainly, and ſpeakeſt no Parable*; becauſe he clearly diſcovers himſelf by this Character to be the expected Meſſias incarnate. Nor is there any poſſible evaſion out of the clearneſs of this Text from the communication of Idioms, becauſe Chriſt cannot be ſaid to come down from Heaven according to his Humane Nature before

fore it was there, therefore his Humane Nature was there before it was incarnate.

And laſtly, The Authority of the Deciſion of this Council (if it did ſo decide) is leſſened, in that contrary to the ſecond Head (as was hinted above) it decides a point that Faith and Godlineſs is not at all concerned in. For the Divinity of Chriſt, which is the great point of Faith, is as firmly held ſuppoſing the Soul of the *Meſſias* united with the *Logos* before his incarnation, as in it. So that the *ſpight* onely of *Pelagius* againſt *Theodorus* to multiply Anathematiſms againſt *Origen*, no *uſe* or *neceſſity* of the Church required any ſuch thing. Whence again their Authority is leſſened upon the account of the third Head.

Theſe things may very well ſuſpend a careful mind, and loth to be impoſed upon, from relying much upon the Authority of this fifth Council. But ſuppoſe its Authority entire, yet the Acts againſt *Origen* are not to be found in the Council. And the ſixth Council in its Anathematiſms, though it mention *Theodorets* Writings, the Epiſtle of *Ibas* and *Theodorus Mopſueſtenus* who were concerned in the fifth Council; yet I find not there a ſyllable touching *Origen*. And therefore thoſe that talk of his being condemned by that fifth Council, have an eye, I ſuppoſe, to the Anathematiſms at the end of that Diſcourſe which *Juſtinian* the Emperour ſent to *Menas* Patri-

arch of *Conſtantinople*, according to which form they ſuppoſe the errours of *Origen* condemned. Which if it were true, yet *ſimple Pre-exiſtence* will eſcape well enough.

Nor do I think that learned and intelligent Patriarch *Photius* would have called the ſimple Opinion of Pre-exiſtence of ſouls δόγμα μιαρὸν καὶ παλαίπλυτον, but for thoſe Appendages that the injudiciouſneſs and raſhneſs of ſome had affixed to it. Partly therefore reflecting upon that firſt Anathematiſm in the Emperours Diſcourſe that makes the pre-exiſtent ſouls of men firſt to be Νόες as if their higheſt felicity conſiſted in having no body to inactuate (which plainly claſhes with both ſound Philoſophy and Chriſtianity, as if the ψυχαὶ and *Rephaim* were all one, and they were not ψυχαὶ till they were ἀποψυγεῖσαι τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀγάπης, *grown cold to the Divine Love*, and onely gathered body as they gathered corruption, and were alienated from the Life of God; which is point-blank againſt the Chriſtian Faith, which has promiſed us, as the higheſt prize, a glorified body:) And partly what himſelf adds, that one ſoul goes into ſeveral bodies; Which are impertinent Appendages of the Pre-exiſtence of the ſoul, falſe, uſeleſs and unneceſſary; and therefore thoſe that add theſe Appendages thereto, violate the ſincerity of the Divine Tradition to no good purpoſe.

But this ſimple Doctrine of Pre-exiſtence is ſo unexceptionable and harmleſs, that the third

third collection of Councils in *Juſtellus*, which is called Ἀνάπλεως, though it reckon the other errours of *Origen* condemned in the fifth Council, omits this of Pre-exiſtence. Certainly that Eccleſiaſtick that framed that Diſcourſe for the Emperour, if he did it not himſelf, had not fully, deliberately and impartially conſidered the Dogma of Pre-exiſtence taken in its ſelf, nor does once offer to anſwer any Reaſons out of Scripture or Philoſophy that are produced for it. Which if it had been done, and this had been the onely errour to be alledged againſt *Origen*, I cannot think it credible, nay ſcarce poſſible, though their ſpight had been never ſo much againſt ſome lovers of *Origen*, that they could have got any General Council to have condemned ſo holy, ſo able, ſo victorious a Champion for the Chriſtian Church in his life-time for an Heretick, upon ſo tolerable a punctilio, about three hundred years after his death. What Father that wrote before the firſt four General Councils, but might by the Malevolent, for ſome odd paſſage or other, be doomed an Heretick, if ſuch ſeverity were admittable amongſt Chriſtians?

But I have gone out further than I was aware, and it is time for me to bethink me what I intended. Which was the juſtifying of my ſelf in my ſeeming to prefer the Diſcretion of our own Church in leaving us free to hold the

Incorporeity and Immortality of the ſoul by any of the three handles that beſt fitted every mans Genius, before the Judgment of the fifth General Council, that would abridge us of this liberty. From which Charge I have endeavoured to free my ſelf, briefly by theſe two ways: Firſt, by ſhewing how hard it is to prove the fifth Oecumenical Council ſo called, to be a legitimate General or Oecumenical Council, and ſuch as whoſe Authority we may relie on. And ſecondly, if it was ſuch, by ſhewing that it did not condemn ſimply the Pre-exiſtence of ſouls, but Pre-exiſtence with ſuch and ſuch Appendages. So that there is no real claſhing betwixt our Church and that Council in this.

But however this is, from the eighth and ninth Heads it's plain enough that the Church of *England* is no favourer of the Concluſions of any General Council that are enjoyned as neceſſary to Salvation, that be either repugnant to Holy Scripture, or are not clearly to be made out from the ſame; which Non-pre-exiſtence of Souls certainly is not, but rather the contrary. But being the point is not ſufficiently clear from Scripture either way to all, and the Immortality of the Soul and ſubſiſtence after death is the main uſeful point; that way which men can hold it with moſt firmneſs and eaſe, her Candour and Prudence has left it free to them to make uſe of.

And

And as for General Councils, though ſhe does not in a fit of Zeal, which *Theodoſius* a Prior in *Paleſtine* is ſaid to have done, anathematize from the Pulpit all people that do not give as much belief to the four firſt General Councils as to the four Goſpels themſelves; yet, as you may ſee in the tenth Head, ſhe makes the Authority of the firſt four General Councils ſo great, that nothing is to be adjudged Hereſie but what may be proved to be ſo either from the *Scripture* or from theſe *four Councils.* Which Encomium might be made with leſs skill and more confidence by that Prior, there having been no more than four General Councils in his time. But it was ſingular Learning and Judgment, or elſe a kind of Divine Sagacity in our firſt Reformers, that they laid ſo great ſtreſs on the firſt four General Councils, and ſo little on any others pretended ſo to be.

But in all likelihood they being perſwaded of the truth of the prediction of the Apoſtaſie of the Church under Antichriſt how univerſal in a manner it would be, they had the moſt confidence in thoſe General Councils which were the earlieſt, and that were held within thoſe times of the Church which ſome call *Symmetral.* And without all queſtion, the two firſt General Councils, that of *Nice*, and that other of *Conſtantinople*, were within thoſe times, *viz.* within four hundred years after Chriſt;

Christ; and the third and fourth within the time that the ten-horned Beast had his horns growing up, according to Mr. *Mede*'s computation. But the Definitions of the third and fourth Councils, that of *Ephesus*, and that other of *Chalcedon* (which are to establish the *Divinity* of Christ, which is not to be conceived without the Union of both Natures into *one person*; as also his *Theanthropy*, which cannot consist with the confusion of *both Natures* into one) were vertually contained in the Definitions of the first and second Councils. So that in this regard they are all of equal Authority, and that unexceptionable. First, because their Decisions were concerning points necessary to be decided one way or other, for the settlement of the Church in the objects of their Divine Worship. And therefore they might be the better assured that the assistance of the Holy Ghost would not be wanting upon so weighty an occasion. And secondly, in that those two first Councils were called while the Church was *Symmetral*, and before the *Apostasie* came in, according to the testimony of the Spirit in the Visions of the *Apocalypse*.

Which Visions plainly demonstrate, that the Definitions of those Councils touching the *Triunity* of the Godhead and *Divinity* of Christ are not Idolatrous, else the Apostasie had begun before the time these Oracles declare it did; and if not Idolatrous, then they are most cer-

certainly true. And all theſe four Councils driving at nothing elſe but theſe neceſſary points to be decided, and their deciſion being thus plainly approved by the ſuffrage of the Holy Ghoſt in the Apocalypſe, I appeal to any man of ſenſe and judgment if they have not a peculiar prerogative to be believed above what other pretended General Council ſoever; and conſequently with what *ſpecial* or rather *Divine* ſagacity our firſt Reformers have laid ſo peculiar a ſtreſs on theſe four, and how conſiſtent our Mother the Church of *England* is to herſelf, *that the deciſions of General Councils have neither ſtrength nor Authority further than the matter may be cleared out of the Holy Scriptures.* For here we ſee, that out of the Holy Scriptures there is a moſt ample teſtimony given to the Deciſions of theſe four General Councils. So that if one ſhould with *Theodoſius* the Prior of *Paleſtine* in a fit of Zeal anathematize all thoſe that did not believe them as true as the four Evangeliſts, he would not want a fair Plea for his religious fury.

But for men after the *Symmetral* times of the Church, upon Piques and private quarrels of Parties, to get General Councils called as they fancy them, to conclude matters that tend neither to the confirmation of the real Articles of the Chriſtian Faith, or of ſuch a ſenſe of them as are truly uſeful to life and godlineſs, and herein to expect the infallible

aſſiſtances

aſſiſtances of the Holy Spirit, either upon ſuch terms as theſe, or for rank worldly intereſt, is ſuch a preſumption as to a free Judgment will look little better than Simony, as if they could hire the aſſiſtance of the Holy Ghoſt for money.

Thus have I run further into the conſideration of General Councils, and the meaſure of their Authority, than was requiſite upon ſo ſmall an occaſion; and yet I think there is nothing ſaid, but if ſeriouſly weighed may be uſeful to the intelligent Reader, whether he favour Pre-exiſtence or not. Which is no further to be favoured than is conſiſtent with the known and approved Doctrines of the Chriſtian Faith, nor claſhes any thing with the ſoundeſt Syſtemes of Divinity, as Dr. *H. More* ſhews his way of exhibiting the Theorie does not, in his *General Preface* to his *Collectio Philoſophica*, Sect. 19. whoſe cautious and caſtigate method I have imitated as near as I could in theſe my Annotations. And he has indeed been ſo careful of admitting any thing in the Hypotheſis that may juſtly be ſuſpected or excepted againſt, that his Friend Mr. *Glanvil* might have enlarged his Dedication by one word more, and called him *Repurgatorem Sapientiæ Orientalis*, as well as *Reſtauratorem*, unleſs *Reſtaurator* imply both: It being a piece of Reſtauration, to free an Hypotheſis from the errours ſome may have corrupted it with, and

to

to recover it to its primeval purity and ſincerity.

And yet when the buſineſs is reduced to this harmleſs and unexceptionable ſtate, ſuch is the modeſty of that Writer, that he declares that if he were as certain of the Opinion as of any demonſtration in Mathematicks, yet he holds not himſelf bound in conſcience to profeſs it any further than is with the good-liking or permiſſion of his Superiours. Of which temper if all men were, it would infinitely contribute to the peace of the Church. And as for my ſelf, I do freely profeſs that I am altogether of the ſelf-ſame Opinion and Judgment with him.

ANNO-

Annotations

UPON THE

Diſcourſe of TRUTH.

Into which is inſerted

By way of DIGRESSION,

A brief Return

To Mr. *BAXTER*'s Reply,

Which he calls

A Placid COLLATION

With the Learned

Dr. *HENRY MORE*,

Occaſioned by the Doctors ANSWER to a LETTER of the Learned *Pſychopyriſt*.

Whereunto is annexed

A DEVOTIONAL HYMN,

Tranſlated for the uſe of the ſincere Lovers of true PIETY.

LONDON: Printed for *J. Collins*, and *S. Lownds*, over againſt *Exeter-Change* in the *Strand*. 1683.

THE Annotatour TO THE READER.

About a fortnight or three weeks ago, while my Annotations *upon the two foregoing Treatiſes were a printing, there came to my hands Mr.* Baxter's Reply *to Dr.* Mores Anſwer to a Letter of the learned Pſychopyriſt, *printed in the ſecond Edition of* Saduciſmus Triumphatus: *Which* Reply *he ſtyles a* Placid Collation with the Learned Dr. *Henry More. I being fully at leaſure, preſently fell upon reading this* Placid Collation; *which I muſt confeſs is ſo writ, that I was much ſurprized in the reading of it, I expecting by the Title*

thereof nothing but fairneſs and freeneſs of Judgment, and calmneſs of Spirit, and love and deſire of Truth, and the proſperous ſucceſs thereof in the World, whether our ſelves have the luck to light on it, or where ever it is found.

But inſtead of this, I found a Magiſterial loftineſs of Spirit, and a ſtudie of obſcuring and ſuppreſſing of the Truth by petty crooked Artifices, ſtrange diſtortions of the ſenſe of the Doctors Arguments, and Falſifications of Paſſages in his Anſwer to the Letter of the Pſychopyriſt. *Which ſurprize moved me, I confeſs, to a competent meaſure of* Indignation *in the behalf of the injured Doctor, and of the Truth he contends for: And that Indignation, according to the* Idioſyncraſie *of my* Genius, *ſtirred up the* merry Humour *in me, I being more prone to laugh than to be ſeverely angry or ſurly at thoſe that do things unhandſomely; And this merry humour ſtirred up, prevailing ſo much upon my Judgment as*

to make me think that this Placid Collation *was not to be anſwered, but by one in a pleaſant and jocular humor; And I finding my ſelf ſomething ſo diſpoſed, and judging the matter not of that moment as to be buzzed upon long, and that this more lightſome, brisk and jocular way of anſwering the* Placid Collation *might better befit an* unknown Annotatour, *than the* known *Pen and Perſon of the Doctor, I preſently betook my ſelf to this little Province, thinking at firſt onely to take notice of Mr.* Baxters Diſingenuities *towards the Doctor; but one thing drawing on another, and that which followed being carefully managed and apparently uſeful, I mean the Anſwering all Mr.* Baxters *pretended* Objections *againſt the* Penetrability *or* Indiſcerpibility *of a* Spirit, *and all his ſmaller Criticiſms upon the Doctors Definition thereof, in finiſhing theſe three Parts, I quickly completed the whole little Work of what I call the* Digreſſion, (*inſerted*

into my Annotations *upon Bishop* Rusts *ingenious* Discourse of Truth) *which, with my* Annotations, *and the serious* Hymn *annexed at the end (to recompose thy Spirits, if any thing over-ludicrous may chance to have discomposed them) I offer, courteous Reader, to thy candid perusal; and so in some hast take leave, and rest*

Your humble Servant,

The ANNOTATOUR.

Annotations
UPON THE
Diſcourſe of TRUTH.

Sect. 1. pag. 165. AND *that there are neceſſary mutual reſpects*, &c. Here was a groſs miſtake in the former Impreſſion. For this clauſe there ran thus: *By the firſt I mean nothing elſe, but that things neceſſarily are what they are. By the ſecond, that there are neceſſary mutual Reſpects and Relations of things one unto another.* As if theſe mutual Reſpects and Relations of Things one to another were Truth in the *Subject*, and not Truth in the *Object*; the latter of which he handles from the fourth Section to the eighteenth, in which laſt Section alone he treats of Truth in the *Subject* or Underſtanding. The former part of the Diſcourſe is ſpent in treating of Truth in the *Object*; that is to ſay, of Truth in the nature of things, and their neceſſary Reſpects and mutual Relations one to another. Both which are antecedent in the order of nature to all Underſtandings, and

therefore both put together make up the first branch of the Division of Truth. So grosly had the Authours MS. been depraved by passing through the hands of unskilful Transcribers, as Mr. *J. Glanvil* complains at the end of his Letter prefixed to this Discourse. And so far as I see, that MS. by which he corrected that according to which the former Impression was made, was corrupt it self in this place. And it running glibly, and they expecting so suddainly the proposal of the other member of the Division, the errour, though so great, was overseen. But it being now so seasonably corrected, it gives great light to the Discourse, and makes things more easie and intelligible.

Sect. 2. pag. 166. *That any thing may be a suitable means to any end*, &c. It may seem a monstrous thing to the sober, that any mans Understanding should be so depraved as to think so. And yet I have met with one that took himself to be no small Philosopher, but to be wiser than both the Universities, and the Royal Society to boot, that did earnestly affirm to me, that there is no natural adaptation of means to ends, but that one means would be as good as another for any end if God would have it so, in whose power alone every thing has that effect it has upon another. Whereupon I asked him, whether if God would a Foot-ball might not be as good an In-

inſtrument to make or mend a Pen withal, as a Pen-knife. He was ſurprized; but whether he was convinced of his madneſs and folly, I do not well remember.

Pag. 167. *Is it poſſible there ſhould be ſuch a kind of Geometry, wherein any Problem ſhould be demonſtrated by any Principles?* Some of the *Carteſians* bid fair towards this Freakiſhneſs, whenas they do not ſtick to aſſert, that, If God would, he could have made that the whole ſhould be leſſer than the part, and the part bigger than the whole. Which I ſuppoſe they were animated to, by a piece of raillery of *Des Cartes*, in anſwering a certain Objection; where, that he may not ſeem to violate the abſolute Power of God for making what Laws he pleaſed for the ordering of the matter of the Univerſe (though himſelf ſeems to have framed the world out of certain inevitable and neceſſary Mechanical Laws) does affirm, that thoſe Laws that ſeem ſo neceſſary, are by the arbitrarious appointment of God, who, if he would, could have appointed other Laws, and indeed framed another Geometry than we have, and made the power of the *Hypotenuſa* of a Right-angled Triangle unequal to the powers of the *Baſis* and *Cathetus*. This piece of Drollery of *Des Cartes* ſome of his followers have very gravely improved to what I ſaid above of the Whole and Part. As if ſome ſuperſtitious Fop, upon the hearing one being

demanded, whether he did believe the real and corporeal preſence of Chriſt in the Sacrament, to anſwer roundly that he believed him there booted and ſpurred as he rode in triumph to *Jeruſalem*, ſhould become of the ſame Faith that the other ſeemed to profeſs, and glory in the improvement thereof by adding that the Aſs was alſo in the Sacrament, which he ſpurred and rid upon. But in the mean time, while there is this Phrenſie amongſt them that are no ſmall pretenders to Philoſophy, this does not a little ſet off the value and uſefulneſs of this preſent *Diſcourſe of Truth*, to undeceive them if they be not wilfully blind.

Pag. 167. *Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones*; namely, Becauſe a Quadrangle is that which is comprehended of four right lines. It is at leaſt a more operoſe and ambagious Inference, if any at all. The more immediate and expedite is this, That the two internal alternate Angles made by a right line cutting two parallels, are equal to one another: Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, *P. Ram. Geom. Lib.* 6. *Prop.* 9. If the reaſoning had been thus: A Quadrangle is that which is comprehended of four right lines, Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are not equal to two right ones; as the Concluſion is groſly falſe, ſo the proof had been egregiouſly alien and impertinent. And the intention

tention of the Author ſeems to be carried to Inſtances that are moſt extravagant and ſurprizing; which makes me doubt whether [equal] was read in the true MS. or [not equal] but the ſenſe is well enough either way.

Sect. 4. pag. 168. *The Divine Underſtanding cannot be the fountain of the Truth of things*, &c. This ſeems at firſt ſight to be a very harſh Paradox, and againſt the current Doctrine of Metaphyſicians, who define Tranſcendental or Metaphyſical Truth to be nothing elſe but the relation of the Conformity of things to the Theoretical (not Practical) Intellect of God; His Practical Intellect being that by which he knows things as produced or to be produced by him, but his Theoretical that, by which he knows things as they are; but yet in an *Objective* manner, as *exiſtent objectively*, not *really*. And hence they make Tranſcendental Truth to depend upon the Intellectual Truth of God, which alone is moſt properly Truth, and indeed the fountain and origine of all Truth. This in brief is the ſenſe of the Metaphyſical Schools. With which this paſſage of our Author ſeems to claſh, in denying the Divine Intellect to be the fountain of the Truth of things, and in driving rather at this, That the things themſelves in their *Objective Exiſtence*, ſuch as they appear there unalterably and unchangeably to the Divine Intellect, and not at pleaſure contrived by it

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(for as he ſays, it is againſt the nature of all underſtanding to make its Object) are the meaſure and fountain of Truth. That in theſe, I ſay, conſiſts the *Truth* in the *Object*, and that the *Truth* in the *Subject* is a conception conformable to theſe, or to the Truth of them whether in the uncreated or created Underſtanding.

So that the niceneſs of the point is this: Whether the Tranſcendental Truth of things exhibited in their *Objective Exiſtence* to the Theoretical Intellect of God conſiſts in their Conformity to that Intellect, or the Truth of that Intellect in its Conformity with the immutable natures and Relations or Reſpects of things exhibited in their *Objective Exiſtence*, which the Divine Intellect finds to be unalterably ſuch, not contrives them at its own pleaſure. This though it be no λογομαχία or ſtrife about mere words, yet it ſeems to be ſuch a conteſt, that there is no harm done whatſoever ſide carries the Cauſe, the two ſeeming ſides being but one and the ſame Intellect of God neceſſarily and immutably repreſenting to it ſelf the natures, Reſpects, and Aptitudes of all things ſuch as they appear in their *Objective Exiſtence*, and ſuch as they will prove whenever produced into act.

As for example, The Divine Underſtanding *quatenus exhibitive* of Idea's (which a Platoniſt would call νοῦς νοητὸς) does of its infinite

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pregnancy and fecundity neceſſarily exhibit certain and unalterable Idea's of ſuch and ſuch determinate things, as ſuppoſe of a Cylinder, a Globe and a Pyramid, which have a ſetled and unalterable nature, as alſo immutable properties, references and aptitudes immediately conſequential thereto, and not arbitrariouſly added unto them, which are thus neceſſarily extant in the Divine Intellect, as *exhibitive* of ſuch Idea's. So likewiſe a Fiſh, a Fowl, and a four-footed beaſt, an Ox, Bear, Horſe, or the like, they have a ſetled nature exhibited in their Idea's, and the properties and aptitudes immediately flowing therefrom. As alſo have all the Elements, Earth, Water and Air, determinate natures, with properties and aptitudes immediately iſſuing from them. Nor is a Whale fitted to fly in the Air, nor an Eagle to live under the Water, nor an Ox or Bear to do either, nor any of them to live in the Fire. But the Idea's of thoſe things which we call by thoſe names being unchangeable (for there are differences indeed of Idea's, but no changing of one Idea into another ſtate, but their natures are diſtinctly ſetled; and to add or take away any thing from an Idea, is not to make an alteration in the ſame Idea, but to conſtitute a new one; As *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere in his *Metaphyſicks* ſpeaks of Numbers, where he ſays, that the adding or taking away of an Unite quite varies the ſpecies. And therefore as every number,

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ſuppoſe, Binary, Quinary, Ternary, Denary, is ſuch a ſetled number and no other, and has ſuch properties in it ſelf, and references immediately accrewing to it, and aptitudes which no other number beſides it ſelf has; ſo it is with Idea's) the Idea's I ſay therefore of thoſe things which we call by thoſe names above-recited being unchangeable, the aptitudes and references immediately iſſuing from their nature repreſented in the Idea, muſt be alſo unalterable and neceſſary. Thus it is with *Mathematical* and *Phyſical* Idea's; and there is the ſame reaſon concerning ſuch Idea's as may be called *Moral*. Foraſmuch as they reſpect the rectitude of Will in whatever Mind, created or uncreated.

And thus, laſtly, it is with *Metaphyſical* Idea's, as for example; As the *Phyſical* Idea of *Body*, Matter or Subſtance *Material* contains in it immediately of its own nature or intimate ſpecifick Eſſence real *Diviſibility* or *Diſcerpibility*, *Impenetrability* and mere *Paſſivity* or Actuability, as the proper fruit of the Eſſential Difference and intimate Form thereof, unalterably and immutably as in its Idea in the Divine Intellect, ſo in any Body or Material Subſtance that does exiſt: So the Idea of a *Spirit*, or of a Subſtance *Immaterial*, the oppoſite Idea to the other, contains in it immediately of its own nature *Indiſcerpibility*, *Penetrability*, and *Self-Activity*, as the inſeparable

fruit

fruit of the eſſential difference or intimate form thereof unalterably and immutably, as in its Idea in the Divine Intellect, ſo in any Immaterial Subſtance properly ſo called that doth exiſt. So that as it is a contradiction in the *Idea* that it ſhould be the Idea of Subſtance *Immaterial*, and yet not include in it *Indiſcerpibility*, &c. ſo it is in the *being* really exiſtent, that it ſhould be Subſtance *Immaterial*, and yet not be *Indiſcerpible*, &c. For were it ſo, it would not anſwer to the Truth of its Idea, nor be what it pretendeth to be, and is indeed, an *exiſtent* Being *Indiſcerpible*; which exiſtent Being would not be Indiſcerpible, if any could diſcerp it.

And ſo likewiſe it is with the Idea of *Ens ſummè & abſolutè perfectum*, which is a ſetled determinate and immutable Idea in the Divine Intellect, whereby, were not God himſelf that *Ens ſummè & abſolutè perfectum*, he would diſcern there were ſomething better than Himſelf, and conſequently that he were not God. But he diſcerns Himſelf to be this *Ens ſummè & abſolutè perfectum*, and we cannot but diſcern that to ſuch a Being belongs *Spirituality*, which implies *Indiſcerpibility*, (and who but a mad man can imagine the Divine Eſſence diſcerpible into parts?) *Infinity* of *Eſſence*, or Eſſential *Omnipreſence*, *Self-Cauſality*, or *neceſſary Exiſtence* immediately of it ſelf or from it ſelf, reſulting from the abſolute and peculiar

peculiar perfection of its own nature, whereby we understand that nothing can exist *ab æterno* of it self but He. And lastly, *Omniscience* and *Omnipotence*, whereby it can do any thing that implies no contradiction to be done. Whence it necessarily follows, that all things were Created by Him, and that he were not God, or *Ens summè perfectum*, if it were not so: And that amongst other things he created *Spirits* (as sure as there are any Spirits in the world) *indiscerpible* as himself is, though of finite Essences and Metaphysical Amplitudes; and that it is no derogation to his *Omnipotence* that he cannot discerp a Spirit once created, it being a contradiction that he should: Nor therefore any argument that he cannot create a Spirit, because he would then puzzle his own Omnipotence to discerp it. For it would then follow, that he cannot create any thing, no not *Metaphysical Monads*, nor Matter, unless it be Physically divisible *in infinitum*; and God Himself could never divide it into parts Physically indivisible; whereby yet his Omnipotence would be puzzled: And if he can divide matter into *Physical Monads* no further divisible, there his Omnipotence is puzzled again; And by such sophistical Reasoning, God shall be able to create nothing, neither Matter nor Spirit, nor consequently be God, or *Ens summè & absolutè perfectum*, the Creator and Essentiator of all things.

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This is ſo Mathematically clear and true, that I wonder that Mr. *Rich. Baxter* ſhould not rather exult, (in his *Placid Collation*) at the diſcovery of ſo plain and uſeful a truth, than put himſelf, p.79. into an Hiſtrionical (as the Latin) or (as the Greek would expreſs it) Hypocritical fit of trembling, to amuze the populacy, as if the Doctor in his ſerious and ſolid reaſoning had verged towards ſomething hugely exorbitant or prophane. The ignorant fear where no fear is, but God is in the generation of the knowing and upright. It's plain, this Reaſoning brings not the exiſtence of God into any doubt, (For it is no repugnance to either his nature or exiſtence, not to be able to do what is a contradiction to be done) but it puts the *Indiſcerpibility* of Spirits (which is a Notion mainly uſeful) out of all doubt. And yet Mr. *Baxter* his phancie ſtalking upon wooden ſtilts, and getting more than a ſpit and a ſtride before his Reaſon, very magiſterially pronounces, *It's a thing ſo high, as required ſome ſhew of proof to intimate that God cannot be God if he be Almighty, and cannot conquer his own Omnipotency.* Anſ. This is an expreſſion ſo high and in the Clouds, that no ſenſe thereof is to be ſeen, unleſs this be it: That God cannot be God, unleſs he be not Almighty; as he would diſcover himſelf not to be, if he could not diſcerp a Spirit of a Metaphyſical amplitude when he has created it. But it plainly

appears

appears from what has been ſaid above, that this diſcerping of a Spirit, which is immediately and eſſentially of its own nature indiſcerpible, as well as a Phyſical Monad is, implying a contradiction, it is no derogation to the Almightineſs of God that he cannot do it; all Philoſophers and Theologers being agreed on that *Maxim*, That what implies a contradiction to be done, is no Object of Gods Almightineſs. Nor is he leſs Almighty for not being able to do it. So that the prick-ear'd Acuteneſs of that trim and ſmug ſaying, that ſeemed before to ſhoot up into the Sky, flags now like the flaccid lugs of the over-laden Animal old *Silenus* rid on when he had a Plot upon the Nymphs by Moon-ſhine. Pardon the tediouſneſs of the Periphraſis: For though the Poet was pleaſed to put old *Silenus* on the Aſs, yet I thought it not ſo civil to put the Aſs upon old Mr. *Baxter.*

But he proceeds, pag. 80. *Your words*, ſays he, *like an intended Reaſon, are* [For that cannot be God from whom all other things are not produced and created] to which he anſwers, (1.) *Relatively*, ſays he, (*as a God to us*) *it's true, though* quoad exiſtentiam Eſſentiæ, *he was God before the Creation.* But, I ſay, if he had not had the power of creating, he had been ſo defective a Being, that he had not been God. But he ſays (2.) *But did you take this for any ſhew of a proof? The ſenſe implyed is this* [*All things*

are

are not produced and created by God, if a ſpiritual ample ſubſtance be diviſible by his Omnipotencie that made it: Yea; Then he is not God. Negatur conſequentia. *Anſ.* Very ſcholaſtically diſputed! Would one think that Reverend Mr. *Baxter*, whom Dr. *More* for his Function and Grandevity ſake handles ſo reſpectfully, and forbears all ſuch Juvenilities as he had uſed toward *Eugenius Philalethes*, ſhould play the Doctor ſuch horſe-play, having been uſed ſo civilly by him before? What Buffoon or Antick Mime could have diſtorted their bodies more ill-favour'dly and ridiculouſly, than he has the Doctors ſolid and well-compoſed Argument? And then as if he had done it in pure innocency and ſimplicity, he adds a Quaker-like [Yea] thereunto. And after all, like a bold Scholaſtick Champion, or Polemick Divine, couragiouſly cries out, *Negatur conſequentia.* What a fardle of freaks is there here, and illiberal Artifices to hide the Doctors ſound Reaſoning in the 28th Section of his Anſwer to the *Pſychopyriſts' Letter*? Where having plainly proved that God *can* create an *Indiſcerpible* Being though of a large Metaphyſical amplitude, and that there is nothing objected againſt it, nor indeed can be, but that then he would ſeem to puzzle his own Omnipotency, which could not diſcerp ſuch a Being; the Doctor ſhews the vanity of that Objection in theſe very words: *The ſame*, ſays he,

may be said of the Metaphysical Monads (namely, that God cannot discerp them) *and at that rate he shall be allow'd to create nothing, no not so much as Matter* (which consists of Physical Monads) *nor himself indeed to be. For that cannot be God from whom all other things are not produced and created.* What reason can be more clear or more convincing, That God *can* create a Spirit in the proper sense thereof, which includes *Indiscerpibility*: there being no reason against it but what is false, it plainly implying that he can create nothing, and consequently that he cannot be God. Wherefore that Objection being thus clearly removed, God, as sure as himself is, can create a Spirit, penetrable and *indiscerpible*, as himself is, and is expresly acknowledged to be so by Mr. *Baxter* himself, pag. 51. And he *having created* Spirits or *Immaterial* Substances of an opposite Species to *Material*, which are *impenetrable and discerpible* of their immediate nature, how can these *Immaterial* substances be any other than *Penetrable* and *Indiscerpible*? Which is a very useful Dogma for assuring the souls personal subsistence after Death. And therefore it is a piece of grand Disingenuity in Mr. *Baxter*, to endeavour thus to slur and obscure so plain and edifying a Truth, by mere Antick Distortions of words and sense, by alterations and mutilations, and by a kind of sophistick Buffoonry. This is one specimen

of

of his *Diſingenuity* towards the Doctor, who in his *Anſwer* has been ſo civil to him. And now I have got into this *Digreſſion*, I ſhall not ſtick to exemplifie it in ſeveral others.

As ſecondly, pag. 4. in thoſe words: *And when I preſume moſt, I do but moſt loſe my ſelf, and miſuſe my underſtanding. Nothing is good for that which it was not made for. Our Underſtandings, as our Eyes, are made onely for things revealed. In many of your Books I take this for an exceſs.* So Mr. *Baxter*. Let me now interpoſe a word or two in the behalf of the Doctor. Is not this a plain piece of Diſingenuity againſt the Doctor, who has ſpent ſo great a part of his time in Philoſophie (which the mere *Letter* of the Scripture very rarely reveals any thing of) to reproach him for his having uſed his underſtanding ſo much about things not revealed in Scripture? Where ſhould he uſe his Underſtanding and Reaſon, if not in things unrevealed in Scripture; that is, in Philoſophical things? Things revealed in Scripture are Objects rather of Faith than of Science and Underſtanding. And what a Paradox is this, that our Underſtandings, as our Eyes, are made onely for things revealed? When our Eyes are ſhut, all the whole viſible world, by the cloſing of the *palpebræ* is vailed from us, but it is revealed to us again by the opening of our eyes; and ſo it is with the eye of the Underſtanding. If it be ſhut through

Pride, Prejudice, or Senſuality, the myſteries of Philoſophy are thereby vailed from it; but if by true vertue and unfeigned ſanctity of mind *that* eye be opened, the Myſteries of Philoſophy are the more clearly diſcovered to it, eſpecially if points be ſtudied with *ſingular induſtry*, which Mr. *Baxter* himſelf acknowledges of the Doctor, pag. 21. onely he would there pin upon his back an *Humble Ignoramus* in ſome things, which the Doctor, I dare ſay, will eaſily admit in many things, yea in moſt; and yet, I believe, this he will ſtand upon, that in thoſe things which he profeſſes to know, he will challenge all the world to diſprove if they can. And for probable Opinions, eſpecially if they be uſeleſs, which many Books are too much ſtuffed withal, he caſts them out as the lumber of the mind, and would willingly give them no room in his thoughts. Firmneſs and ſoundneſs of Life is much better than the multiplicitie of uncertain Conceits.

And laſtly, whereas Mr. *Baxter* ſpeaking of himſelf, ſays, *And when I preſume moſt, I do but moſt loſe my ſelf*; He has ſo bewildered and loſt himſelf in the multifarious, and moſtwhat needleſs points in Philoſophy or Scholaſtick Divinity, that if we can collect the meaſures of the Cauſe from the amplitude of the Effect, he muſt certainly have been *very preſumptuous*. He had better have ſet up his Staff

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in his *Saints everlaſting Reſt*, and ſuch other edifying and uſeful Books as thoſe, than to have ſet up for either a *Philoſopher* or *Polemick Divine*. But it is the infelicity of too many, that they are ignorant ——*Quid valeant humeri, quid ferre recuſent*, as the Poet ſpeaks, or as the *Pythagoreans*—— Οἷφ τῷ δυίμων χεῶνται. And ſo taking upon them a part in a Play which they are unfit for, they both neglect that which they are fit for, and miſcarry, by reaſon of their unfitneſs, in their acting that Part they have raſhly undertaken; as *Epictetus* ſomewhere judiciouſly obſerves.

But if that paſſage, *And when I preſume moſt, I do but moſt loſe my ſelf*, was intended by him as an oblique *Socratical* reproof to the Doctor; let him inſtance if he can, where the Doctor has preſumed above his ſtrength. He has medled but with a few things, and therefore he need not envie his ſucceſs therein, eſpecially they being of manifeſt uſe to the ſerious world, ſo many as God has fitted for the reception of them. Certainly there was ſome grand occaſion for ſo grave a preliminary monition as he has given the Doctor. You have it in the following Page, p. 5. *This premiſed*, ſays he, *I ſay, undoubtedly it is utterly unrevealed either as to any certainty or probability, That all Spirits are Souls, and actuate Matter.* See what Heat and Haſt, or ſome worſe Principle has engaged Mr. *Baxter* to do; to father a down-right

falſhood upon the Doctor, that he may thence take occaſion to beſtow a grave admonition on him, and ſo place himſelf on the higher ground. I am certain it is neither the Doctors opinion, That *all* Spirits are Souls, and actuate Matter, nor has he writ ſo any where. He onely ſays in his Preface to the Reader, *That all* created *Spirits are* ψυχαὶ [*Souls*] *in all probability, and actuate ſome matter.* And his expreſſion herein is both modeſt and true. For though it is not *certain* or neceſſary, yet it is *very probable.* For if there were of the higheſt Orders of the Angels that fell, it is very probable that they had corporeal Vehicles, without which it is hard to conceive they could run into diſorder. And our Saviour Chriſts Soul, which actuates a glorified ſpiritual Bodie, being ſet above all the Orders of Angels, it is likely that there is none of them is ſo refined above his Humane Nature, as to have no bodies at all. Not to add, that at the Reſurrection we become ἰσάγγελοι, though we have bodies then; which is a ſhrewd intimation that the Angels have ſo too, and that there are no *created* Spirits but have ſo.

Thirdly, Mr. *Baxter*, pag. 6. wrongfully blames the Doctor for being ſo defective in his ſtudies as not to have read over Dr. *Gliſſon De Vita Naturæ*; and ſays he has talk'd with diverſe high pretenders to Philoſophie, and askt their judgment of that Book, and found that none

of

of them underſtood it, but neglected it, as too hard for them; and yet contemned it. His words to Dr. *More* are theſe: *I marvel that when you have dealt with ſo many ſorts of Diſſenters, you meddle not with ſo ſubtile a piece as that of old Dr.* Gliſſons, *De Vita Naturæ.* He thinks the *ſubtilty* of the Book has deterred the Doctor from reading it, as ſomething above *his* Capacity, as alſo of *other* high Pretenders to Philoſophie.

This is a Book it ſeems calculated onely for the elevation of Mr. *Baxters* ſubtile and ſublime wit. And indeed by the benefit of reading this Book he is moſt dreadfully armed with the affrightful terms of *Quoddities* and *Quiddities*, of *Conceptus formalis* and *fundamentalis*, of *Conceptus adæquatus* and *inadæquatus*, and the like. In vertue of which *thwacking* expreſſions he has fancied himſelf able to play at *Scholaſtick* or *Philoſophick* Quarter-ſtaff with the moſt doughty and beſt appointed Wits that dare enter the Liſts with him; and as over-neglectful of his flock, like ſome conceited Shepherds, that think themſelves no ſmall fools at the uſe of the Staff or Cudgil-play, take Vagaries to Fairs or Wakes to give a ſpecimen of their skill; ſo he ever and anon makes his *Polemick* ſallies in Philoſophie or Divinity to entertain the Spectators, though very oft he is ſo rapt upon the knuckles, that he is forced to let fall his wooden Inſtrument,

and blow his fingers. Which is but a juſt Nemeſis upon him, and he would do well to interpret it as a ſeaſonable reproof from the great Paſtor of Souls, to whom we are all accountable.

But to return to his ſpeech to the Doctor; I will adventure to anſwer in his behalf, That I marvel that whenas Mr. *Baxter* has had the curioſity to read ſo many Writers, and ſome of them ſure but of ſmall concern, that he has not read that ſound and *ſolid* piece of Dr. *More*, viz. his *Epiſtola altera ad V. C.* with the *Scholia* thereon, where *Spinozius* is confuted. Which if he had read he might have ſeen *Volum. Philoſoph. Tom.* 1. pag. 604, 605, &c. that the Doctor has not onely read that *ſubtile* Piece of Doctor *Gliſſons*, but underſtands ſo throughly his *Hypotheſis*, that he has ſolidly and ſubſtantially confuted it. Which he did in a faithful regard to Religion. For that *Hypotheſis*, if it were true, were as ſafe, if not a ſafer Refuge for *Atheiſts*, than the mere Mechanick Philoſophie is: And therefore you may ſee there, how *Cuperus*, brought up amongſt the *Atheiſts* from his very childhood, does confeſs, how the *Atheiſts* now-a-daies explode the Mechanick Philoſophie as not being for their turn, and betake themſelves wholly to ſuch an Hypotheſis as Dr. *Gliſſons Vita Naturæ*. But, God be thanked, Dr. *H. More* in the fore-cited place has perfectly routed

that

that fond and foul Hypotheſis of Dr. *Gliſſon*, and I dare ſay is ſorry that ſo good and old a Knight *errant* in Theologie and Philoſophie as Mr. *Richard Baxter* ſeems to be, ſhould become benighted, as in a wood, at the Cloſe of his daies, in this moſt horrid dark Harbour and diſmal Receptacle or Randevouz of wretched *Atheiſts*. But I dare ſay for him, it is his ignorance, not choice, that has lodged him there.

The fourth *Diſingennity* of Mr. *Baxter* towards the Doctor is, in complaining of him as if he had wronged him by the Title of his *Anſwer* to his *Letter*, in calling it an *Anſwer* to a *Pſychopyriſt*, pag. 2. 82. As if he had aſſerted *that* materiality of Spirits which belongs to bodies, pag. 94. In complaining alſo of his inconſiſtency with himſelf, pag. 10. as if he one while ſaid that Mr. *Baxter* made Spirits to be Fire or *material*, and another while ſaid he made them not Fire or *material*. But to the firſt part of this Accuſation it may be anſwered, That if it is Mr. *Baxter* that is called the Learned *Pſychopyriſt*, how is the thing known to the world but by himſelf? It looks as if he were ambitious of the Title, and proud of the civil treating he has had at the hands of the Doctor, though he has but ill repai'd his civility in his Reply. And beſides this, there is no more harſhneſs in calling him *Pſychopyriſt*, than if he had called him *Pſycho-Hyliſt*, there being nothing abſurd in *Pſychopyriſm* but ſo

far

far forth as it includes *Pſycho-Hyliſm*, and makes the Soul *material*.

Which *Pſycho-Hyliſm* that Mr. *Baxter* does admit, it is made evident in the Doctors *Anſwer*, Sect. 16. And Mr. *Baxter* in his *Placid Collation* (as he miſ-calls it, for aſſuredly his mind was turbid when he wrote it) pag. 2. allows that Spirits may be called Fire *Analogicè* and *Eminenter*, and the Doctor in his Preface intimates that the ſenſe is to be no further ſtretched, than the *Pſychopyriſt* himſelf will allow.

But now that Mr. *Baxter* does aſſert *that* Materiality in created Spirits that belongs to bodies in the common ſenſe of all Philoſophers, appears Sect. 16. where his words are theſe: *But cuſtom having made MATERIA, but eſpecially CORPUS to ſignifie onely ſuch groſſer Subſtance as the three paſſive Elements are* (he means Earth, Water, Air) *I yield*, ſays he, *ſo to ſay, that Spirits are not Corporeal or Material.* Which plainly implies that Spirits are in no other ſenſe *Immaterial*, than *Fire* and *Æther* are, *viz.* than in this, that they are thinner matter.

And therefore to the laſt point it may be anſwered in the Doctors behalf, that he aſſuredly does nowhere ſay, That Mr. *Baxter* does not ſay that *Spirits* are *Material*, as Material is taken in the common ſenſe of all Philoſophers for what is *impenetrable* and *diſcerpible*.

pible. Which is *Materia Phyſica*, and in oppoſition to which, a Spirit is ſaid to be *Immaterial.* And which briefly and diſtinctly ſtates the Queſtion. Which if Mr. *Baxter* would have taken notice of, he might have ſaved himſelf the labour of a great deal of needleſs verboſity in his *Placid Collation*, where he does over-frequently, under the pretence of more diſtinctneſs, in the multitude of words obſcure knowledge.

Fifthly, Upon Sect. 10. pag. 21. where Mr. *Baxters* Queſtion is, *How a man may tell how that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one*, &c. To which the Doctor there anſwers: *If the meaning be of ſubſtantial Spirits, it has been already noted, that God acting in Nature does not make many ſubſtances out of one, the ſubſtance remaining ſtill entire; for then Generation would be Creation. And no ſober man believes that God aſſiſts any creature ſo in a natural courſe, as to enable it to create: And then I ſuppoſe that he that believes not this, is not bound to puzzle himſelf why God may not as well make many ſubſtances into one, as many out of one, whenas he holds he does not the latter*, &c. Theſe are the Doctors own words in that Section. In reply to which, Mr. *Baxter: But to my Queſtion*, ſaies he, *why God cannot make two of one, or one of two, you put me off with this lean Anſwer, that we be not bound to puzzle our ſelves about it. I think*, ſaies he, *that Anſwer might*

might ſerve to much of your Philoſophical diſputes. Here Mr. *Baxter* plainly deals very diſingenuouſly with the Doctor in perverting his words, which affirm onely, *That he that denies that God can make two ſubſtances of one in the ſenſe above-declared, need not puzzle himſelf how he may make one of thoſe two again.* Which is no *lean*, but *full* and appoſite Anſwer to the Queſtion there propounded.

And yet in this his *Placid Collation*, as if he were wroth, he gives ill language, and inſinuates, That much of the Doctors Philoſophical Diſputes are ſuch as are not worth a mans puzling himſelf about them; whenas it is well known to all that know him or his Writings, that he concerns himſelf in no Theories but ſuch as are weighty and uſeful, as this of the *Indiſcerpibility* of Spirits is, touching which he further ſlanders the Doctor, as if it were his *mere Aſſertion without any Proof.* As if Mr. *Baxter* had never read, or forgot the Doctors *Diſcourſe of the true Notion of a Spirit*, or what he has writ in the further *Defence* thereof. See Sect. 26, 28, 30, 31. Thus to ſay any thing in an angry mood, verily does not become the Title of a *Placid Collation.*

Sixthly, The Doctor in Sect. 11. of his *Defence of his Notion of a Spirit*, writes thus: I deſire you to conſider the nature of Light throughly, and you ſhall find it nothing but a certain

certain motion of a *Medium*, whoſe parts or particles are ſo or ſo qualified, ſome ſuch way as *Carteſianiſm* drives at. To this Mr. *Baxter* replies againſt the Doctor, pag. 59. *Really*, ſaies he, *when I read how far you have eſcaped the deluſions of* Carteſianiſm, *I am ſorry you yet ſtick in ſo groſs a part of it as this is; when he that knoweth no more than motion in the nature of Fire, which is the Active Principle by which Mental and Senſitive Nature operateth on Man and Brutes and Vegetables, and all the Paſſive Elements; and all the viſible actions in this lower world are performed, what can that mans Philoſophie be worth? I therefore return your Counſel, ſtudy more throughly the nature of Ethereal Fire.*

Satis pro imperio! very *Magiſterially* ſpoken! and in ſuch an igneous Rapture, that it is not continuedly ſenſe. Does *Mental* and *Senſitive* Nature act on Brutes and Vegetables and all the Paſſive Elements? But to let go that: Is all the Doctors Philoſophie worth nothing if he hold with *Des Cartes* touching the Phænomenon of Light as to the *Material* part thereof? It is the ignorance of Mr. *Baxter*, that he rejects *all* in *Des Cartes*, and Judiciouſneſs in the Doctor, that he retains *ſome* things, and ſupplies where his Philoſophie is deficient. He names here onely the *Mechanical* Cauſe of Light, *viz. Motion*, and duly modified *Particles*. But in his *Enchiridium* he intimates an higher

higher principle than either Fire or Æther, or any thing that is *Material*, be it as fine and pure as you please to fancie it. See his *Enchirid. Metaphys.* Cap. 19. where he shews plainly, that Light would not be Light, were there not a *Spiritus Mundanus*, or *Spirit of Nature*, which pervades the whole Universe; Mr. *Baxters* ignorance whereof has cast him into so deep a dotage upon *Fire* and *Light*, and fine discerpible *Corporeities*, which he would by his Magisterial Prerogative dubb *Spirits*, when to nothing that Title is due, but what is *Penetrable* and *Indiscerpible* by reason of the immediate Oneness of its Essence, even as God the Father and Creator of all Spirits is one Indiscerpible Substance or Being. And therefore I would advise Mr. *Baxter* to studie more throughly the true nature of a Spirit, and to let go these *Ignes Fatui* that would seduce him into thick mists and bogs. For that universal *Spirit of Nature* is most certainly the Mover of the matter of the world, and the Modifier thereof, and thence exhibits to us not onely the Phænomena of *Light* and *Fire*, but of Earth and Water, and frames all Vegetables into shape and growth; and Fire of it self is but a dead Instrument in its hand, as all is in the hand of God, who is πῦρ πῦρ and ζωὴ ζωή, as *Synesius*, if I well remember, somewhere calls him in his Hymns.

Seventhly, That is also less ingenuously done

of

of Mr. *Baxter*, when the Doctor ſo friendly and faithfully puts him in a way of undeceiving himſelf, Sect. 17. touching the Doctrine of Atoms, that he puts it off ſo ſlightly. And ſo Sect. 18. where he earneſtly exhorts him to ſtudie the nature of Water, as Mr. *Baxter* does others to ſtudie the nature of Fire; he, as if he had been bitten, and thence taken with that diſeaſe the Phyſicians call ὑδροφοβία, and which ſignifies the *fear of Water*, has ſlunk away and quite neglected the Doctors friendly monition; and is ſo ſmall a Proficient in *Hydroſtaticks*, that pag. 68. he underſtands not what greater wonder there is in the riſing of the Dr.'s Rundle, than in the riſing of a piece of Timber from the bottom of the Sea. Which is a ſign he never read the 13th Chapter of the Dr.'s *Enchiridion Metaphyſicum*, much leſs the Scholia thereon. For if he had, he would diſcern the difference, and the vaſt uſefulneſs of the one above that of the other to prove a *Principium Hylarchicum* diſtinct from the matter of the Univerſe, againſt all evaſions and tergiverſations whatſoever. But theſe things cannot be inſiſted on here.

Eighthly, Mr. *Baxter*, pag. 76. charges the Doctor with ſuch a ſtrange Paradox as to half of it, that I cannot imagine from whence he ſhould fetch it. *You ſeem*, ſays he, *to make all ſubſtance Atoms, Spiritual Atoms and Material Atoms.* The latter part of the charge the Doctor I doubt not but will acknowledge to

be

be true: But may eaſily prove out of Mr. *Baxter*, pag. 65. that he muſt hold ſo too. For his words there are theſe: *That God is able to divide all matter into Atoms or indiviſible parts I doubt not.* And can they be Phyſically divided into parts of which they don't conſiſt? But Mr. *Baxter* by the ſame reaſon making Spirits diviſible by God, though not by any Creature, makes them conſiſt of Spiritual Atoms, for they cannot but conſiſt of ſuch parts as they are diviſible into. And if they be diviſible by God into larger ſhreds onely but not into Atoms, then every created Spirit, eſpecially particular ones, are ſo many ſubtil living Puppets made up of ſpiritual rags and clouts. But if God can divide them neither into ſpiritual *Atoms* nor *larger* ſpiritual *parcels*, he can't divide them at all. And ſo according to what the Doctor contends for, they will be, as they ought to be, abſolutely indiſcerpible.

I omit here to take notice of another abſurdity of Mr. *Baxters*, That though the ſubſtance of a Spirit he will have to be diviſible, yet he will have the form indiviſible, pag. 50, 99. and yet both parts to be Spirit ſtill; which implies a contradiction. For then one of the parts will be without the form of a Spirit, and conſequently be no Spirit, and yet be a Spirit according to Mr. *Baxter*, who makes Spirits diviſible into parts of the ſame denomination, as when water is divided into two parts, each part is ſtill water, pag. 53.

Ninth-

Ninthly. That which occurrs pag. 48. is a groſs Diſingenuity againſt the Doctor, where Mr. *Baxter* ſays, *And when you make all Spirits to be Souls and to animate ſome matter, you ſeem to make God to be but* Anima Mundi. How unfair and harſh is this for you Mr. *Baxter*, who has been ſo tenderly and civilly handled by the Doctor in his Anſwer to your Letter, he conſtantly hiding or mollifying any thing that occurred therein that might overmuch expoſe you, to repreſent him as a favourer of ſo groſs a Paradox as this, That there is no God but an *Anima Mundi*, which is the Poſition of the *Vaninian Atheiſts*, which himſelf has expreſly confuted in his *Myſtery of Godlineſs*, and declared againſt lately in his Advertiſements on *Joſ. Glanvils* Letter to himſelf, in the ſecond Edition of *Saduciſmus Triumphatus*? This looks like the breaking out of unchriſtian rancour, in a *Reply* which bears the Specious Title of a *Placid Collation*. Which is yet exceedingly more aggravable, for that this odious Collection is not made from any words of the Doctor, but from a fiction of Mr. *Baxter*. For the Doctor has nowhere Written, nor ever thought that *all* Spirits, but only all *Created* Spirits, might probably be Souls, that is to ſay, actuate ſome matter or other. And thoſe words are in his Preface to his Anſwer to the *Letter* of the *Pſychopyriſt*, as I noted before. I might reckon up ſeveral other

Disingenuities of Mr. *Baxters* towards the Doctor in this his *Placid Collation*; but I have enumerated enough already to weary the Reader, and I must remember I am but in a *Digression*.

I shall onely name one *Disingenuity* more, which was antecedent to them all, and gave occasion both to Mr. *Baxters* Letter, and to the Doctors *Answer* thereto, and to this *Reply* of Mr. *Baxter*. And that was, That Mr. *Baxter* in his *Methodus Theologiæ* (as he has done also in a little Pamphlet touching Judge *Hales*) without giving any reasons, which is the worst way of traducing any man or his sentiments, sleighted and slurred those two essential Attributes of a Spirit, *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility*, which for their certain Truth and usefulness the Doctor thought fit to communicate to the World.

But forasmuch as Mr. *Baxter* has in this his *Reply* produced his Reasons against them, I doubt not but the Doctor will accept it for an amends. And I, as I must disallow of the Disingenuity of the omission before, yet to be just to Mr. *Baxter*, I must commend his discretion and judgment in being willing to omit them; they appearing to me now they are produced, so weak and invalid. But such as they are, I shall gather them out of his *Reply*, and bring them into view.

First then, pag. 13. It is alledged, That nothing hath two forms univocally so called.

But

But if *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie* be added to the *Virtus Vitalis*, to the *Vital Power* of a Spirit, it will have two forms. Therefore *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie* are to be omitted in the notion of a Spirit. See alſo *p.* 22.

Secondly, pag. 14. *Penetrable* and *Indiſcerpible* can be no otherwiſe a form to Spirits, than *Impenetrable* and *Diſcerpible* are a form to Matter. But *Impenetrable* is onely a modal *Conceptus* of Matter, and *Diſcerpible* a Relative notion thereof, and neither one nor both contrary to *Virtus vitalis* in a Spirit.

Thirdly, pag. 14. He ſees no reaſon why *Quantity*, and the *Trina Dimenſio*, may not as well be part of the form of Matter as *Diſcerpibilitie* and *Impenetrabilitie*.

Fourthly, pag. 15, 16. Nothing is to be known without the mediation of Senſe, except the immediate ſenſation itſelf, and the acts of intellection and volition or nolition, and what the Intellect inferreth of *the like*, by the perception of theſe. Wherefore as to the modification of the ſubſtance of Spirits which is contrary to *Impenetrabilitie* and *Diviſibilitie*, I may grope, ſays he, but I cannot know it poſitively for want of ſenſation.

Fifthly, pag. 16, 17. If *Indiſcerpibilitie* be the eſſential character of a Spirit, then an Atom of matter is a Spirit, it being acknowledged to be *Indiſcerpible*. Wherefore *Indiſcerpibilitie* is a falſe character of a Spirit.

Sixthly, pag. 17, 18. [Penetrable] whether actively or paſſively underſtood, can be no proper Character of a Spirit, foraſmuch as Matter can penetrate a Spirit, as well as a Spirit Matter, it poſſeſſing the ſame place. See *pag.* 23.

Seventhly, pag. 40, 41. *Immaterialitie*, ſays he, *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie*, in your own judgment I think are none of them proper to Spirit. For they are common to diverſe *Accidents* in your account, *viz.* to Light, Heat, Cold. And again in his own words,

Eighthly, pag. 77. If your *Penetrabilitie*, ſays he, imply not that all the ſingular Spirits can contract themſelves into a *Punctum*, yea that all the Spirits of the world may be ſo contracted, I find it not yet ſufficiently explained. See alſo *pag.* 52, 78, 89, 90.

Ninthly, pag. 50. Seeing, ſays he, you aſcribe Amplitude, Quantitie, and Dimenſions and Logical Materialitie to the Subſtantialitie of Spirits, I ſee not but that you make them Intellectually diviſible, that is, that one may think of one part as here, and another there. And if ſo, though man cannot ſeparate and divide them, if it be no contradiction, God can.

Tenthly, and laſtly, pag. 90. The putting of *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility* into the notion of a Spirit, is needleſs, and *hazardous*, it being ſufficient to hold that God hath made Spirits of no kind of parts but what do Naturally abhor

hor Separation, and ſo are inſeparable unleſs God will ſeparate them, and ſo there is no fear of loſing our Perſonality in the other State. But *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility* being hard and doubtful words, they are better left out, leſt they tempt all to believe that the very Being of Spirits is as doubtful as thoſe words are.

Thus have I faithfully though briefly brought into view all Mr. *Baxters* Arguments againſt the *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility* of Spirits, which I ſhall anſwer in order as they have been recited.

To the firſt therefore I ſay, that the Doctors Definition of a Spirit, which is [A Subſtance immaterial intrinſecally indued with life and a faculty of motion] where *Subſtance* is the *Genus*, and the reſt of the terms comprize the *Differentia* (which Mr. *Baxter* calls *Conceptus formalis* and *Forma*) I ſay, that this *Difference* or *Form* though it conſiſt of many terms, yet theſe terms are not *Heterogeneal*, as he would inſinuate, pag. 22. but *Congenerous*, and one in order to another, and eſſentially and inſeparably united in that *one* ſubſtance which is rightly and properly called *Spirit*, and in vertue of that one ſubſtance, though their Notions and Operations differ, they are really *one* inſeparable ſpecifick *Difference* or *Form*, as much as Mr. *Baxters Virtus vitalis una-trina* is; that is to ſay, they are

ſpecifick knowable terms, *ſuccedaneous* to the true *intimate ſpecifick Form* that is utterly unknowable; and therefore I ſay, in this ſenſe theſe knowable terms are one inſeparable ſpecifick Difference or Form whereby Spirit is diſtinguiſhed from Bodie or *Matter* in a Phyſical acception. Which the Univerſality of Philoſophers hold to conſiſt in *Impenetrability*, and *Diſcerpibilitie*, and *Self-inactivitie*. Which if Mr. *Baxter* would have been pleaſed to take notice of, *viz.* that a Spirit is ſaid to be a Subſtance *Immaterial* in oppoſition to Matter *Phyſical*, he might have ſaved himſelf the labour of a deal of tedious trifling in explication of words to no purpoſe.

But to ſhew that this Pretence of more Forms than one in one Subſtance is but a Cavil, I will offer really the ſame Definition in a more ſuccinct way, and more to Mr. *Baxters* tooth, and ſay, As *Corpus* is *Subſtantia Materialis* (where *Materialis* is the ſpecifick Difference of *Corpus* comprized in one term:) ſo *Spiritus* is *Subſtantia Immaterialis* (where *Immaterialis* the ſpecifick Difference of *Spiritus* is likewiſe comprized in one term, to pleaſe the humour of Mr. *Baxter*.) But now as under that one term [Materialis] are comprized *Impenetrabilitie*, *Diſcerpibilitie*, and *Self-Inactivity*; ſo alſo under that one term [Immaterialis] are comprized, as under one head, *Penetrability*, *Indiſcerpibility*, and *Intrinſecal life* and *motion*, that

that is, an essential facultie of life and motion, which in one word may be called *Self-Activity*. Whence *Penetrability*, *Indiscerpibility*, and *Self-Activity* are as much one Form of a Spirit, as Mr. *Baxters Vita*, *Perceptio*, and *Appetitus*, is one Form thereof. For though in both places they are three distinct notions, at least as Mr. *Baxter* would have it, yet they are the essential and inseparable Attributes of one substance, and the immediate fruit and result of the *Specifick nature* thereof. They are inseparably one in their Source and Subject.

And this I think is more than enough to take off this first little Cavil of Mr. *Baxters* against the Doctors including *Penetrability* and *Inseparability* in the Form or Specifick difference of a Spirit. For all that same is to be called *Form*, by which a thing is that which it is, as far as our Cognitive faculties will reach, and by which it is essentially distinguished from other things. And if it were not for *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiscerpibilitie*, *Spirit* would be confounded with *Body* and *Matter*. And Body or Physical Matter might be *Self-Active*, *Sentient*, and *Intelligent*.

To the Second I answer, That whosoever searches things to the bottom, he will find this a sound Principle in Philosophie, That there is nothing in the whole Universe but what is either *Substantia* or *Modus*. And when a Mode or several Modes put together are im-

immediately and eſſentially inſeparable from a Subſtance, they are lookt upon as the *Form*, or the onely knowable *Specifick difference* of that Subſtance. So that *Impenetrability* and *Diſcerpibility*, which are immediately eſſential to, and inſeparable from Body or Matter, and Self-Inactivitie, (as *Irrational* is made the ſpecifick difference of a Brute) may be added alſo: Theſe, I ſay, are as truly the Form or Specifick difference of Body or Matter, as any thing knowable is of any thing in the world. And *Self-Inactivity* at leaſt, is contrary to the *Virtus vitalis* of a *Spirit*, though *Impenetrability* and *Diſcerpibility* were not. So that according to this œconomy, you ſee how plainly and exquiſitely *Body* and *Spirit* are made oppoſite *Species* one to another. And 'tis theſe Modal differences of Subſtances which we only know, but the *Specifick* Subſtance of any thing is utterly unknown to us, however Mr. *Baxter* is pleaſed to ſwagger to the contrarie, p.44,62. Where he ſeems to miſ-underſtand the Doctor, as if by *Eſſence* he did not underſtand *Subſtance*, as both οὐσία and *Eſſentia* uſually ſignifie (eſpecially with the Ancients) but any Being at large.

But of *Subſtance* it is moſt true, we know it onely by its eſſential *Modes*, but the *Modes* are not the *Subſtance* it ſelf of which they are Modes; otherwiſe the Subſtance would want Modes, or every Subſtance would be more ſubſtances than one. And Mr. *Baxter* him-

ſelf

ſelf ſaith, pag. 62. *To know an eſſential Attribute, and to know* ipſam eſſentiam ſcientiâ inadequatâ, *is all one.* Which inadequate or partial knowledge, ſay I, is this, the knowing of the Eſſential Mode of the Subſtance, and not knowing the Subſtance it ſelf; Otherwiſe if both the Eſſential *Modes* were known, and alſo the *Specifick Subſtance* to which the Modes belong (more than that thoſe Modes belong to that Subſtance) the knowledge would be full and adequate, and ſtretcht through the whole Object. So that Mr. *Baxters Scientia inadæquata*, and the Doctors denying the bare Subſtance it ſelf to be known, may very well conſiſt together, and be judged a mere ἐπιχείρησις. Which is an exerciſe more grateful it's likely to Mr. *Baxter*, than to the Doctor.

To the third I ſay, Any one that conſiders may find a neceſſarie reaſon why *Quantitie* or *Trina Dimenſio* ſhould be left out in the Form of *Body* or *Matter*, eſpecially why the Doctor ſhould leave it out, becauſe he does profeſſedly hold, That whatever is, has *Metaphyſical* Quantitie or Metaphyſical *Trina Dimenſio*; Which no man can denie that holds God is *Eſſentially* preſent every-where. And no man, I think, that does not dote can denie that. Wherefore allowing Matter to be *Subſtance*; in that *Generical* nature, *Trina Dimenſio* is comprized, and need not be again repeated in the *Form*. But when in the *Forma*

or

or *Differentia*, Diſcerpible and Impenetrable is added, this is that which makes the *Trina Dimenſio* (included in the *Genus*, *Subſtantia*) of a *Corporeal* kind, and does conſtitute that *Species* of things, which we call *Corpora*. This is ſo plain a buſineſs, that we need inſiſt no longer upon it.

Now to the fourth, I anſwer briefly, That from what knowledge we have by the mediation of the *Senſes* and inference of the *Intellect*, we arrive not onely to the knowledge of *like things*, but of *unlike*, or rather *contrary*: As in this very example, we being competently well inſtructed, indeed aſſured by our Senſes, that there is ſuch a kind of thing as Body, whoſe nature is to be *Impenetrable* and *Diſcerpible*, and our Reaſon certainly informing us, as was noted even now, that whatever is, has a kind of Amplitude more or leſs, or elſe it would be nothing; hence we are confirmed, that not *Extenſion* or *Trina Dimenſio*, but *Impenetrabilitie* and *Diſcerpibilitie* is the determinate and adequate nature of what we call *Body*; and if there be any oppoſite ſpecies to *Body*, our Reaſon tells us it muſt have oppoſite Modes or Attributes, which are *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility*. This is a plain truth not to be groped after with our fingers in the dark, but clearly to be diſcerned by the eye of our underſtanding in the light of Reaſon. And thus we ſee (and many examples more we might accumulate) That by the help of our

Senſes and *Inference* of our *Underſtanding*, we are able to conclude not onely concerning *like things*, but their *contraries* or *oppoſites*. I muſt confeſs I look upon this allegation of Mr. *Baxter* as very weak and faint.

And as for his fifth, I do a little marvel that ſo grave and grandævous a perſon as he ſhould pleaſe himſelf in ſuch little flirts of Wit and Sophiſtry as this of the *Indiſcerpibility* of an *Atom* or *Phyſical Monad*. As if *Indiſcerpibility* could be none of the eſſential or ſpecifical Modes or Attributes of a Spirit, becauſe a *Phyſical Monad* or *Atom* is *Indiſcerpible* alſo, which is no Spirit. But thoſe very *Indiſcerpibilities* are *Specifically* different. For that of a *Spirit* is an *Indiſcerpibility* that ariſes from the poſitive perfection and *Oneneſs* of the Eſſence, be it never ſo *ample*; that of an *Atom* or *Phyſical Monad*, from imperfection and privativeneſs, from the mere *littleneſs* or ſmalneſs thereof, ſo ſmall that it is impoſſible to be ſmaller, and thence onely is Indiſcerpible.

The ſixth alſo is a pretty juvenile Ferk of Wit for a grave ancient Divine to uſe, That *Penetrability* can be no proper Character of a *Spirit*, becauſe Matter can penetrate Spirit as well as Spirit Matter, they both poſſeſſing the ſame ſpace. Suppoſe the bodie A. of the ſame amplitude with the bodie B. and thruſt the bodie A. againſt the bodie B. the bodie A. will not nor can penetrate into the ſame ſpace that

that the bodie B. actually occupies. But ſuppoſe the bodie A. a Spirit of that amplitude, and according to its nature piercing into the ſame ſpace which the bodie B. occupies, how plain is it that that active piercing into the ſame ſpace that the bodie B. occupies, is to be attributed to the *Spirit* A. & not to the bodie B. For the *bodie* A. could not get in. Theſe are prettie forc'd diſtortions of Wit, but no ſolid methods of due Reaſon. And beſides, it is to be noted, that the main Character of a *Spirit* is, as to *Penetrability*, that *Spirit* can penetrate *Spirit*, but not *Matter Matter*.

And now the Seventh is as ſlight as the Fifth. Diverſe Accidents, ſaith he, penetrate their Subjects, as Heat, Cold, *&c.* Therefore *Penetrabilitie* is no proper Character of a Spirit. But what a vaſt difference is there here! The one pierce the matter, (or rather are in the matter merely as continued Modes thereof) the other enters into the matter as a diſtinct Subſtance therefrom. Penetration therefore is here underſtood in this Character of a Spirit, of *Penetratio Subſtantialis*, when a ſubſtance penetrates ſubſtance, as a Spirit does Spirit and matter, which Matter cannot do. This is a certain Character of a Spirit. And his inſtancing in Light as Indiſcerpible, is as little to the purpoſe. For the ſubſtance of Light, *viz.* the *Materia ſubtiliſſima* and *Globuli*, are diſcerpible. And the motion of them is but a *Modus*, but the point

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in hand is Indiſcerpibilitie of Subſtance.

To the Eighth I Anſwer, That Mr. *Baxter* here is hugely unreaſonable in his demands, as if *Penetrabilitie* of Spirits were not ſufficiently explained, unleſs it can be made out, that all the Spirits in the world, Univerſal and particular, may be contracted into one *Punctum*: But this is a Theme that he *loves* to enlarge upon, and to declaim on very Tragically, as *pag.* 52. If Spirits have parts which may be extended and contracted, you will hardly ſo eaſily prove as ſay, that God cannot divide them. And when in your Writings ſhall I find ſatisfaction into how much ſpace one Spirit may be extended, and into how little it may be contracted, and whether the whole Spirit of the World may be contracted into a Nut-ſhell or a Box, and the Spirit of a Flea may be extended to the Convex of all the world? And again, *pag.* 78. You never tell into how little parts onely it may be contracted; And if you put any limits, I will ſuppoſe that one Spirit hath contracted itſelf into the leaſt compaſs poſſible; and then I ask, Cannot another and another Spirit be in the ſame compaſs by their Penetration? If not; Spirits may have a contracted Spiſſitude which is not Penetrable, and Spirits cannot penetrate contracted Spirits, but onely dilated ones. If yea; then *quæro*, whether all created Spirits may not be ſo contracted. And I ſhould hope that the Definition

of

of a Spirit excludeth not God, and yet that you do not think that his Essence may be contracted and dilated. O that we knew how little we know!

This grave moral *Epiphonema* with a sorrowful shaking of the Head is not in good truth much misbecoming the sly insinuating cunning of Mr. *Richard Baxter*, who here makes a shew, speaking in the first person [We] of lamenting and bewailing the ignorance of his own ignorance, but friendly hooks in, by expressing himself in the plural number, the Doctor also into the same condemnation. *Solamen miseris*— as if He neither did understand his own ignorance in the things he Writes of, but will be strangely surprised at the hard Riddles Mr. *Baxter* has propounded, as if no *Oedipus* were able to solve them. And I believe the Doctor if he be called to an account will freely confess of himself, That in the things he positively pronounces of, so far as he pronounces, that he is indeed altogether *ignorant* of any *ignorance* of *his own* therein; But that this is by reason that he according to the cautiousness of his Genius does not adventure further than he clearly sees ground, and the notion appears useful for the Publick. As it is indeed useful to understand that *Spirits* can both *Penetrate* matter and Penetrate one another, else God could not be *Essentially* present in all the parts of the *Corporeal* Universe, nor the Spirits of Men and Angels

gels be in God. Both which notwithſtanding are moſt certainly true, to ſay nothing of the *Spirit of Nature*, which particular Spirits alſo Penetrate, and are Penetrated by it.

But now for the *Contraction* and *Dilatation* of Spirits, that is not a propertie of Spirits in general as the other are, but of *particular created* Spirits, as the Doctor has declared in his Treatiſe of the *Immortalitie of the Soul*. So that that hard Queſtion is eaſily anſwered concerning *Gods* contracting and dilating himſelf; That he does neither, he being no *created* Spirit, and being more abſolutely perfect than that any ſuch properties ſhould be competible to him. And it is reaſonable to conceive that there is little actually of that propertie in the *Spirit of Nature*, it being no *particular* Spirit, though *created*, but an Univerſal one, and having no need thereof. For the corporeal world did not grow from a ſmall *Embryo* into that vaſt amplitude it is now of, but was produced of the ſame largeneſs it now has, though there was a ſucceſſive delineation and orderly poliſhing and perfecting the vaſt diſtended parts thereof. And to ſpeak compendiouſly and at once, That God that has Created all things *in number, weight & meaſure*, has given ſuch meaſures of *Spiritual Eſſence* and of the facultie of *contracting* and *dilating* the ſame, as alſo of Spiritual *Subtilty* of ſubſtance, as ſerves the ends of his Wiſdom and Goodneſs in creating ſuch a ſpecies of Spirit.

rit. So that it is fond, unskilful, and ridiculous, to ask if the whole Spirit of the world can be contracted into a Nut-ſhell, and the Spirit of a Flea extended to the Convex of the Univerſe. They that talk at this rate err, as Aliens from the Wiſdome of God, and ignorant of the Laws of Nature, and indeed of the voice of Scripture itſelf. Why ſhould God make the Spirit of a Flea, which was intended for the conſtituting of ſuch a ſmall Animal, large enough to fill the whole world? Or what need of ſuch a contraction in the *Spirit of Nature* or *Plaſtick Soul* of the corporeal Univerſe, that it may be contrived into a Nut-ſhell?

That it has ſuch *Spiritual ſubtiltie* as that *particular* Spirits may contract themſelves in it ſo cloſe together, as to be commenſurate to the firſt Inchoations of a *Fœtus*, which is but very ſmall, ſtands to good reaſon, and Effects prove it to be ſo. As alſo this ſmalneſs of a *Fœtus* or *Embryo* that *particular* Spirits are ſo far contracted at firſt, and expand themſelves leiſurely afterwards with the growth of the bodie which they regulate. But into how much leſſer ſpace they can or do contract themſelves at any time, is needleſs to know or enquire. And there is no Repugnancie at all, but the *Spirit of Nature* might be contracted to the like *Eſſential Spiſſitude* that ſome *particular* Spirits are; but there is no reaſon to conceit that it ever was or ever will be ſo contracted, while the World ſtands.

Nor

Nor lastly is there any Inconvenience in putting indefinite limits of *Contraction* in a Spirit, and to allow that after such a measure of Contraction, though we cannot say just what that is, it naturally contracts no further, nor does another so contracted naturally penetrate this thus contracted Spirit. For as the usefulness of that measure of *Self-Penetrability* and *Contraction* is plain, so it is as plain, that the admitting of it is no incongruitie nor incommoditie to the Universe, nor any confusion to the *Specifick* modes of *Spirit* and *Bodie*. For these two Spirits, suppose, contracted to the utmost of their natural limits, may naturally avoid the entring one another, not by a dead ἀντιτυπία as in Bodies or Matter, but by a vital Saturitie, or natural Uneasiness in so doing. Besides that, though at such a contracted pitch they are naturally *impenetrable* to one another, yet they demonstrate still their *Spirituality*, by *Self-Penetration*, haply a thousand and a thousand times repeated. And though by a Law of life (not by a dead ἀντιτυπία), they are kept from penetrating one another, yet they both in the mean time necessarily penetrate Matter, as undergoing the diverse measures of *essential Spissitude* in the same. So that by the increase of that *essential Spissitude*, they may approach near to a kind of *Hylopathick* disposition of *Impenetrability*, and thence, by the Matter of the Universe (out of which they

never are) be curb'd from contracting themſelves any further, than to ſuch a degree; and I noted at firſt, that *ſpiritual Subtilty*, as well as *Amplitude*, is given in meaſure to created Spirits. So that *Penetrabilitie* is ſtill a ſteadie Character of a Spiritual Eſſence or Subſtance, to the utmoſt ſenſe thereof. And to argue againſt *Impenetrability* its being the propertie of *Matter* from this kind of Impenetrability of *contracted Spirits*, is like that quibbling Sophiſtrie againſt *Indiſcerpibility* being the propertie of a *Spirit*, becauſe a *Phyſical Monad* is alſo *indiſcerpible*.

The ninth Objection is againſt the *Indiſcerpibility* of Spirits, and would infer, that becauſe the Doctor makes them intellectually diviſible, therefore by Divine Power, *if it imply no contradiction*, a Spirit is Diſcerpible into Phyſical parts. But this is ſo fully ſatisfied already by the Doctor in his *Diſcourſe of the true Notion of a Spirit*, and its *Defence*, to ſay nothing of what I have ſaid already above to prove it *does imply a contradiction*, that I will let it go, and proceed.

To the tenth and laſt Allegation, which pretends, That theſe two terms *Penetrable* and *Indiſcerpible* are *needleſs* and *hazardous* in the Notion of a Spirit. But how *uſeful* or *needful Penetrability* is, is manifeſt from what we have ſaid to the eighth Objection. And the needfulneſs of *Indiſcerpibility* is alſo ſufficiently

ently ſhewn by the Doctor in his *Defence of the true Notion of a Spirit*, Sect. 30. But now for the *Hazardouſneſs* of theſe terms, as if they were ſo hard, that it would diſcourage men from the admitting of the Exiſtence of Spirits; It appears from what has been ſaid to the eighth Objection, That *Penetrability* is not onely intelligible and admittable, but neceſſarily to be admitted, in the Notion of a Spirit, as ſure as God is a Spirit, and that there are Spirits of men and Angels, and that the Souls of men are not made of Shreds, but actuate their whole grown bodie, though at firſt they were contracted into the compaſs of a very ſmall *Fœtus*. And that there is no Repugnancie that an Eſſence may be ample, and yet indiſcerpible, Mr. *Baxter* himſelf muſt allow, who, pag. 51. plainly declares, *That it is the vileſt contradiction to ſay that God is capable of diviſion.* So that I wonder that he will call [Penetrable] and [Indiſcerpible] *hard* and *doubtful* words, and ſuch as might ſtumble mens belief of the Exiſtence of Spirits, when they are terms ſo *plain* and *neceſſary*. Nor can that *Unitie* that belongs to a Spirit be conceived or underſtood without them, eſpecially without *Indiſcerpibilitie*. And indeed if we do not allow *Penetrability*, the Soul of a man will be far from being *one*, but a thing *diſcontinued*, and ſcatter'd in the pores of his corporeal conſiſtencie.

We will conclude with Mr. *Baxters* Conceit of the *Indiviſibleneſs* of a Spirit, and ſee how that will corroborate mens faith of their Exiſtence, and put all out of *hazard*. Various Elements, ſaith he, pag. 50. vary in *Diviſibility*; *Earth* is moſt diviſible; *Water* more hardly, the parts more inclining to the cloſeſt contact; *Air* yet more hardly; and in *Fire*, no doubt the *Diſcerpibility* is yet harder: And if God have made a Creature ſo ſtongly inclined to the unitie of all the parts, that no Creature can ſeparate them but God onely, as if a Soul were ſuch, it is plain that ſuch a Being need not fear a diſſolution by Separation of parts. *Anſ.* This is well ſaid for an heedleſs and credulous multitude; but this is not to Philoſophize, but to tell us that God works a perpetual Miracle in holding the ſmall tenuious parts of the Soul together, more pure and fine than thoſe of *Fire* or *Æther*; but here is no natural cauſe from the thing it ſelf offered, unleſs it be, that in every Subſtance, or rather Matter, the parts according to the tenuitie and puritie of the Subſtance, incline to a cloſer Contact and inſeparable Union one with another; which is a conceit repugnant to experience, and eaſily confuted by that ordinarie accident of a Spinner hanging by its weak thread from the brim of ones Hat; which feeble line yet is of force enough to divide the Air, and for that very reaſon, becauſe it conſiſts

ſiſts of thinner parts than Water or Earth. As alſo, we can more eaſily *run* in the Air than *wade* in the Water, for the very ſame reaſon. Theſe things are ſo plain, that they are not to be dwelt upon.

But Mr. *Baxter* is thus pleaſed to ſhew his Wit in maintaining a weak Cauſe, which I am perſwaded he has not ſo little judgment as that he can have any great confidence in. And therefore in ſundry places he intimates that he does allow or at leaſt not deny but that *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie* is contained in the Notion of a Spirit; but not as part of the *Conceptus formalis*, but as *Diſpoſitio* or *Modus ſubſtantiæ*, but yet withal ſuch a *Diſpoſitio* as is *eſſential* to the ſubſtance that with the *Conceptus formalis* added, makes up the true Notion of a Spirit. See *pag.* 30, 32, 61, 85. And truly if Mr. *Baxter* be in good earneſt and ſincere in this agreement without all equivocation, that *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie* is *Eſſential* to the true Notion of a Spirit, onely they are to be admitted as *Diſpoſitio Subſtantiæ*, not as *Pars Formæ*, I confeſs, as he declares *pag.* 94. That the difference betwixt him and the Doctor lyeth in a much ſmaller matter than was thought; and the Doctor I believe will eaſily allow him to pleaſe his own fancy in that. But then he muſt underſtand the terms of *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie* in the Doctors ſenſe, *viz*, of a

Spirits penetrating not *inter partes*, but *per partes materiæ*, and poſſeſſing the ſame ſpace with them. And of an *Indiſcerpibleneſs* not ariſing from thinner and thinner parts of matter, as he imagines Air to be more hardly diſcerpible than Earth or Water, foraſmuch as by reaſon of its thinneſs its parts lye cloſer together, as was above noted; but from the immediate eſſential Oneneſs of ſubſtance in a Spirit, according to the true Idea of an *Indiſcerpible Being* in the Divine Intellect, which, whether in Idea or in Actual Exiſtence, it would ceaſe to be, or rather never was ſuch, if it were diſcerpible, and therefore implies a contradiction it ſhould be ſo. But if a Spirit be not *Penetrable* in the Doctors ſenſe, it is really *Impenetrable*; and if not *Indiſcerpible* in his ſenſe, it is really *Diſcerpible*, and conſequently diviſible into Phyſical Monads or *Atoms*, and therefore conſtituted of them, and the laſt Inference will be that of the Epigrammatiſt:

Πάντα γέλως, καὶ πάντα κόνις, καὶ πάντα τὸ μηδέν.
Ἔστι γὰρ ἐξ ἀτόμων πάντα τὰ γεγόμενα.

To this ſenſe:

All a vain Jeſt, All Duſt, All Nothing deem,
For of mere Atoms all compoſed been.

And thus the faireſt and firmeſt ſtructures of Philoſophical Theorems in the behalf of the Providence of God, the Exiſtence of Spirits, and the Immortality of the Soul, will become a

Caſtle

Caſtle of Come-Down, and fall quite to the ground. Whence it was rightfully done of the Doctor to lay ſuch ſtreſs upon theſe two terms *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie*, they being the eſſential Characteriſticks of what is *truly* a *Spirit*, and which if they were taken out of the world, *all* would neceſſarily be *Matter*, I mean *Phyſical Matter* (to prevent all quibblings and fiddlings about words and phraſes) and this *Phyſical Matter* would be the Subject and Source of all *Life* whatever, *Intellective*, *Senſitive* and *Vegetative*. And Mr. *Baxter* did ill in not onely omitting theſe terms himſelf in *his* Notion of a *Spirit*, but in publickly ſlighting and diſgracing of the Doctors uſing of them, and afterwards in ſo ſtomaching his vindication of the ſame in publick, whenas we ſee that without them there can be nothing but *Phyſical Matter* in the world, and *God* and *Angels* and the *Souls of men* muſt be *ſuch* Matter, if they be any thing at all: and therefore in ſuch an errour as this, Mr. *Baxter* with Chriſtian patience might well have born with the Doctors calling it, not onely a *Miſtake*, but a *Miſchief*. And I hope by this time he is ſuch a proficient in that Vertue, that he will chearfully bear the publication of this my Anſwer in the behalf of the Doctor to all his Objections againſt theſe two eſſential and neceſſarie Characters of a Spirit; and not be offended if I briefly run over his ſmaller *Criti-*

ciſms upon the Doctors Definition of the ſame, which do occur, pag. 80,81. and elſewhere, as I ſhall advertiſe.

The Doctors Definition of a Spirit in his Diſcourſe of that Subject, Sect. 29. is this [A Spirit is a Subſtance immaterial intrinſecally indued with liſe and the facultie of motion] where he notes that *Immaterial* contains virtually in it *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility*. Now let us hear how Mr. *Baxter* criticizes on this Definition.

Firſt, ſaies he, pag. 80. Your Definition is common, good and true, allowing for its little imperfections, and the common imperfection of mans knowledge of Spirits. If by [Immaterial] you mean not [without Subſtance] it ſignifieth truth, but a negation ſpeaketh not a formal Eſſence. *Anſ.* How very little theſe *imperfections* are, I ſhall note by paſſing through them all; and for the *common* imperfection of mans *knowledge of Spirits*, what an unskilful or hypocritical pretence that is, the Doctor hath ſo clearly ſhewn in his *Diſcourſe of the true Notion of a Spirit*, Sect. 16, 17, 18, 19. that it is enough to ſend the Reader thither for ſatisfaction. But as for [Immaterial] how can any one think that thereby is meant [without Subſtance] but thoſe that think there is nothing but Matter in the Phyſical ſenſe of the word, in the world? As if [Subſtance Immaterial] was intended to ſignifie [Subſtance with-

without Subſtance]! And laſtly, the Doctor will denie that [In] in *Immaterial* ſignifies negatively here more than in *Immortal*, *Incorruptible*, or *Infinite*, but that it is the indication of oppoſite properties to thoſe of *Phyſical Matter*, viz. *Impenetrability* and *Diſcerpibility*, and that therefore *Immaterial* here includes *Indiſcerpibility* and *Penetrability*.

Secondly, pag. 81. Spirit it ſelf, ſaies he, is but a metaphor. *Anſ.* Though the word firſt ſignified other things before it was uſed in the ſenſe it is here defined, yet uſe has made it as good as if it were originally *proper*. With your Logicians, in thoſe Definitions, *Materia eſt Cauſa ex qua res eſt, Forma eſt Cauſa per quam res eſt id quod eſt*; *Materia* and *Forma* are Metaphorical words, but uſe has made them in thoſe Definitions as good as proper; nor does any ſober and knowing man move the leaſt ſcruple touching thoſe Definitions on this account. To which you may add, that *Ariſtotles* caution againſt Metaphors in defining things, is to be underſtood of the Definition it ſelf, not the *Definitum*; but *Spirit* is the *Definitum* here, not the Definition.

Thirdly, [Intrinſecally indued with life] tells us not that it is the *Form*. Qualities, and proper Accidents are *intrinſecal*. *Anſ.* Mr. *Baxter*, I ſuppoſe, for clearneſs ſake, would have had *Form* written over the head of this part of the Definition, as the old bungling painters

painters were wont to write, This is a Cock, and this a Bull; or as one wittily perſtringed a young Preacher that would name the Logical Topicks he took his Arguments from, ſaying he was like a Shoemaker that offered his Shoes to ſale with the Laſts in them. I thought Mr. *Baxter* had been a more nimble Logician than to need ſuch helps to diſcern what is the *Genus* in the Definition, what the *Differentia* or *Forma*. And for [intrinſecally indued] I perceive he is ignorant of the proper force and ſenſe of the word *Intrinſecùs*, which ſignifies as much as not onely, which implies that this life is from the intimate Eſſence of a Spirit *quatenus* a Spirit, and therefore can be no common qualitie nor a facultie clarted on, as Mr. *Baxter* fancies God may clart on Life the ſpecifick Form of Spirit, as he himſelf acknowledges, on Matter, though *Materia* quatenus *Materia* implies no ſuch thing; but, I ſay, *Spiritus quatenus Spiritus* does, which is both the Source and proper Subject of life. But it is the effect of an ill perturbed ſight, to fancie flaws where there are really none. And to fancie that a *Vis Vitalis*, or Power of living can belong to *Materia Phyſica* immediately, which power muſt neceſſarily be the Reſult of an Eſſence ſpecifically diſtinct from Phyſical Matter, I think may juſtly be called clarting of this Power on a Subject it belongs not to, nor is intrinſecal to it, there being

ing no new ſpecifick Eſſence from whence it ſhould ſpring.

Fourthly, The [Facultie of motion] ſaies he, is either a Tautologie included in *Life*, or elſe if explicatorie of *Life*, it is defective. *Anſ.* It is neither Tautological nor Exegetical, no more than if a man ſhould define *Homo*, *Animal rationale riſibile*. [Riſibile] there, is neither Tautological, though included in *Animal rationale*; nor Exegetical, it ſignifying not the ſame with *Rationale*. And the Definition is as true with *Riſibile* added to it, as if omitted. But the addition of *Riſibile* being needleſs, is indeed ridiculous. But it is not *Ridiculous* to add the faculty of motion in this Definition of a Spirit, becauſe it is not *needleſs*, but is added on purpoſe to inſtruct ſuch as Mr. *Baxter*, that an *intrinſecal faculty* of *motion* belongs to Spirit *quatenus* Spirit, and indued with *Life*; whenas yet he, pag. 35. will not admit that ſelf-motion is an indication of *Life* in the ſubject that moves itſelf, although it is the very prime argument that his beloved and admired Dr. *Gliſſon* uſeth to prove, that there is *univerſally life in Matter*. But it is the ſymptome of an over-*Polemical* Fencer, to deny a thing merely becauſe he finds it not for his turn. In the mean time it is plain the Doctor has not added [the facultie of motion] raſhly out of overſight, but for the inſtructing the ignorant in ſo important a truth, That there

there is no ἀνόλκωσις but there is *Life* and *Spirit*. This is ſo great a truth, that the *Platoniſts* make it to be the main Character of Soul or Spirit, to be τὸ κρεῖττον ἀνόλκωσιν, as you may ſee in *Proclus*.

Fifthly, No man, ſaith he, can underſtand that the Negative [Immaterial], by the terms, includeth *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie*. *Anſ.* No man that rightly underſtands himſelf but muſt conceive that [Immaterial] ſignifies an oppoſite or contrary condition to [Material]: and he knowing (as who is ignorant of it?) that the proper and eſſential characters of [Material] in *ſubſtantia materialis*, is to be *Impenetrable* and *Diſcerpible*, he will neceſſarily, even whether he will or no, diſcover that [Immaterial] which ſignifies the oppoſite to theſe in *ſubſtantia immaterialis*, muſt denote *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility*.

Sixthly, You do not ſay here, ſaith he, that they are the *Form*, but elſewhere you do; and the Form ſhould be *expreſt*, and not onely *vertually* contained, as you ſpeak. *Anſ.* What would you have him in the very Definition it ſelf, which is ſo clear an one, ſay, This is the *Genus*, this the *Form*, as thoſe bunglers I mentioned above writ the names of the Animals they had ſo badly drawn? And that the *Form* ſhould be *expreſt* is true, but it is ſufficient it be expreſt in ſuch a comprehenſive term as contains under it all that belongs to ſuch a

Species;

Species. As when we have divided *Vivens* into *Planta* and *Animal*, if we then define *Animal* to be *Vivens ſenſu præditum*, that one word *ſenſus*, is ſufficient, becauſe it reaches any Species of Animal, and none but Animals. And yet here the Doctor is not ſo niggardly as to pinch the expreſſion of all the Form or Difference, into that one word *Immaterial*, whereby he here onely intimates *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility*; but for fuller explication addeth, *Intrinſecally indued with Life and the facultie of motion.* But laſtly, For his elſewhere calling *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility* the *Form* of a Spirit, he nowhere makes them the *whole Form* of a Spirit, but makes the Logical *Form* or *Differentia* of a Spirit, to be all that which he has expreſſed in this Definition, *viz.* [Immaterial] which denotes *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility*, and [Intrinſecal life and motion]. And it is evident that when he calls this *Differentia* in his Definition, *Form*, that he does not mean the very *ſpecifick* Subſtance or Eſſence, whereby a Spirit is a Spirit, but onely eſſential or inſeparable *Attributes*, which onely are known to us, and which are only in an improper ſenſe ſaid to be the *Form* it ſelf, or *ſpecifick* Nature. They are onely the *Reſult* of the *Form* and *Notes* of an Eſſence or Subſtance *Specifically* diſtinct from ſome other Subſtance.

It is not ſo in *ſubſtantial* Forms as in Geometrical

trical *Forms* or *Figures*, as to Visibilitie or Perceptibilitie. *Dic tu formam hujus lapidis*, says *Scaliger* to *Cardan*, *& Phyllida solus habeto.* But there are inseparable and essential *Properties* of a *substantial Form*, necessarily resulting from the Form it self, as there are in external Forms or Figures. As for example, from the *form* of a *Globe*, which is a round Form, defined from the equalitie of all lines from one point drawn thence to the Superficies. From this form does necessarily and inseparably result the Character of an easie rouling Mobilitie. That a bodie of this Form is the most easily moved upon a Plain, of any bodie in the world. And so from the *Form* of a piece of Iron made into what we call a *Sword*; Fitness for striking, for cutting, for stabbing, and for defending of the hand, is the necessarie result from this Form thereof. And so I say that from the intimate and essential *Form* of a *Spirit*, suppose, essentially and inseparably result such and such properties by which we know that a Spirit is a distinct Species from other things, though we do not know the very *specifick* essence thereof. And therefore here I note by the by, that when the Doctor saies any such or such Attributes are the *Form* of a Spirit, he does *datâ operâ balbutire cum balbutientibus*, and expresses himself in the language of the Vulgar, and speaks to Mr. *Baxter* in his own Dialect. For it is the declared opinion

of

of the Doctor, that the intimate *Form* of no Eſſence or Subſtance is knowable, but onely the inſeparable Fruits or Reſults thereof. Which is a Principle wants no proof, but an appeal to every mans faculties that has ordinarie wit and ſinceritie.

Seventhly, They are not the *Form*, ſaith he, but the *Diſpoſitio vel Conditio ad formam.* Anſ. You may underſtand out of what was ſaid even now, that *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie* are ſo far from being *Diſpoſitio ad formam*, that they are the *Fruits* and *Reſults* of the intimate and *Specifick Form* of a *Spirit*, and that they ſuppoſe this *Specifick Form* in order of nature to precede them, as the Form of a Globe precedes the rouling mobilitie thereof. In vertue of a Spirits being ſuch a Specifick ſubſtance, it has ſuch inſeparable attributes reſulting from it, as a *Globe* has *mobilitie*. And as the *Globe* is conceived *firſt*, and *mobilitie* inſeparably reſulting from it; ſo the *Specifick* Nature of a *Spirit*, which is its true and intimate Form, and made ſuch according to the eternal Idea thereof in the Intellect of God, being one ſimple *Specifick* ſubſtance or Eſſence, has reſulting from it thoſe eſſential or inſeparable properties which we attribute to a Spirit, itſelf in the mean time remaining but one ſimple ſelf-ſubſiſtent *Actus Entitativus*, whoſe *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiviſibilitie* Mr. *Baxter* himſelf, pag. 99. ſays is eaſily defendible. And

the

the Doctor, who underſtands himſelf, I dare ſay for him, defends the *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiviſibilitie* of no Eſſences but ſuch.

Eighthly, If ſuch Modalities, ſays he, or Conſiſtence were the *Form*, more ſuch ſhould be added which are left out. *Anſ.* He ſhould have nominated thoſe which are left out. He means, I ſuppoſe, *Quantity* and *Trina Dimenſio*, which it was his diſcretion to omit, they being ſo impertinent as I have ſhewn above, in my Anſwer to his third Objection againſt the Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie of a Spirit.

Ninthly, *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie* are two Notions, and you ſhould not give us, ſays he, a *compound* Form. *Anſ.* This implies that *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility* are the *Form* of a Spirit; but I have ſaid again and again, they are but the *Fruits* and *Reſult* of the *Form*. A Spirit is one ſimple *Specifick* Eſſence or ſubſtance, and that true *Specifickneſs* in its Eſſence, is the *real* and *intimate Form*, or *Conceptus formalis* thereof, but that which we know not (as I noted above out of *Julius Scaliger*) though we know the eſſential and inſeparable Attributes thereof, which may be *many*, though in *one ſimple* ſpecifick Subſtance, as there are many Attributes in God immediately and inſeparably reſulting from his moſt *ſimple* ſpecifick Nature.

Tenth-

Tenthly, Yea you compound, ſaith he, *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiſcerpibilitie* with a quite different notion [life and the faculty of motion], which is truly the *Form*, and is one thing, and not compounded of notions ſo different as *Conſiſtence* and *Vertue* or *Power*. Anſ. I ſay again as I ſaid before, that neither *Penetrability* nor *Indiſcerpibility*, nor *Life* nor *Motion*, are the *ſpecifick Form* it ſelf of a Spirit, which is a ſimple Subſtance, but the *Fruits* and *Reſults* of this *ſpecifick Form*; and all theſe have a proper *Cognation* with one another, as agreeing in *Immateriality* or *Spirituality*: and how the common ſagacitie of mankind has preſaged, that the moſt noble functions of life are performed by that which is moſt *ſubtile* and moſt *one*, as *Penetrability* and *Indiſcerpibility* makes the conſiſtence of a Spirit to be, the Doctor has noted in his *Diſcourſe of the true notion of a Spirit*. Mr. *Baxter* in reading Theological Syſtems may obſerve, That Attributes as much differing among themſelves as theſe, are given to the moſt ſimple Eſſence of God.

Eleventhly, You ſay, ſays he, pag. 82. Life intrinſecally iſſues from this Immaterial Subſtance: But the *Form* is concreated with it, and iſſues not from it. *Anſ.* I grant that the *Form* is concreated with the Spirit. For a Spirit is nothing elſe but ſuch a *ſpecifick* ſimple Subſtance or Eſſence, the *Specifickneſs* of whoſe

nature onely is its real intimate *Form.* And if we could reach by our Conception that very *Form* it ſelf, it would be but the *Conceptus inadæquatus* of one ſimple Subſtance, and be the true *Conceptus formalis* thereof; and the *Conceptus fundamentalis*, to ſpeak in Mr. *Baxters* or Dr. *Gliſſons* language, would be *Subſtance* in *general*, which is contracted into this *Species* by this *real intimate Form*; which both conſidered together, being but one ſimple Eſſence, they muſt needs be created together, according to that Idea of a Spirit which God has conceived in his eternal mind. And life will as naturally and neceſſarily iſſue from ſuch a *Species* or *Specifick Eſſence*, or from *Subſtance* contracted into ſuch a *Species* by the aboveſaid *Form*, as *Mobility* does iſſue from the form of a Globe. From whence it is plainly underſtood how Life does intrinſecally iſſue from immaterial Subſtance, nor is the *Form* it ſelf but the Fruit thereof. And as it were but trifling to ſay that the power of eaſie rolling every way on a Plain were the very Form of a Globe, the word *Power* or *Vertue* being but a dark, looſe, general, dilute term, and which belongs to every thing, and is reſtrained onely by its Operation and Object; but it is the Form or Figure of the Globe that is the immediate cauſe that that Vertue or Power in general is ſo reſtrained to this eaſie rolling: ſo it is in Mr. *Baxters* pretended Form of a Spirit, which he

makes *Virtus vitalis*, a *power* of living: *Power* there, is such a dark dilute term, loose and general. But that it is determined to life, it is by that intimate specifick Form, which we know not; but onely this we know, That it is to the *Power* of *living* as the Figure of a Globe is to the *Power* of easie *rolling*, and that in neither, one can be without the other. There must be a Specifick Essence, which is the root of those Powers, Properties, or Operations from whence we conclude distinct Species of things: For 'tis too coarse and slovenly to conceit, that these are clarted on them, but the Specifick Powers arise immediately, and inseparably from the Specifick Nature of the thing; else why might they not be other powers as well as these?

Twelfthly and lastly, pag. 32. But do you verily believe, saith he, that *Penetrability* or *Subtility* is a sufficient *Efficient* or *Formal* cause of Vitalitie, Perception and Appetite, and so of Intellection and Volition? I hope you do not. *Ans.* I hope so of the Doctor too; and before this, I hoped that Mr. *Baxter* had more insight into the nature of a *Formal cause* and into the Laws of Logick, than once to imagine that any one in his Wits could take *Penetrability* to be the *Formal cause* of *Intellection* and *Volition*. For then every Spirit being *Penetrable*, every Spirit even of a plant, at least of the vilest *Animalculum*, would have Intellection

and Volition. Nor, for the ſame reaſon, can any body think that *Penetrability* is a *ſufficient* Efficient cauſe of Intellection and Volition. Nor is it ſo much as the *Efficient* cauſe of *Vitality*, *Perception*, *Appetite*, much leſs the *Formal*. So infinitely is Mr. *Baxter* out in theſe things. But the caſe ſtands thus: The Subſtance of that ſpecies of things which we call a *Spirit*, and is ſo by that *intimate ſpecifick Form* which I named before, this ſubſtance is the cauſe of *Vitality* in ſuch a ſenſe as the round Form of a Globe, or any matter of that Form is, *quatenus* of that Form, the cauſe of its own rolling Mobilitie. I ſay therefore, that *Vitality* is as immediate and neceſſarie a Fruit or Effect of the *real and intimate Form* of a *Spirit*, as that eaſie mobilitie is of the Form of a Sphere or Globe; And ſuch a kind of *Vitality*, *Vegetative*, *Senſitive*, *Intellective* of ſuch a Species of Spirit: Theſe kinds of *Vitalities* are the Fruits or Effects neceſſarie and immediate of the aboveſaid ſo ſpecificated Subſtances; that is to ſay, they are immediately *Self-living*, and all of them *Penetrable* and *Indiſcerpible* of themſelves, *quatenus Spirits*, all theſe eſſential attributes ariſing from the ſimple eſſence or ſpecificated ſubſtance of every Spirit, of what Claſſis ſoever, created according to its own Idea eternally ſhining in the Divine Intellect.

As for example; In the Idea of a Plaſtick

Spirit

Spirit onely; *Penetrability*, *Indiſcerpibility*, and *Plaſtick Vitality*, whereby it is able to organize Matter thus and thus, are not three Eſſences clarted upon ſome fourth Eſſence, or glewed together one to another, to make up ſuch an Idea: But the Divine Intellect conceives in itſelf one ſimple ſpecifick Eſſence immediately and intrinſecally of it ſelf, indued with theſe eſſential Properties or Attributes. So that when any thing does exiſt according to this Idea, thoſe three properties are as immediately Conſequential to it, and as effectually, as *Mobility* to the *Form* of a *Globe*. It is the *ſpecifick Subſtance* that is the neceſſary Source of them, and that acts by them as its own connate or natural inſtruments, fitted for the ends that the eternal Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God has conceived or contrived them for.

For it is manifeſt, that thoſe eſſential Attributes of a Spirit contrarie to Matter are not in vain. For whenas a *Plaſtick* Spirit is to actuate and organize Matter, and inwardly diſpoſe it into certain forms, *Penetrability* is needful, that it may poſſeſs the Matter, and order it throughout; As alſo that *Oneneſs* of Eſſence and *Indiſcerpibility*, that it may hold it together. For what ſhould make any maſs of Matter *one*, but that which has a ſpecial *Oneneſs* of Eſſence in it ſelf, quite different from that of Matter? And foraſmuch as all Souls

are indued with the *Plaſtick* whether of Brutes or Men, not to add the Spirits of Angels; ſtill there holds the ſame reaſon in all ranks, that Spirits ſhould be as well *Penetrable* and *Indiſcerpible* as *Vital*. And if there be any *Platonick* Nous, that have no *Plaſtick*, yet *Penetrability* muſt belong to them, and is of uſe to them, if they be found to be within the verges of the Corporeal Univerſe (and why not they as well as God himſelf?) and *Indiſcerpibility* maintains their Suppoſital Unitie, as it does in all Spirits that have to do with Matter, and are capable of a *vital* coaleſcencie therewith. But I have accumulated here more Theorie than is needful. And I muſt remember that I am in a *Digreſſion*.

To return therefore to the particular point we have been about all this while. I hope by this time I have made it good, that the Dr.'s *Definition* of a *Spirit* is ſo clear, ſo true, ſo expreſs, and uſefully inſtructive (and that is the ſcope of the Doctors Writings) that neither he himſelf, nor any body elſe, let them conſider as much as they can, will ever be able to mend it. And that theſe affected Cavils of Mr. *Baxter* argue no defects or flaws in the Doctors Definition, but the ignorance and impotencie of Mr. *Baxters* Spirit, and the undue elation of his mind, when notwithſtanding this unexceptionableneſs of the Definition, he, pag. 82. out of his Magiſterial Chair of Judicature pro-

pronounces with a gracious nod, *You mean well—— but all our Conceptions here muſt have their ALLOWANCES, and we muſt confeſs their weakneſs.* This is the Sentence which grave Mr. *Baxter, alto ſupercilio,* gives of the Doctors accurate Definition of a Spirit, to humble *him,* and exalt *himſelf,* in the ſight of the *populacie.* But is it not a great weakneſs, or worſe, to talk of favourable *allowances,* and not to *allow* that to be *unexceptionable* againſt which *no juſt exception* is found?

But to give Mr. *Baxter* his due, though the extream or extimate parts of this Paragraph, pag. 82. which you may fancie as the skin thereof, may ſeem to have ſomething of bitterneſs and toughneſs in it, yet the Belly of the Paragraph is full of plums and ſweet things. For he ſaies, *And we are all greatly beholden to the Doctor for his ſo induſtrious calling fooliſh Senſualiſts to the ſtudy and notion of* inviſible *Beings, without which, what a carcaſs or nothing were the world?*

But is it not pity then, while the Doctor does diſcharge this Province with that faithfulneſs and induſtrie, that Mr. *Baxter* ſhould diſturb him in his work, and hazzard the fruits and efficacie thereof, by eclipſing the clearneſs of his Notions of *Spiritual* Beings, (for *Bodies* may be alſo *inviſible*) by the interpoſition or oppoſition of his own great Name againſt them, who, as himſelf tells the

world in his *Church-Hiſtory*, has wrote *fourſcore Books*, even as old Dr. *Gliſſon* his Patron or rather Pattern in Philoſophy arrived to at leaſt *fourſcore Years* of age? And Mr. *Baxter* it ſeems is for the common Proverb, The older the wiſer; though *Elihu* in *Job* be of another mind, who ſaies there, *I ſaid Days ſhould ſpeak, and multitude of Years ſhould teach Wiſdom; But there is a Spirit in man, and the Inſpiration of the Almighty giveth him Underſtanding.* But whither am I going?

I would conclude here according to promiſe, having reſcued the Doctors Definition of a Spirit from Mr. *Baxters* numerous little *Criticiſms*, like ſo many ſhrill buſie Gnats trumpeting about it, and attempting to infix their feeble *Proboſcides* into it; and I hope I have ſilenced them all.

But there is ſomething in the very next Paragraph which is ſo wrongfully charged upon the Doctor, that I cannot forbear ſtanding up in his juſtification. The Charge is this: That he has fathered upon Mr. *Baxter* an Opinion he never owned, and nick-named him *Pſychopyriſt* from his own fiction. As if, ſays he, we ſaid that *Souls* are *Fire*, and alſo took *Fire*, as the Doctor does, for *Candles* and *hot Irons*, &c. onely. But I anſwer in behalf of the Doctor, as I have a little toucht on this matter before, That he does indeed entitle a certain Letter (which he anſwers) to a *Learned Pſychopyriſt*,

as

as the Author thereof: But Mr. *Baxters* name is with all imaginable care concealed. So that he by his needleſs owning the Letter, has notched that nick-name (as he calls it) of *Pſychopyriſt* upon himſelf, whether out of greedineſs after that alluring Epithet it is baited with, I know not; but that he hangs thus by the gills like a Fiſh upon the Hook, he may thank his own ſelf for it, nor ought to blame the Doctor. Much leſs accuſe him for ſaying, that Mr. *Baxter* took *Fire* in no other ſenſe than that in Candles and hot Iron, and the like. For in his *Preface*, he expreſly declares on the *Pſychopyriſts* behalf, that he does not make this *craſs* and *viſible* Fire the Eſſence of a Spirit, but that his meaning is more ſubtile and refined. With what conſcience then can Mr. *Baxter* ſay, that the Doctor affirms that he took Fire in no other ſenſe than that in Candles and hot Iron, and the like, and that he held *all* Souls to be ſuch Fire? whenas the Doctor is ſo modeſt and cautious, that he does not affirm that Mr. *Baxter* thinks any to be ſuch; though even in this *Placid Collation*, he profeſſes his inclination towards the Opinion, that *Ignis* and *Vegetative Spirit* is all one, pag. 20, 21. I have oft profeſſed, ſaith he, that I am ignorant whether *Ignis* and *Vegetative Spirit* be all one, (to which I moſt incline) or whether *Ignis* be an active nature made to be the inſtrument, by which the three ſpiritual natures,

Vege-

Vegetative, *Senſitive*, and *Mental* work on the three paſſive natures, Earth, Water, *Air*.

And again, pag. 66. If it be the Spirit of the world that is the neareſt cauſe of illumination, by way of natural activity, then that which you call the *Spirit* of the *World*, I call *Fire*; and ſo we differ but *de nomine*. But I have (ſaith he as before) profeſſed my ignorance, whether *Fire* and the *Vegetative nature* be all one, (which I incline to think) or whether *Fire* be a middle active nature between the *ſpiritual* and the mere *Paſſive*, by which *Spirits* work on *bodie*. And, pag. 71. I doubt not but *Fire* is a Subſtance permeant and exiſtent in all mixt bodies on Earth. In your bloud it is the prime part of that called the Spirits, which are nothing but the *igneous* principle in a pure Aereal Vehicle, and is the organ of the *Senſitive* faculties of the Soul. And if the Soul carry any Vehicle with it, it's like to be ſome of this. I doubt you take the ſame thing to be the *Spirit* of the *world*, though you ſeem to vilifie it. And, pag. 74. I ſuppoſe you will ſay, the Spirit of the world does this. But call it by what name you will, it is a pure active Subſtance, whoſe form is the *Virtus motiva*, *illuminativa* & *calefactiva*, I think the ſame which when it operateth on due ſeminal Matter is *Vegetative*. And laſtly, pag. 86. I ſtill profeſs my ſelf in this alſo uncertain, whether *Natura Vegetativa*

and

and *Ignea* be all one, or whether *Ignis* be *Natura Organica* by which the three *Superiour* (he means the *Vegetative*, *Senſitive*, and *Intellective* Natures) operate on the *Paſſive*. But I incline moſt to think they are all one, when I ſee what a glorious *Fire* the *Sun* is, and what operation it hath on Earth, and how unlikely it is that ſo glorious a Subſtance ſhould not have as noble a formal nature as a Plant.

This is more than enough to prove that Mr. *Baxter* in the moſt proper ſenſe is inclined to *Pſychopyriſm* as to the *Spirit of the world*, or *Vegetative ſoul* of the *Univerſe*; that that *Soul* or *Spirit* is *Fire*: And that all *created* Spirits are *Fire*, *analogicè* and *eminenter*, I have noted above that he does freely confeſs.

But certainly if it had not been for his ignorance in the Atomick Philoſophie which he ſo greatly deſpiſeth, he would never have taken the *Fire* it ſelf, a *Congeries* of agitated particles of ſuch figures and dimenſions, for the *Spirit* of the *world*. But without further doubt have concluded it onely the inſtrument of that Spirit in its operations, as alſo of all other created Spirits, accordingly as the Doctor has declared a long time ſince in his *Immortalitas Animæ*, Lib. 2. Cap. 8. Sect. 6. And finding that there is one ſuch univerſal *Vegetative* Spirit (properly ſo called) or Λόγος σπερματικὸς of the world, he could not miſs of concluding the *whole Univerſe* one great

great *Plant*, or if ſome obſcure degree of ſenſe be given to it, one large *Zoophyton* or *Plant-animal*, whence the Sun will be endued or actuated as much by a *Vegetative* Nature as any particular Plant whatſoever; whereby Mr. *Baxter* might have took away his own difficultie he was entangled in. But the truth is, Mr. *Baxters* defectiveneſs in the right underſtanding of the *Atomick Philoſophy*, and his Averſneſs therefrom, as alſo from the *true Syſtem of the world*, which neceſſarily includes the *motion of the Earth*, we will caſt in alſo his abhorrence from the *Pre-exiſtence of Souls* (which three Theories are hugely neceſſary to him that would Philoſophize with any ſucceſs in the deepeſt points of natural Religion and Divine Providence) makes him utter many things that will by no means bear the Teſt of ſeverer Reaſon.

But in the mean time this Defectiveneſs in found Philoſophie neither hinders him nor any one elſe from being able Inſtruments in the Goſpel-Miniſtrie, if they have νοῦς and γνῶσις in a due meaſure; If they have a firm *Faith* in the revealed Truths of the Goſpel, and skill in *Hiſtory*, *Tongues* and *Criticiſm*, to explain the Text to the people, and there be added a ſincere Zeal to inſtruct their Charge, and (that they may appear in good earneſt to believe what they teach) they lead a life devoid of ſcandal and offence, as regulated by thoſe Goſpel-Rules

they

they propoſe to others; *this*, though they have little of the φρὸν properly ſo called, that reaches to the deepeſt account of things, (but inſtead thereof, *Prudence* and *Ingenuity*) will ſufficiently enable them to be Guides to the people, eſpecially by adhering in Matters of moment to the Ancient Apoſtolick and unapoſtatized Church, and preſuming nothing upon their private ſpirit againſt the ſame. Such, queſtionleſs, will prove able and ſafe Paſtors, and will not fail of being approved of by our Lord Jeſus the great Shepherd and Biſhop of our Souls.

But if any ſuch, as I noted above, for that they conceit themſelves alſo dapper fellows at Cudgils or Quarter-ſtaff, ſhall, leaving their Flocks ſolitary in the fields, out of an itch after applauſe from the Country-Fry, gad to Wakes and Fairs to give a proof of their dexterity at thoſe Rural exerciſes; if they ſhall, I ſay, for their pains return with a bruiſed knuckle or broken pate, who can help it? it will learn them more wit another time. Thus much by way of *Digreſſion* I thought fit to ſpeak, not out of the leaſt ill-will to Mr. *Baxter*, but onely in behalf of the Doctor, hoping, though it is far from all that may be ſaid, that yet it is ſo much, and ſo much alſo to the purpoſe, that it will ſave the Doctor the labour of adding any thing more thereto. So that he may either enjoy his Repoſe, or betake

him

himſelf to ſome deſign of more uſe and moment.

In the mean time, I having diſpatcht my *Digreſſion*, I ſhall return to the main buſineſs in hand. I think it may plainly appear from what has been ſaid, that it is no ſuch harſh thing to adventure to conclude, That the Truth of the Divine Intellect *quatenus conceptive, ſpeculative*, or *obſervative*, which a *Platoniſt* would be apt to call Νοῦς νοητὸς, as the Divine Intellect *exhibitive* Νοῦς νοητῶν, (for though it be but one and the ſame Intellect, yet for diſtinctneſs ſake we are fain to ſpeak as of two) does conſiſt in its Conformity with the Divine Intellect *exhibitive*, with the immutable Idea's, Reſpects and References of things there. In conceiving and obſerving them (as I may ſo ſpeak) to be ſuch as they are repreſented in the ſaid Intellect *quatenus* neceſſarily and unalterably repreſenting ſuch Idea's with the immediate Reſpects and References of them. In this conſiſts the *Truth* of the Divine Intellect *Speculative*. But the Tranſcendental Truth of things conſiſts in their Conformity to the Divine Intellect *Exhibitive*. For every thing is true as it anſwers to the immutable Idea of its own nature diſcovered in the Divine Intellect *Exhibitive*. To which alſo the ſame Divine Intellect *quatenus Conceptive, Speculative*, or *Obſervative*, gives its ſuffrage ſteadily and unalterably, conceiving theſe immutable Idea's

of

of things in their *Objective Exiſtence* what their natures will be, with their neceſſary references, aptitudes or ineptitudes to other things when they are produced into act.

From whence we may diſcern, how that ſaying of this ingenious Author of the *Diſcourſe of Truth* is to be underſtood. Where he writes, *It is againſt the nature of all Underſtanding to make its Object.* Which if we will candidly interpret, muſt be underſtood of all underſtanding *quatenus* merely *conceptive, ſpeculative* or *obſervative*, and of framing of its Object at its pleaſure. Which as it is not done in the ſetled Idea of a Sphere, Cylinder and Pyramid, no more is it in any other Idea's with their properties and aptitudes immediately iſſuing from them, but all the Idea's with their inevitable properties, aptitudes, or ineptitudes are neceſſarily repreſented in the Divine Intellect *Exhibitive*, immutably ſuch as they are, a Triangle with its three Angles equal to two right ones, a right-angled Triangle with the power of its *Hypotenuſa* equal to the powers of the *Baſis* and *Cathetus* both put together: Which things ſeem neceſſary to every ſober man and rightly in his wits, our underſtanding being an *Abſtract* or *Copy* of the Divine Underſtanding. But thoſe that ſay that if God would, he might have made the three Angles of a Triangle unequal to two right ones, and alſo the powers of the *Baſis* and *Cathetus*

of

of a right-angled Triangle unequal to the power of the *Hypotenuſa*, are either Buffoons and Quibblers, or their Underſtandings being but creatural huffineſs of mind and an ambition of approving themſelves the Broachers and maintainers of ſtrange Paradoxes, has crazed their Intellectuals, and they have already entred the ſuburbs of down-right Phrenſie and Madneſs.

And to conclude; Out of what has been inſinuated, we may reconcile this harſh ſounding Paradox of our Author, that ſeems ſo point-blank againſt the current doctrine of the Metaphyſical Schools, who make Tranſcendental Truth to depend upon the Intellectual Truth of God, which they rightly deem the Fountain and Origine of all Truth, whenas he plainly declares, *That the Divine Underſtanding cannot be the Fountain of the Truth of things*: But the ſeeming abſurdity will be eaſily wiped away, if we take notice of our diſtinction touching the Divine Underſtanding *quatenus* merely *conceptive, ſpeculative* or *obſervative*, and *quatenus* neceſſarily (through its own infinite and immutable pregnancie and fœcundity) *Exhibitive* of the diſtinct and determinate Idea's or natures of things, with their immediate Properties, Reſpects or Habitudes in their *Objective Exiſtence*, repreſenting them ſuch as they certainly will be if reduced into act. His aſſertion is not to be underſtood of the Divine Under-

Underſtanding in this latter ſenſe, but in the former. But being it is one and the ſame Underſtanding, though conſidered under this two-fold Notion, our Author, as well as the ordinarie Metaphyſicians, will agree to this truth in the ſenſe explained; That the Divine Underſtanding is the Fountain of the truth of things, and that they are truly what they are, as they anſwer to their Idea's repreſented in the *Exhibitive* Intellect of God. How the Author himſelf comes off in this point, you will better underſtand when you have read the fifteenth, ſixteenth and ſeventeenth Sections of his Diſcourſe. Let this ſuffice in the mean time for the removing all ſtumbling-blocks from before the Reader.

Pag. 168. *Nor the foundation of the references one to another*; that is to ſay, The Divine Underſtanding *quatenus Conceptive* or *Speculative*, is moſt certainly not the Foundation of the references of things one to another; but the Divine Underſtanding *quatenus Exhibitive*, that repreſents the Idea's or natures of things in their *Objective Exiſtence* ſuch as they would be if reduced really into act, repreſents therewith all the references and habitudes they have one to another. Which habitudes are repreſented not as flowing from or arbitrariouſly founded in any Intellect whatſoever, but as reſulting from the natures of the things themſelves that reſpect one another, and are repre-

ſented in the *Exhibitive* Underſtanding of God. Which is the main thing that this ingenious Author would be at, and ſuch as will ſerve all his intents and purpoſes.

Pag. 168. *It is the nature of Underſtanding ut moveatur, illuminetur*, &c. namely, of Underſtanding *quatenus Conceptive* or *Speculative*, not *quatenus Exhibitive*.

Pag. 169. *No Idea's or Repreſentations either are or make the things they repreſent*, &c. This Aſſertion is moſt certainly true. But yet they may be ſuch Idea's and Repreſentations as may be the meaſure of the Truth of thoſe things they repreſent: And ſuch are all the Idea's in the Divine Intellect *Exhibitive*, their ſetled diſtinct natures neceſſarily exhibited there in vertue of the abſolute perfection of the Deitie, though onely in their *Objective Exiſtence*, are the meaſures of the Truth of thoſe things when they are reduced into act, as I have noted above; but they are not the things themſelves reduced into act, no more than an Autographon is the very Copy.

Ibid. *All Underſtanding is ſuch*; that is, Idea's and Repreſentations of the natures of things in their *Objective Exiſtence*, the Patterns of what and how they are when they Exiſt, and what references and aptitudes they have. I ſuppoſe he means here by Underſtanding, not any power of the mind to conceive any thing, but Underſtanding properly ſo called,

viz.

viz. that, whoſe Objects are τὰ ἀναγκαῖα or τὰ ἀεὶ τοιαῦτα ἢ ἀσύλλυτα ἴσχοντα, as the *Platoniſts* ſpeak, the Idea's or Repreſentations of ſuch things as are neceſſarily and unalterably ſuch, not fictions at pleaſure. Let the Intellect *Speculative* be ſuch Idea's or Repreſentations as theſe, and then what it perceives, conceives, or obſerves, it does not make, but it is made to its hand, as not being able to be otherwiſe, nor it ſelf to think otherwiſe. And therefore it is rightly inferred as follows: That no Speculative Underſtanding in that reſtrict ſenſe above-named makes at pleaſure the natures, reſpects and relations of its Objects repreſented in the Intellect *Exhibitive* in their *Objective Exiſtence*, but finds them there. Nor does any Intellect whatſoever make them at pleaſure, but they are neceſſarily and unalterably repreſented in the *Exhibitive* Intellect of the Deitie, both their natures, reſpects, and habitudes, as I noted above.

Sect. 5. pag. 169. *It remains then that abſolute, arbitrarious and independent Will muſt be the Fountain of all Truth*, &c. It being ſuppoſed that the Divine Underſtanding and the independent Will of God are the onely competitours who ſhould be the Fountain of all Truth, and the former Section proving in a ſenſe rightly underſtood, that the Divine Underſtanding cannot be the Fountain of Truth, it remains that the mere Will of God ſhould be

the Fountain of Truth, and that things are true onely becauſe he wills they be ſo. As if four bore a double proportion to two becauſe God would have it ſo; but if he would that Two ſhould bear a double proportion to Four, it would immediately be ſo.

Ibid. *Which Aſſertion would in the firſt place deſtroy the nature of God*, &c. Nay, if he will, it deſtroys his very *Exiſtence*. For if all Truths depend upon Gods Will, then this Truth, *That God Exiſts*, does. And if he will the contrary to be true, namely, That he does not Exiſt, what becomes of him then?

Ibid. *And rob him of all his Attributes.* That it robs him of Science and aſſured Knowledge, whoſe Objects are τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ τὰ ἀεὶ ταυτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, Things immutable and neceſſary, this Section makes good. And that it deſpoils him of his Rectitude of Nature, the Eighth Section will ſhew.

Pag. 170. *Any Angel or man may as truly be ſaid to know all things as God himſelf*, &c. Becauſe this ſuppoſition takes away all the ſteadie and ſcientifick Knowableneſs in things, it taking away their ſetled, fixt and neceſſary habitudes one to another, as if *double* proportion of Four to Two did no more belong to it in Truth and Reality than *Sub-double*, and that Four in Truth were no more the Quaternarie number than the Binary, but indifferently either, as the Will of God will have

have it. This plainly pulls up by the roots all pretence of Science or Knowledge in God, Angels, and Men. And much more, flatly to aſſert, That if God will, contradictions may be true. For this plainly implies that there is really no Repugnancy nor Connection of one thing with another, and that therefore no one thing can be proved or diſproved from another.

Pag. 171. *If we diſtinguiſh thoſe two Attributes in God*, &c. namely, of *Wiſdom* and *Knowledge*, as if the one were *Noematical*, the other *Dianoetical*; although that diſcurſiveneſs is more quick than lightning, or rather an eternal intuitive diſcernment of the conſequence or coheſion of things at once.

Sect. 6. pag. 172. *Becauſe they ſuppoſe that God is mutable and changeable*, &c. This can be no allegation againſt the other Arguings, becauſe we cannot be aſſured of the Immutability or Unchangeableneſs of God, but by admitting of what thoſe arguings drive at, namely, That there is an immutable, neceſſary and unchangeable reference and reſpect or connection of things one with another. As for example, of Immutableneſs or Unchangeableneſs with Perfection, and of Perfection with God. For to fancie God an imperfect Being is nonſenſe to all men that are not delirant; and to fancie him Perfect, and yet Changeable in ſuch a ſenſe as is here underſtood, is as arrant

a Contradiction or Repugnancie. Wherefore they that would oppoſe the fore-going Arguings by ſuppoſing God Unchangeable, muſt acknowledge what is aimed at, That there is a neceſſary and unchangeable reſpect and connection betwixt things, or elſe their oppoſition is plainly weak and vain. But if they grant this, they grant the Cauſe, and ſo Truth has its juſt victory and triumph. This Section is abundantly clear of it ſelf.

Sect. 8. pag. 174. *Will ſpoil God of that univerſal Rectitude which is the greateſt perfection of his nature*, &c. In the fifth Section it was ſaid, That the making the Will of God the Fountain of all Truth robs him of all his Attributes. And there it is proved how it robs him of his *Wiſdom* and *Knowledge*. Here it is ſhewn how it robs him of his *Juſtice*, *Mercy*, *Faithfulneſs*, *Goodneſs*, &c.

Pag. 175. *For to ſay they are indiſpenſably ſo becauſe God underſtands them ſo*, &c. This, as the Author ſaies, muſt be extream Incogitancy. For the Truth of the Divine Underſtanding *Speculative* conſiſts in its Conformitie with the Idea's of things and their Reſpects and Habitudes in the Divine Underſtanding *Exhibitive*, which neceſſarily, unchangeably and unalterably repreſents the natures of things with their Reſpects and Habitudes in their *Objective Exiſtence*, ſuch as they neceſſarily are when they do really exiſt. As of a Sphere, Pyramid,

Pyramid, Cube and Cylinder. And there is the ſame reaſon of all natures elſe with their Reſpects and Habitudes, that they are as neceſſarily exhibited as the Cube and Cylinder, and their Habitudes and Reſpects one to another, as the proportion that a Cylinder bears to a Sphere or Globe of the ſame altitude and equal diameter. Which *Archimedes* with incomparable clearneſs and ſubtiltie of wit has demonſtrated in his Treatiſe *De Sphæra & Cylindro*, to be *ratio ſeſquealtera*, as alſo the Superficies of the Cylinder with its Baſes to bear the ſame proportion to the Superficies of the Sphere. And as theſe Idea's are neceſſarily and unalterably with their Reſpects and χόσμος repreſented, ſo are all Idea's elſe, *Phyſical* and *Moral*, as I have noted above. And the nature of Juſtice, Mercy, Faithfulneſs and Goodneſs are with their habitudes and reſpects as fixedly, determinately and unalterably repreſented in their Idea's, as the Sphere and Cylinder, or any other Form or Being whatſoever.

Sect. 9. pag. 178. *For we are to know that there is a God, and the Will of God*, &c. That is to ſay, If there be no ſetled natures and reſpects and habitudes of things in the order of Nature antecedent to any *Will* whatever, Meditation or Contrivance, nor there be any certain nature, reſpects, habitudes, and connections of things in themſelves; it will be neceſſary that we firſt know there is a God, and

what his *Will* is touching the natures, reſpects and habitudes of things. Whether theſe which we ſeem to diſcern and do argue from are the ſame he means and wills, or ſome other. And ſo there will be a neceſſity of knowing God and his Will, before we have any means to know him; or, which is all one, we ſhall never have any means to know him upon this falſe and abſurd Hypotheſis.

Sect. 11. pag. 181. *Then it infallibly follows that it is all one what I do or how I live*, &c. This, as the following words intimate, is to be underſtood in reference to the pleaſing God, and to our own future Happineſs. But it is manifeſt it is not all one what I do or how I live (though I did ſuppoſe there were no real diſtinction betwixt Truth and Falſhood, Good and Evil in the ſenſe here intended) in reference to this preſent condition in this World, where the ſenſe of pain and eaſe, of impriſonment and liberty, and of the ſecurity or ſafety of a mans own perſon will oblige him to order his life in ſuch a manner as hath at leaſt the imitation of Temperance, Faithfulneſs, and Juſtice.

Sect. 12. pag. 183. *If the oppoſition of Contradictory Terms depend upon the arbitrarious reſolves of any Being whatſoever.* The plainneſs and irretragableneſs of this Truth, that the oppoſition of contradictory Terms is an affection, habitude or [illegible] betwixt thoſe terms that no power in Heaven or Earth can aboliſh, methinks

methinks ſhould aſſure any that are not pure Sots or crazie Fantaſticks, that there may be many other ſuch unalterable and immutable habitudes of Terms, Natures or Things that are every jot as unaboliſhable as this. Which is no derogation to the Divine Perfection, but an Argument of it; unleſs we ſhould conceit that it is the height of the Perfection of Divine Omnipotence to be able to deſtroy himſelf. And truly to fancie an ability in him of deſtroying or aboliſhing thoſe eternal, neceſſary and immutable habitudes or reſpects of the natures of things repreſented in their Idea's by the Divine Intellect *Exhibitive*, is little leſs than the admitting in God an ability of deſtroying or aboliſhing the Divine Nature it ſelf, becauſe *ipſo facto* the Divine Wiſdom and Knowledge would be deſtroyed, as was ſhewn in the fifth Section, and what a God would that be that is deſtitute thereof!

Wherefore it is no wonder that thoſe men that are ſober and in their wits, find it ſo impoſſible in themſelves but to conceive that ſuch and ſuch natures are ſteadily ſuch and no other, and betwixt ſuch and ſuch natures there are ſteadily and immutably ſuch habitudes and reſpects and no others. Foraſmuch as the Intellect of man is as it were a ſmall compendious Tranſcript of the Divine Intellect, and we feel in a manner in our own Intellects the firmneſs and immutability of the Divine, and

of

of the eternal and immutable Truths exhibited there. So that those that have their minds so crackt and shatter'd as to be able to fancy that if God would, he could change the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι or *common notions* into their Contradictories, as *The whole is less than its Part*, &c. must have very crazy Intellectuals, and have taken their lodging at least in the suburbs of downright dotage or Phrensie, as I noted above.

Pag. 184. *If any one should affirm that the Terms of common notions have an eternal and indispensable relation to one another*, &c. That this priviledge is not confined to the common notions they are abundantly convinced of, that have bestowed any competent study upon Mathematicks, where the connection of every link of the demonstration is discerned to be as firmly and indissolubly knit, as the Terms of a common notion are the one with the other. And it is our Impatience, Carelesness or Prejudices that we have not more conclusions of such certitude than we have in other studies also.

Sect. 13. pag. 184. *For if there be Truth antecedently to the Divine Understanding*, &c. This Objection of the Adversaries is framed something perversly and invidiously, as if the other party held, That there were Truth antecedently to the Divine Understanding, and as if from thence the Divine Understanding would be a mere passive Principle actuated by something without, as the Eye by the Sun.

Sun. But it is a plain caſe, out of what has been declared, that the Divine Underſtanding (though there be ſuch eternal Natures and unchangeable reſpects and habitudes of them repreſented in the Idea's that are in the *Exhibitive* Intellect of the Deity) that it is, I ſay, before any external Object whatever, and yet always had exhibited to it ſelf the eternal and unalterable natures and reſpects of things in their Idea's. And it was noted moreover, that the Truth of the external Objects, when brought into act, is meaſured by their Conformity to theſe Idea's.

Beſides, the Divine Underſtanding being before all things, how could there be any Truth before it, there being neither Underſtanding nor Things in which this Truth might reſide? Or the Divine Underſtanding be a mere paſſive Principle actuated by ſomething without, as the eye by the Sun, whenas queſtionleſs the Divine Intellect *quatenus Exhibitive* is the moſt active Principle conceivable; nay, indeed *Actus puriſſimus*, the moſt pure Act, as *Ariſtotle* has defined God? It is an eternal, neceſſary, and immutable Energy, whoſe very Eſſence is a true and fixt Ideal Repreſentation of the natures of all things, with their reſpects and habitudes reſulting eternally from the Divine fœcundity at once. How then can this, which is ſo pure and pregnant an Energy, be a mere paſſive Principle, or be actuated by any

externa

external Object, when it was before any thing was? But a further Answer is to be found of the Authour himself in the Fifteenth Section.

Pag. 185. *Which is to take away his independency and self sufficiency.* Namely, If there be mutual and unalterable *Congruities* and *Incongruities* of things, as if they would determine God in his actions by something without himself. Which is a mere mistake. For the pregnant fulness of the Divine Essence and perfection eternally and necessarily exerting it self into an Ideal display of all the natures, properties, respects and habitudes of things, whether Congruities or Incongruities, and these fixt, immutable, necessary and unchangeable in their Ideal or *Objective Existence*; And in time producing things according to these Paradigms or Patterns into actual Existence by his Omnipotence, and ever sustaining, supporting and governing them by his unfailing Power and steady and unchangeable Wisdom and Counsel; I say, when all things are thus from God, sustained by God, and regulated according to the natures he has given them, which answer the Patterns and Paradigms in him, how can any such determination of his Will any way clash with his Self-sufficiency or Independency, whenas we see thus, that all things are from God and depend of him, and his actions guided by the immutable Idea's in his

his own nature, according to which all external things are what they are, and their Truth meaſured by their Conformity with them. But there is a fuller anſwer of the Author's, to this Objection, in the ſixteenth and ſeventeenth Sections.

Sect. 14. pag. 187. *And to fetter and impriſon Freedom and Liberty it ſelf in the fatal and immutable chains and reſpects of things,* &c. This is a miſconceit that ſavours ſomething of a more refined *Anthropomorphitiſm*, that is to ſay, Though they do not make the Eſſence of God finite and of an Humane figure or ſhape, yet they imagine him to have two different Principles in him, an extravagant and undetermined luſt or appetite, as it is in man, and an Intellectual or rational Principle, whoſe Laws are to correct the luxuriancies and impetuoſities of the other, and to bridle and regulate them. But this is a groſs miſtake; For there is no ſuch blind and impetuous will in God upon which any Intellectual Laws were to lay a reſtraint, but his whole nature being *pure* and *Intellectual*, and he acting according to his own nature, which contains thoſe Idea's and immutable reſpects, Congruities and Incongruities of things there eternally and unalterably repreſented, he acts with all freedom imaginable, nor has any chains of reſtraint laid upon him, but is at perfect liberty to do as his own nature requires and ſuggeſts.

geſts. Which is the moſt abſolute liberty that has any ſound or ſhew of Perfection with it, that can be conceived in any Being.

Sect. 15. pag. 189. *And does as it were draw them up into its own beams.* This is ſomething a ſublime and elevate expreſſion. But I ſuppoſe the meaning thereof is, That the natures and reſpects of the things of this lower Creation, the Divine Underſtanding applies to the bright ſhining Idea's found in his own exalted nature, and obſerves their Conformity therewith, and acknowledges them true and right as they anſwer to their eternal Patterns.

Sect. 16. pag. 189. *To tie up God in his actions to the reaſon of things, deſtroys his Liberty, Abſoluteneſs, and Independency.* This is ſaid, but it is a very vain and weak allegation, as may appear out of what has been ſuggeſted above. For reaſons of things and their habitudes and references repreſented in the eternal Idea's in their *Objective Exiſtence*, which is the Pattern of their natures when they exiſt actually, is the very life and nature of the Divine Underſtanding; And as I noted above, the moſt true and perfective libertie that can be conceived in any Being is, that without any check or tug, or lubricity and unſteadineſs, it act according to its own life and nature. And what greater Abſoluteneſs than this? For that which acts according to its own nature, acts alſo according

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to its own will or appetite. And what greater Independencie than to have a power upon which there is no reſtraint, nor any modification of the exerciſe thereof, but what is taken from that which has this power? For the eternal and immutable reaſons of things are originally and Paradigmatically in the Divine Underſtanding, of which thoſe in the Creatures are but the Types and tranſitorie Shadows. The Author in this Section has ſpoke ſo well to this preſent Point, that it is needleſs to ſuperadd any thing more.

Sect. 17. *pag.* 191. In this ſeventeenth Section the Author more fully anſwers that Objection, As if Gods acting according to the reaſons of things inferred a dependency of him upon ſomething without himſelf; Which he does with that clearneſs and ſatisfaction, that it is enough to commend it to the peruſal of the Reader.

Sect. 18. pag. 193. *Truth in the power or faculty is nothing elſe but a Conformity of its conceptions or Idea's unto the natures and relations of things which in God we may call,* &c. The Deſcription which follows is (though the Author nowhere takes notice of that diſtinction) a Deſcription of the Divine Underſtanding *quatenus Exhibitive*, not *Conceptive* or *Speculative*. The Truth of which latter does indeed conſiſt in the Conformity of its Conception unto the natures and relations of things, but not

of

of things *ad extra*, but unto the natures, habitudes and reſpects of things as they are neceſſarily, eternally and immutably repreſented in the Divine Underſtanding *Exhibitive*, which is the Intellectual World, which the Author here deſcribes, and τὸ πεδίον τῆς ἀληθείας the vaſt Champion or boundleſs field of Truth. So that in thoſe words [unto the natures and relations of things which in God we call an actual, ſteady, immoveable, eternal omniformity, &c.] *Which* is to be referred to [the Natures and Relations of things] as is evident to any that well conſiders the place. And with this ſenſe that which follows the deſcription is very coherent.

Pag. 194. *Now all that Truth that is in any created Being, is by participation and derivation from this firſt Underſtanding* (that is, from the Divine Underſtanding *quatenus Exhibitive*) *and Fountain of Intellectual Light.* That is, according to the *Platonick* Dialect, of thoſe ſteady, unalterable and eternal Idea's (τὰ πρὸς τι ἀεὶ ὄντα) of the natures and reſpects of things repreſented there in the Divine Underſtanding *Exhibitive* in their *Objective Exiſtence*; In conformity to which the Truth in all created things and Underſtandings doth neceſſarily conſiſt.

Pag. 195. *Antecedently to any Underſtanding or Will*, &c. That is, Antecedently to any Underſtanding *Conceptive*, *Obſervative* or *Speculative* whatſoever, or to any *Will*; but not antecedently

tecedently to the Divine Underſtanding *Exhibitive.* For that is antecedent to all created things, and contains the ſteady, fixt, eternal, and unalterable natures and reſpects or habitudes, before they had or could have any Being. I ſay it contains the Truth and meaſure of them; nor can they be ſaid to be truly what they are, any further than they are found conformable to theſe eternal, immutable Idea's, Patterns and Paradigms, which neceſſarily and eternally are exerted, and immutably in the Divine Underſtanding *Exhibitive.* And of theſe Paradigmatical things there, what follows is moſt truly affirmed.

Pag. 195. *For things are what they are, and cannot be otherwiſe without a Contradiction,* &c. This was true before any external or created things did exiſt. True of every *Form* in that eternal *Omniformity*, which the *Platoniſts* call the Intellectual World, as the Author has obſerved above in this Section. A Circle is a Circle, and a Triangle a Triangle there, nor can be otherwiſe without a Contradiction. And ſo of a Globe, Cylinder, Horſe, Eagle, Whale, Fire, Water, Earth, their Ideal fixt and determinate natures, habitudes, aptitudes, and reſpects neceſſarily and immutably there exhibited, are ſuch as they are, nor can be otherwiſe without a contradiction. And becauſe it is thus in the Divine Nature or Eſſence, which is the root and fountain of the exteriour Crea-

tion, the ſame is true in the created Beings themſelves. Things are there alſo what they are, nor can they be a Globe ſuppoſe, or a Cylinder, and yet not be a Globe or a Cylinder at once, or be both a Globe and Cylinder at once; and ſo of the reſt. As this is a contradiction in the Intellectual World, ſo is it in the Exteriour or Material World, and ſo, becauſe it is ſo in the Intellectual. For the ſteadineſs and immutableneſs of the nature of all things, and of their reſpects and habitudes, ariſe from the neceſſity, immutability, and unchangeableneſs of the Divine Eſſence and Life, which is that ſerene, unclouded, undiſturbed, and unalterable Eternity, where all things with their reſpects and aptitudes, their order and ſeries, are neceſſarily, ſteadily and immutably exhibited at once.

P. 195. *As they conform & agree with the things themſelves*, &c. The more *Platonical* ſenſe, and more conformable to that we have given of other paſſages of this learned and ingenious Author is, if we underſtand the things themſelves, at leaſt primarily, to be the Αὐτοθεσεις of *Plato*, which is the term which he beſtows upon his Idea's, which are the Patterns or Paradigms according to which every thing is made, and is truly ſuch ſo far forth as it is found to agree with the Patterns or Originals in which all Archetypal Truth is immutably lodged. All created things are but the *Copies* of theſe, theſe

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the Original, the Αὐτόγραφον or Writing it ſelf, from whence *Plato* calls them Αὐτοόντα, as if thoſe Archetypal Forms were the forms or things themſelves, but the numerous created Beings here below, only the *Copies* or Imitations of them. Wherefore no Conception or Idea's that we frame, or any Intellect elſe as *Conceptive* merely and *Speculative*, can be true, but ſo far as they agree with theſe Αὐτοόντα, in that ſenſe we have declared, or with cre ted things ſo far as they are anſwerable to the Αὐτοόντα or Archetypal things themſelves. And from hence is ſufficiently underſtood the nature of *Truth* in the *Subject*.

Theſe few curſory Notes I thought worth the while to make upon theſe two learned and ingenious Writers, the Subjects they have written on being of no mean importance and uſe, and the things written in ſuch a time of their age, as if men be born under an auſpicious Planet, beſt fits their minds for the reliſhing and ruminating upon ſuch noble Theories. For I dare ſay, when they wrote theſe Diſcourſes or Treatiſes, they had neither of them reached ſo much as half the age of man as it is ordinarily computed. Which has made them write upon theſe Subjects with that vigour and briskneſs of Spirit that they have.

For the conſtitution of Youth, in thoſe that have not an unhappy Nativity, is far more heavenly and Angelical than that of more

grown age, in which the Spirit of the World is more uſually awakened, and then begins that Scene which the Poet deſcribes in his *De Arte Poetica*,

Quærit opes & amicitias, inſervit honori.

their mind then begins to be wholly intent to get wealth and riches, to enlarge their Intereſt by the friendſhip of great Perſons, and to hunt after Dignities and Preferments, Honours and Imployments in Church or State, and to thoſe more heavenly and Divine Sentiments through diſuſe and the preſence of more ſtrong and filling Impreſſions are laid aſleep, and their Spirits thickened and clouded with the groſs fumes and ſteams that ariſe from the deſire of earthly things; and it may ſo fall out, if there be not ſpecial care taken, that this mud they have drawn in by their coarſe deſires, may come to that opaque hardneſs and incruſtation, that their Terreſtrial body may prove a real dungeon, & caſt them into an utter oblivion of their chiefeſt concerns in the other State.

——— Nec auras
Reſpicient clauſi tenebris & carcere cæco.

Which I thought fit to take notice of, as well for the inſtruction of others, as for a due Appretiation of theſe two brief Treatiſes of theſe florid

florid Writers, they being as it were the Virgin-Honey of theſe two *Attick* Bees, the *Primitiæ* of their intemerated Youth, where an happy natural complexion, and the firſt Rudiments of Chriſtian Regeneration may ſeem to have conſpired to the writing of two ſuch uſeful Treatiſes.

Uſeful, I ſay, and not a little *grateful* to men of refined Fancies and gay Intellectuals, of benign and Philoſophical tempers, and Lovers of great Truths and Goodneſs. Which natural conſtitution were a tranſcendent priviledge indeed, were there not one great danger in it to thoſe that know not how to uſe it skilfully. For it does ſo nearly ape, as I may ſo ſpeak, the Divine Benignity it ſelf, and that unſelf-intereſſed Love that does truly ariſe from no other ſeed than that of real Regeneration (which Self-mortification and a ſerious endeavour of aboliſhing or utterly demoliſhing our own will, and quitting any thing that would captivate us, and hinder our union with God and his Chriſt, does neceſſarily precede) that too haſtily ſetting up our reſt in theſe mere complexional attainments, which is not *Spirit* but *Fleſh*, though it appear marvellous ſweet and goodly to the owner, if there be not due care taken to advance higher in that Divine and Eternal Principle of real Regeneration, by a conſtant mortification of our own will, there may be a perpetual hazzard of this *Fleſh* grow-

ing corrupt and fly-blown, and ſending up at laſt no ſweet ſavour into the noſtrils of the Almighty. *That which is born of the fleſh is fleſh, and that which is born of the ſpirit is ſpirit*; And all fleſh is graſs, and the beauty thereof as the flower of the field; but that which is born of the eternal Seed of the living Word, abideth for ever and ever.

And therefore there is no ſafe Anchorage for the Soul, but in a perpetual endeavour of annihilating of her own Will, that we may be one with Chriſt, as Chriſt is with God. Otherwiſe if we follow the ſweet enticing Counſels of mere Nature, though it look never ſo ſmugly on it, it will ſeduce us into a falſe liberty, and at laſt ſo corrupt our Judgment, and blind us, that we ſhall ſcarce be able to diſcern him that is that great Light that was ſent into the world, but become every man an *Ignis Fatuus* to himſelf, or be ſo ſilly as to be led about by other *Ignes Fatui*, whenas it is moſt certain that Chriſt is the only way, the Truth and the Life, and he that does not clearly ſee that, when he has opportunity to know it, let his pretence to other knowledge be what it will, it is a demonſtration that as to Divine things he is ſtark blind. But no man can really adhere to Chriſt, and unwaveringly, but by union to him through his Spirit; nor obtain that Spirit of life, but by reſolved Mortification of his own will, and a deadneſs to all world-

worldly vanities, that we may be reſtored at laſt to our ſolid happineſs which is through Chriſt in God, without whoſe Communion no ſoul can poſſibly be happy.

And therefore I think it not amiſs to cloſe theſe my Theoretical Annotations on theſe two Treatiſes, with that more Practical and Devotional Hymn of *A. B.* that runs much upon the mortification of our own Wills, and of our Union and Communion with God, tranſlated into Engliſh by a Lover of the Life of our Lord Jeſus.

THE
Devotional HYMN.

1.

O *Heavenly Light! my Spirit to Thee draw,*
With powerful touch my ſenſes ſmite,
Thine arrows of Love into me throw,
With flaming dart
Deep wound my heart,
And wounded ſeize for ever, as thy right.

2.

O ſweeteſt Sweet! deſcend into my Soul,
And ſink into its low'ſt abyſs,
That all falſe Sweets Thou mayſt controul,
Or rather kill,
So that Thy will
Alone may be my pleaſure and my bliſs.

3.

Do thou my faculties all captivate
Unto thy ſelf with ſtrongeſt tye;
My will entirely regulate:
Make me thy Slave,
Nought elſe I crave,
For this I know is perfect Liberty,

Thou

4.

Thou art a Life the ſweeteſt of all Lives,
Nought ſweeter can thy Creature taſte;
'Tis this alone the Soul revives.
Be Thou not here,
All other chear
Will turn to dull ſatiety at laſt.

5.

O limpid Fountain of all vertuous Leare!
O well-ſpring of true Joy and Mirth!
The root of all contentments dear!
O endleſs Good!
Break like a floud
Into my Soul, and water my dry earth.

6.

That by this Mighty power I being reft
Of every Thing that is not ONE,
To Thee alone I may be left
By a firm will
Fixt to Thee ſtill,
And inwardly united into one.

7.

And ſo let all my Eſſence, I Thee pray,
Be wholly fill'd with thy dear Son,
That thou thy Splendour mayſt diſplay
With bliſsful rays
In theſe hid ways
Wherein Gods nature by frail Man is won.

For

8.

For joyned thus to Thee by thy ſole aid
And working (whilſt all ſilent ſtands
In mine own Soul, nor ought's aſſay'd
From Self-deſire)
I'm made entire
An inſtrument fit for thy glorious Hands.

9.

And thus henceforwards ſhall all workings ceaſe,
Unleſs't be thoſe Thou doſt excite
To perfect that Sabbatick Peace
Which doth ariſe
When Self-will dies,
And the new Creature is reſtored quite.

10.

And ſo ſhall I with all thy Children dear,
While nought debars Thy workings free,
Be cloſely joyn'd in union near,
Nay with thy Son
Shall I be one,
And with thine own adored Deitie.

11.

So that at laſt I being quite releas'd
From this ſtrait-lac'd Egoity,
My ſoul will vaſtly be encreas'd
Into that ALL
Which ONE we call,
And one *in't ſelf alone doth all imply.*

Here's

12.

Here's Reſt, here's Peace, here's Joy and holy Love,
The Heaven's here of true Content,
For thoſe that hither ſincerely move,
Here's the true Light
Of Wiſdom bright,
And Prudence pure with no ſelf-ſeeking mient.

13.

Here Spirit, Soul and cleanſed Body may
Bathe in this Fountain of true Bliſs
Of Pleaſures that will ne're decay,
All joyful Sights
And hid Delights;
The ſenſe of theſe renew'd here daily is.

14.

Come therefore come, and take an higher flight,
Things periſhing leave here below,
Mount up with winged Soul and Spright,
Quick let's be gone
To him that's One,
But in this One to us can all things ſhow.

15.

Thus ſhall you be united with that ONE,
That ONE where's no Duality;
For from this perfect GOOD alone
Ever doth ſpring
Each pleaſant thing,
The hungry Soul to feed and ſatisfie.

Where-

16.

Wherefore, O man! conſider well what's ſaid,
To what is beſt *thy Soul incline,*
And leave off every evil trade.
Do not deſpiſe
What I adviſe;
Finiſh thy Work before the Sun decline.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

FINIS.

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